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Preface
This book consists of two complementary parts: (1) an analysis of new trends 
in various categories of capital flows to emerging economies since the Asian 
crisis, their determinants and their international policy implications, and 
(2) an evaluation of national policies to reduce the volatility of capital flows 
and the negative impact of such volatility on domestic economies. The book 
aims to help fill the gap in knowledge on what determines lenders/investors' 
decisions to enter or withdraw from individual developing countries. It exam­
ines how the decision-making process has been modified in light of recent 
crises and by subsequent measures for a new financial architecture. It con­
siders the policy implications for developing countries, especially in respect 
of macroeconomic and financial regulation policies, their interconnections, 
and volatile and reversible capital flows.
Key conclusions are that the volatility of capital flows has constrained the 
ability of developing countries to implement countercyclical policies in times 
of both surge and drought. Since the Asian crisis the drought in private flows 
(which has already lasted five years), plus the high stock of existing debt, has 
severely constrained growth in developing countries; for example in Latin 
America there has been no per capita growth since 1998. This book explores 
policy options at the national and international levels to remedy this highly 
unsatisfactory situation.
The book is the result of a UNU/WIDER project on 'Capital Flows to 
Emerging Markets since the Asian Crisis: How to Manage their Volatility', 
codirected by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffith-Jones. An initial 
workshop was held at the ECLAC headquarters in Santiago in March 2001. 
The workshop, whose purpose was to coordinate the participants' research 
projects, was inaugurated by José Antonio Ocampo, Executive Secretary of 
ECLAC. A final seminar took place at the WIDER Institute in Helsinki 
in October 2001, with the participation of the Director of WIDER and the 
Executive Secretary of ECLAC. We thank the contributors to this book and 
other participants for creative and fruitful discussions.
We appreciate the stimulating environment provided by ECLAC and 
WIDER for the development of the project, the contributions made by 
several specialists at ECLAC, the financing provided by WIDER and the 
support of staff at ECLAC and WIDER in the organization of the workshop 
and the seminar. Ricardo Gottschalk and Jenny Kimmis (at IDS) and 
Heriberto Tapia (at ECLAC) provided very useful assistance and advice.
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1C ap ita l Flows to  Em erging  




This chapter considers how capital flows to developing countries (and 
especially emerging markets) have changed since the Asian and other crises. 
It attempts to further our understanding of how investors, lenders and other 
financial actors make their decisions to supply capital to developing coun­
tries, and how this decision making influences or determines their main 
features, in particular their tendency for procyclicality and short-termism. 
The discussion draws on the chapters in this book on the supply of capital 
flows and extracts overall conclusions from them. Finally, it makes policy 
proposals to deal with the two most problematic current aspects of capital 
flows to developing countries: their very low levels and strong reversibility.
Since the Asian crisis there has been a drastic change in both the level and 
the structure of private capital flows to developing countries. To date insuffi­
cient emphasis has been placed by analysts and policy makers on the nature, 
causes and policy implications of these changes. A key question is whether 
the changes in capital flows -  particularly their sharp decline, but also their 
composition -  are mainly structural or cyclical. If they are cyclical, how long is 
the flow likely to remain low? Although this is a difficult question to answer, 
it is very important to attempt to do so, given the policy implications for all 
involved, but particularly for developing countries.
One scenario is that the recent trends will continue for a long time: net 
private capital flows to all emerging economies have declined since 1997, 
and were extremely low in 2000 and 2001, according to the IMF (2002) (see 
Table 1.1). As the IMF (2001a) asks, was the resurgence of such flows in the 
first half of the 1990s, after the debt crisis, a 'one-off portfolio stock adjust­
ment' that has now run its course? This implies that the presence of foreign 
companies, banks and other investors in emerging economies will contribute 
very little foreign exchange or external savings to the emerging economies,
1
T a b le  1 .1  Emerging market economies: net capital flows, 1994-2003 (US$ billion)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Private  ca p ita l flow s, o f  w h ic h 150.9 2 1 2 .0 234.2 111.9 65.4 69 A 7.7 31.3 58.0 76.8
Private  d irect in v e s tm e n t 80.8 1 0 0 .1 117.0 142.7 154.7 163.8 153.4 175.5 157.1 165.7
Private  p o r t fo lio  in v e s tm e n t 113.0 41.2 86.9 46.3 - 4 . 6 33.9 - 4 . 3 - 3 0 . 2 14.6 15.8
O th e r* - 4 2 .9 70.7 30.3 -7 7 .2 - 8 4 . 7 -1 2 8 .2 -1 4 1 .4 - 1 1 4 . 0 - 1 1 3 .7 - 1 0 4 .7
O ff ic ia l f lo w s 3.5 26.9 - 1 . 5 64.9 60.5 13.7 5.7 37.2 32.7 15.2
C h a n g e  in  reserves - 6 9 .1 -1 1 6 .7 - 1 0 8 . 8 - 5 9 . 8 - 4 5 . 0 - 8 5 . 8 -1 1 4 .3 - 1 3 4 . 3 - 8 7 . 6 - 6 0 . 6
C u r re n t  a c c o u n t - 7 2 . 2 - 9 2 . 4 - 9 6 . 8 -6 9 .0 - 5 2 . 6 32.9 128.3 89.4 16.9 - 1 6 . 7
* M ainly  b a n k  lend ing . 
Source: IMF (2002).
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and that their only contribution will be via the transfer of technology, man­
agement know-how and other expertise. The value of a foreign presence for 
developing countries -  and especially but not only the more advanced ones -  
is in the blend of capital flows and the transfer of expertise; if only the 
transfer of expertise were to remain, the balance of benefits and costs would 
change quite significantly, as would the number of policy measures and 
other efforts to attract such flows. The emperor would have no clothes, or 
more accurately, would be half-naked.
On the other hand, if the other scenario is more likely and the sharp decline 
is mainly driven by general cyclical factors and the memory of recent crises 
(and if crises stop happening), then the pay-off will be far greater for policy 
makers (in developed and developing countries, as well as in international 
organizations) if they make an effort to attract private flows to developing 
countries and encourage more of those which are stable.
In the following sections we shall first examine the new pattern of private 
flows, particularly to emerging countries, and then the extent to which the 
recent changes are likely to be permanent or temporary. We shall then look 
briefly at some of the new features that make different capital flows to devel­
oping countries so procyclical and easily reversible, and conclude with policy 
implications.
New pattern of private flows 
Sharp decline of flows
As briefly sketched out above, and as shown in Table 1.1, capital flows to 
developing countries have undergone a major change since the East Asian 
crisis. According to the IMF (2002), net private capital flows to emerging 
market economies, which peaked at almost US$240 billion in 1996 (having 
grown consistently throughout the first half of the 1990s), more or less 
halved to less than US$ 120 billion in 1997, fell by around 40 per cent to less 
than US$70 billion in 1998 and 1999, collapsed to less than US$10 billion 
in 2000 and recovered only very slightly to US$31 billion in 2001. As a result, 
emerging markets' current accounts have also shifted dramatically, from 
significant deficits to very large surpluses since 1999.
FDI maintains its level but is increasingly hedged
At the same time there has been a dramatic change in the structure of flows. 
FDI tripled between the early 1990s and 2001, when it peaked at US$175 
billion. Since 1998 it has been the only large source of foreign capital inflow 
for emerging markets, and in terms of the net transfer of resources it has 
been the only source for emerging markets. Overall this change in the struc­
ture of flows is a very positive development as FDI includes the transfer of 
expertise and tends to be long term. However there are important caveats.
4 C a p i ta l  F lo w s  to  E m e r g in g  E c o n o m ie s
The first is that the FDI flow to developing countries may not be sustained 
at its current high levels because of changes in the developed economies and 
because the easy purchase of companies being privatized or large attractive 
companies already in the private sector may gradually come to an end. In 
successful dynamic economies or sectors this may be followed by additional 
FDI to seize profitable opportunities for expansion (for example as occurred 
in telecommunications in several Latin American countries) or for 'green­
field' investment. However in less dynamic economies or sectors FDI may 
just decline, as it is beginning to do in Latin America.
The second caveat has been explored less in the literature but has become 
a major new issue. Although FDI is relatively more stable than other forms 
of investment it does have a volatile component. Historically this has taken 
the form of variability in the remittance of dividends, but it now relates to 
increased and variable external debt financing of FDI. The latest concern is 
that multinational companies, especially those producing for the domestic 
market, are hedging their short-term foreign exchange risk (see Chapter 9). 
This could reduce the positive net foreign exchange impact of FDI through, 
for example, the purchase of US dollars or dollar-denominated government 
paper in a country (for example Brazil, Mexico), or by hedging offshore. 
Particularly problematic would be companies dramatically increasing their 
hedging of exchange rate risk if devaluation seemed likely. As there might 
be no one who was willing to 'take the other side', this could lead to an 
outflow of foreign capital and/or put pressure on the exchange rate. As Dodd 
explains in Chapter 6, if there were an unbalanced market in which most 
participants wanted to be short in the local currency, the forward exchange 
rate might have to fall so risk takers would be willing to hold greater 
amounts of the long positions or dealers could create a synthetic forward by 
borrowing locally and buying as well as investing in foreign exchange. This 
could result in a temporary outflow equal to the size of the hedge. Although 
the intention would be to hedge and not to speculate, the impact on 
reserves and/or the exchange rate might be the same. Reportedly the 
increased use of hedging by foreign direct investors whose sales are in the 
local currency has been an important factor in Latin America in recent years, 
significantly intensifying the pressure for devaluation. A matter of concern 
is that such hedging takes place with both fixed and floating exchange rate 
regimes.
Bank lending: water flowing upwards
In sharp contrast to FDI, whose levels have remained high since the East Asian 
crisis, net international bank lending has not only collapsed but also became 
highly negative during 1997-2001 (Tables 1.1 and 1.2: see also Chapters 4 
and 5).
The decline was across the board, but far deeper in the crisis-hit East Asian 
economies. The main reason was banks' greater perception of the risk of
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T a b le  1 .2  International banks' involvement with all developing countries, 1998-2001
fune 1998  
(US$ bn)
Dec. 2001  
(USS bn)
Percentage change 
(a t annual rate)
L o a n s  o u t s t a n d in g 92 4 742 - 7 . 0
O th e r  assets* 1 1 0 157 9.1
L o a n s  b y  su b s id ia r ie s  
in  lo c a l cu rre n cy 248 434 23.7
* Includes h o ld in g  o f d e b t securities, som e derivative  po sitio n s  a n d  equities. 
Sources : C h ap te r 4; BIS, w w w .bis.org.
lending to developing countries, especially to Asia. A secondary reason was 
that, once recession or lower growth hit the countries concerned, their 
demand for international loans fell. Hence the increased perception of and 
aversion to risk in international lending to developing countries is due to the 
frequency and scale of recent crises. Bankers argue that currency mismatch 
is dangerous for lenders and borrowers alike.
As Kumar and Persaud (2001) argue persuasively, for investors and bank 
lenders, at any point in time their appetite for risk is in one of two states: 
risk loving or risk averse, although in the boom phase there is little percep­
tion of risk. Recent experiences, particularly the losses made in Russia and 
Argentina and on developing-country corporates1 (especially in the East 
Asian crisis countries), have contributed to bankers' aversion to developing- 
country risk. This is occurring in a context where banks have generally 
become more risk sensitive and therefore more reluctant to assume risk. 
This is related to a greater emphasis on shareholder value, which is forcing 
banks to reassess the balance of their activities against the criterion of rate 
of return, and not the volume of business. This pressure on shareholder 
value is being further encouraged by the growing importance of and com­
petition from capital markets. Banks are increasingly behaving more like 
portfolio investors and are using similar instruments, such as credit risk 
derivatives. Furthermore the increasing trend amongst banks to use VaR 
(value at risk) models has not only increased risk sensitivity but also, 
according to some analysts, contributed to herding and procyclicality (see 
Chapter 3).
A second, positive, change is that the average maturity of bank loans has 
increased. Thus for all developing countries the ratio of short-term to total 
debt fell from 54 per cent in 1996 to 46.5 per cent in 2000, according to 
World Bank data. The decline was particularly sharp in East Asia and the 
Pacific. One reason for this change is that borrowers have, as a result of the 
painful experience of suddenly losing bank credit during the recent crises, 
become reluctant to depend overly on short-term loans. Indeed several 
countries have adopted specific guidelines restricting short-term borrowing
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by banks and lengthening debt maturities.2 Some of the bank officials inter­
viewed said that they would like to increase their short-term exposure to 
developing countries, especially to large banks (which they consider safe), 
but there is insufficient country demand.
In the case of low-income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, banks 
have traditionally concentrated on short-term lending, typically related to 
trade finance, and on the whole have avoided medium-term international 
bank lending. Their reluctance to make medium-term loans to poor coun­
tries holds even if a country has improved its fundamental and structural 
features.
A third major change is that international banks have significantly increased 
their lending via domestic subsidiaries in the local currency (Table 1.2). This 
has been made possible by the dramatic increase in the ownership by inter­
national banks of bank subsidiaries in developing countries, that is, banks 
are 'crossing the border' (see Chapter 5). The greater foreign ownership of 
banks is also partly a result of the recent crises, which have significantly 
reduced the entry costs for foreign banks, not only through currency devalu­
ations but also because the crises caused an erosion of the net worth of 
banks (see Chapter 4). From the perspective of international banks, lending 
through subsidiaries has the advantage of allowing better quality control by 
lending officers located in specific emerging economies. However the main 
advantage for banks is the ability to avoid a currency mismatch, and there­
fore exchange rate risk.
Such loans are funded locally via deposits in the domestic currency. While 
some bankers argue that local currency lending by foreign subsidiaries can 
be complementary to international bank lending, recent trends suggest the 
opposite, that is, there is a substitution effect. Indeed bankers argue that 
there has been a large redistribution of banks’ overall emerging-market port­
folios, in which banks have substituted onshore lending for cross-border 
lending. From the perspective of developing countries, this may have some 
advantages, for example the possibility of stronger and more efficient banks, 
as well as less vulnerability to crises (however the latter point seems far more 
doubtful since the Argentinean crisis).
Foreign bank ownership also has large costs and other disadvantages. 
One cost, which can be very significant, is a smaller capital inflow to the 
developing country (with the one-off purchase via FD1 of the bank, replacing 
a far larger stream of international bank lending). Another potential dis­
advantage is that domestic lending by international bank subsidiaries may 
have certain biases that are not suited to developing countries. For example, 
in comparison with the domestic banks they have taken over, they may be 
more inclined to lend mainly to large companies and less oriented towards 
lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for a 
high proportion of employment in developing countries. Furthermore they 
may give greater priority to consumer lending (for example credit cards),
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especially to middle- and high-income persons, and less to lending to com­
panies, especially for long-term investment. Given the need in developing 
countries for greater and more efficient investment, this may be very prob­
lematic.3 The effects on development, in different categories of developing 
country, of these new trends -  increased foreign ownership of banks, and 
bank lending 'crossing the border' -  needs careful empirical research.
To conclude, clearly the decline in international bank lending has a 
temporary element that is largely linked to the memory of recent crises 
and reinforced by the subsequent slowdown in the world economy and its 
negative effects on developing countries' prospects. If crises stop occurring, 
the memory of them fades and the world economy recovers, this element 
could be reversed. However more structural, and therefore more permanent, 
factors seem to be playing a fairly large part in the decline of international 
bank lending to developing countries. The main factor seems to be the 
increased ownership by international banks of subsidiaries in developing 
countries, which allows them to lend in the local currency. Although this 
local currency lending could be complemented by international lending, 
there may be a strong incentive for banks not to do so on a significant scale, 
especially given the increase in risk sensitivity and the relatively high degree 
of exchange rate risk in international lending to developing countries.
Portfolio flows
Equity flows
Portfolio equity flows to developing countries, which had grown significantly 
in 1990-97, fell after the East Asian crisis, although the decline was far less 
dramatic than that of bank lending. Furthermore equity flows became 
increasingly concentrated in a handful of developing countries. According 
to the World Bank (2001), in 2000 just four countries -  Brazil, China, Mexico 
and Turkey -  accounted for around 85 per cent of all equity flows to devel­
oping countries. An equally important issue is the volatility of equity flows. 
As the World Bank (ibid.) points out, in three of the recent crises -  those 
in Mexico, East Asia and Russia -  mutual funds (which constitute some of 
the most significant equity investors in emerging markets) withdrew large 
sums of money.4 The recent trends in portfolio equity flows to developing 
countries are in sharp contrast to global cross-border equity portfolio flows, 
which have increased dramatically; indeed according to Kumar and Persaud 
(2001), between 1995 and 2000 they rose fivefold from US$268 billion to 
an estimated US$1,100 billion. Thus developing countries now receive a far 
lower percentage of global equity flows than they did in the mid 1990s.
The process of allocating investors' funds to equity -  both globally and in 
developing countries -  is quite complex, particularly as it involves a range 
of actors. We shall briefly outline it here before examining recent changes. 
Institutional investors (such as pension funds and insurance companies),
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retail investors (wealthy individuals) and charities are major global invest­
ment actors. In the case of pension funds, the ultimate responsibility for 
allocating funds falls on the trustees. However, particularly in the United 
States and United Kingdom, trustees rely on consultants' advice on how -  
given the structure of their liabilities -  they should broadly allocate their 
assets (typically including the percentage to be allocated to emerging 
markets). This is done via specialized asset liability models (ALMs). Once the 
broad allocative decisions have been taken, one or several fund managers 
are chosen. These fund managers may have a global, regional or country 
mandate, and they may specialize in bonds and/or equities. In the case of 
developing countries, they may be a small part of a global fund, there may 
be specialized funds for all emerging markets, there may be regional ones 
(for example for Latin America, the Far East, Sub-Saharan Africa or Eastern 
Europe), or there may even be country funds.
One of the more important new trends is that since the mid 1990s there 
has been a sharp reduction of so-called dedicated investors: emerging-market 
country funds (which have practically disappeared) and regional emerging- 
market funds.5 This is particularly the case for Sub-Saharan African funds. 
A far higher proportion of equity flows to emerging markets go via so-called 
'cross-over investors', that is, those originating from global funds, where only 
a very small proportion of their portfolios goes to emerging markets. This 
is problematic because dedicated investors reportedly tend to have a more 
long-term commitment than cross-over investors, and therefore lower rota­
tion and volatility.6 The problem of reversibility and volatility is therefore 
made more acute.
With regard to the evolution of equity flows to developing countries, the 
1990s can be split into two halves. In the first half there was great optimism 
about the prospect for emerging markets, with the expectation that higher 
returns would compensate for higher risks, and with the perception that 
emerging markets offered an interesting opportunity for portfolio diversi­
fication due to their low correlation with developed economies. As a result 
equity flows to emerging markets grew systematically. The optimism even 
extended to Sub-Saharan Africa, which was described as 'the last frontier of 
emerging markets'.7
However since the East Asian and other crises this optimism has declined, 
as have equity flows. The main reasons for this were that, in the second half 
of the 1990s, volatility in emerging markets was very high and the returns 
were not only very low (and on occasion negative) but also lower than in 
the developed markets -  especially the United States. Moreover, as the stock 
markets became more integrated into the global financial market, the 
correlation between emerging and developed markets increased, though it 
remained lower than between developed economies; thus the gains from 
diversification declined. As a result the promise that emerging markets 
would offer higher economic growth and therefore high returns, as well as
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a lower correlation to compensate for higher risk, was fulfilled only partially; 
and the risks were certainly seen as high, as one crisis in emerging markets 
followed another with alarming speed. There seemed to be particularly little 
interest in investing in low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the 
overall disappointment with emerging markets was particularly focused on 
these countries, even though they themselves did not have currency crises.
There is an additional, more structural, factor that has inhibited equity 
flows: from the point of view of portfolio investors there are no longer 
enough large companies in which to invest. Many of the most attractive, 
large and profitable companies (for example in telecommunication, energy 
and so on) have been sold to foreign direct investors; this is particularly the 
case in Latin America. As a result there is no room for portfolio investors. 
The remaining companies are seen as too small or not attractive enough. 
Smaller and poorer economies are perceived to have very few or no large and 
attractive companies for equity investors to put their money into.
An important new trend that has emerged in recent years is that an 
increasing proportion of the issuing and trading of developing-country 
stocks is taking place in New York and London, via the issuance of American 
and Global Drawing Rights (ADRs and GDRs). Consequently, a smaller 
proportion of these activities is taking place in developing countries' stock 
markets. It could even be said that, to some extent, developing countries 
are exporting their stock markets! There is a contrast here, between inter­
national banking, where the analysis of and decision making on loans by 
international banks to developing countries is increasingly taking place in 
the latter countries (in local currency), and international equity investment 
in emerging markets, which is increasingly taking place in the major inter­
national financial centres.
The increasing issuance and trading of developing-country stocks in the 
big financial centres is not unique; indeed a similar trend can be detected for 
the smaller European countries. Factors such as the deregulation of capital 
flows, falling information costs and a growing preference for liquidity are 
driving this trend. The main factor seems to be investors' increased preference 
for liquidity.
The increased preference for liquidity has some temporary elements in 
that investors responded strongly to the collapse of LTCM and the terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. However, 
besides the temporary after-effects of recent crises and problems, there are 
also important structural factors that suggest that investors will continue to 
be biased towards more liquid -  and therefore larger -  markets. A key factor 
is that the crowd of international investors has grown; there is a great con­
centration of huge institutional investors, who argue they are 'too large' for 
small market's liquidity. As a result, if they switch a significant part of their 
funds they will have a large effect on prices. A second factor is that investors, 
particularly cross-border investors, are herding more. According to Persaud
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in Chapter 3, the increased tendency to herd is due to greater uncertainty 
about valuation (as the new economy is based on ideas and knowledge, 
which are more difficult to value than bricks and mortar), and to the 
encouragement given by the regulators of short-term, market-sensitive risk 
management systems to investors with different mandates to act in a simi­
lar way.
Given that the latter factors are part of a more long-term trend, this 
implies that liquid markets will become more liquid while illiquid markets 
will become even less liquid. This has been the subject of growing complaints 
in developing countries such as Chile and South Africa, where large local 
companies are either issuing ADRs or switching their primary listings to New 
York or London. This is further undermining liquidity in these developing- 
country markets, as overseas investors no longer need to invest there. 
A particular problem from a development perspective is that while very 
large companies will have access to international liquidity, relatively smaller 
companies will not; they will be restricted to small stock markets with 
declining liquidity. Because medium-sized companies are not only often 
more dynamic but also an important source of employment, this could 
have negative development implications. One policy implication that we 
shall discuss below is that stock markets in developing countries may need 
to concentrate on improving their efficiency in raising capital for small 
companies.
Bond flows
Bond markets continued to fund emerging economies in the post-Asian 
crisis period, although at a significantly lower level. For those countries 
which continued to have access to bond finance, four problems have emerged 
since the East Asian crisis. First, the cost of borrowing and cost volatility 
have risen well above the precrisis levels. Second, there have been frequent 
market closures when issuance has dried up. The IMF (2001b) defines market 
closures as weeks during which bond issuance falls below 20 per cent of 
the previous year's weekly average issuance. Under this definition, US dollar 
emerging bond markets were closed for 16 weeks in 2000-1. One of the 
main reasons for the on-off nature of recent market access is the increasing 
dominance of emerging-market investment by 'cross-over investors', who 
can easily reduce or eliminate their emerging-market holdings if their out­
look deteriorates, if there are better opportunities elsewhere or if their risk 
aversion increases. The third problem is the reduction of average maturities, 
and the fourth is the high concentration of bond lending to sovereigns, 
which is also a reflection of increased risk aversion and is problematic 
for developing-country corporates. Reportedly, for corporates to be able to 
issue bonds internationally they not only have to be very creditworthy but 
must also have international partnership or ownership, as well as foreign 
exchange earnings.8
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On balance there is a greater preference, particularly among institutional 
investors, for fixed-income instruments, which are seen as less risky. However 
in the case of emerging-market bonds there is a reduced appetite for this 
type of paper because of the increased perception of risk. As a result of recent 
crises, and especially since the Russian default, the market for bonds has 
become far more prone to panic in individual countries. If panic sets in 
among investors, this can even undermine countries with relatively good 
fundamentals. Because of the Russian default, investors learned that having 
the wrong bond, at the wrong time, with the wrong counterparty could lead 
to complete destruction. Reportedly, the lesson drawn by many fund 
managers is that if problems emerge in a country they should abandon 
it entirely, and they explain to their clients that the country abandoned 
could be a repeat of Russia. This clearly has very negative implications for 
developing countries.
Another important point to stress is that some US investors mark their 
performance against benchmarks on a daily basis. Large falls in bond values 
can quickly affect their careers, so they are unwilling to stay in bonds that 
may fall sharply. Since the Russian default it seems that there has been a 
tendency among analysts towards a negative bias in their country analysis, 
as there was strong criticism of analysts who wrote positive reviews on 
Russia. Besides the problems emanating from the Russian and Argentinean 
defaults, bond holders -  and their associations -  tend deeply to resent 
discussions on orderly debt work-out procedures within the framework of 
a new international bankruptcy legal procedure, which reportedly would 
further discourage new bond lending to emerging markets. On the other hand 
the inclusion of collective action clauses is not seen as a major problem, 
especially as the British and Canadian Treasuries have issued paper with such 
clauses. This is true even in the New York market, where there has been little 
tradition of using such clauses but investors have become more relaxed about 
their inclusion. Recently a number of major developing countries have 
issued bonds with collection action clauses, which is very positive.
Financial markets have traditionally been inherently short-termist and 
volatile (see for example Keynes, 1936; Kindleberger, 1978; Minsky, 1982). 
However the evidence gathered in this book seems to indicate that these 
markets have become more volatile and that this volatility has the potential 
to be transmitted in harmful ways to macroeconomic trends in developing 
countries.
Indeed, although the conventional view is that developing-country 
fundamentals determine the behaviour of international financial markets, 
there is increasing evidence that in many cases it is the endogenous 
behaviour of international financial markets that conditions or strongly
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influences fundamentals in developing countries (see Chapter 11). Thus 
the demand and supply curves for emerging market assets are not inde­
pendent; a supply-led, large capital inflow affects the domestic economic 
situation (for example by generating an asset price bubble or an over­
valued exchange rate) in a way that can increase the demand for assets. 
This can lead to costly macroeconomic crises, which makes regulation 
and other state intervention in international financial markets essential. 
The ever-increasing complexity of the international financial markets 
complicates effective regulation, but we hope that this book will con­
tribute to the understanding of different markets and provide useful 
policy suggestions, including for the design of appropriate international 
regulation.
An important element in the increased volatility of international bank 
lending is the use of modern risk management models (such as VaR or 
the related 'daily earnings at risk'). As Persaud points out in Chapter 3, the 
intrinsic problem with market-sensitive risk management systems is that 
they incorrectly assume that banks act independently when in fact their 
decisions are interconnected. When many banks try to sell the same asset 
at the same time, and there are few or no buyers, prices fall and volatility 
increases. As prices collapse, for liquidity reasons banks try to sell another 
asset, which may have been previously uncorrelated with the first. This not 
only increases the volatility of the second asset, but also correlation. This 
prompts repeated rounds of selling among agents who use similar models, 
and generalized herding takes place. The adoption of banks' own risk 
management models to determine their required levels of capital in the 
internal ratings approach, as proposed in the new Basel Capital Accord, could 
seriously increase banks' tendency for procyclicality in lending, exacerbating 
both booms and crashes (see Chapter 10).
An additional source of concern with regard to the procyclicality of 
flows is the evidence that the VaR models first developed by banks are 
being extensively adopted by fund managers and pension funds, leading 
to similar herding patterns and to procyclicality in their investment (see 
Chapter 3). Therefore herding is not restricted to one class of actor (banks), 
but is spreading among many actors.
The problem is not just one of procyclical flows, but also of increasingly 
frequent boom-bust cycles. As Williamson points out in Chapter 8, this is 
linked to the fact that financial markets are currently dominated by invest­
ment managers with a short-termist approach who are willing -  and able -  
to move in and out of different markets in a relentless quest for short-term 
returns. This is strongly influenced by the fact that fund managers are 
evaluated at very short intervals (Griffith-Jones, 1998). Not only is it doubt­
ful that this behaviour maximizes long-term returns, it is also clear that it 
does not maximize the usefulness of financial markets to the developing 
countries that raise funds from them.
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The problem of procyclicality is further exacerbated, especially in relation 
to bond flows to developing countries, by the increased influence and 
impact of rating agencies on the terms (and magnitude) on which developing 
countries can tap world bond markets. As Reisen shows in Chapter 7, 
sovereign ratings still lag behind rather than lead markets, and they have 
an important procyclical effect, especially on the bond market. Improved 
ratings reinforce euphoric expectations and cause excessive capital inflows 
during booms, whilst during crises the downgrading of ratings causes panic 
among investors, resulting in capital outflows and increased spreads. Unfortu­
nately, and despite criticisms after the East Asian crisis, procyclical indicators 
still play a very large part in determining ratings, rather than the use of 
indicators that can 'see through the cycle' (see Chapter 7). The impact on 
flows is increased by the practice of certain institutions (for example pension 
funds) to sell once ratings fall below a certain level; this is particularly 
marked in the fall from investment grade to non-investment grade ratings. 
Implementation of the proposed Basel Capital Accord could similarly 
increase the procyclicality of bank lending, both domestically and, to a lesser 
degree, internationally (see Chapter 10).
The large growth of derivatives in recent years may have positive effects on 
hedging or managing the risks associated with capital flows for individual 
investors and lenders. During normal times the unbundling of risk, and the 
increased liquidity offered by derivatives, is positive. However derivatives -  
even if used by foreign and domestic companies to hedge their investment -  
can put downward pressure on emerging-market currencies, and can even 
precipitate or seriously deepen a devaluation, as investors rush to hedge 
their currency exposure in anticipation of a possible currency crisis or to 
meet collateral requirements once the currency and asset prices fall. We 
have already discussed the use of foreign exchange forwards and swaps (for 
example by foreign direct investors), and their possible negative impact on 
capital flows and/or the exchange rate in the lead-up to a crisis. Perhaps 
more damaging -  as Dodd explains in Chapter 6 -  is the use of total return 
swaps (TRS). A TRS is a contract where one leg is based on the total rate of 
return of some underlying asset, security or security index, and the other leg 
is based on an interest rate, usually LIBOR. As the swap replicates positions, 
and thus does not involve ownership or debt, the only capital it involves is 
the posting of collateral. It is not subject to regulatory restrictions on foreign 
exchange exposure. TRS can be more problematic than short-term loans 
if the sudden value of the swap drops (for example because the exchange 
rate falls), at which point the local swap holder must immediately post 
additional collateral with its counterpart. Typically this necessitates the sale 
of other assets, which can result in large and immediate currency outflows. 
As Dodd points out, if short-term bank loans are considered hot money, 
then payments to meet margin and collateral are microwave money -  they 
get hot far more quickly.
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Policy implications
We have seen from our analysis that capital flows to developing countries 
pose two clearly separate though related problems. One is that there may 
be a structural decline in capital flows to both emerging and low-income 
countries (especially to the former) for a considerable period. The second 
is the strong tendency -  reinforced in recent years -  for capital flows to 
developing countries to be procyclical and short-termist. We shall there­
fore divide our policy suggestions into two sections, the first focusing on 
encouraging the recovery of private flows to developing countries, especially 
long-term ones, and the second on measures to diminish the procyclicality 
and short-termism of such flows.
A clear conclusion from our analysis is that private capital flows to dif­
ferent categories of developing countries have fallen significantly since the 
East Asian crisis. The decline in private flows seems to have been caused to 
a significant extent by the structural factors outlined above, and therefore 
may be more permanent. An important and high-priority task therefore is 
to design measures that will encourage a sufficient return of private flows 
to developing countries, especially more stable flows, and particularly to 
low-income countries.
It is also important to reduce existing or prevent future international 
measures that will serve to discourage private flows to developing countries. 
For example it will be necessary to ensure that the new Basel Capital Accord 
will not discourage bank lending to developing countries, or increase its cost 
and procyclicality.9
With regard to policy measures to encourage lending to and investment 
in developing countries, we can distinguish between those to be taken by 
(1) recipient countries and (2) developed countries. We shall concentrate on 
the latter here.
Encouraging lending to and investment in developing countries
An important issue in respect of bank lending and bond issuance, is how 
to develop and expand public guarantees or the collateralization of loans, 
especially during periods when the perception of country risk increases. 
Mechanisms such as guarantees only on interest payments could be explored, 
as these could provide additional leverage. A particularly important role that 
improved public guarantees could play would be to encourage private invest­
ment in infrastructure, especially (but not only) in low-income countries.
The possibility of using tax incentives also needs to be evaluated carefully, 
in both source and recipient countries. In developed countries, for example, 
could tax relief on contributions to personal pension plans be made some­
what higher if pension funds invested a somewhat higher proportion of 
their capital in long-term investments in developing countries for a mini­
mum holding period? Could tax incentives also be used to encourage other
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investment/lending to developing countries? And could other mechanisms, 
such as ethical investment, which is an increasingly important part of pen­
sion fund activities, be modified so that one criterion for eligibility would be 
long-term investment in developing countries? In the case of taxation, how 
in practice would such a mechanism work?
With regard to bonds, market participants have made some specific 
policy suggestions whose net benefits for developing countries as well as 
their feasibility may need to be explored further. A specific proposal is 
that developing-country governments should emulate developed-country 
governments and have preannounced a schedule of borrowing; this, it is 
suggested, would lead to a more efficient and liquid market for their paper, 
but it could have -  especially in the short term -  unfavourable effects on 
their cost. A more ambitious suggestion relates to the possibility of estab­
lishing a regional mechanism -  for example a Latin American borrower 
authority -  that would pool the risks of the various countries in the region 
and would be capitalized up front; possibly with the capitalization being 
funded or cofunded by developed economies. Such a mechanism could 
lower the cost of bond borrowing for developing countries. The positive 
experience of the Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina 
de Fomento), which is able to issue paper at a significantly lower cost 
than its member countries and whose capital is funded only by member 
governments, provides an important precedent.
There is also the difficult policy issue of how radical and how formalized 
should be the ex ante rules for orderly debt work-outs and standstills in 
times of distress. This issue has been amply debated, but it seems worthwhile 
stressing here that there may be a significant trade-off between (1) the posi­
tive effects from the greater flexibility in and speed of debt resolution in 
times of crisis (including the existence of an international legal mechanism to 
reduce debt in cases of insolvency via international bankruptcy procedures, 
which may be very helpful for avoiding declines in output or growth during 
crises) and (2) the possible negative effect on the ability to raise future new 
money, at increased cost. The inclusion of collective action clauses and the 
use of exit consent mechanisms offer an intermediate solution that may be 
effective in rescheduling and reducing debt, as well as in allowing access 
to new money. This intermediate solution may also have the advantage of 
greater speed of implementation.
Turning now to portfolio equity flows and equity markets, policy actions 
seem desirable not only to attract more equity flows (though care must be 
taken to ensure that foreign equity inflows deepen the liquidity of domestic 
stock markets and do not increase their volatility) but also to ensure that 
a higher share is traded in developing countries' own stock markets. One 
measure to consider is the creation of regional or subregional stock markets. 
In this regard important lessons can be learned from Europe, where the 
smaller stock markets are uniting to pool their liquidity. Another important
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point is that, given the possibility that large companies may leave, smaller 
exchanges may need to focus on helping to raise foreign capital for some­
what smaller but potentially dynamic companies.
Further study is required in all these areas, but above all urgent action is 
needed, given the sharp fall in private flows.
Reducing procyclicality and the short-termism of flows
A major challenge is to create countervailing forces in both source and 
recipient countries that will dampen the natural tendency of financial 
markets for procyclicality and short-termism, a tendency that has been 
accentuated by the changes outlined above. In this section we shall focus on 
issues relating to procyclicality in source countries.
There are two complementary means of creating countervailing forces: 
action taken by the financial industry itself; and measures taken by public 
authorities, especially regulatory ones. An innovative way to counteract the 
market's tendency for volatility would be to create market stabilizers, via for 
example, the greater use of insurance instruments. Similarly, to deal with 
liquidity holes in emerging markets there is a need to create market makers.
Other measures that market actors could take include those already 
taken by final investors, especially institutional investors with long-term 
liabilities, such as pension funds. As the Myners Review (2001) argues, to over­
come the problems that arise from the overly frequent (quarterly or monthly) 
evaluation of fund managers it is crucial for pension fund trustees to recon­
sider the length of the evaluation period and to make it more relevant to 
their particular liabilities. For example in the case of emerging-market assets 
the yields over longer periods are likely to be higher than in other markets. 
More broadly, pension fund trustees -  and other institutional investors -  
should link their investment objectives to what is necessary to meet their 
future liabilities, and to set targets for their fund managers that accord with 
these objectives.
In turn fund managers should use different risk management systems and 
models for different clients, making them a better match for the diversity 
of investment objectives. Furthermore, particularly if the ultimate investor 
has long-term liabilities, it is crucial to use risk models that 'see through the 
cycle'. The latter and the greater diversity of risk-management models would 
encourage stability and discourage the herding and short-termism that are 
engendered by the current practice of using the same models, and by their 
problematic nature (see also Chapter 3).
A key question is whether market actors will, by themselves, take such 
actions, or whether encouragement -  or indeed formal regulation -  by 
regulators may be required. At the very least regulators should encourage 
a diversity of risk-management systems and models that better match the 
diversity of investment objectives, as well as the characteristics of different
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investors and lenders. Equally, as Persaud points out in Chapter 3, regulators 
could research structural, non-market-sensitive measures of risk (such as 
degree of duration or currency mismatch), and encourage fund managers to 
use them. As stated above, the use of more appropriate and diverse models 
would discourage herding. Furthermore regulators could encourage a longer 
assessment period for fund managers' performance (well beyond the trad­
itional one to three months). Mere encouragement may not be sufficient, 
and mandatory regulatory action may need to be taken. Because there may 
be institutional gaps in these areas and/or the regulators do not normally 
attend to them, a special effort will be needed by those regulatory authorities 
which do not pay sufficient attention to issues such as cyclicality, herding 
and short-termism.
Another factor that requires attention is the stipulation that investors -  
like insurance companies -  cannot hold bonds that are less than investment 
grade. The problem is that this requirement is specified in terms of what 
paper they may hold, and not what they can acquire. As a result, in crises 
investors mechanically sell (thus deepening the crisis), even if the long-term 
prospect of the country is good (see Chapter 8). The requirement should be 
modified to limit what investors can buy rather than what they can hold; 
this would not only make bond lending more stable, but would also reduce 
the premium on short-term assessment of whether and when ratings may 
change.
In one area where regulators do have the power to act -  bank regulation -  
it is important that: (1) they are careful not to cause greater procyclicality 
when they introduce market-risk-sensitive models or the use of ratings 
by rating agencies to determine capital to asset ratios; and (2) that they 
introduce explicit countercyclical elements into bank regulation, such as 
forward-looking general provisions in boom times or even higher capital 
adequacy ratios in good times, which would discourage excessive expansion 
of bank lending in good times and provide a cushion to facilitate sustained 
bank lending in bad times. The Spanish provisioning system is a concrete 
practical example of the implementation, at least partially, of such princi­
ples of countercyclical regulation. More generally, regulators could require 
prudential provisions (or capital) when the growth of loans -  and/or key 
asset prices, such as stocks -  either accelerates sharply or exceeds some long­
term average measured over at least one cycle. Similarly, charges could be 
imposed if loan growth fell below this average, decelerated sharply or 
became negative (see Chapter 12).
With regard to rating agencies, in Chapter 7 Reisen shows that their 
methodology is still procyclical. Hence these seems to be a strong case for 
regulating rating agencies, and especially their methodology, to ensure that 
the sovereign ratings they produce focus on objective indicators, particularly 
variables that 'see through the cycle'. Given the influence and power of 
rating agencies, and the problem with the quality and procyclicality of their
18 C a p i ta l  F lo w s  to  E m e r g in g  E c o n o m ie s
assessment of sovereigns, there is an obvious need for transparency in the 
criteria they use to determine ratings.
Finally, derivatives have recently enjoyed considerable growth, but regu­
lation of them has lagged somewhat. As Dodd points out in Chapter 6, it is 
necessary to improve the reporting and registration requirements; improved 
transparency will contribute to greater market efficiency and is a sine qua non 
for appropriate regulation. Second, it is necessary to prevent or discourage 
market practices that are procyclical and could act as a crisis accelerator. 
This means imposing appropriate capital requirements on all financial insti­
tutions, including derivative dealers, particularly in developing countries, 
where such requirements often do not exist. Of equal or greater importance, 
is the necessity to post and maintain adequate and appropriate collateral 
or margin on all derivatives transactions at all times. This would replace the 
current, rather dangerous, method of managing collateral. The initial collat­
eral requirement would be small, but firms should be required to become 
'super-margined' if their credit ratings drop substantially, especially below 
investment grade. This will require a derivatives counterparty to post sub­
stantial amounts of additional collateral, although in the case of developing 
countries this could force capital outflows if a crisis approached or exploded.
In summary, regulators need to focus on generating countervailing or 
countercyclical measures and actors in order to compensate for the natural 
tendency of financial markets for procyclicality, accentuated by modern 
trends. This they have not yet done, or only to a very limited extent. 
Procyclical and herding behaviour can lead to complex and problematic 
interactions between different actors and flows. For example a downgrade 
by a rating agency of a particular sovereign (especially from investment to 
non-investment grade) can cause investors immediately to sell the bonds of 
the country in question; simultaneously domestic derivative counterparties 
may be called on to meet margin calls, leading to capital outflows, and 
banks may stop lending following their own risk evaluation, which may be 
reinforced by the proposed Basel Accord. This implies that regulators need 
to look not just at the risks of particular actors but also at the interaction 
between the risks of different actors, as they may affect the same borrower 
or capital recipient, as well as at the possibility of risk increases spreading 
among borrowers. This will be a complex task, so there is a strong argument 
for increased coordination -  or even better, integration, where feasible -  
between regulators in different financial sectors.
Besides regulatory measures, tax incentives could be used to encourage 
more stable, longer-term investment, as well as investment in developing 
countries. Such incentives could be tapered so as to increase with the term 
of the investment.10 There are legislative precedents for this in the United 
Kingdom and France in respect of domestic investment. What we propose 
is that a similar tapering of tax incentives be applied to investment in 
developing countries.
S te p h a n y  G r i f f i th - J o n e s  19
* I t h a n k  R ic a rd o  G o t t sc h a lk  fo r  u se fu l in p u ts. I a m  a lso  v e ry  g rate fu l t o  José A n to n io  
O c a m p o ,  R ic a rd o  F fre n c h -D a v is  a n d  J o h n  H a w k in s  fo r th e ir  v a lu a b le  c o m m e n ts .
1. In te rv ie w  m ateria l.
2. N e u m a n n  a n d  T u rn e r (2001); in te rv ie w  m ateria l.
3. I  t h a n k  R ic a rd o  F fre n c h -D a v is  fo r  th is  p o in t.
4. For th e  East A s ia n  crisis, see G r iff ith -J o n e s  et al. (2002).
5. In te rv ie w  m ateria l.
6 . In te rv ie w  m ateria l; IM F  (2001b).
7. For a m o re  d e ta ile d  d is c u s s io n  see B h in d a  et al. (1999).
8 . In te rv ie w  m ateria l.
9. See G r iff ith -J o n e s  a n d  Sp ratt  (2001); R e ise n  (2001); G o o d h a r t  (2001).
10. I  t h a n k  J e n n y  K im m is  fo r  th is  p o in t.
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Notes
Financial Crises and N a tio n a l Policy  
Issues: A n O verview
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis
Introduction
In recent years a new type of crisis has developed in Asia and Latin America, 
with four features that differentiate it from the old type. First, international 
capital markets have been the major source of shocks, both positive and 
negative, to emerging economies. Second, capital flows have largely taken 
place between private suppliers and demanders; fiscal deficits have played 
only a secondary role, and indeed in most cases public finance has been in 
balance or surplus (Korea and Thailand before 1997; Argentina and Mexico 
before the Tequila crisis in late 1994). Third, this type of financial crisis 
has been suffered by emerging economies that were deemed to be highly 
successful by international financial institutes, risk evaluation agencies and 
the financial press. Fourth, flows have been characterized by a lack of regu­
lation and supervision on both the supply and the demand sides. Domestic 
financial systems in recipient markets have often been liberalized without 
the parallel development of a significant degree of prudential regulation and 
supervision, while the new sources of supply have grown, usually unregulated.
This chapter discusses the interplay of supply and demand, especially pro­
cyclical interrelations. These involve processes rather than one-off changes, 
with short-termist agents being the more active dealers, and the natural, 
long-lasting, differences between relative prices in emerging economies and 
developed economies are crucial in explaining flows and their macroeconomic 
effects. The discussion then moves onto capital flows, fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies and bank regulations, and their implications for 
the sustainability of macroeconomic balances. The chapter concludes with 
selected policy implications.
The interplay between the supply and demand of funds
Since the 1970s international financial flows have increased dramatically 
and become more diversified (see Chapter 1). But the outcome is potentially
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unstable, in that there has been a shift from long-term bank credit, which 
was the predominant source of financing in the 1970s, to portfolio flows, 
medium- and short-term bank financing, time deposits and non-greenfield 
FDI (acquisitions). In fact a very high proportion of the newer supply of 
financing is of a liquid nature. Thus, paradoxically, there has been a diversi­
fication towards volatile sources of financing in the 1990s. The relative 
improvement after the Tequila crisis, with a rising share of FDI,1 still 
included a significant proportion of volatile flows.2 The foundations of the 
broad liquid market for portfolio investment that were laid down with the 
Brady bonds in the late 1980s developed vigorously in the 1990s, with Latin 
America as a major destination for both bond and stock financing; this mar­
ket offered the expectation of high rates of return during the upswings of 
the two cycles in the 1990s (see Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001).
Meanwhile East and South-East Asian countries were just starting to enter 
'vulnerability zones' during the first half of the 1990s (Akyiiz, 1998; Furman 
and Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Jomo, 1998; Agosin, 2001), with 
mismatches in the maturity structure of the balance sheets of domestic 
financial intermediaries proving to be even more severe than the worsening 
net debt position (Krugman, 1999).
As a con sequence, in contrast to the 1980s debt and 1995 Tequila crises, 
both regions moved into vulnerability zones (a combination of large exter­
nal liabilities with a high short-term or liquid share, a significant external 
deficit, an appreciated exchange rate and high price-earnings ratios in the 
stock market, plus low domestic investment ratios in Latin American coun­
tries). The outcome, then, was economies that were increasingly sensitive to 
adverse political or economic news (Calvo, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). The longer 
and deeper an economy's penetration into these zones, frequently encour­
aged by capital surges, the more severe the 'financierist trap'3 in which the 
authorities could be caught, and the lower the probability of leaving it with­
out undergoing a crisis and incurring long-lasting economic and social costs.
By the end of the second upswing in 1997, several economies in Asia and 
Latin America had penetrated deep into the vulnerability zone, which was 
reflected in severe crises in both regions when the mood of the external 
financial market changed, first with respect to East Asia and then to Latin 
America.
One of the strong features of capital flows in the last quarter of the century 
was the overshooting of supply on both sides of the cycle. There was con­
tagion of both optimism and pessimism. Today the latter feeds the view that 
the market dryness in emerging economies is permanent, but it is suggested 
here that the present drought, even though it has lasted quite a long time, 
is temporary and that the financial setting will tend to generate a new boom 
and subsequent crisis unless policies and institutions are reformed domes­
tically and internationally (see Ocampo, 2002a; ECLAC, 2002a, 2002b; 
United Nations, 2002).
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The literature emphasizes, as sources of financial instability, the asymmetries 
of information between creditors and debtors and inadequate internalization 
of the negative externalities that each agent generates (through growing 
vulnerability) and that underlie the cycles of abundance and shortage of 
external financing (Rodrik, 1998; Krugman, 2000; Stiglitz, 2000).4 Beyond 
these issues, as stressed by Ocampo (2002c), finance deals with the future, 
and concrete information about the future is unavailable. As he states, the 
tendency to equate opinions and expectations with information is confus­
ing. All the above contribute to herd behaviour, transborder contagion and 
multiple equilibria.
Over and above these facts there are two additional features of the creditor 
side that are crucially important. One is the particular nature of the agents 
on the supply side. There are asymmetries between the behaviour and object­
ives of different economic agents. The agents that predominate in the 
financial markets specialize in short-term liquid investment and are highly 
sensitive to changes in variables that affect returns in the short term.5 
In fact short time horizons are a significant part of the story of the 1990s, 
as reflected in the volatility of flows that characterized the boom-bust 
cycles. The second feature is the gradual spread of information on invest­
ment opportunities. Agents from different segments of the financial market 
are gradually drawn into international markets as they take note of the 
profitable opportunities offered by emerging economies. This explains, from 
the supply-side, why the surges of flows to emerging economies in 1977-81, 
1991-94 and 1995-97 were processes that went on for several years rather 
than one-off changes in supply (Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001).
On the domestic side, high rates of return were potentially to be gained 
from capital surges directed to Latin American economies that were experi­
encing recession, depressed stock and real estate markets, high real interest 
rates and initially undervalued exchange rates. Indeed in the early 1990s the 
prices of equity stocks and real estate were extremely depressed in Latin 
America, which allowed for a 300 per cent average capital gain (in current 
US dollars) in the stock markets of Latin America between late 1990 and 
September 1994 (Table 2.1), with rapidly rising price-earnings ratios. After 
a sharp drop in prices -  over 40 per cent -  around the time of the Tequila 
crisis, with the contagion spreading to all Latin American stock markets, 
average prices nearly doubled between March 1995 and July 1997, pushed 
up by portfolio inflows (see IMF, 1998).
The case of East Asia was different from that of Latin America in one 
respect -  unlike the Latin American countries, the East Asian economies 
were growing vigorously and had a high ratio of capital formation, financed 
by domestic savings -  but otherwise several similarities were shared by the 
two regions. When many countries opened their capital accounts in the 
early 1990s the international supply of funds was booming, equity stock was 
cheaper than in capital-rich countries (low price-earnings ratios) and external





















Latin America 21.7 44.6 92.5 52.3 1 0 0 .0 47.2 88.3 54.8 71.8 60.8
A rg e n t in a 13.4 46.9 78.2 53.5 10 0 .0 53.4 90.3 37.8 23.5 13.5
B raz il 8 .0 2 2 .1 71.8 42.8 1 0 0 .0 44.4 76.9 39.0 54.6 44.6
C h i le 24.5 51.4 93.1 89.4 10 0 .0 48.0 78.4 54.2 61.8 56.4
C o lo m b ia 16.6 65.0 113.1 96.3 1 0 0 .0 49.9 41 .2 29.0 31.2 33.3
M e x ic o 38.6 72.7 132.1 45.9 10 0 .0 49.7 118.5 83.3 116.2 98.7
Peru n.a. n.a. 72.9 56.4 1 0 0 .0 57.3 67.7 54.1 60.2 57.6
V e n e z u e la 84.9 82.2 50.8 37.9 1 0 0 .0 26.2 36 .2 46.3 31.7 27.3
East Asia n.a. 49.9 1 1 0 .0 97.9 1 0 0 .0 37.0 107.9 45.1 77.0 73.9
In d o n e s ia n.a. 53.7 84.2 71.6 1 0 0 .0 1 1 . 1 27.6 13.7 17.3 2 2 .0
K o rea n.a. 87.6 187.2 161.9 10 0 .0 30.2 1 2 0 .1 54.9 109.6 111.9
M a la y s ia n.a. 63.7 119.0 103.5 1 0 0 .0 16.8 61.3 35.6 46.1 47.3
P h il ip p in e s n.a. 67.1 134.6 108.6 10 0 .0 30.4 47.9 25.5 30.9 27 .7
T a iw a n n.a. 37.1 80.9 73.5 10 0 .0 47.6 99.1 31.6 55.5 48 .8
T h a i la n d n.a. 133.9 279.8 236.3 10 0 .0 19.0 48 .0 25.2 3 6.1 42 .2
* The averages are w eigh ted  b y  a m o u n t o f transac tions . The values a t  th e  en d  o f  e ach  p e rio d  a re  expressed in  cu rre n t US dollars, exclud ing  d is trib u ted  
earn ings. T he selected dates co rresp o n d  to  peaks a n d  m in im u m  levels for th e  average o f L atin  A m erica (excep t fo r Sep tem ber 1992).
Source: Based o n  IFC /S tandard & Poor's, Em erging Stock M arket Review , several issues.
N>u>
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liabilities were low. The expected outcome in any emerging economy that 
moves from a closed to an open capital account should be similar to that 
recorded in the Latin American countries. Naturally, the rate of return tends 
to be higher in the productive sectors of capital-scarce emerging economies 
than in mature, capital-rich markets, so there is scope for very profitable 
capital flows from the latter to the former. This outcome did in fact occur in 
East Asia, whose stock prices doubled between 1992 and 1994 and the deficit 
on the current account and real exchange rates rose.
Domestic interest rates, particularly in Latin American countries, tended 
to be high at the start of surge episodes, reflecting the binding external 
constraint faced by most countries during periods of low capital inflows, 
their restrictive monetary policies and the short-termist bias of the financial 
reforms (see Ffrench-Davis, 2000: ch. 2). Finally, the increased supply of 
external financing in the 1990s generated an exchange-rate appreciation 
in most Latin American countries, and more moderately in East Asia. The 
expectation of continued appreciation encouraged additional inflows from 
dealers operating with maturity horizons located within the expected appre­
ciation of the domestic currency.
The increased supply of external funding in three episodes (1977-81, 
1991-94 and 1995-97) generated a greater demand for such financing. 
This was associated with procyclical domestic policies. Recipient countries 
that formally adopted such policies or took a passive stance experienced real 
exchange-rate revaluation, a boom in domestic credit and large deficits in 
the current account, which were often financed by short-term and liquid 
capital flows. As a consequence they tended to become increasingly vul­
nerable to changes of mood among creditors; the outstanding cases were 
Mexico in 1991-94 (Ros, 2001) and Argentina after the Asian crisis. Given 
the high exposure of financial assets placed in the region, creditors became 
more sensitive to bad news. This sensitivity rose steeply with the size of net 
short-term liabilities (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000; Stiglitz, 2000).
In summary, the interaction between two factors -  the nature of agents and 
a process of adjustment -  explains the dynamics of capital flows over time. 
When creditors discover an emerging market their initial exposure is negli­
gible or non-existent. But as their stock of financial assets in the emerging 
market increases their sensitivity to negative news grows. Given their degree 
of dependence on additional flows, which are associated with the magnitude 
of the current account deficit, the refinancing of maturing liabilities and 
the volume of liquid liabilities that is likely to flow out of the country in 
the event of a crisis it is not surprising that, after a significant increase in 
asset prices and exchange rates, accompanied by rising stocks of external 
liabilities, their expectation of the future trend reverses sharply.
The accumulation of stocks and the subsequent reversal of flows can both 
be considered as rational responses by individual suppliers, given the short 
time horizon of the main agents on the supply side. This is because investors
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with short horizons are not concerned about whether (long-term) funda­
mentals are being improved or worsened with capital surges as long as they 
continue to bring inflows. What is important to these investors is that the 
crucial indicators from their point of view -  real estate, bond and stock 
prices, and exchange rates -  continue providing them with profits in the 
short term, and that the liquid markets will allow them, if necessary, to 
reverse their decisions in a timely fashion. Hence they will continue to pour 
in money until expectations of an imminent reversal start to grow. Indeed 
for the most influential financial operators, the more relevant variables are 
not related to long-term fundamentals but to short-term profitability. This 
explains why they may suddenly display a radical change of mind about the 
economic situation of a country whose fundamentals, other than liquidity 
in foreign currency, remain more or less unchanged. The opposite process 
tends to take place when the debtor markets have adjusted sufficiently down­
ward. This inverse process may be sustained, as in 1991-94 and 1995-97, or 
short-lived, as in 1999-2000.6
It is no coincidence that in all three significant surges of the last quarter 
century loan spreads underwent a sustained fall while the stock of liabilities 
rose sharply: for five to six years in the 1970s, four years before the Tequila 
crisis, and for a couple of years after that crisis (Figure 2.1). This implies that 
during the expansion side of the cycle there will be a downward-sloping, 
medium-term supply curve, a highly destabilizing feature indeed. In this 
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Figure 2.1 L a t in  A m erica : cost a n d  m a tu r ity  o f  issues o f  b o n d s, 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 2  (percentages  
a n d  years)*
* T he cost is equal to  th e  average spread  o n  issues o f b o n d s  p lu s th e  ra te  o f re tu rn  o f US Treasury 
10-year bonds.
Sources: ECLAC; W orld Bank; IMF. A nnua l m o v in g  averages.
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(praised as a well-behaved reformer in the 1990s) and Argentina (which today 
is classified, incorrectly, as being a non-reformer in the 1990s) (Figure 2.2). 
Apparently creditors did not perceive any significant difference between these 
two economies until 1999.
One particularly relevant issue is that, as stressed by Ffrench-Davis (2000), 
economic agents who specialize in the allocation of financial funding (we 
shall call this microfinance, as opposed to macrofinance) and may be highly 
efficient in their field but operate with short horizons 'by training and 
by reward', have come to play the leading role in determining macroeco­
nomic conditions and policy design in emerging economies. This leads to 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, with 'wrong' or outlier macro 
prices and ratios. Figure 2.3 shows the notoriously unstable GDP growth in 
Latin America as a whole in 1990-2001; obviously, that of the individual 
countries tended to be even more unstable. The changes in GDP were led by 
rises and falls in aggregate demand. The changes in demand were stronger 
in private expenditure and were associated with the evolution of net capital 
inflows.
The resulting real macroeconomic instability undermined the environ­
ment for productive investment and was a strong force behind the poor 
achievement of investment ratios in the 1990s, when they latter surpassed 
the 1980s average (19 per cent) by less than one percentage point of GDP 
and were more than five points below that in the 1970s (Figure 2.4). This 
significant variable partly explains why GDP growth was 5.6 per cent in the 
1970s and a mere 2.4 per cent in 1990-2002 (Table 2.2).
What is irrational, and evidently inefficient from the perspective of 
resource allocation and total factor productivity, is for the decisions of the 
authorities, which should obviously have a long time horizon, to become
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Figure 2 .2  A r g e n t in a  a n d  M e x ic o :  c o u n t ry  risks, 1 9 9 4 -2 0 0 2  (base  p o in ts )
Source: JP M organ. C o u n try  risk  m easu red  by  th e  sovereign  spread  over th e  US zero co u p o n  
curve.
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Figure 2.3  L a t in  A m erica : G D P  a n d  aggregate  d e m a n d , 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 1  (average a n n u a l  
g r o w th  rates, per cent)
Source: ECLAC, based  o n  official figures for 20  co u n trie s  in  c o n s ta n t 1995 dollars.
Latin America: Gross fixed investment, 1977-2002 
(% of GDP)
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Figure 2 .4  L a t in  A m e ric a : g ro s s  fix e d  in v e s tm e n t, 1 9 7 7 -2 0 0 2  (pe rcen tage  o f  G D P ) *  
* P relim inary  d a ta  for 2002.
Source: Based o n  ECLAC figures for 19 coun tries , scaled to  1995 prices.
entrapped with the lobbying and policy recipes of microfinance, leading 
to 'irrational exuberance' (to use Alan Greenspan’s expression). Thus in 
the next cycle the macroeconomic authorities should ensure that funda­
mentals (sustainable external deficit, moderate stock of external liabilities 
with a low liquid share, the crowding in of domestic savings, limited real 
exchange rate appreciation) prevail in order to achieve macroeconomic 
balances that are both sustainable and functional for long-term growth. This
Table 2 .2  L a t in  A m e ric a  a n d  East  A sia : G D P , 1 9 7 1 -2 0 0 2  (a n n u a l g ro w th  rates, percent)
1971-80 1981-89 1990 1991-94 1995 199 6 -9 7 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2 1 199 0 -2 0 0 2 1
Latin America2 5.6 1.3 - 0 . 6 4.1 1.1 4.5 1.2 2.4
A rg e n t in a 2.8 - 0 . 7 - 2 . 0 8.0 - 2 . 9 6.7 - 3 . 3 1.7
Brazil 8.6 2.3 -4 . 6 2.8 4.2 2.8 1.7 1.9
C h ile 2.5 3.0 3.3 7.5 9.0 6.8 2.3 5.2
C o lo m b ia 5.4 3.7 3.2 3.9 4.9 2.6 0.4 2.4
M e x ic o 6.7 1.5 5.1 3.5 - 6 . 2 6.1 3.2 3.1
Peru 3.9 - 0 . 7 - 5 . 4 5.1 8.6 4.6 1.6 3.0
V enezu e la 1.8 - 1 . 5 5.5 3.2 5.9 3.4 - 1 . 2 1.9
1971-80 1981-90 1991-92 1993-96 1997 1998 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 1 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 2 1
East Asia3 8.1 7.0 7.3 7.3 4.6 - 5 . 4 4.7 5.3
In d o n e s ia 7.7 5.5 8.1 7.7 4.7 -1 3 .1 3.1 4.4
K orea 9.0 8.8 7.3 7.3 5.0 - 6 . 7 7.1 6.1
M a la y s ia 7.8 5.2 9.2 9.7 7.3 - 7 . 4 4.8 6.5
P h il ip p in e s 5.9 1.7 - 0 . 1 4.2 5.2 - 0 . 6 3.6 3.0
T a iw an 9.3 8.5 7.5 6.7 6.7 4.6 3.0 5.4
T h a ila n d 7.9 7.9 8.3 8.0 - 1 . 4 - 1 0 . 8 3.5 4.6
Notes:
1 Provisional figures.
2 Average o f 19 coun tries.
3 In  each  period , each  co u n try 's  GDP was w eigh ted  b y  its share  in  reg ional o u tp u t, expressed  in  c u rren t US dollars.
Sources: For L atin  America: ECLAC (expressed in  US dollars a t 1980 prices fo r 1971-80, a t  1990 prices for 1980-89  an d  a t  1995 prices for 1989-2002). For 
East Asia: IMF, In te rna tiona l F inancia l Statistics; A sian D evelopm en t Bank; JP M organ.
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requires them to avoid entering vulnerability zones during economic booms 
cum capital surges. Once inside these zones, much-needed countercyclical 
policies become impossible during a period of dryness, as discussed in next 
section.
Domestic policies and a macroeconomics for growth
As discussed in Chapter 12, the association between capital flows and 
domestic economic activity has been an outstanding feature of emerging 
market economies during the past 25 years or so. This highlights the central 
role played by the mechanism by which externally generated boom-bust 
cycles in capital markets are transmitted to the developing world, and the 
vulnerabilities they generate. The high costs generated by business cycles in 
emerging economies are thus related to the strong connections between 
domestic and international capital markets. This implies that an essential 
objective of macroeconomic policies is to reap the benefits from external 
savings while reducing the intensity of capital account cycles and their 
negative effects on domestic economic and social variables. In Chapter 12 
Ocampo discusses two complementary policy instruments to achieve this 
objective: capital account regulations and countercyclical prudential regula­
tion of domestic financial intermediation.7
Capital account cycles are associated with the twin phenomena of volatility 
and contagion. Significant shifts in expectations, usually reinforced by subse­
quent risk-rating changes, lead to sharp procyclical changes in the availability 
of financing, maturities and spreads (Figure 2.1).8 The most damaging, as 
already argued, are medium-term fluctuations rather than very short-term 
volatility, as shown by the several years of abundant financing (1991-94 and 
mid 1995-97) followed by several years of dryness (1998-2002, with a brief 
upsurge around 2000).
Capital account regulations can serve as a prudential macroeconomic tool, 
working at the direct source of boom-bust cycles: unstable capital flows. If 
effective, they provide the ability to 'lean against the wind' during periods 
of financial euphoria through the adoption of a contractionary monetary 
policy and reduced appreciation pressures. They should be accompanied 
by measures to encourage flows in periods of drought, both internationally 
(see Chapter 1) and nationally. If effective, they will also reduce or eliminate 
the quasifiscal costs of sterilized foreign exchange accumulation. What is 
extremely important is that, during the subsequent period of binding exter­
nal constraints, the domestic economy is left with scope for expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies.
Capital account regulations also serve as a liability policy. The market 
rewards sound external debt structures, because during times of uncertainty 
it responds to gross financing requirements, which means that the rollover 
of short-term liabilities is not financially neutral. This indicates that economic
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policy management during booms should aim to improve the maturity 
structures of both private and public sector liabilities.
Chapter 12 also discusses recent innovations in capital account regulations. 
Overall the results of the innovative practice in the 1990s of across-the- 
board price restrictions on liquid and short-term financial inflows indicate 
that these can be useful instruments, in terms of both improving debt 
profiles and facilitating the adoption of countercyclical macroeconomic 
policies. The basic advantages of a price-based instrument applied to inflows, 
as pioneered by Chile and Colombia, are its simplicity and its applicability 
during boom periods. The more quantitative-type Malaysian system, which 
is geared to outflows, has proved to have stronger short-term macroeconomic 
effects. Traditional exchange controls, such as those in China and India (for 
example prohibition on short-term financial borrowing) may be superior if 
the objective of macroeconomic policy is to reduce significantly domestic 
macroeconomic sensitivity to international capital flows.9
These direct, price-based or quantitative, regulations on capital flows can 
be partly substituted by prudential regulation and supervision of domestic 
financial institutions. The main problem with this option is that it does not 
attend to the external borrowing of non-financial agents, and may actually 
encourage them to borrow abroad (that was a severe problem, for instance, 
in the crises in Korea and Thailand). Accordingly it needs to be supplemented 
with other disincentives to external borrowing by these agents, deterrents 
that may become cumbersome and extremely difficult to implement. They 
may include restrictions on the class of firms that can borrow abroad, 
restrictions on the terms of corporate debts that can be contracted, and tax 
arrangements that raise the cost of direct borrowing in foreign markets. 
Price-based capital account regulations may thus be a superior alternative 
and much simpler to administer.
Prudential regulation and supervision should take into account not only 
microeconomic risks but also the macroeconomic risks associated with 
boom-bust cycles. In particular, countercyclical devices should be intro­
duced into prudential regulation and supervision, involving a mixture of 
the following:
• Forward-looking provisions for latent risks, made when the credit is 
granted on the basis of the credit risks that are expected throughout 
the full business cycle (an approach adopted by the Spanish authorities).
• More discrete countercyclical prudential provisions decreed by the 
authorities on the basis of objective criteria (for example the rate of 
growth of credit).
• Countercyclical regulation of the prices used for assets given in 
guarantee.
• Capital adequacy requirements that focus on long-term solvency criteria 
rather than cyclical performance.
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Aside from the macroeconomic implications, prudential regulation and 
supervision of domestic financial systems are needed for the sake of trans­
parency, honesty and microeconomic efficiency. The record was bad in many 
countries where the liberalization of domestic finance took place without 
the reform and strengthening of regulation and supervision. Interestingly 
the severe banking crisis in Chile in 1983, which had cost the Treasury one 
third of GDP, was forgotten by the financial reformers of the 1990s in Latin 
America and most of the errors were replicated.
The financial crises of 1994-95 and 1997-98 sounded a wake-up call to 
Latin America and East Asia, respectively, that regulation and supervision 
needed to be strengthened substantially. As reported in Chapter 15, since 
then important steps have been taken to improve the rules and ensure 
their implementation, but financial regulation and supervision do not take 
place in a vacuum. Financial policies need a consistently supportive macro- 
economic environment in which to operate, as the Argentinean crisis of 
2001-2 showed only too well.
Problems in individual banks can set off chain reactions because of the 
direct links between banks, and because of the effects that bank collapses 
can have on borrowers' capacity to honour their commitments. Moving from 
systems where the authorities had set interest rates, directed credit and held 
a large share of bank deposits as required reserves, governments freed com­
mercial banks to make their own decisions on borrowers, loan volumes and 
prices. At approximately the same time, in both Latin America and East Asia, 
capital account liberalization enabled local banks to engage in transactions 
in foreign currencies and allowed foreign institutions to enter local markets. 
The lack of an adequate regulatory and supervisory system compounded the 
problems of bankers who lacked sufficient experience in conducting credit 
analyses of local borrowers and had an inadequate understanding of financial 
mismatches and the complexities of international financial markets.
The typical results were credit booms, maturity and currency mismatches, 
and eventually banking crises. As seen in the paradigmatic Chilean case 
(but also later in Mexico, East Asia and Argentina), errors by domestic actors 
provided the basis for such crises, and if this was combined with external 
shocks the situation became far more severe (Ffrench-Davis, 2002: ch. 6). 
Government rescues tended to follow a standard procedure. The first steps 
were to take over non-performing loans, recapitalize banks and conduct 
liquidations and mergers, usually involving foreign institutions.10 Later, 
in an attempt to prevent future crises, regulation and supervision were 
stepped up; moreover greater information and transparency were required. 
In Chapter 15 Stallings and Studart, on the basis of World Bank data (see 
Barth et ah, 2001), review the recent situation in Latin America, particularly 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
According to the authors, these countries have made considerable progress 
with restructuring their financial system and putting in place prudential
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regulation and supervision since the initial phase of more naive financial 
liberalization. Supposedly, with the reform to the previous reform, these 
countries are now better able to withstand external shocks, with their 
financial systems showing greater resilience than before. It was a common 
belief among international financial institutions that Argentina had pro­
gressed enormously in terms of improving its financial system. This is con­
firmation that Argentina, as evaluated by financial markets, was classified as 
a well-behaved and dedicated reformer.
Argentina's regulations appeared to be the strictest in the region. However 
very strong macroeconomic shocks can undermine even the strictest regula­
tions and lead to banking crises, as Argentina's experience in 2001-2 showed. 
In this case a particularly crucial domestic variable was an outlier macro price -  
the exchange rate -  in a highly but far from fully dollarized economy. The 
sharp rise in spreads faced by Argentina severely complicated its fiscal stance.
The exchange-rate regime has become a much more influential variable 
in emerging economies in terms of trade and finance. It is subject to two 
conflicting demands, which reflect the more limited degree of freedom that 
authorities face in a world of reduced policy effectiveness (see ECLAC, 2000; 
Ocampo, 2002b). The first demand comes from trade: with the dismantling 
of traditional trade policies the real exchange rate has become a key determin­
ant of international competitiveness and a crucial variable in the efficient 
allocation of resources into tradables. The second demand comes from the 
capital account. Boom-bust cycles in international financial markets generate 
a demand for flexible macroeconomic variables to absorb, in the short 
term, the positive and negative shocks generated during the cycle. Given the 
reduced effectiveness of traditional policy instruments, particularly monetary 
policy, the exchange rate plays an essential role in helping to absorb shocks. 
This objective cannot be easily reconciled with the trade-related goals of 
exchange rate policy.
The relevance of this dual demand is ignored in the call to limit alterna­
tives to the two extreme exchange rate regimes: a totally flexible exchange 
rate or a currency board (or outright dollarization). Intermediate regimes of 
managed exchange rate flexibility -  such as crawling pegs and bands, and 
dirty floating -  attempt to reconcile these conflicting demands (see Frankel, 
1999; Williamson, 2000; Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001; Ocampo, 2002b).
As argued by Ffrench-Davis and Larrain in Chapter 13, completely rigid 
exchange rate systems tend to amplify external shocks because they put 
heavy and unrealistic demands on domestic flexibility, particularly on wage 
and price flexibility in the face of negative shocks. Currency boards cer­
tainly introduce built-in institutional arrangements that provide for fiscal 
and monetary discipline, but they radically reduce the ability to stabilize 
monetary, credit and fiscal policies, which is necessary to prevent crises or 
facilitate recovery in a post-crisis environment. Currency boards therefore 
allow the domestic transmission of external shocks, generating strong
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swings in economic activity and asset prices, with corresponding domestic 
financial vulnerability. There is an amplification effect when agents consider 
that the external shock is strong enough to induce the authorities to modify 
the exchange rate policy. This is particularly grave when the rate appears to 
be an outlier price, too appreciated.
Notwithstanding the pitfalls of nominal pegs, there are cases in which 
they can work efficiently. The currency board in Argentina, assisted by 
the capital surge to Latin America since the early 1990s, was quite effective 
in stopping hyperinflation, which was the more harmful problem in that 
economy in 1991. The worst mistake was not to use the opportunities 
provided in 1992 and 1993 to make the rate more flexible when inflation 
and the budget were evidently under control, capital inflows were vigorous 
and spreads to emerging economies, including Argentina, were falling.
On the other hand the volatility characteristic of freely floating exchange 
rate regimes is not a problem when market fluctuations are short-lived; they 
are easily dealt with by derivatives (see Chapter 6). But fluctuations become 
a major concern when there are longer waves, as has been typical of the 
access of emerging economies to capital markets in recent decades. In this 
case exchange rate volatility tends to have perverse effects on resource 
allocation in irreversible capital formation. Moreover under freely floating 
regimes with open capital accounts, anticyclical monetary policy exacer­
bates cyclical exchange rate fluctuations, with their associated allocative and 
income effects.
The ability of a flexible exchange rate regime to smooth out the effects 
of externally induced boom-bust cycles thus depends on the authorities' 
capacity to manage countercyclical monetary and credit policy without 
enhancing procyclical exchange rate patterns. The effectiveness of this is 
strengthened under intermediate exchange rate regimes cum capital account 
regulations, as in the case of Chile in the first half of the 1990s (Le Fort and 
Lehmann, 2000; Ffrench-Davis, 2002: ch. 10).
However, as discussed by Ffrench-Davis and Larrain in Chapter 13, bands 
did not behave well during the Asian crisis. In many cases this was partly the 
result of mismanagement of the band. The huge increase in capital inflows 
to emerging economies in 1990-97 put severe upward pressure on exchange 
rates. The response, in terms of expanding the size of the band or appreci­
ating it, resulted in a credibility loss. Subsequently bands that already had 
an overly appreciated rate had trouble adapting to the sharp shift brought 
by the Asian crisis, when capital inflows suddenly stopped. This added to 
the mismanagement of bands, thereby causing a further credibility loss.
The main benefit of managed flexibility, including bands, emerges in times 
when there are no strong shocks. In such cases, bands induce real exchange 
rate stability and maintain the ability to absorb, at least partly, the effects of 
moderate shocks. Consequently the exchange rate more efficiently fulfils its 
allocative role between tradables and non-tradables.
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Obviously, intermediate regimes also have shortcomings and can generate 
costs (Ocampo, 2002b). First, all intermediate regimes are subject to specu­
lative pressure if they do not enjoy credibility in the markets, and the cost 
of defending the exchange rate from such pressure is very high. Second, 
sterilized reserve accumulation during long booms can be financially costly. 
Finally, the capital account regulations needed to manage intermediate 
regimes efficiently are only partially effective. But all things considered, 
intermediate regimes offer a sound alternative to costly volatility.
The review in Chapter 13 of the Argentinean, Chilean and Mexican 
experiences shows that a policy that is suitable for one macroeconomic 
environment may not be so for another. In this sense, a crucial point to bear 
in mind when adopting a policy is how costly it would be to switch to an 
alternative one.
Credible pegged systems can be useful when a crisis with hyperinflation 
has bottomed out and there is a plentiful supply of external funding. Floating 
systems are useful in times of financial distress when the authorities have 
doubts about the level of the real exchange rate or the nature of the shock 
they face; flotation allows them not to put their reputation in jeopardy by 
defending the wrong real exchange rate.
Finally, bands help to stabilize the real exchange rate, which in turn 
has a positive effect on the quality of exports and on growth (see ECLAC, 
1998a: ch. 4). But bands are subject to weakness if a big shock appears and 
the authorities have failed to avoid vulnerability zones during the previous 
boom. In such cases they open the way to speculation, inducing significant 
financial instability. The latter can be tackled more efficiently by temporarily 
moving to a fully flexible rate.
Chapter 13 summarizes why corner solutions do not have symmetric con­
sequences. With a capital surge, the current account deteriorates, asset prices 
increase and the real exchange rate appreciates. Each exchange rate policy 
will deliver different combinations of these three elements. With pegged 
systems a capital surge creates a demand boom, forcing up asset prices and 
probably crowding out domestic savings and worsening the external balance. 
With floating regimes a nominal appreciation will take place, thus making 
the process of real appreciation faster (and potentially more disruptive) than 
with the peg. Pegs tend to work better in the upward phase of the cycle, but 
after the inflection point the float does it better in terms of the necessary 
expenditure switching. But in this type of cycle there is the possibility of 
multiple equilibria based on self-fulfilling prophesies: expectations of more 
inflows (outflows) may further appreciate (depreciate) an already appreciated 
(depreciated) currency.
Large deviations from equilibrium by the real exchange rate are costly. 
Central banks should be concerned with both the level and the stability of 
the exchange rate. In this sense, and despite what has happened since the 
Asian crisis, managed flexibility -  with or without bands -  is still a policy to
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be considered. Policy makers need to be wary about across-the-board lib­
eralization of the capital account as the behaviour of capital flows may 
be inconsistent with macroeconomic stability, particularly in terms of the 
stability of the exchange rate and economic activity. In this sense the 
authorities need to have a flexible policy package rather than a single, rigid 
policy tool.
Fiscal policy should be part of the flexible policy package. As discussed by 
Budnevich in Chapter 14, fiscal policy has two macroeconomic objectives: 
sustainable public accounts and the regulation of aggregate demand. It is 
obvious that policy efforts have tended to concentrate on the first objective, 
leaving the stabilizing role to monetary policy.
Given the vulnerability of emerging economies to global economic down­
turns, overreliance on monetary policy may bring poorer macro results than 
a more balanced framework of countercyclical fiscal, exchange rate and 
monetary policy, as well as prudential regulation of capital flows. The use of 
countercyclical fiscal policy requires solvent and sustainable fiscal accounts 
as a precondition.
A more active role for countercyclical fiscal policy may emerge when 
transmission channels of monetary policy to the output gap are weak or 
show significant lags. Moreover spreading the adjustment burden between 
fiscal and monetary policy may bring better macroeconomic results, with 
macro prices staying closer to sustainable equilibria.
Fiscal policy has been at the heart of the debate on adjustment programmes 
in emerging economies (see ECLAC, 1998b; Ocampo, 2002b). In both East 
Asia and Latin America the more conventional recipes recommended achiev­
ing current or annual fiscal balances, when in recessionary conjunctures 
that depressed tax proceeds. This is typically procyclical behaviour. In Latin 
America fiscal policy has not played a proper countercyclical role. During 
recessions it has typically been directed at keeping financial solvency under 
control, while during booms expenditure has tended to expand with the 
cycle.
In countercyclical policy packages, structural balance is the most import­
ant fiscal component. There are different definitions, but the essential 
component is the measurement of the balance across the business cycle, 
estimating at each point of time what would be the public expenditure 
and income in a framework of sustainable full employment of human and 
physical capital. If terms of trade fluctuations are of relevance to tax 
proceeds -  via the profits of public or private exporters -  the purchasing 
power of potential GDP should be estimated at the trend terms of trade as 
well as public income. Chile has advanced significantly in achieving a 
structural fiscal balance (see Tapia, 2003).
Developing countries typically concentrate their international trade on 
a few commodity exports that are subject to highly volatile market prices. 
When a significant export -  such as copper in Chile and oil in Mexico and
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Venezuela -  is public property the establishment of a stabilization fund 
can contribute to macroeconomic sustainability. For a long time the Coffee 
Fund has played an important macroeconomic stabilizing role in Colombia. 
Above trend or normal public receipts from coffee are saved in the fund in 
order to finance public expenditure when the receipts are below normal.
As argued by Budnevich in Chapter 14, most commodity prices tend 
eventually to revert to their trend -  a requirement for a stabilization fund 
to be viable -  but only very slowly, the average reversal time being measured 
in years. Thus a commodity stabilization fund has to be very large to be 
effective in the long term. Furthermore in the case of an export stabilization 
fund it is wise to initiate it when prices are high in comparison with the trend 
prices, so that the fund can finance subsequent negative price scenarios.
The stabilization fund principle can also be used for deviations in tax 
proceeds from their structural level, and flexible tax rates have been pro­
posed as a countercyclical device. The suggestions tend to concentrate on 
VAT and contributions to pension funds. For instance when the external 
deficit is above a sustainable level because of excess domestic absorption, 
then the proceeds of VAT will exceed the structural level. That excess could 
be automatically put into a fund, which would help to push aggregate 
demand downward towards equilibrium. The disadvantage of using VAT 
(an inflationary impulse in the short term, when the rate is increased) must 
be weighed against the advantages (a broad tax base and effects on con­
sumption rather than investment). A VAT adjustment will not bring about 
a significant misallocation of resources and the taxes are collected regularly. 
However it is likely to involve some transaction costs. Another policy tool to 
consider is some short-term variation in compulsory pension fund or unem­
ployment insurance contributions. An effective unemployment insurance 
scheme is not only socially desirable, but it can also serve as an important 
countercyclical stabilizer. Of course the most direct tool is the regulation of 
flows when they are the source of disequilibria.
Some policy lessons and pending issues
Dominant features of the 'new generation' of business cycles in emerging 
economies are the sharp fluctuations in private spending and balance sheets 
associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Of course external 
shocks, both positive and negative, will be amplified domestically if the 
exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policy stances are also procyclical, as is 
expected to be the case by financial market agents and even multilateral 
agencies (particularly the IMF).
Changes in expectations and the credibility of domestic macroeconomic 
authorities and domestic financial intermediaries play a key role throughout 
the process. We have observed that emerging economies have moved into 
vulnerability zones that include high external liabilities with a large liquid
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share, high external deficits, high exchange rates and high prices of domestic 
financial assets and real estate.
Policy lessons
Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo (2001) summarize what they consider to be 
robust policy actions, grouped into five areas:
• Maintain a sustainable volume and composition of external liabilities and 
capital flows; sustainability is closely related to the use made of inflows.
• Avoid outlier exchange rates and price-earnings ratios of equity stock.
• Ensure that there is flexible, comprehensive, prudential macroeconomic 
regulation, including of the financial system, fiscal accounts and capital 
flows.
• Press for a reform of the international financial architecture in the interest 
of a more efficient and balanced globalization process.
• Implement a crisis-prevention policy, based on the prudential manage­
ment of booms.
If these lessons have not been learned and a country or region is in a critical 
conjuncture, as is the case today in Latin America, what policy recommen­
dations can be made to address pending issues?
Pending issues
In the domestic realm there are three issues to consider: the quality of 
recovery; capital account opening and the sustainability of real macroeco­
nomic equilibria; and the constituencies served by the authorities.
With regard to the quality of recovery, here again the approach taken 
during the precrisis stage is crucial. Countries that have undergone severe 
crises -  including Korea, where recovery was very strong -  are usually 
pushed onto a lower GDP path. There are three particularly important 
medium-term effects on GDP:
• A sharp reduction of productive investment during the crisis naturally 
damages the path of potential GDP.
• The deterioration of balance sheets (Krugman, 1999), as illustrated by the 
experience of emerging economies, shows that restoring a viable financial 
system can take several years, generating adverse effects throughout the 
period in which it is being restored.
• There is a growing body of evidence that boom-bust cycles have ratchet 
effects on social variables (Rodrik, 2001). The deterioration of the labour 
market (through unemployment, a decline in the quality of jobs or in 
real wages) is generally very rapid, whereas the recovery is painfully slow 
and incomplete. This was reflected in the long-lasting deterioration of 
real wages in Mexico after the Tequila crisis (Ros, 2001).
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These three problems point to the policy priorities that should be estab­
lished during a crisis: sustaining public investment and encouraging private 
investment; helping to reschedule liabilities and solve currency and maturity 
mismatches; and reinforcing the social network by using the opportunity to 
improve the productivity of temporarily underutilized factors.
With regard to the second issue, it is commonly argued that fully opening 
the capital account discourages domestic macroeconomic mismanagement. 
This is partly true for domestic sources of instability -  large fiscal deficits, 
permissive monetary policy and arbitrary exchange-rate overvaluation -  but 
volatile market perceptions make this type of control highly unreliable in 
emerging economies with responsible authorities: lax demand policies or 
exchange rate appreciation tends to be encouraged by financial markets 
during booms, whereas excessive punishment during crises may force the 
authorities to adopt overly contractionary policies ('irrational overkill'). As 
we have argued, this is associated with the nature of agents and the nature 
of cycles. Indeed market actors such as credit rating agencies and investment 
banks usually operate in a procyclical fashion (for a related discussion on 
rating agencies see Chapter 7).
In reality, opening the capital account can lead to a deterioration of 
economic fundamentals. Thus although market discipline can serve as 
a check to domestic sources of macroeconomic instability, it can also be 
a source of externally generated instability. The market may actually induce 
the deviation of fundamental variables from their sustainable levels, thus 
entering into a vulnerability zone. Financial operators, perhaps unwittingly, 
have come to play a role with significant macroeconomic implications. With 
their herd-like expectations they have helped to intensify financial flows 
to successful countries during capital surges, thus causing rapid increases in 
the price of financial assets and real estate, as well as a sharp exchange rate 
appreciation. When added to the substandard prudential regulation and 
supervision in these markets, these macroeconomic signals serve to prolong 
a process that wrongly appears to be efficient and sustainable (with good 
profits and loan guarantees, supported by high stock prices and the low 
value in domestic currency of dollar-denominated debt). But in fact bub­
bles are being generated, with outlier macro prices that sooner or later will 
burst. Excessive indebtedness and massive outflows ensue, often prompting 
admonishment by the very agents who praised the economic performance 
of these countries during the boom.
There is a broad consensus that fundamentals are the most relevant 
variables. However there is disagreement about what constitute sound 
fundamentals and how to achieve and sustain them. A comprehensive 
definition of sound fundamentals should include (alongside low inflation, 
a sound fiscal balance and dynamic exports) sustainable external deficits 
and net debts, low net liquid liabilities, a non-outlier real exchange rate, 
a crowding in of domestic savings, high investment in human and physical
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capital, strong prudential regulation and supervision, and a transparent 
financial system. In recessive periods this requires the achievement of a 
structural fiscal balance (recognizing that during recessions tax proceeds are 
abnormally low and that public expenditure should not follow suit) and 
strong encouragement of demand, with a switch of policies when domestic 
activity is clearly below productive capacity (see Ffrench-Davis, 2000: ch. 6).
Finally, there is a growing duality, worrisome for democracy, in the 
constituencies served by the authorities. The increasing complexity of and 
course taken by economic globalization are increasing the distance between 
decision makers, financial agents and the agents (workers and firms) who 
bear the consequences. One consequence of the path being taken by 
globalization is that experts in financial intermediation -  which requires 
only microeconomic training -  have become a determining factor in the 
evolution of countries' macroeconomy; instead a good economic system 
needs to reward productivity improvements rather than speculation and 
rent seeking.
The integration of capital markets has strong implications for the gover­
nance of domestic policies and the constituencies of national governments. 
In fact most leaders of emerging countries have a dual constituency: on the 
one hand they seek reelection by their countries' voters, and on the other 
they seek the support of those who 'vote' for their financial investments 
(Pietrobelli and Zamagni, 2000). Recent cycles in financial markets have 
revealed a significant contradiction between the two in a negative sum 
game. A positive outcome requires institutions and policies that can achieve 
consistency between the level and composition of financial flows, and real 
macroeconomic sustainability.
Notes
* I  a m  grate fu l fo r  the  c o m m e n ts  m a d e  b y  the  p a rt ic ip a n ts  in  th e  U N U / W ID E R  project, 
p a rt ic u la r ly  José  A n t o n io  O c a m p o  a n d  S te p h a n y  G riffith -Jo n e s; b y  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  
in  a se m in a r  at th e  D E S A / U N  h ead qu arte rs; a n d  b y  th e  M a c r o e c o n o m ic  G r o u p  o f  
th e  In it ia t iv e  fo r  P o lic y  D ia lo g u e ,  d irected  b y  J o se p h  S t ig litz . I  a lso  ap p rec ia te  the  
v a lu a b le  a ss ista n ce  o f  a n d  s u g g e s t io n s  b y  R ic a rd o  G o t t s c h a lk  ( ID S )  a n d  H e rib e rto  
T a p ia  (E C L A C ) .  T h e  re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  a ll in te rp re ta t io n s  is  s o le ly  m in e .
1. T h e  d irect p o s it iv e  l in k  b e tw een  E D I  a n d  p ro d u c t iv e  in v e s tm e n t  (F fre n c h -D a v is  
a n d  Re isen, 1998: ch . 1) w a s  w e ak e n e d  b y  th e  fact th a t  a  s ig n if ic a n t  share  o f  F D I  
co r re sp o n d e d  to  m erge rs  a n d  a c q u is it io n s  in ste a d  o f  c re a tin g  n e w  capac ity . It  is  
e stim a te d  th a t  m e rge rs  a n d  a c q u is it io n s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  49  per ce n t  o f  F D I  to  L a t in  
A m e r ic a  in  1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 0  ( U N C T A D ,  2001).
2. T h e  accelerated g r o w th  o f  d eriva tive s m arke ts  h e lp e d  to  so ften  m ic ro  in stab ility , b u t  
te n d e d  to  in crease  m a c ro  in s ta b il ity  a n d  to  reduce  tran sp aren cy . For a n  a n a ly s is  o f  
th e  c h a n n e ls  b y  w h ic h  s ta b ility  a n d  in s ta b il ity  are tran sm itte d , see C h a p te r  6.
3. B y  'f in a n c ie r is t ' w e  m e a n  a m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o lic y  a p p ro a c h  th a t  le ad s to  a n  
extrem e  p re d o m in a n c e  o f  o r  d e p e n d e n c y  o n  a ge n ts  w h o  sp ec ia lize  in  m ic ro e c o ­
n o m ic  aspects o f  fin an ce , p la c e d  in  th e  sh o rt-te rm  o r  l iq u id  se g m e n ts  o f  cap ita l 
m arkets.
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4. Th ere  is  a d if fe re n t issue, b u t  a lso  re levant, a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  g a p  b e tw een  
average  (p riva te ) a n d  m a rg in a l (so c ia l) co sts  o f  b o r ro w in g  b y  e m e rg in g  e co n o m ie s.  
See H arb e rge r (1985).
5. In  C h a p te r  3 Pe rsau d  a rgu e s  th a t  m o d e rn  r isk  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  in v e s t in g  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  (su c h  as fu n d s  a n d  b a n ks), b a se d  o n  v a lu e -a t-r isk  m e a su re d  d a ily  a n d  
w ith  lim it s  set fo r  d a ily  e a rn in g s  a t risk, w o rk s  p ro c y c lic a l ly  in  b o o m s  a n d  busts. 
P ro cy c lic a lity  is  re in fo rce d  b y  a  tre n d  to w a rd s  th e  h o m o g e n iz a t io n  o f  cre d ito r  
agents.
6. V u ln e ra b ilit ie s  w ere s t ill s ig n if ic a n t  in  e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s  w h e n  n e ga t iv e  s ig n a ls  
reappeared  in  th e  w o r ld  e c o n o m y , in c lu d in g  th e  d o w n w a r d  a d ju s tm e n t  in  th e  
U n ite d  States.
7. N e ith e r  o f  these  is  a  su b st itu te  fo r  th e  r isks th a t  p ro c y c lic a l o r  'ir re sp o n s ib le ' 
m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o lic ie s  generate.
8. T h e  m ark e ts  h a v e  m a d e  so m e  p ro gre ss  to w a rd s  s ta b ility  b y  in t r o d u c in g  c o u n te r ­
c y c lic a l a d ju s tm e n t  c lau se s  fo r  lo an s : fo r  in sta n c e  tied  to  e xp o rt  p rice s (see 
C h a p te r  14) a n d  co lle c t ive  a c t io n  c lau se s  (see C h a p te r  8). O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d  
r isk -ra t in g  a ge n c ie s  c o n t in u e  to  b e h a ve  p ro c y c lic a l ly  a n d  to  fo l lo w  ra th e r th a n  
le ad  th e  f in a n c ia l m a rk e ts  (see C h a p te r  7).
9. See fo r in s ta n c e  Le  Fort a n d  L e h m a n n  (20 00) a n d  A g o s in  a n d  F fre n c h -D a v is  (2001) 
o n  C h ile ,  a n d  K a p la n  a n d  R o d r ik  (20 01) o n  M a la y s ia .
10. T h ere  h a v e  b e e n  s izab le  a c q u is it io n s  o f  b a n k s  in  e m e rg in g  e co n o m ie s , p a rt ic u la r ly  
i n  C e n t ra l E u ro p e  a n d  L a t in  A m e rica . For in s ta n c e  in  2 0 0 0  h a lf  o f  A rg e n t in a 's  
b a n k  assets b e lo n g e d  to  fo re ig n  c o n tro lle d  b an ks. In te re stin g ly , fo re ig n  o w n e r ­
s h ip  im p lie s  th a t  o ffsh o re  le n d in g  b y  these  b a n k s  h a s  b e e n  co n ve rte d  to  o n sh o re  
le n d in g  (see C h a p te r s  4  a n d  5). T h e  c o n v e n t io n a l a rg u m e n t  th a t  th e  lo c a l 
p resence  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k s  w o u ld  h e lp  e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s  to  c o n fro n t  f in a n c ia l  
s h o c k s  h a s  a p p a re n t ly  n o t  b e e n  su p p o r te d  in  A rg e n t in a .
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3L iq u id ity  Black Holes: W h y  M o d ern  
Financial R egulation in  Developed  
C ountries is M ak in g  Short-Term  
C ap ita l Flows to  D evelop ing  
Countries Even M ore V o la tile
Avinash Persaud
Since the early 1990s financial regulation has been about the spread of 
market-sensitive risk-management systems for banks, the spillover of this 
approach to other financial institutions and, in general, the retreat of regu­
latory ambition. There is growing evidence that these trends are leading 
to a more fragile financial system that is prone to concentration, crisis and 
'liquidity black holes'. This problem has not been sufficiently addressed 
because, although it is born of the regulation of financial institutions in 
developed countries, its most glaring effects are the procyclicality and 
volatility of capital flows to emerging markets (Griffith-Jones, 1998; Ffrench- 
Davis and Reisen, 1998).
The root of the problem is that the liquidity of financial markets requires 
diversity, but all these trends are serving to reduce the diversity of behaviour 
among market participants. Regulators should have a more global per­
spective on the implications of their local regulation. In order to encourage, 
and perhaps impose, greater diversity in the financial system as a whole, 
regulators need to place less reliance on internal ratings-based approaches to 
bank risk management; they must encourage the adoption of alternative, 
countercyclical risk management systems by long-term investors and, 
within limits, should temper their discouragement of offshore, leveraged 
institutions.
W hat is Liquidity?
Confusingly, liquidity has many different though often related meanings. 
As an instrument of monetary policy, central banks influence the amount of 
liquidity in the money markets through the sale and repurchase of Treasury
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bills. In popular commentaries on the equity market, liquidity conditions 
often refer to new demand for equities coming from the flow of savings from 
investors. In this chapter we are not concerned with the grand subjects of 
monetary policy or the flow of private savings, but with liquidity conditions 
for trading in capital markets. This liquidity is about the speed and cost of 
buying or selling loans, bonds or equities (Bank of Japan, 1999). If I were 
selling an instrument in a liquid market, I would not expect my selling 
in itself to lower the price I was paid. In an illiquid market, on the other 
hand, I might have to push the market price down in order to find a buyer. 
Investors try to avoid illiquid markets. Pushing the price up when you are 
buying and pushing it down when you are selling will erode your returns. 
Moreover these trading costs are often variable, hard to measure and intro­
duce uncertainty. As well as being a major obstacle to encouraging overseas 
capital, illiquid financial markets are bad at converting local savings into 
local investment. Liquidity matters more than the sparse literature on the 
subject would suggest.
Liquidity is under-researched because it is hard to measure the price impact 
of trading without detailed information on who sold what, when and at what 
price. Consequently most measures of liquidity in the securities markets 
focus on the size of the bid-ask spreads quoted by market makers on 
electronic brokerage systems, and in the loan markets on the amount of new 
loans that are issued. Comprehensive loan issuance and turnover data are not 
very timely -  they are often available only quarterly -  and so when trying to 
understand the behaviour of liquidity most analysts study the time series of 
bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange, equity or government bond markets 
(Engle and Lange, 1997; Borio, 2000). In a competitive market this spread 
should represent the estimated cost to the market maker of getting out of 
a position, which in turn should relate to the market's liquidity.
If market makers begin by not having a position in a stock and they expect 
their buying of that stock to push its price up and/or to take time, they will 
try to pass on that future price -  and the risks of being short on the stock as 
they try to buy it -  to clients who wish to buy the stock from them. They 
will do this through the bid price they quote for the stock. Similarly if they 
believe that selling the stock will push the price down, they will want to pass 
on that new price and the risk of being long on the stock to clients who wish 
to sell the stock to them, and they will do this through the ask price they 
quote. Often the market makers will already have a position and this will 
influence their preference for buying or selling more, but on average, across 
market makers, the spread between the bid and ask price should reflect their 
forecasts of the price of getting out of a position in the stock, which in 
turn reflects the underlying liquidity conditions (O'Hara, 1995; Fleming 
and Remolona, 1999). The problem with using reported bid-ask spreads, 
however, is that they are only quoted on small trades, and the larger the size 
of trade and the more market conditions are under stress, the wider the
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spreads. Bid-ask spreads are a good  m easure o f liqu id ity  during good  liqu id ity  
con d ition s, but n o t  during poor co n d itio n s -  w h ich  o f  course is exactly  
w h en  a m easure is needed .
O ne so lu tio n  to  th is  data p roblem  is to  use custod ia l databases that record  
b o th  qu an tity  and  price in form ation  o n  purchases and  sales b y  investors. 
State Street is o n e  o f  th e  w orld's largest custod ians, w ith  approxim ately  
U S$6 trillion  o f  assets under custod y  or 10 per cen t o f  th e  w orld's tradable 
securities. U sing  th is database at an  aggregate level, Ken Froot and  Paul 
O 'C on n ell o f  Harvard U niversity  and  State Street A ssociates (State Street 
Bank and  FDO Partners, 2000) have d evelop ed  an  in d ex  o f  th e  price im pact 
faced  b y  overseas investors w h en  b u y in g  and  se llin g  equ ities in  42  m arkets.
Figure 3.1 show s th e  average percentage price im pact faced  b y  an overseas 
in vestor w h en  b u y in g  or sellin g  o n e  basis p o in t o f  th e  cap ita lization  o f  
an  em erging  eq u ity  market. This graph suggests th at liq u id ity  is returning. 
T he bad new s is that it has taken an  extraordinarily lo n g  tim e to  d o  so -  
3 0  m on th s, fo llo w in g  a series o f  liq u id ity  d rain ing even ts in  1998: th e  
u n w in d in g  o f  th e  U S $/yen  carry trade in  July, th e  Russian defau lt in  A ugust 
and  th e  collapse o f  Long Term C apital M an agem ent (LTCM), an  overly  lever­
aged h ed ge fund , in  Septem ber. In 1999 liq u id ity  was probably h eld  d ow n  
by tw o  o th er  factors. First, there w as con cern  about th e  m illen n iu m  bug, 
w h ich  was p oten tia lly  o f  greatest threat to  em erging markets. Second, 
in v estm en t banks, hurt by  th e  even ts o f  1998, rem oved  their  trading  
infrastructure from  m a n y  em erging m arkets. It w as said th a t o n e  large US
(July) (Apr.) (Jan.) (Oct.) (July) (Apr.) (Jan.)
Figure 3.1 L iq u id i t y  in d e x  fo r  e m e rg in g  e q u i ty  m a rk e ts , 1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 2  (p e rce n ta g e  
r e tu r n  p e r  bas is  p o in t  o f  m a rk e t  cap )
Source: State Street Bank.
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in v estm en t bank h ad  4 0 0  em p loyees in  its M oscow  office  trading Russian  
debt and  stocks in  A ugust 1998, just before th e  Russian default, bu t just four  
in  A ugust 1999.
Figure 3.1 sh ow s a striking variability  in  liquidity. T he F root-O 'C onnell 
m eth o d o lo g y  m oderates th is  to  som e ex ten t b y  m easuring price im pact over  
a period  o f  100 days, b u t it is clear th at sharp d eclin es in  liq u id ity  w ere  
n o t just a feature o f  1998. Over th e  past five years there h ave b een  tw o  occa­
sion s each  year w h en  th e  average price im pact o f se llin g  em erging  eq u ity  
m arkets has risen sharply. This is an average: som e m arkets suffer m ore th an  
others. This variability  is particularly trou b lin g  for investors. Indeed  there  
is ev id en ce th at th e  rude aw aken in g  to  liqu id ity  issues in  1998  led  to  an  
increased preference b y  investors for m arkets w ith  h ig h  and  stable liquidity. 
This has kept overseas investors o u t o f  em erging m arkets for an ex ten d ed  
period, even  th o u g h  m an y  o f  th ese  markets have offered, o n  a historical basis, 
attractive in v estm en t y ield s (Figure 3.2).
L iq u id ity  b la c k  h o le s
If a m arket is co n sisten tly  and  m easurably illiquid , investors w ill dem and  
a liq u id ity  prem ium  b u t w ill probably n o t avoid  th e  m arket altogether. 
If a m arket appears liqu id , especia lly  w h en  o n e  buys in to  it, b u t b ecom es  
illiqu id  just w h en  o n e  w an ts to  sell, th is  generates a degree o f  u ncerta in ty
Figure 3.2  C ro s s -b o rd e r  p o r t f o l io  f lo w s  to  e m e rg in g  e q u i ty  m a rk e ts  ( e x c lu d in g  
H o n g  K o n g , K o re a , T a iw a n  a n d  S in g a p o re ) as a p r o p o r t io n  o f  m a rk e t  c a p ita l iz a t io n ,  
1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 2  (c u m u la t iv e  basis  p o in ts  o f  m a rk e t c a p ita l iz a t io n ,  J a n u a ry  fig u re s )
Source: State Street Bank.
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th at investors and  creditors strongly  dislike, especia lly  w ith  th e  current 
em p hasis o n  q uan titative risk controls. M easurem ents o f  liq u id ity  th at are 
m ean in gfu l to  m arket participants sh ou ld  in clu d e n o t just th e  average level 
o f liq u id ity  bu t also th e  vo la tility  o f  liquidity. O f course liquidity, especia lly  
w h en  d efin ed  in  term s o f  h o w  m u ch  th e  price m oves for a g iven  flow, is 
a m easure o f  th e  v o la tility  o f  price (and so in  m easuring th e  v o la tility  o f  
liq u id ity  w e are m easuring th e  vo la tility  o f  vo la tility  -  th e  th ird  derivative  
o f price). In th is chapter, ep isodes w here liq u id ity  sud d en ly  disappears w ill 
b e called  'liqu id ity  black  holes', partly because liq u id ity  appears to  be sucked  
o u t o f  m arkets that are in  th e  v ic in ity  o f th e  o n e  at th e  centre o f  a liq u id ity  
event. Investors are concerned  that w h ile , in  general, th e  level o f  liqu id ity  has 
fin a lly  returned to  levels last seen  in  1 9 9 6 -9 7 , th e  num ber o f  liq u id ity  black  
h o les m ay h ave increased.
O ne sim ple m easure o f  th e  frequency o f liqu id ity  black h o les is to  cou n t the  
num ber o f  tim es there is a spike in  vo latility . Figure 3 .3  tracks th e  num ber  
o f days in  a quarter th a t th e  broad m arket in d ices for US, UK and  Japanese  
stocks (S&P 500, FTSE and  Topix, respectively) m o v ed  b y  tw o  standard  
d ev ia tion s m ore th a n  th e  average daily  m arket m ove. To capture th e  trend  
better w e h ave  p lo tted  a five-year m o v in g  average o f  th is quarterly tally, and  
replaced th e  outliers -  th e  three largest and  three sm allest readings -  w ith  
th e  average reading. There appears to  be a regular cycle to  th is m easure o f  
volatility , bu t b o th  th e  quarterly bars and  th e  sm o o th ed  average suggest th at  
th e  num ber o f  extrem e events or liq u id ity  black  h o les  h ave risen sign ifi­
can tly  sin ce  th e  m id  1990s. It is reasonable to  q u estion  h o w  m u ch  th is  is
60  -. —  Five-year smoothed average 
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Figure 3.3  L iq u id i t y  b la c k  h o le s : n u m b e r  o f  da ys  p e r  f i r s t  q u a r te r  th a t  th e  US, Japanese 
a n d  B r it is h  b ro a d  s to c k  in d ic e s  m o v e d  b y  tw o  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n s  m o re  th a n  th e  
average  d a i ly  p r ic e  m o v e , 1 9 7 8 -2 0 0 2
Source: State Street Bank.
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a trend  and  h o w  m u ch  it is related to  th e  great rise and  su bsequent fall in  
eq u ity  prices b e tw een  1998  and  2001 . It is hard to  be sure, bu t it is eq ually  
reasonable to  ask w h eth er  liq u id ity  factors h elp ed  to  produce th is surge 
and  collapse. It is a lso in terestin g  to  observe th at th e  upw ard trend in  black  
h o les con tin u ed  b ey o n d  th e  peak and  b o tto m  in  eq u ity  prices in  M arch and  
Septem ber 2000 , respectively. M oreover a sim ilar trend in  b lack  h o les  can  
b e seen  ou tside th e  eq u ity  m arkets in  th e  U S$/yen  foreign  exch an ge  m arket 
(Figure 3.4).
W e have focused  o n  ev id en ce o f  liqu id ity  black ho les in  th e  m ajor markets 
because their presence in  large, grow ing m arkets is m o st striking, h ow ever  
th ere is certain ly ev id en ce o f liq u id ity  black  h o les  in  em erging  m arkets to o  
(Persaud, 2001b ). T he q u estion  is, w h y  are liq u id ity  black h o les  b eco m in g  
m ore frequent in  general?
L iq u id ity  is  a b o u t  d iv e rs ity , n o t  s ize , a n d  th e  tw o  a re  n o t  
s y n o n y m o u s
T he assum ption  th at th e  bigger a m arket th e  m ore liqu id  it is, is so  prevalent 
th at turnover and  liq u id ity  are o ften  seen  as syn on ym ou s. In fact th e  tw o  
are o n ly  ind irectly  related. Im agine a m arket place w ith  tw o  assets (govern­
m en t b on d s and  cash) and  just tw o  players (A nish an d  Ishan), an d  im agin e  
th at w hen ever  A n ish  w an ted  to  b u y  bon d s w ith  h is cash, Ishan w an ted  cash  
for h is bonds, and  vice versa. This w ou ld  b e a very liq u id  m arket w ith  th e  
price im pact o f  trading b e in g  n il for b o th  A nish  and  Ishan. N o w  im agin e  
th at A nish, bored  w ith  such  provincial bliss, m oves to  a b igger m arket place
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 19881990 1992 1994 19961998 2000 2002
Figure 3 .4  L iq u id i t y  b la c k  h o le s : n u m b e r  o f  d a ys  p e r  f i r s t  q u a r te r  t h a t  U S $ /y e n  
m o v e d  tw o  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n s  m o re  t h a n  th e  a v e ra g e  d a i ly  p r ic e  m o re ,  
1 9 7 0 -2 0 0 2
Source: State Street Bank.
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w ith  10 0 0 0  players, and  that w h en ever  h e  w an ted  to  b u y  b on d s for cash  so 
did  th e  other 9 999 , and  w h en ever  h e  w an ted  to  sell so  d id  th e  other 9 999. 
W h en  b u yin g , A nish  w ou ld  have to  b id  up  th e  price o f b on d s a lo n g  w ay  to  
turn o n e  o f  th e  o th er  buyers in to  a seller. The sam e w ou ld  be true w h en  
h e  tried to  sell. T he price im pact o f  b u y in g  or selling  w o u ld  be h igh . The  
m arket m ay have b een  bigger in  term s o f  th e  num ber o f  players and  
th e  am ou n t o f b on d s and  cash  b e in g  m anaged , and  ev en  in  term s o f  th e  
turnover, but it w o u ld  have b een  less liq u id  in  term s o f  th e  price im pact o f  
trading. Markets can  b e bigger and  yet th inner: liq u id ity  requires diversity.
O f course th is is an extrem e exam p le and  it is sensib le to  assum e th at th e  
m ore m arket players there are, th e  greater th e  d iversity o f  o p in io n s  and  
desired trades. T he lin k  b etw een  liq u id ity  and  size m ay b e indirect, b u t it 
certain ly  exists. T he problem  is th at a lth ou gh  m arkets are generally  gettin g  
bigger, a num ber o f  separate forces have consp ired  to  reduce diversity. T hese  
forces have grow n strongly since th e  m id  1990s, a period in  w h ich , according  
to  th e  data w e have just considered , m a n y  m arkets appeared to  b e grow ing  
larger and  yet th inner, or at least m ore vo la tile . T he three m ain  forces 
reducing d iversity are th e  collap se o f  in form ation  costs, th e  co n so lid a tio n  o f  
m arket players and  m odern  risk-m anagem ent and  regulatory practices. The  
fo llo w in g  d iscu ssion  w ill to u ch  o n  th e  first tw o  forces and  dw ell longer on  
th e  last.
F orces r e d u c in g  th e  d iv e r s i ty  o f  b e h a v io u r  i n  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts  
The collapse o f  in fo rm a tio n  costs
In th e  past, o n e  source o f  d iversity  o f  v iew s w as th e  cost o f  in form ation: th e  
higher th e  cost o f  o b ta in in g  in form ation  th e  greater th e  d iversity o f  v iew s, 
especially  b etw een  market insiders and outsiders. A num ber o f  factors, such as 
th e  exp o n en tia l rise in  th e  co m p u tin g  pow er o f  com puter ch ips, m ass access 
to  th e  Internet an d  deregu lation  o f th e  airwaves and  te leco m m u n ica tio n s  
netw orks, h ave led  to  th e  co llapse o f  in form ation  costs, w h ich  in  turn has 
dram atically  reduced th e  d iversity o f  in form ation . A rm ed w ith  th e  n ew  
tech n o logy , regulators h ave accelerated th is process th rou gh  in itia tives  
su ch  as th e  US SEC's Fair D isclosure R egulation, w h ich  requires com p an ies  
to  broadcast price-sensitive in form ation  to  everyon e at th e  sam e tim e (in  
practice, via th e  Internet) an d  n o  longer g ive preferential treatm ent to  a 
sm all co m m u n ity  o f  professional analysts.
T he encou ragem en t o f d eve lop in g  countries to  m eet specific codes and  
standards is also causing  investors to  possess and  use sim ilar in form ation  
sets (see Archarya, 2001). T hanks to  such  regu lations and  popular financial 
new s broadcasters such  as B loom berg and  CNN, th e  outsiders have, to  a 
large ex ten t, step ped  in sid e . If there is a favourable p iece  o f  in form ation  
about a com pany's stock  or a country's fu n d am en ta ls and  th is is m ade
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available to  everyon e at th e  sam e tim e, everyone w ill w an t to  b u y  at th e  
sam e tim e and  th e  price o f  th e  stock  has to  rise a lo n g  w ay  to  co n v in ce  som e  
buyers to  b e sellers (W ermers, 1998). In th e  bad  old  days th e  insiders w ou ld  
have b ou gh t th e  stock  ch eap ly  from  th e  b lissfu lly  ign oran t outsiders. The 
m arkets are m ore equitab le and  transparent tod ay  -  and  less liqu id  because  
o f it.
M arket co nso lida tion
Even before th e  1999  G ram m -L each-B iley  Act, w h ic h  repealed th e  1933  
G lass-Steagall Act, th e  attem pt b y  US Senator Carter Glass and  R epresentative 
H enry Steagall to  separate d ifferent finan cia l activ ities in to  separate firm s 
h ad  b een  w atered  d ow n . C on so lid atin g  d ifferent b u t related financial 
activities, o ften  w ith  th e  sam e clien ts, led  to  substantial savings and  positive  
synergies (w h ich  is w h y  an  Act had  b een  required to  enforce th e  earlier 
separation), and  served as a strong in cen tiv e  for con so lid a tio n . D iversity has  
b een  reduced b y  there b e in g  fewer, m ore vertically  in tegrated  players in  
th e  market.
This co n so lid a tio n  can  be seen  clearly in  th e  foreign  exch an ge  m arket. 
In th e  1995 BIS survey o f  foreign  exch an ge  activity, so m e 2 417  banks from  
26 countries participated. By 2001  th is num ber had  dropped by  2 0  per cen t  
to  1 9 4 5 . In th e  U n ited  States in  1995, 20  o f  th ese  banks accou n ted  for 75 per 
cen t o f  forex transactions. By 2001  just 13 banks accou n ted  for 75 per cen t  
o f forex transactions. The foreign  exch an ge m arket rem ains th e  'largest', w ith  
a daily  turnover o f  U S$1.5 trillion , but in  2001  o n ly  2 0  banks around th e  
w orld  qu oted  tw o-w ay  prices o n  a w id e range o f  currency pairs (BIS, 2001).
M arket-sensitive risk  m an ag em en t system s
There is an in terestin g  d iscrepancy b etw een  th e  large degree to  w h ich  
financia l crises are external and  system ic and  relate to  th e  herd behaviou r  
o f  creditors in  d evelop ed  countries, and  th e  focus o f  p o licy  m akers o n  th e  
n eed  for d om estic  reform s (Eatwell, 1997). It is argued b y  m a n y  develop ed - 
cou n try  p o licy  makers, an d  is currently perhaps m ost strongly  espoused  
b y  th e  U n ited  K ingdom , th at if  banks and  countries w ere to  adopt tighter  
prudential, supervisory an d  risk-m anagem ent controls, liq u id ity  or so lven cy  
crises w ou ld  n o t h app en , and  if  there was n o  in itia l crisis, there w ou ld  be 
n o  subsequent co n ta g io n  -  w h atever th e  flaws in  th e  current fin an cia l archi­
tecture. This m ay be true, b u t th e  real prob lem  has co m e w ith  th e  attem pt 
to  im prove th ese  contro ls b y  stepp ing  aw ay from  th e  previous system  o f  
a few  regulatory risk buckets o u tlin ed  in  th e  original Basel C apital A dequacy  
A ccord (1988) an d  th e  stride tow ards m arket-sensitive risk m an agem en t  
system s.
This has b een  m otivated  b y  a num ber o f  factors. First, there is con cern  
th at u sin g  a few  broad categories o f  risk w h en  regu lating th e  activ ities o f  
participants in  fin an cia l m arkets, is prone to  regulatory arbitrage th rough
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th e  in n o v a tio n  o f  financial in stru m ents th at appear to  sit in  a low-risk  
category b ut have th e  characteristics o f  a high-risk in strum en t. Second, th e  
previous broad risk-bucket approach failed to  capture th e  grow ing com p lex ity  
and  range o f  n ew  fin ancia l instrum ents, even  w h en  regulatory arbitrage was 
n o t a m o tiv e  for their in n o v a tio n . Third, there is a b e lie f th a t has sp illed  
over from  oth er w alks o f  life th at public officia ls can n ot presum e to  k n ow  
m ore th an  th e  m arket w h en  assessing risk. W h ile  th is m ay in d eed  b e true 
in  general, it is least applicable to  th e  w ork o f  th e  regulators o f  financial 
m arkets. After all, financial crises occur because m arkets fail, and  th is  is w h y  
th e  in creasing u se o f m arket-sensitive risk m an agem en t system s has n o t led  
to  a m ore robust and  effic ien t finan cia l system , b u t to  o n e  that is m ore  
pron e to  finan cia l crisis and  in d u ces m ore con cen tra tion  o f  fin an cia l risks 
(Persaud, 2000).
M o d e m  r is k  m a n a g e m e n t  th e o ry :  v a lu e  a t  r is k  a n d  d a i ly  
e a r n in g s  a t  r is k
In essen ce  value-at-risk (VaR) system s estim ate th e  am ou n t o f  a bank's daily  
earnings th at are at risk, at a g iven  probability, u sin g  th e  d istribution  o f  th e  
vo la tility  and  correlation  o f  th e  p ortfo lio  o f  assets and  liab ilities w ith  w h ich  
th e  bank  has exposure. T he m ore vo la tile  an  asset th e  greater th e  lik elih ood  
o f a loss, u n less  it  is in verse ly  correlated w ith  a n o th er  asset in  th e  p ort­
fo lio . Lower v o la tility  o f assets, and  correlation  b etw een  assets, reduce daily  
earnings at risk (DEAR). A rise in  vo la tility  and  correlation does th e  opposite . 
M ost o ften  th e  bank's risk m an agem en t process is to  set a lim it for DEAR, 
and  if th e  lim it is reached, to  take action  to  reduce DEAR b y  sellin g  th e  m ost  
v o la tile  or m ost h ig h ly  correlated assets.
T he in trinsic  p rob lem  w ith  m arket-sensitive risk m an agem en t system s -  
a p roblem  th at ca n n o t b e so lved  b y  increasingly  sop h istica ted  statistical 
m od els  and  th e  use o f  stress tests -  is th a t th ey  assum e th at banks and  
m arket participants act in d ep en d en tly  and  th at th e  p ositio n s o f o n e  bank  
are in d ep en d en t o f  th ose  o f  another. In a w orld  o f in d ep en d en t m arket 
players there is a strong probability  th at th e  se llin g  o f securities b y  o n e  bank  
cou ld  b e m et b y  th e  purchases o f another. T he reality, o f  course, is d ifferent. 
M arket participants an d  banks b eh ave in  strategic relation  w ith  o n e  another. 
O ften  th ey  herd  in to  o n e  or a sim ilar set o f  m arkets or instrum ents. There 
are a num ber o f  in d iv id u a lly  rational reasons for herd ing  behaviour, n o t  
least because there is safety in  num bers, b o th  fin an cia lly  and  in  term s o f  
reputation  (Shiller, 1990). If o n e  bank m akes an in v estm en t m istake th e  
regulators m ay let it go  under, as in  th e  case o f  Barings in  th e  U n ited  
K ingdom . If all banks m ake th e  sam e m istake, th e  regulators w ill bail th em  
o u t in  order to  preserve th e  fin an cia l system . M oreover in  a w orld  o f  un cer­
ta in ty  th e  cheapest strategy for ca tch in g  up  w ith  th ose  y o u  th in k  are better  
in form ed  is to  fo llo w  them .
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W h en  vo la tility  rises in  o n e  market, increasing DEAR and  p rom p tin g  
a bank  to  sell its risky assets, it is likely  th at th e  DEAR lim its w ill b e  reached  
b y  m an y  banks. T he dynam ics th en  go from  bad to  w orse. As m a n y  banks 
try to  sell th e  sam e asset at th e  sam e tim e, there are few  or n o  buyers and  
so  th e  price gaps narrow  an d  vo la tility  rises further, w h ich  increases DEAR 
again and triggers further sales. Faced w ith  a gap ing  market, som e banks w ill 
try to  reduce DEAR b y  sellin g  an oth er  asset that is h e ld  by  th e  herd  partly  
because it is uncorrelated  w ith  th e  first. H ow ever th is n o t  o n ly  increases 
vo la tility  in  th e  seco n d  asset, b u t also increases correlation. Higher volatility , 
and  n o w  correlation  too , n o t o n ly  raise DEAR at th e  first set o f  banks, but 
also at a secon d  set o f  banks th at m ay n o t h ave had  th e  first asset, and  
so m ore banks and  m ore m arkets are sucked in to  th e  process. T he resu lting  
co n tag ion  o f  se llin g  m ystifies m ost analysts because th e  m arkets th at are h it  
are fu n d am en ta lly  unrelated . T he step p in g-ston e path  o f th e  A sian financial 
crisis from  T hailand  to  Ind onesia  and  M alaysia, th en  to  Korea and  o n  to  
Russia, and  fin a lly  to  Brazil, w as n o t related to  th e  p ath  o f  trade flow s, b u t  
to  th e  path  o f  shared creditors and  bankers (Persaud, 2001a).
A p e r p le x in g  p a r a d ig m
In th e  co n tex t o f  u ncerta in ty  and  investor behaviour, th e  VaR approach n o t  
o n ly  leads to  co n ta g io n  w h en  it com b in es w ith  herd behaviour, b u t also  
contributes to  herd in g  in  th e  first p lace. VaR system s h ig h lig h t th o se  sets o f  
m arkets w h ich  currently offer lo w  vo la tility  and  lo w  correlation, and  thus  
'safe' returns, w h ic h  prom pts m a n y  players to  sw itch  in to  th ese  m arkets 
over tim e, u n til at som e p o in t there is a large co n so lid a tio n  o f  p o sitio n s -  
a herd. The o p p osite  also occurs. VaR system s h ig h lig h t th e  current set o f  
m arkets th at offer h igh  v o la tility  and  correlation  and  as a con seq u en ce  
investors stay clear o f  th ese  m arkets, m aking  th em  less correlated and  less 
vo la tile  over tim e and  less prone to  con tag ion . Here is a perp lexing paradigm: 
th e  observation  o f  safety creates risk (as th e  herd chases after w h at w as safe 
and investors b ecom e overly concentrated) and  th e  observation  o f  risk creates 
safety (as th e  herd  avoid s w h at w as risky). In th is w ay  m arket-sensitive risk 
m an agem en t system s dangerously  add to  th e  procyclica lity  o f  capital flow s  
(Persaud, 2000; Turner, 2000).
We are in  th e  latter en v iro n m en t today. L ooking th rou gh  a five-year 
w in d o w  o f returns, vo la tilities and  corrections, em erging m arkets still appear 
to  be th e  last places o n  earth an investor w ou ld  w an t to  be, w ith  their lo w  
to  negative returns, h ig h  risks and  volatility , and  h ig h  correlation . C on ­
seq u en tly  investors h ave aban d on ed  th is space and  so w h en  'accidents' 
happ en , such  as in  Turkey in  D ecem ber 2 0 0 0  and  February 2001 , and  
A rgentina in  D ecem ber 2001 , there is n o  con tag ion . T he regulators th in k  that 
th is is a sign  o f  a m ore robust system , but th ey  are m istaken . The five-year
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w in d o w  w ill so o n  sh o w  th at em erging m arkets are safer, less correlated  
and  m ore profitable, and  th e  herd w ill return. A lready in  2001  th e  advan ce  
party, com prising  em erging-m arket h ed ge funds, p osted  th e  best in vestm en t  
perform ance ou t o f  a broad range o f  in v estm en t sectors and  styles. Far from  
b ein g  robust, th e  in tern ation a l fin an cia l system  appears to  deliver either to o  
m u ch  capital to  em erging  m arkets or to o  little  (Gurria, 1995; Griffith-Jones, 
1998). This supports neither econ om ic  d evelop m en t nor th e  necessary reform  
process in  m an y  em erging  financia l m arkets (W illiam son, 1993).
T h e  c r e e p in g  in f lu e n c e  o f  b a n k  r e g u la t io n
T hroughout th is chapter w e  h ave lu m p ed  th e  behaviour o f  banks w ith  
th a t o f  o ther creditors and  investors in  general. H ow ever th e  Basel C apital 
A dequacy Accord is designed  for th e  regu lation  o f  banks, n o t  all investors. 
W h y is th e  herd ing  o f  banks n o t  o ffset b y  longer-term  investors lo o k in g  to  
pick  up  a bargain in  th e  w ake o f  th e  forced sellin g  triggered b y  VaR m odels?  
T he problem  is th at th e  vast m ajority  o f  investors and  creditors n o w  use th e  
VaR approach. This is n o t  en tirely  ou t o f  free ch o ice . To b eg in  w ith  there is 
regulatory creep. Regulators are ca jo lin g  other financial in stitu tion s, espe­
cia lly  in surance com p an ies and  fu n d  m anagers, to  adopt th e  VaR approach  
in  th e  m istaken  b e lie f th at co m m o n  standards are good . W here herd ing  is 
prevalent, h igh  standards are good; co m m o n  standards are bad.
H ow ever even  w h ere regulators are n o t breath ing  d o w n  th e  necks o f  
investors, m a n y  ch o o se  to  fo llo w  th e  VaR approach. W hy? In a w orld  of 
u n certa in ty  w ith  a lo n g  h istory  o f  fin ancia l crises and  rogue traders, it is 
hard for in vestors to  te ll their trustees th at th ey  are u sin g  a risk m an agem en t 
system  th at n o b o d y  else uses. Investors generally  approve o f  exp erim en ­
ta tion , b u t o n ly  w ith  other peop les' m on ey . T he irony, o f  course, is th at 
a d iversity  o f risk m an agem en t system s, w ith  long-term  investors and  
creditors fo llo w in g  a risk m an agem en t approach th at is m ore suitable for 
their objectives, w o u ld  n o t o n ly  reduce th e  num ber o f  liq u id ity  black h o les  
bu t w ou ld  also enab le long-term  investors to  profit. T he fo llo w in g  exam p le  
illustrates th is  p o in t. Im agine a long-term  investor called  Felicity  Foresight. 
Each year Felicity know s w h ich  are th e  ten  best currency trades for th e  year. 
She puts th em  o n  at th e  b eg in n in g  o f  th e  year and  uses a state-of-the-art, 
daily  m ark-to-m arket, value-at-risk, risk m an agem en t system . Over th e  past 
ten  years sh e  w ou ld  have lo s t m o n ey  in  a lm ost every year, stop ped-out 
b y  her risk system  w h en  th e  trades had  g o n e  against her. W hatever you  
th in k  your in v estm en t sty le  is, in  reality  it is largely d eterm ined  b y  your risk 
m an agem en t system . Investors proudly  proclaim  a raft o f  d ifferent styles, 
m od els and  approaches, bu t th e  vast m ajority adopt th e  sam e risk m an ­
agem en t approach and  so th ey  b eh ave like everybody else, lead in g  to  little  
diversity and  m a n y  black h o les .
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W h a t  a re  t h e  s o lu tio n s ?
H aving analyzed  th e  problem s, three so lu tion s com e to  m in d . First, regu­
lators n eed  to  h ig h lig h t as a risk th e  duration  m ism atch  b etw een  long-term  
in vestm en t ob jectives and  short-term  risk m an agem en t system s. T hey  can  
facilitate a narrow ing o f  th is  gap an d  in  so  d o in g  encourage a greater 
diversity o f  b ehaviou r by  g iv in g  their considered  stam p o f  approval to  a few  
and  varied risk m an agem en t approaches. For exam p le in  th e  a ttem p t to  be 
th e  first to  get ou t o f  assets b e in g  dragged d ow n  in  a crisis, risk m an agem en t  
system s are increasingly  focusing  o n  very short-term  correlations an d  vo la til­
ities, and  w h en  th ese  rise risk lim its are h it, triggering further sales. H ow ever  
a bank th at m anages short-term  liab ilities m ay  be m ore in terested  in  a rise in  
th e  short-run correlation  o f  assets during a crisis th an  a long-term  investor, 
w h o  m ay be c o n te n t to  assum e that th e  current correlations w ill fall back  
to  their long-term  average. A risk m an agem en t system  for th e  long-term  
investor m ay therefore be less sensitive to  short-term  ch an ges in  vo la tility  
and  correlation and  m ore sen sitive  to  th e  underly in g , perhaps fun dam ental, 
correlation. There is th e  p o ten tia l here for a v irtuous cycle . T he m ore that  
short-term  and long-term  investors behave differently, th e  shorter th e  market 
disruptions w ill b e and  th e  m ore th is d ifferent b ehaviour w ill be profitable  
for long-term  investors. G iv in g  a stam p o f  approval to  a variety o f  risk m an ­
agem en t system s d esign ed  for d ifferent types o f  investor w o u ld  so lve  a coor­
d in a tio n  problem : it w o u ld  b eco m e easier for fu n d  m anagers to  go  to  their  
trustees and  say th at th ey  are n o t fo llo w in g  a short-term , m arket-sensitive  
risk m an agem en t system , bu t another, a lon g  th e  lin es proposed  b y  th e  
regulators specifica lly  for lon g-term  investors.
Second, there n eed s to  b e less reliance o n  m arket-sensitive m easures o f  
risk. Regulators sh ou ld  pursue research in to  countercyclical or structural m ea­
sures o f  risk, su ch  as th e  degree o f  d iversity or fragm entation  in  a financial 
m arket as w ell as th e  degree o f  duration  and  currency m ism atch  o f  assets 
and  liabilities. M arkets th a t are n o t  vo la tile  or h ig h ly  correlated w ith  others  
bu t w here there is a h igh  con cen tra tion  o f  p osition s b y  o n e  type o f  player 
in  o n e  in stru m en t sh ou ld  be v iew ed  as risky and  require m ore regulatory  
capital th an  h istorical vo la tilities and  correlations m ig h t suggest. T he large 
con cen tration  o f  foreign  currency len d in g  to  th e  property and  b an k in g  
system  in  A sian m arkets is a case in  p o in t (Perry and  Lederm an, 1998).
Third, a lth ou gh  m u ch  regu lation  is about lim itin g  losses, liq u id ity  needs  
losers. If a m arket is to  be liqu id  there n eed s to  be a buyer w h en  everyone  
else is sellin g  and  th e  price is falling. In itia lly  th e  buyer w ill lose, b u t she or 
h e  w ill h op e  to  profit w h en  th e  m arket turns around and  w ill be m ore  
in c lin ed  to  take th is  gam ble if sh e  or h e  is n o t w orried th at her or h is risk 
m an agem en t system  w ill take her or h im  o u t o f  th e  trade just as it is go in g  
to  m ake m oney. Regulators n eed  to  address th is prob lem  b y  regu lating w h o  
th e  unregulated  in vestor can  be. T hey w ill w an t to  lim it th e  losses o f  retail
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investors for fear th at th ey  w ill b e abused for their relative lack o f  in form a­
tion , and  to  encourage th em  to  save for their future. F inancial instru m ents  
used  b y  retail investors sh ou ld  be strictly regulated -  as th ey  are -  an d  their  
losses lim ited  th rou gh  short-term  risk system s. F inancial in strum ents used  
b y  professional investors, how ever, sh ou ld  be lig h tly  regulated and  their  
ability  to  buck th e  trend  sh ou ld  be facilitated.
T his fram ework provides a d ifferent perspective o n  h ed ge  fu n d s -  
in v estm en t veh ic les  d esign ed  for in v estm en t professionals w ith  w ea lth  to  
lose. H edge funds som etim es lose m oney, som etim es b low  up  and  som etim es  
are part o f  th e  herd, bu t th ey  are a lso best su ited  to  th e  role o f  unregulated  
investors w h o  can b u y  w h en  everyone else is selling, and  in  th e  process  
m ake th e  fin ancia l m arket liqu id . T he cost o f  m aking  it hard for th em  to  
do th is -  b y  regulating their leverage and  credit -  is a redu ction  in  m arket 
liquid ity. The regu lation  o f hed ge funds and  their requirem ents o f  d isclosure  
to  their counterparties sh ou ld  therefore b e governed  b y  to u g h  q u estions  
such  as: w ou ld  a fu n d  w ith  th is am ou n t o f  leverage endanger th e  finan cia l 
system ? T his w o u ld  catch  an y  future LTCM w ith o u t causing  th e  others to  
w ithdraw  from  p rovid in g  th e  necessary liquidity.
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a n k  L e n d i n g :  W a t e r  
F l o w i n g  U p h i l l ? *
John Hawkins
B a n k  l e n d in g  a n d  o th e r  c a p i ta l  f lo w s
International b ank  len d in g  is a very im portan t co m p o n en t o f  capital flow s  
to  em ergin g  econ om ies. M oreover bank  len d in g  has b een  th e  m ost variable 
type o f  capital flow. Table 4.1 sh ow s h o w  foreign  direct in vestm en t, and  
even  portfo lio  in vestm en t, h eld  fairly steady th rou gh ou t th e  A sian crisis. 
H ow ever th e  in tern ation a l banks w en t from  len d in g  large am ou n ts before  
th e  crisis to  w ithdraw ing large am ou n ts after it.
T he Bank for International S ettlem en ts (BIS) com p iles and  p u b lish es th e  
m ost com p reh en sive  data o n  in tern ation a l bank  len d in g ,1 w h ich  were used  
w h en  p u ttin g  togeth er  th e  Institu te o f  In ternational F inance (IIF) estim ates  
used  in  Table 4.1 and  th e  statistics o n  external debt pub lished  jo in tly  w ith  
th e  W orld Bank, IMF and  OECD. T he great advantage o f  th ese  data is that 
th e y  are com p iled  from  th e  creditor side in  a co n sisten t way. T he d isadvan­
tage is th at th ey  cover o n ly  part o f  capital flow s, albeit perhaps th e  vo la tile  
part. IMF data o n  capital flow s are based  o n  th e  b alance o f  p aym en ts reports 
b y  th e  recipient countries and are m ore com prehensive. H ow ever it is kn ow n  
th at th e  reporting o f  capital flow s is in ev itab ly  rather inaccurate (a lth ough
Table 4.1 E m e rg in g  m a rk e t e c o n o m ie s ' n e t  e x te rn a l f in a n c in g ,  1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 2  (US$ b i l l i o n )
1996 1997 1998 1999 2 000 2001 2 0 0 2 e
D ire c t  e q u i ty  in v e s tm e n t 93 11 6 121 149 135 135 113
P o r t fo l io  e q u i ty  in v e s tm e n t 35 25 14 19 14 11 11
B a n k  le n d in g 118 4 4 - 5 5 - 5 2 - 0 - 2 6 - 1 1
N o n -b a n k  p r iv a te  le n d e rs 8 9 8 4 64 3 6 3 8 7 10
O f f ic ia l  f lo w s 5 47 5 2 13 - 4 14 17
T o ta l e x te rn a l f in a n c in g 3 4 0 3 1 6 195 166 184 140 14 0
Source : In s titu te  o f In te rn a tio n a l F inance (2001, 2002).
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m ajor progress has b een  m ade in  recent years as a result o f th e  efforts o f th e  
IMF C om m ittee  o n  Balance o f  P aym ents Statistics).
T he BIS data (w h ich  are described in  m ore detail in  A ppend ix  4 .1) are 
com p iled  o n  tw o  bases. T he locational statistics report o n  th e  activ ities o f  
banks in  th e  reporting econ om y, regardless o f  their ow nersh ip , bu t n o t  
in c lu d in g  their foreign  subsidiaries. T he consolidated statistics report o n  th e  
global activ ities (in clu d in g  foreign  subsidiaries) o f banks w h o se  head  office  
is located  in  th e  reporting econom y.
W h en  appropriately scaled, th e  BIS data can  be h elp fu l in  id en tify in g  
eco n o m ies w here th e  accu m u lation  o f  borrow ing from  in tern ation a l banks 
is leav in g  th em  vu lnerable to  a loss o f  con fid en ce  (see H aw kins and  Klau, 
2000 ). It has o ften  b een  th e  case th at excessive capital in flow s h ave fu nded  
d om estic  specu lative b oom s. T he central bank governors o f  th e  G 10 co u n ­
tries h ave b een  regularly briefed over th e  years o n  signs o f im p en d in g  trouble. 
A recently  p u b lish ed  accou n t b y  an em in en t insider, A lexandre Lam falussy  
(2000), w h o  w as eco n o m ic  adviser at th e  BIS from  1976  an d  th en  general 
m anager, p o in ts  o u t th at in  th e  1970s th e  governors agreed to  pub lish  
country-by-coun try  data o n  external bank debt accu m u lation  o n ly  after 
som e h esita tion  because n a m in g  countries cou ld  in  itse lf precip itate crises. 
Yet even  th o u g h  th ese  data w ere p u b lic ly  available before th e  A sian crisis, 
at th e  tim e th ey  attracted relatively  little  a tten tion  desp ite  efforts b y  th e  
BIS to  draw a tten tio n  to  th e  w arnings it w as g iv ing. H aw kins (1999) p o in ts  
o u t th at in  early 1997  th e  BIS data revealed th e  large, rapidly grow ing  and  
increasingly  short-term  debt incurred b y  th e  five A sian em erging eco n o m ies  
w h ich  so o n  after suffered m assive depreciations.
T h e  p a t t e r n  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  b a n k  le n d in g  
Specialization b y  len d in g  countries
T he BIS's con so lid a ted  statistics are p u b lish ed  by  n a tio n a lity  o f  reporting  
bank, so, for exam ple, it is possib le  to  see th e  exposure o f  G erm an-ow ned  
banks to  Russia, or S p an ish -ow ned  banks to  Brazil. T he d istribution  o f  
len d in g  to  em ergin g  eco n o m ies is sum m arized  in  Table 4 .2 . As can  b e seen, 
E uropean-ow ned banks are th e  largest lenders to  all reg ion s,2 but there is 
also a degree o f  specia lization . Japanese-ow ned  banks m a in ly  len d  to  th e  
Asia-Pacific reg ion  w h ile  U S-ow ned  banks concentrate o n  Latin America. 
W ith in  Europe, G erm an-ow n ed  banks are th e  m a in  lenders to  C entral and  
Eastern Europe, w h ile  F rench-ow ned banks are th e  m a in  lenders to  Africa 
and  Spanish banks are large lenders to  Latin America.
Two recent trends are o f  particular sign ificance. The first is th e  w ithdraw al 
o f Japanese banks from  Asia (b oth  from  th e  d eve lop in g  coun tries an d  from  
H on g  Kong): from  its peak in  June 1995, b y  m id  2001  th is had  fa llen  by  
around tw o  thirds, a d ec lin e  o f  a lm ost U S$200 b illion , a lth ou gh  som e o f  th is  
w as b ook in g  Japanese len d in g  bu siness w ith in  Japan rather th an  offshore.
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Table 4.2 Consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks for developing
countries, June 2002 (US$ billion)
Asia-Pacific Europe Latin America Middle-East 
and Africa
Total
E u ro p e , o f  w h ic h 194 2 4 4 3 0 2 109 8 4 9
G e rm a n y 47 88 3 4 2 2 191
Fran ce 29 21 21 3 6 107
U n ite d  K in g d o m 64 11 2 7 2 7 129
S p a in 1 1 157 2 161
U n ite d  S tates 76 21 131 15 2 4 3
Ja p a n 52 4 10 5 71
O th e r 73 28 49 25 175
T o ta l 395 2 9 7 4 9 2 154 1 3 3 8
Source: BIS (2002).
T he secon d  is th e  rapid grow th  o f  Spanish banks' exposure in  Latin Am erica. 
In th e  five years to  m id  2001 , th is a lm ost quadrupled, an increase o f  a lm ost  
U S$40 b illion .
M aturity  o f  b an k  len d in g
A round a third o f  in tern ation a l bank len d in g  to  em ergin g  eco n o m ies is 
short term , th at is, w ith  a rem ain in g  m aturity  o f  less th a n  o n e  year (see 
Table A 4.1). T he p roportion  rose in  th e  first h a lf o f th e  1990s -  Jeanneau  
and  M icu (2002) attribute th is to  'the grow th  o f  trade fin an cin g , th e  liberal­
isation  o f financial sectors, th e  estab lishm ent o f offshore financial centres and  
th e  advantages offered b y  short-term  loan s in  th e  m on ito r in g  and  m an age­
m en t o f in tern ation a l exposures'. Short-term  borrow ing is u sually  cheaper  
bu t exp oses th e  borrow er to  refinan cing  risks. As borrowers fo u n d  that  
short-term  credit was som etim es cut o ff during th e  A sian and  other crises, 
th ey  have increasingly  felt th at th e  h igh er in terest rates are w orth  p aying  
and  so m aturities h ave len g th en ed  again. Som e borrow ing cou ntries have  
ad opted  specific gu id elin es to  len g th en  debt m aturities.
C o n cen tra tio n  o f b a n k  len d in g
It is o ften  cla im ed  th at in tern ation a l bank fin an ce to  em erging  eco n o m ies is 
u n d u ly  concentrated . At first sigh t th is appears to  be th e  case, as over h a lf  
o f in ternational bank loans to  em erging eco n o m ies go  to  just ten  econ om ies. 
In order, these are Brazil, Korea, M exico, C hina, Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and  Taiwan. H ow ever it is less con cen trated  th an  
pop u la tion , GDP or o ther form s o f  capital in flo w  (Table 4 .3). T he list o f  th e  
top  ten  recip ients o f bank len d in g  is very sim ilar to  th e  ten  largest em erging  
econ om ies, w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  th at India receives m u ch  less len d in g  th an  
th e  size o f its e co n o m y  w ou ld  suggest. T he OECD m em bers receive m ore
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Table 4.3 C oncentration ratios (percentage shares of emerging economies)1
Share o f  top 5 Share o f  top 10
I n te r n a t io n a l b a n k  le n d in g  (e n d  2 0 0 0 )2 4 0 62
In te r n a t io n a l b o n d  is su a n ce  (e n d  2 0 0 0 ) 65 83
S to c k  o f  in w a rd  fo re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t  (2 0 0 0 ) 53 68
P o p u la t io n  (1 9 9 9 ) 55 66
G D P  (PPP basis) (1 9 9 9 ) 53 67
N otes :
1 D ata cover 126 em erg ing  econom ies w ith  a p o p u la tio n  over o n e  m illio n  a n d  p e r cap ita  GDP of 
be low  a ro u n d  U S$15000 ( th a t is, a b o u t th e  level o f S o u th  Korea).
2 C o nso lidated  basis (for a n  e x p la n a tio n  see A ppendix  4.1).
Sources: W orld B ank A tlas (2001); UNCTAD (2001); BIS (2001).
(perhaps partly because o f  their favoured treatm en t under th e  Basel C apital 
Accord -  see b elow ).
At th e  other en d  o f  th e  d istribution , th e  25 poorest eco n o m ies (m ostly  
African countries w ith  per capita in com es b elow  US$1 000) receive o n ly  about 
1 per cen t o f in tern ation a l bank  len d in g . W h ile  th ese  eco n o m ies accou n t 
for 10 per cen t o f  th e  p op u la tion  o f  em erging  econ om ies, th ey  o n ly  accou n t 
for 2 per cen t o f  GDP. M oreover len d in g  to  m a n y  o f th e  poorest countries is 
a lm ost entirely  short term , creating add ition al vu lnerabilities. T hese charac­
teristics suggest that in ternational bank  len d in g  m ay n o t  b e th e  ideal veh ic le  
for provid in g  fin an ce to  th e  sm allest and  poorest countries.
C urrency  d en o m in a tio n  o f bo rrow ing  b y  em erging  econom ies
M ost em erging econ om ies, particularly th ose  w ith  a h istory  o f  h ig h  in fla tion  
and  depreciation , face a sign ifican t lacuna in  financia l m arkets. As a result 
o f w h at E ichengreen and  H ausm ann  (1999) call 'original sin', th e y  have  
great d ifficu lty  m arketing long-term  securities d en o m in a ted  in  th e  d om estic  
currency. In ad d ition  foreign  lenders w ill n o t  len d  in  th e  d om estic  currency  
(Table 4 .4) and  ten d  to  b e u n w illin g  to  stand o n  th e  o th er  side o f  a h ed ge  
contract.3 In th ese  circum stances firm s can o n ly  ch o o se  b etw een  a currency  
m ism atch  and  a m aturity  m ism atch .
R e c e n t t r e n d s  i n  n e t  b a n k  f in a n c e  to  e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s  
B ank len d in g
The cutbacks in  in tern ation a l bank  loans to  em erging  eco n o m ies after th e  
A sian crisis m oderated  during 2 0 0 0  and  2001  (Table 4 .5  and  Figure 4.1). 
T here were co n tin u in g , a lbeit m u ch  m ore m odest, d eclin es in  loan s to  
em erging  A sian eco n o m ies4 but som e increase in  loan s to  Latin America, 
a lth ou gh  th is w as partly a reflection  o f  th e  purchase b y  Spanish banks o f
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Table 4.4  B o r ro w in g  b y  d o m e s t ic  n o n -b a n k s  f r o m  in te r n a t io n a l b a n k s : p e rc e n ta g e  
d e n o m in a te d  in  d o m e s t ic  c u r re n c y ,*  J u n e  2 0 0 2
Asian emerging Latin American Other Advanced
economies emerging emerging economies
economies economies
C h in a 4 A rg e n t in a 0 C ze ch  Rep. 14 A u s tra lia 2 7
In d ia 2 B ra z il 1 H u n g a ry 5 G e rm a n y 18
In d o n e s ia 6 C h ile 0 Is ra e l 1 H o n g  K o n g 17
K o re a 4 C o lo m b ia 0 P o la n d 6 Ja p a n 57
M a la y s ia 4 M e x ic o 1 Russia 1 S in g a p o re 11
P h i l ip p in e s 3 P eru 1 S o u th  A fr ic a 13 U K 23
T h a ila n d 4 V e n e z u e la 0 T u rk e y 1 U S A 8 4
* For som e em erg ing  econom ies  th e  figures m ay  be overestim ates as it is assum ed  th a t  all loans 
an d  b o n d s  n o t d e n o m in a ted  in  a m a jo r cu rrency  are d e n o m in a te d  in  th e  d om estic  currency. 
Source: BIS (2002).
Table 4.5  In te rn a t io n a l f in a n c in g  o f  d e v e lo p in g  e c o n o m ie s , 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 0  (U S$ b i l l io n s ,  
a n n u a l ra te )
International bank lending1 International debt securities2
1990-97 1998-99 2000 1 990-97 1998-99 2000
A l l  d e v e lo p in g
e c o n o m ie s 3 4 8 - 7 4 - 1 3 54 37 4 0
A s ia -P a c if ic ,3
o f  w h ic h 39 - 7 9 - 2 9 21 - 1 2
C h in a 8 - 1 4 - 5 2 - 1 0
c r is is -h it  A s ia 4 27 - 5 9 - 1 7 17 0 3
L a t in  A m e r ic a
a n d  C a rr ib e a n 8 - 1 2 14 26 2 4 28
Notes:
1 Exchange ra te  ad ju sted  change  in  claim s o f BIS rep o rtin g  banks.
2 N e t issuance.
3 Excludes H ong  K ong a n d  Singapore.
4 Indonesia , Korea, M alaysia, th e  P h ilipp ines  a n d  T hailand .
privatized  Brazilian banks. For m ost o f  2 0 0 0  Turkey received  sign ifican t 
am ou n ts o f  n ew  len d in g , bu t th is  w as sharply reduced in  early 2001 .
It is striking th at even  five years after th e  A sian crisis, bank len d in g  to  
em erging  eco n o m ies has n o t recovered. Several possib le  reasons h ave b een  
suggested .5 There w as an  unu sual period  in  recent years w h en  Latin Am erica  
and  m u ch  o f Asia grew m ore slow ly  th an  th e  global average (Table 4.6). M any  
em erging m arket borrowers in  Asia ran current accou n t surpluses, as after th e  
1 9 9 7 -9 8  crises im ports were h eld  d o w n  b y  w eak d om estic  con su m p tion
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Total bank flows Bank flows by region2' 3
Figure 4.1 B a n k s ' e x te rn a l p o s it io n s  vis-à-vis e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s , 1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 1  
(e x c h a n g e  ra te  a d ju s te d  c h a n g e s  i n  a m o u n ts  o u ts ta n d in g ,  US$ b i l l i o n )
Notes :
1 A negative  (positive) va lue  ind ica tes  a n  increase  (decrease) in  BIS rep o rtin g  b a n k s ' liab ilities 
vis-à-vis em erg ing  econom ies.
2 C hanges in  claim s m in u s  changes  in  liabilities.
3 T w o-quarter m o v in g  average.
Source: BIS (2002).
T a b le  4 .6  R ea l G DP, a c tu a l a n d  fo reca st, 1 9 5 0 -2 0 1 0  (average a n n u a l p e rce n ta g e  
c h a n g e )
1 950-96 1996-2001 2 0 0 1 -1 0 5
W e s te rn  E u ro p e 1 3 .7 2 .6 2 .2
U n ite d  States 3 .4 3 .4 3 .1
E m e rg in g  A s ia ,2 o f  w h ic h 6.7 5 .3 6 .2
c r is is -h it 6 .2 1.5 4 .8
L a t in  A m e r ic a 3 4 .8 2 .5 3 .3
W o r ld 4 4 .8 3.3 3 .6
N otes :
1 W eigh ted  average o f 15 W estern  E uropean  econom ies.
2 W eigh ted  average o f C h in a , H o n g  Kong, India , Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiw an 
a n d  Thailand, o f w h ich  th e  co u n trie s  in  italics are classified as crisis-hit.
3 W eighted  average o f A rgen tina , Brazil, C hile, C o lom bia, M exico, Peru a n d  V enezeula.
4 W eigh ted  average o f 45 econom ies w ith  over 85 per c en t o f global GDP.
5 C onsensus forecasts.
and  in vestm en t w h ile  exports b en efited  from  im proved  com p etitiven ess  
fo llo w in g  th e  large devaluation s. M ore recen tly  th e  s low d ow n  in  th e  US 
eco n o m y  has in d u ced  further w ariness o n  th e  part o f  lenders. T he Asian  
eco n o m ies in  particular are suffering from  th e  w eakness in  US tech n o lo g y
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industries. Furthermore, as d iscussed  below , banks in  th e  industrial countries 
have increasingly sought credit exposure in  em erging econ om ies by  purchas­
in g  loca l banks, rather th an  th rou gh  cross-border len d in g . R ecent problem s 
in  A rgentina and  Turkey are likely  to  be d am p en in g  banks' en th u siasm  for 
len d in g  to  em erging  econ om ies, a lth ou gh  th e  extrem es o f  co n ta g io n  seen  in  
earlier crises have n o t  b een  observed.
D eposits from  em erg ing  econom ies
D eposits from  em erging  eco n o m ies h ave b een  grow ing  strongly. In 2000 , 
d eposits w ere eq u iva len t to  2  per cen t o f  em erging  econ om ies' GDP, th e  
largest proportion  since 1 9 7 9 -8 0 , w h en  o il-exp orting  countries p laced  w in d ­
fall revenues w ith  in tern ation a l banks. T he m a in  sources o f  th ese  deposits  
w ere Taiwan, m ain lan d  C hina and  th e  o il-exporting  countries (notab ly  Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, M exico  and  Russia). In th e  case o f  C hina, a w eak d em an d  for 
foreign  currency loan s and  in terest rate differentials were im portant reasons. 
M ore generally, a sharp rise in  residents' d eposits in  overseas banks is o ften  
regarded as sym p tom atic  o f  capital flight, w h ile  a m ore gradual rise in  th ese  
d eposits m ay just reflect p ortfo lio  reallocations. M any countries d iscouraged  
or prohib ited  fu n d  m anagers (un it trusts, p en sio n  and  m utu al fund s and  so  
on) from  in vestin g  abroad so  as to  retain scarce capital for d om estic  d evel­
o p m en t. This m le  has b een  gradually eased  in  a num ber o f  countries. For 
exam ple in  C h ile  th e  a llow able prop ortion  o f  assets in vested  abroad w as 
raised from  2  per cen t in  1992  to  16 per cen t in  2 0 0 0  as th e  authorities 
w ish ed  to  reduce their con cen tration  o f  risk. In m a n y  cases fu n d  m anagers 
h ave taken advantage o f  th is greater freedom  to  p lace fun ds w ith  in ter­
n ation a l banks.6
N et b a n k  fu n d in g
W ith  len d in g  at best flat and  d eposits rising, funds flow ed  from  em erging  
eco n o m ies to  th e  banks (Figure 4 .1). T he IIF estim ates in  Table 4.1 sh o w  that 
banks w ithd rew  m ore m o n ey  from  th e  em erging  eco n o m ies in  2001  and  
2 002 . In ternational bank  loans ou tstan d in g  to  Asia are exp ected  to  co n tin u e  
fa lling. W h ile  th is partly reflects less d em and  for credit, or m ore o f  it b e in g  
m et dom estically, it also reflects co n tin u in g  caution  by  lenders about political 
uncerta in ties an d  th e  slow  pace o f  restructuring in  som e countries.
C y c lic a l a sp e c ts  o f  i n te r n a t io n a l  b a n k  le n d in g
In tern a tion a l b an k  len d in g  to  em erg in g  e c o n o m ie s  is subject b o th  to  
p u sh  factors (in  th e  source cou n tries) an d  to  p u ll factors (in  th e  user  
cou n tr ies). A sim p le  com p arison  o f  th ree  o f  th ese  forces -  th e  strength  
o f  th e  ad van ced  an d  em erg in g  e co n o m ies , w h ic h  m ig h t be associa ted  
w ith  th eir  resp ective  ex p ec ted  returns, and  in terest rates in  th e  advan ced  
e co n o m ies  -  are sh o w n  in  Figures 4 .2 , 4 .3  and  4 .4 . In term s o f  th e  activ ity
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Figure 4.2  B a n k  le n d in g  to  e m e rg in g  m a rk e t  e c o n o m ie s  a n d  p o l ic y  in te re s t  ra tes, 
1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 1
N otes:
1 L eft-hand  scale.
2  R igh t-hand  scale.
Sources: N ationa l da ta ; BIS.
Figure 4.3  'P u s h ' in f lu e n c e s  o n  in te r n a t io n a l b a n k  le n d in g ,  1 9 7 8 -2 0 0 1
Notes:
1 L eft-hand  scale.
2  R igh t-hand  scale.
Sources: N a tio n a l data: BIS.
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Total bank flows Bank flows by region3-4
Figure 4.4  B a n k s ' e x te rn a l p o s it io n s  vis-à-vis e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s ,1 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 1
Notes :
1 Exchange ra te  a d ju sted  changes in  a m o u n ts  o u ts tan d in g , in  b illio n s  o f US dollars.
2 A negative  (positive) value ind ica tes a n  increase (decrease) in  BIS rep o rtin g  b an k s ' liabilities 
vis-à-vis em erg ing  econom ies.
3 C hanges in  claim s m in u s  changes  in  liabilities.
4 T w o-quarter m o v in g  average.
Source: BIS.
Figure 4.5  Japanese in te r n a t io n a l b a n k  le n d in g  t o  A s ia n  e c o n o m ie s , 1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 1  
Sources: N a tiona l da ta ; BIS.
m easures, th e  graphs su ggest th a t th e  p u ll factor is gen era lly  stronger th a n  
th e  p u sh , th a t is, banks' le n d in g  is m ore resp on sive  to  c o n d it io n s  in  th e  
borrow in g  e c o n o m ie s  th a n  in  th e  le n d in g  e co n o m ies , b u t th ere  are som e  
ex c e p tio n s . T he starkest recen t ex a m p le  o f  th is  has b een  th e  sharp c u t­
back  in  le n d in g  to  A sian  e c o n o m ie s  b y  Japanese banks b ecau se  o f  th eir  
d o m estic  d ifficu lties  (Figure 4 .5 ). It has b een  su ggested  th a t th e  p u sh  
factor d o m in a tes  in  Latin A m erica an d  th e  p u ll factor in  Asia. In their  
survey o f  th e  literature, Jeanneau  and  M icu (2002 ) c o m m en t th a t 'som e o f  
th e  m ore recen t stu d ies h a v e  ten d ed  to  em p h a sise  th e  co m p lem en ta r ity  o f
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p u sh  and  p u ll factors, w ith  th e  first set o f  factors d e term in in g  th e  tim in g  
and  m a g n itu d e  o f  flow s an d  th e  seco n d  set d eterm in in g  their  geograp h ic  
distrib ution '.
Jeanneau an d  M icu present em pirical ev id en ce, u sin g  BIS ban k in g  data, 
that o n e  p ush  factor -  real short-term  in terest rates in  industrial countries -  
is th e  d om in an t in flu en ce  (but real GDP in  th e  len d in g  countries does  
n o t h ave a sign ifican t in flu en ce). O f th e  p u ll factors, th ey  fin d  a role for 
eco n o m ic  grow th  in  borrow ing  countries, their exch an ge  rate variance and  
ch anges in  foreign  reserves and  th e  current account. T he results are broadly  
sim ilar for Asia and  Latin Am erica. Tests u sin g  a crisis d u m m y suggest th at 
th e  A sian crisis h ad  th e  effect o f  redirecting len d in g  from  Asia to  Latin 
Am erica. T hese factors exp la in  m ore o f  short-term  th an  long-term  len d in g . 
It is n otew orth y  th a t th e  previously  observed ten d en cy  for capital flow s to  
em erging  eco n o m ies  to  rise w h en  activ ity  in  th e  industrial w orld  w eakened  
is n o t  h ap p en in g  in  th e  current slow dow n; all th e  signs are that flow s are 
declin in g .
Interest rates in  m ost advan ced  eco n o m ies were lo w  in  th e  early 1990s  
(in  th e  U n ited  States, partly due to  th e  w eakness o f  th e  ban k in g  sector at 
th at tim e). This encouraged  banks to  seek h igher returns from  len d in g  to  
em erging  eco n o m ies. Interest rates stayed very lo w  in  Japan in  th e  1990s, 
g iv in g  rise to  'yen  carry' trade: borrow ing in  y en  (at perhaps 0 .5  per cent) 
and  len d in g  elsew h ere in  Asia (perhaps at 2 0  per cen t in  Indonesia). The  
sheer size o f  th e  in terest rate differential and  co n fid en ce  in  th e  A sian eco ­
n o m ic  m iracle tem p ted  lenders to  ignore th e  exch an ge rate and  credit risks 
in vo lved . A nother exam p le w here in terest rates p layed  an im portant role 
w as th e  rise in  US rates in  early 1994, w h ich  acted  as an  im p ortan t trigger 
for M exico's su b seq uent problem s. H ow ever th is also provides a cou n terex­
am ple as th e  in terest rate increase seem ed  to  d o  n o th in g  to  curb len d in g  to  
th e  A sian econ om ies.
Just look in g  at in terest rates in  advanced  eco n o m ies is, o f  course, very  
sim plistic. A m ore relevant m easure w ou ld  be th e  risk-adjusted exp ected  
return, w h ich  sh ou ld  b e com pared w ith  exp ected  returns in  em erging  
m arket econ om ies. Furtherm ore len d in g  m ay  also respond  to  th e  degree o f  
variation  and uncerta in ty  about th e  return or th e  ex ten t to  w h ich  returns are 
correlated across countries an d  regions. A ddressing th ese  issues em pirically  
is w ell b eyon d  th e  scop e o f  th is  chapter.
T he relative im portance o f  pu sh  and  pu ll factors w ill a lso d ep en d  o n  th e  
ex ten t to  w h ich  banks are in form ed  about in d iv id u a l em erging  eco n o m ies  
and  d iscrim inate b etw een  th em . To test for th is, th e  percentage ch an ge in  
th e  outstand ing  claim s o f banks ow n ed  b y  th e  five m ain  len d in g  countries on  
th e  ten  m ain  em erging  eco n o m ies  was calculated  over s ix -m o n th ly  periods 
from  June 1990  to  June 2000 . T he correlations are sh o w n  in  Table 4 .7 . There 
are qu ite  a few  n egative correlations, suggesting  th at th e  len d in g  flow s were 
n o t  u n iform  b u t h ad  m a n y  id iosyncratic features. It can  also b e observed
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Table 4 .7  C o r re la t io n s  b e tw e e n  c h a n g e s  in  c la im s  o f  B IS - re p o r t in g  b a n k s  o n  d e v e l­
o p in g  e c o n o m ie s , J u n e  1 9 9 0 -J u n e  2 0 0 0 *
Lenders




C h in a 0 .0 8 0 .01 0 .11 0 .1 2 0 .0 1 0 .1
In d o n e s ia - 0 . 0 6 0 .0 2 - 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 1 7 - 0 . 0 3 0 .1
In d ia - 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 1 0 0 .3 3 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 8 0 .2
M a la y s ia - 0 . 1 2 0 .1 4 - 0 . 3 2 0 .0 9 - 0 . 1 8 0 .2
K ore a 0 .0 3 - 0 . 2 0 - 0 . 2 8 - 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 1 5 0 .1
T h a ila n d - 0 . 2 0 - 0 . 3 7 - 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 3 3 - 0 . 3 9 0.1
A rg e n t in a 0 .51 0 .2 5 0 .1 0 0 .9 0 0 .1 2 0 .3
B ra z il 0 .4 5 0 .4 6 0 .1 2 - 0 . 0 3 0 .1 1 0 .2
C h ile 0 .4 2 0 .1 9 - 0 . 0 2 0 .41 0 .3 9 0 .2
M e x ic o 0 .0 3 0 .0 6 0 .1 4 - 0 . 1 5 - 0 . 3 0 0 .2
S ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n s 0 .3 0 .2 0 .2 0 .4 0 .2
* C orre la tion  betw een  percen tage  ch an g e  in  le n d in g  over s ix -m o n th ly  p eriods b y  b anks  ow n ed  by  
le n d in g  co u n try  i to  bo rrow er /  w ith  all loans to  all develop ing  eco n o m y  borrow ers.
th at th e  correlations ten d  to  b e m ore sim ilar across th e  rows (borrowers) 
th a n  d o w n  th e  co lu m n s (lenders), again  su ggesting th at p u ll factors w ere  
generally  m ore im portant.
In a similar study th at focuses o n  periods o f  currency crisis, Van Rijckeghem  
and  W eder (2000 , 2001 ) use BIS con so lid ated  b ank ing  statistics to  ex a m in e  
th e  role o f  bank len d in g  in  con tag ion . N o tin g  th e  specia lization  illustrated  
in  Table 4 .2 , th ey  test for a 'co m m o n  lender effect'. T he h y p oth esis  is that 
banks th at m ake losses due to  their exposure to  a crisis cou n try  respond  by  
cu ttin g  back len d in g  to  o ther em erging  econ om ies. As a result, em erging  
eco n o m ies th at h ave th e  sam e lenders as a crisis e co n o m y  suffer from  c o n ­
tag ion . T hey fin d  ev id en ce for su ch  an effect after th e  M exican  and  A sian  
crises b u t n o t after th e  Brazilian crisis. G iven  th e  pattern o f  co m m o n  lenders 
sh o w n  in  Table 4 .2 , th is form  o f  co n ta g io n  is m ost likely  to  affect o ther  
eco n o m ies in  th e  sam e region . From a p o licy  p o in t o f  view , th ese  find ings  
im p ly  that em erging eco n o m ies cou ld  reduce their co n ta g io n  risk b y  d iver­
sify ing  th e  sources o f  their fu n d in g  and  carefully m on ito r in g  their vu ln er­
ab ility  th rou gh  shared b ank  creditors. N otw ith stan d in g  th e  fact th at private 
banks' ch o ice  o f  creditors is th e  d ecis ion  o f  in d iv id u a l banks, th e  authorities 
can  still p lay a role b y  provid ing  in form ation  o n  aggregate p osition s and  by  
adjusting th e  co m p o sitio n  o f their o w n  creditors.
Som e recent studies o n  determ inants o f th e  destination  o f  bank len d in g  are 
sum m arized  b y  Buch (2000). For G erm an banks, len d in g  is h ig h ly  correlated
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w ith  trade links, a lth ou gh  th is does n o t  appear to  b e 'fo llow  th e  custom er' 
behaviour as m u ch  o f  th e  len d in g  studied was to  banks, rather th an  co m ­
panies, in  th e  recip ien t countries. A study o f  OECD banks fou n d  th at market 
grow th  and d iversification  prospects were m ost im portant. In th e  U n ited  
States, sm all banks ten d  to  fo llo w  th e  lead  o f  large banks in  their overseas 
len d in g . Based o n  BIS data, B uch finds th at in tern ation a l b ank  loan s are 
greater to  countries that h ave trade links w ith  th e  lender, strong grow th  in  
industrial production , m em bersh ip  o f  th e  OECD (assum ed to  reflect th e  
corresponding low er capital requirem ents under th e  Basel A ccord) and  are 
geographically  c lose  to  th e  lender. C apital contro ls deter len d in g . In add­
ition , Spanish banks len d  far m ore th an  th ese  variables a lon e  w ou ld  predict 
to  Spanish-speaking countries (th e o n ly  case w h ere c o m m o n  language  
appears to  be im portant). Interest rate differentials are n o t sign ificant.
T he in tern ation a l len d in g  behaviou r o f  ind iv idu al US banks is stud ied  by  
G oldberg (2001). M u ch  o f  th is len d in g  is con cen trated  in  Latin Am erica, and  
G oldberg sh ow s th at th is is especially  true o f  sm aller banks. She con clu d es  
th at US banks' foreign  len d in g  to  Latin Am erica expands m ore w h en  th e  US 
e co n o m y  is grow in g strongly, b u t th is is n o t  th e  case for len d in g  to  Asia. 
H ow ever in tern ation a l len d in g  b y  US banks is n o t sen sitive  either to  real 
in terest rates or to  d em an d  co n d itio n s in  th e  recip ient em erging  econ om ies.
Structural aspects of international bank lending 
C h a n g es  in  b a n k  o p era tio n s
G lobal banks h ave reduced th eir  len d in g  to  em ergin g  eco n o m ies in  favour 
o f  fee-based activ ities and  len d in g  via subsidiaries (Table 4 .8). T he m ove  
tow ards fee-based activ ities m ay  b e  due to  banks trying to  m eet their aspir­
a tion  for h igh  returns o n  eq u ity  w ith o u t adding assets to  their balance  
sheet, w h ich  w ou ld  require m ore eq u ity  to  be raised. It also m ay  reflect 
a m ore conservative attitude tow ards tak ing risks o n to  th eir  o w n  balance  
sh eets (possib ly  due to  a greater appreciation  o f  th e  ex ten t o f  th ese  risks) and  
a desire for m ore stable in co m e  sources.
L ending th rou gh  subsidiaries m ay a llow  better quality  con tro l b y  len d in g  
officers located  in  specific em erging  econ om ies. It m ore readily a llow s in ter­
n ation a l banks to  len d  in  d om estic  currency, as a subsidiary can  raise deposits 
in  th e  d om estic  currency to  avoid  a currency m ism atch . In som e countries 
(for exam ple C hina an d  M alaysia) direct len d in g  in  d om estic  currency from  
th e  head  office  is p roh ib ited  b y  capital controls.
In som e cases, h o st bank  supervisors prefer in tern ation a l banks to  len d  
th rou gh  such  subsidiaries. M any em erging m arket eco n o m ies are n o w  
encouragin g  th e  en try  o f  foreign  banks to  m ake u p  for d efic ien cies in  
their d om estic  b an k in g  system , such  as lack o f  capital, lack o f  com m ercial 
bank ing  skills and  an  in effic ien t bank ing  structure. Foreign banks usually
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Table 4.8 In ternational banks' involvem ent in  developing countries, June
1998-December 2000
June 1998  
(US$ bn)
Dec 2000  
(USS bn)
%  change 
(at annual rate)
A ll developing countries
L o a n s  o u ts ta n d in g 9 2 4 739 - 8 . 8
O th e r  assets1 110 155 14 .7
L o a n s  b y  s u b s id ia r ie s 2 2 4 8 4 35 2 5 .2
Developing Asia
L o a n s  o u ts ta n d in g 3 5 8 2 43 - 1 4 . 4
O th e r  assets1 36 41 5 .3
L o a n s  b y  s u b s id ia r ie s 2 72 11 8 2 1 .8
Latin America
L o a n s  o u ts ta n d in g 2 7 8 2 1 3 - 1 0 .1
O th e r  assets1 43 74 2 4 .3
L o a n s  b y  s u b s id ia r ie s 2 134 231 2 4 .3
In te r n a t io n a l d e b t s e c u rit ie s  o n  issue 3 4 5 4 1 7 7.9
Notes:
1 Inc ludes h o ld in g s  o f d eb t securities, som e derivative  p o sitio n s  a n d  equ ities. See BIS (2000), 
p a rt I.C.
2 Local cu rrency  claim s o f BIS rep o rtin g  b a n k s ' fo reign  affiliates w ith  local residents.
Source: BIS (2000), p a rt I.C.
bring state-of-the-art tech n o logy  and  train ing for d om estic  bankers. M oreover 
th ey  are fam iliar w ith  soph isticated  fin ancia l in strum ents and  tech n iq u es, 
and  h ave faster and  cheaper access to  in tern ation a l capital m arkets and  
liqu id  funds. Their presence m ay also encourage other foreign firms to  invest 
in  th e  d om estic  econ om y. Empirical studies h ave fou n d  th at foreign  bank  
entry im proves th e  fu n ctio n in g  o f  n ation a l ban k in g  m arkets b y  increasing  
th e  degree o f com p etition , and  b y  in trod u cin g  a variety o f  n ew  financia l 
products an d  better risk m an agem en t tech n iq u es .7 A liberal approach to  
foreign  bank  entry has b een  laid  d o w n  b y  in tern ation a l trade agreem ents 
(WTO, NAFTA), is a co n d itio n  o f  m em bersh ip  o f  th e  OECD and  th e  EU, or 
is part o f  reciprocity requirem ents for d om estic  banks to  exp an d  in to  foreign  
markets.
As a result, foreign  banks n o w  h ave a large presence in  m ost em erging  
eco n o m ies. Indeed  for a sm all e co n o m y  it m ay m ake sense n o t to  h ave any  
d om estica lly  o w n ed  banks at all, as th ey  m ay n o t be able to  diversify their  
risks sufficiently. N on eth eless in  practice there are o n ly  a few  eco n o m ies w ith  
fu lly  foreign -ow ned  ban k in g  system s, w ith  th e  degree o f  foreign  ow n ersh ip  
m ore n orm ally  ly in g  som ew h ere b etw een  2 0  per cen t and  5 0  per cen t.8 
W h en  an n o u n c in g  a m ajor liberalization  program m e, th e  authorities in  
Singapore stated  exp lic itly  th at th ey  w an ted  loca l banks to  retain at least
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h a lf th e  m arket. A nother exam p le  is th e  P hilipp ines, w here a law  restricts 
foreign  banks' share o f  assets to  30  per cen t or less.
Foreign banks o ften  enter b y  tak ing over a troubled  d om estic  bank. H ow ­
ever there m ay b e pub lic  resistance to  th is, especially  if  taxpayers' m o n ey  
has b een  used  to  clean  up  th e  bank's balance sh eet ahead o f  privatization. 
G overnm ents a lso face d om estic  pressure to  lim it th e  role o f  foreign  banks 
because o f fears th a t foreign  banks w ill qu ick ly  d om in ate  th e  loca l m arket 
and  n eg lect sm all businesses or rural custom ers, or cause a low ering  o f  credit 
standards b y  increasing com p etition , especially  if  th ey  use their deep  pockets  
to  subsidize early losses. E vidence o n  w h eth er  th e  b u sin ess focus o f foreign  
and  d om estic  banks diverges is rather m ixed . In m ost em erging  m arket 
econ om ies, how ever, foreign  banks appear to  be very cautious about len d in g  
to  sm aller firm s because o f their  lim ited  k n ow led ge o f loca l industry.
A n im portant issue has b een  foreign banks' b ehaviour during recessions 
in  h o st countries and  th e  foreign  banks' h o m e base. O n e o p in io n  is that 
d om estic  banks are m ore co m m itted  to  th e  d om estic  econ om y, in  th e  sense  
o f hav in g  b o th  longer-term  business relations w ith  custom ers and  a patriotic  
affin ity  w ith  th e  n ation a l interest. Foreign banks, b y  contrast, are said to  
lo o k  at len d in g  op p ortu n ities around th e  w orld  an d  m ay  n eg lect th e  h o st  
cou n try  e co n o m y  if  its prospects deteriorate or if  prospects im prove in  other  
countries. Foreign banks m ay  also be less likely  th an  d om estica lly  o w n ed  
banks to  h eed  exh orta tion s b y  th e  d om estic  authorities to  m ain ta in  len d in g  
during recessions. In som e cases foreign  banks have b een  less cooperative  
in  rescheduling loan s in  tim es o f  crisis. It is d ifficu lt to  assess th e  truth  o f  
th ese  criticism s. T hey  m ay w ell app ly  m ore to  foreign  banks w ith  o n ly  a 
sm all and  recent presence in  th e  d om estic  ban k in g  system . H ow ever, larger, 
longer-estab lished  foreign  banks m ay be less in c lin ed  to  risk their reputation  
and  beh ave m ore like th e  d om estic  banks. There is also ev id en ce th a t local 
m an agem en ts are u su ally  strongly  com m itted  to  th e  loca l operations, and  
th at th ey  id en tify  m ore w ith  d om estic  interests over tim e.
T he contrary o p in io n  is th at foreign  banks are better p laced  to  ride ou t 
d om estic  recessions because th ey  can m ore readily access in tern ation a l 
financia l m arkets or draw o n  credit lin es from  their parents. Furtherm ore 
th ey  h ave m ore diversified  balan ce sheets. T he em pirical ev id en ce from  
Latin America suggests that foreign banks have generally  had low er vo latility  
o f len d in g  th an  d om estic  banks and  n otab le  credit grow th  during crisis 
periods, and  th at o n ly  offshore len d in g  tend s to  contract in  bad tim es. 
Foreign bank operations m ay also keep in ternational m arkets better inform ed  
about d om estic  co n d itio n s and  so h elp  d am p en  p an ic  w ithdraw als o f  
in tern ation a l fu n d in g  (as in  Saudi Arabia during th e  G ulf War in  1991), or 
can  h elp  reduce resident capital ou tflow s during crises because th ey  are 
usually  perceived as safer.
G overn m en ts m ay  also be reluctant to  h ave their d om estic  bank ing  
system s d om in ated  b y  banks from  a single  coun try  lest th ey  su d d en ly  cut
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their activ ities w h en  faced w ith  problem s at h o m e  (for exam p le Japanese  
banks in  Asia) or exert p o litica l pressure for favourable treatm ent. For th is  
reason em erging  eco n o m ies m ay seek to  'diversify' foreign  ow ners. For 
exam p le th e  Saudi authorities h ave b een  selective and licen sed  foreign  banks 
from  d ifferent parts o f  th e  w orld, w ith  d ifferent m an agem en t cultures, 
system s and  tech n o log ies . Sim ilarly th e  authorities in  C h ina  h ave b een  
con cern ed  about th e  im pact o f foreign  banks o n  th e  com p etitiven ess o f  
d om estic  banks, and  have sou gh t to  lim it their m arket share b y  licen sin g  
banks from  d ifferent countries, restricting their activ ities to  b u sin ess in  
foreign  currencies on ly , or restricting their business in  loca l currency to  
tw o  cities. T hey have also ensured th at banks are fam iliar w ith  th e  local 
m arket by  requiring th em  to  have a representative office  for tw o  years before  
co m m en c in g  bank ing  operations.
P o lic y  to w a rd s in te r n a t io n a l b a n k  le n d in g
Since th e  A sian crisis there has b een  greater aw areness a m on g  p o licy  makers 
o f th e  risks in vo lved  in  excessive external borrow ing. Supervisors m ay th ere­
fore d iscourage banks from  b orrow ing offshore and  restrict their foreign  
exch an ge  exp osure.9 Som etim es, how ever, banks try to  restrict their o w n  
foreign  exch an ge exposure b y  len d in g  in  foreign  currency to  d om estic  
custom ers w h ose  cash  flow s are in  th e  d om estic  currency. H ow ever th ey  
th en  face a large credit risk if  there is a sharp depreciation . This w as a m ajor  
problem  during th e  M exican  and  A sian crises in  th e  1990s.
In som e countries restrictions have b een  p laced  o n  in tern ation a l bank  
fin an cin g , such  as th e  recent tig h ten in g  o f  lim its o n  non-residents' ability  
to  borrow  d om estic  currency in  Indonesia , th e  P h ilipp ines and  T hailand. 
O ften  th ese  have b een  directed at su ch  activ ities as non -resid en ts short- 
se llin g  th e  currency as part o f  a sp ecu lative attack, bu t th e  restrictions m ay  
reduce len d in g  for other, m ore in n o cen t, purposes as w ell.
In te r n a tio n a l b a n k  le n d in g  a n d  th e  B asel C ap ita l A ccord
T he Basel C om m ittee  o n  Banking Supervision  is currently in  th e  process o f  
adapting  th e  Basel C apital Accord to  n ew  m arket realities (it issued co n su l­
ta tion  drafts in  June 1999  and  January 2001). This cou ld  have im p lica tion s  
for th e  qu an tity  or d istribution  o f  bank len d in g  to  em erg in g  econ om ies. 
Som e argue th at banks are already reacting to  th e  proposals.
A prim ary goal o f th e  proposals is to  a lign  m ore c lose ly  th e  capital required  
to  support a loan  and  th e  risk o f  th e  loan . In particular it replaces th e  OECD/ 
non-O EC D  d istin ction  w ith  an approach based  o n  banks' in ternal credit 
ratings or th ose  set b y  credit assessm ent agencies. This m ean s th at loan s to  
low er-rated OECD eco n o m ies such  as Korea, M exico, Poland and  Turkey 
w ou ld  require m ore capital w h ile  loans to  higher-rated non-O EC D  econ om ies  
such  as C hile, H on g  K ong and  Singapore w ou ld  require less.
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Risk w eigh ts for banks and  corporates w ou ld  also b e d ep en d en t o n  their  
credit ratings. This sh ou ld  reduce th e  fu n d in g  costs o f  som e o f  th e  sou n d est 
banks and  com p an ies in  em ergin g  econ om ies. T he low er risk w eigh ts  
assigned  to  corporations rated A m in u s or above cou ld  lead  to  m ore len d in g  
to  th em  at th e  exp en se  o f  weaker credits. As weaker credits ten d  to  b e m ore  
prevalent in  em erging  econ om ies, th is cou ld  reduce th e  overall flow  o f  bank  
len d in g  to  em erging  eco n o m ies. It m ig h t w ell b e in  em erg in g  econ om ies' 
in terests if th e  riskiest borrowers were to  fin d  credit m ore exp en sive , but 
con cern  has b een  expressed  -  for exam p le b y  Griffith-Jones and  Spratt 
(C hapter 10) -  th a t th e  m ap p in g  b etw een  credit assessm ents and  capital 
required m ay b e so steep  th a t th e  low est-rated  borrowers w ou ld  fin d  loan s  
from  banks proh ib itive ly  exp en sive. A particular prob lem  for corporate  
borrowers in  m a n y  em ergin g  eco n o m ies is th at few  o f  th em  have a credit 
rating; for exam ple Pow ell (2001) reports that in  A rgentina o n ly  150  o f  80  0 0 0  
corporate borrowers are rated.
T he n ew  Accord envisages th at th e  m ore sop h isticated  banks w ill u se  an  
advanced  in ternal ratings-based approach. This m ay reduce th e  ex ten t o f  
herd ing  if it causes banks to  base their loan s o n  in d iv id u a l assessm ents o f  
cou n tries.10 H ow ever th e  proposed  role for external credit assessm ent agen ­
cies (n o t just ratings agencies bu t also n ation a l export credit agencies) has 
led  to  som e con cern . Sovereign  ratings h ave ten d ed  to  lag b eh in d  eco n o m ic  
d evelop m en ts as rating agencies have b een  slow  to  dow ngrade coun tries in  
th e  run-up to  crises, w h en  und erly in g  im balances are b u ild in g  up  and  w arn­
in gs w ou ld  be usefu l b o th  to  borrowers and  to  lenders, and  th en  pu t th e  
countries th rou gh  several dow ngrades o n ce  th e  crises h ave broken ou t. This 
m ay m ake th em  a procyclical e lem en t (as th e y  w ere during th e  A sian crisis), 
encouragin g  banks to  w ithdraw  even  further from  em ergin g  eco n o m ies just 
w h en  their support is m ost n eed ed . H ow ever it is n o t  clear w h at w ou ld  be  
a better alternative. Sovereign  credit spreads ten d  to  b e ev en  m ore vo la tile  
th an  ratings. O ne approach w o u ld  be to  adjust regulatory risk w eigh ts o n ly  
gradually in  response to  chan ges in  credit ratings. F inancial m arkets are 
likely to  be procyclical regardless o f  h o w  regulations are structured. It is to  be  
h op ed  that a greater focus o n  m easuring risk b y  banks and  their supervisors 
w ill m ean  a m ore careful and  less short-term  focus.
Under th e  present accord, in ternational interbank len d in g  o f  up to  o n e  year 
to  non-O EC D  eco n o m ies  has a 2 0  per cen t risk w e ig h t w h ile  longer-term  
len d in g  carries a 100  per cen t risk w eigh t. O ne possib le  con seq u en ce  o f  th is  
d istin ction  is th at bank  len d in g  to  em erging m arkets is 'too ' short term , and  
th u s m ore subject to  cyclical forces.11 W h ile  a low er risk w eig h t for short­
term  len d in g  th an  for long-term  len d in g  m ay  m ake sense for th e  len d in g  o f  
an  in d iv idual bank  (w h ich  is th e  focus o f  th e  supervisors), it m akes less sense  
if all banks len d  short term  so  th at th e  borrower is vu lnerable to  a su dden  
loss in  liquidity. In o ther w ords th e  system ic (or m acro) con sid eration s m ay  
to  som e ex ten t run cou n ter  to  supervisory (or m icro) considerations.
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T he con su lta tive  d o cu m en t issued by  th e  Basel C om m ittee  (2001) recog­
n ized  th e  p o ten tia l for 'u n in ten d ed  con seq u en ces o n  len d in g  markets' from  
settin g  low er capital requirem ents for short-m aturity loan s and  sought 
co m m en ts o n  th is qu estion . It suggested  low ering  th e  th resh o ld  for pre­
ferable treatm ent o f  short-term  debt to  three m on th s, th e  upper m aturity  
ban d  in  th e  interbank m o n ey  market. W h ile  th e  proposed  risk w eigh ts  
for short-term  len d in g  to  banks rated b etw een  A p lus and  B m in u s are low er  
th an  th ose  applied  to  lon g-term  loan s to  th ose  banks, th e  difference is 3 0 -5 0  
percentage p o in ts  rather th an  th e  current 80  percentage p o in ts.
Conclusions
Since th e  A sian crisis fund s have co n sisten tly  flow ed  to  in tern ation a l banks 
from  em erging  econ om ies. Previously th is w ou ld  h ave seem ed  as lik ely  as 
w ater flow in g  u p h ill. A n um ber o f  factors are responsib le for th is surprising  
event, b o th  cyclical and  structural:
•  T he A sian crisis cam e as a shock  to  com p lacen t banks th at had  assum ed  
th e  g ood  tim es in  Asia w ou ld  g o  o n  in d efin ite ly  and  therefore ignored  th e  
m o u n tin g  debt in  th e  region . Su bsequently  th e  Russian crisis w eakened  
th e  co n v ic tio n  that lenders to  im portant countries w ou ld  alw ays be bailed  
out. This has led  to  reduced len d in g .
• Som e com p lacen cy  w as a lso rem oved  from  borrowers in  em erging  
econ om ies. M any borrowers b ecam e k een  to  repay debt. In Asia, currency  
d evalu ation s and  strong d em an d  (until recently) for their e lectron ic  
exports a llow ed  th em  to  repay excessive debt.
•  C yclical factors p layed  som e role; u n til recen tly  grow th  prospects in  th e  
U n ited  States w ere seen  as excep tion a lly  strong. G row th prospects looked  
poorer in  dam aged  A sian econ om ies, as w ell as in  A rgentina, Brazil and  
Turkey. M any A sian eco n o m ies have a legacy  o f  overin vestm en t so  are 
n o t k een  to  borrow.
• D ep osits in  in tern ation a l banks b y  em erging  m arket eco n o m ies h ave  
b een  grow ing, reflecting th e  deregu lation  o f  fast-grow ing fu n d  m anagers, 
capital fligh t and  th e  savings from  h ig h  o il revenues.
• A structural ch an ge exaggerating th e  p h e n o m e n o n  is th a t banks, encou r­
aged b y  p o licy  makers, are increasingly  d o in g  their len d in g  in  em erging  
eco n o m ies th rou gh  subsidiaries there, u sin g  deposits raised there, rather 
th a n  from  h ead  office.
It is hard to  apportion  th e  turnaround in  in tern ation a l bank len d in g  
b etw een  th ese  factors. But there is a risk th at in stead  o f  excessive capital 
in flow s th e  em erging  eco n o m ies w ill face in adequ ate in flow s. T he water 
flow in g  u p h ill w ill m o v e  th em  from  flo o d  to  drought.
76 International Bank Lending
Appendix 4.1
BIS in te r n a t io n a l b a n k in g  sta tis tic s
Data are gathered quarterly from  n ation a l authorities, u sually  central banks, 
in  32  econ om ies, in c lu d in g  th e  w orld's m ain  ban k in g  cen tres.12 There are 
tw o  m ain  quarterly co llection s, k n ow n  as th e  location a l and  con so lid ated  
co llection s.
T he location a l data, w h ich  co m m en ced  in  1964, are co n sisten t w ith  
balance o f p aym en ts p rincip les and  cover banks, b o th  d om estic  and  foreign- 
ow n ed , located  in  th e  32  econ om ies (but n o t  their overseas subsidiaries). 
T he data relate to  banks' in tern ation a l b an k in g  business, d efin ed  as gross 
financial claim s or liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents as w ell as foreign currency  
p osition s vis-à-vis residents. To m in im ize  reporting burdens th e  co llec tio n  is 
b u ilt o n  ex istin g  n a tion a l data co llection s. A lth ou gh  th e  data u su ally  cover  
w ell over 9 0  per cen t o f  in tern ation a l len d in g , there is som e variation  in  th e  
coverage o f  in stitu tio n s and  som e d efin ition a l in co n s isten c ies .13
T he assets and  liab ilities (and a narrower con cep t o f  loan s and  deposits) 
are broken d o w n  by:
•  currency, in to  d o m estic  currency, US dollar, euro, y en , sterling, Swiss 
franc and 'other'. O n e reason for th is  is to  m easure th e  ex ten t to  w h ich  
changes in  stock  expressed  in  US dollars are attributable to  va lu a tion  
effects arising from  exch an ge  rate flu ctuations rather th an  b e in g  d ue to  
transactions;
•  sector, in to  banks and  non-banks;
•  e co n o m y  (in tern ational organizations such  as th e  IMF, OPEC and  so  on  
are in clu d ed  as 'special countries' rather th an  b e in g  allocated  to  th e  
cou ntry  in  w h ich  th ey  are headquartered).
A sn ap shot sum m ary o f  th ese  data, w h ich  are pu b lish ed  for over 160  in d i­
vidual em erging econ om ies, as o f  m id  2 0 0 2  is provided  in  th e  upper part o f  
Table A 4.1. For som e countries there are sign ifican t discrepancies b etw een  
th e  data pu b lish ed  b y  th e  BIS (based o n  in form ation  from  lenders) and  th e  
external debt statistics p u b lish ed  by  n ation a l statistical agencies (based o n  
in form ation  from  borrow ers). In som e cases th is is k n o w n  to  be due to  
d efin ition a l d ifferences rather th an  m isrep orting .14
T he con so lid a ted  co llec tion , lau n ch ed  in  1977 b ut reported o n ly  sem i­
an n u ally  u n til 2 000 , focuses o n  banks' w orldw ide credit and  cou n try  risk 
exposure. It g ives in form ation  o n  banks' in ternational len d in g  activ ities  
broken d ow n  b y  m aturity, sector and  borrow ing cou n try  o n  a w orld-w ide  
con so lid ated  basis. Banks w ith  head  offices in  th e  reporting cou n try  provide  
in form ation  o n  all their o ffices at h o m e and  abroad (in clu d in g  an y  oper­
a tion s in  w h ich  th e y  o w n  m ore th an  50  per cen t o f  th e  capital), w ith  th e  
p osition s b etw een  d ifferent offices o f  th e  sam e bank n etted  ou t. E xam ples o f
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Assets 2 7 7 173 28 1 15 6 8 8 7
o f  which
lo a n s 23 1 135 2 1 5 147 72 8
to  n o n -b a n k  se c to r 112 79 147 78 4 1 6
L ia b il i t ie s 3 7 1 150 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 0 9 7
o f  which
d e p o s its 3 7 0 150 22 9 3 3 9 1 0 8 8
to  n o n -b a n k  se c to r 140 41 131 144 4 5 6
C o n s o lid a te d  c la im s 39 5 2 9 6 4 9 2 154 1 3 3 7
o f  which
s h o r t - te rm 128 8 0 1 1 2 6 2 3 8 2
o n  p u b l ic  se c to r 4 0 33 4 0 2 0 133
o n  n o n -b a n k
p r iv a te  s e c to r 121 108 164 58 45 1
U n u s e d  lin e s 5 4 50 3 2 4 4 1 8 0
A f f i l ia te s ' lo c a l c u r re n c y
c la im s  o n  lo c a l re s id e n ts 141 104 247 3 4 5 2 6
Source : BIS (2002).
th ese  data are provided  in  th e  low er part o f  Table A 4.1. T he co llec tio n s also  
in clu d e separate reporting o f foreign  banks' local business in  loca l currency, 
a grow ing item  d ue to  in tern ation a l banks’ purchase o f  d om estic  banks in  
em erging  econ om ies.
Im p ro v em en ts
The BIS data co llection s are con tin u ou sly  b ein g  im proved in  term s o f accuracy, 
coverage an d  tim elin ess. Likely im p rovem en ts w ith in  th e  n ex t tw o  years 
in clu d e ad d in g  m ore d eve lop in g  countries and  offshore centres to  th e  in ter­
n ation a l bank ing  statistics, a cou n try  breakdow n for th e  derivatives business  
o f banks and  m ore detailed  data o n  an u ltim ate risk basis. T he im prove­
m en ts are overseen  b y  th e  C om m ittee  o n  th e  G lobal F inancial System  and  
an expert group o f  central bank statisticians (see Fender and  Frankel, 2001).
N o tes
*  A n y  o p in io n s  exp re ssed  in  th is  c h a p te r  a re  th o s e  o f  th e  a u th o r  a n d  are  n o t  ne ce s­
s a r ily  sh a re d  b y  th e  BIS. H e lp fu l c o m m e n ts  h a v e  b e e n  re c e ive d  f r o m  P a lle  A n d e rs e n , 
C h a rle s  F re e la n d , S te p h a n y  G r if f i th -J o n e s , M a rc  K la u , E lm a r  K o c h , C h r is t in a  L u n a , 
M a r ia n  M ic u ,  P h i l ip  T u rn e r , A g u s t in  V il la r ,  K a rs te n  v o n  K le is t, B e a tr ice  W eder, 
R a in e r W id e ra  a n d  p a r t ic ip a n ts  a t  s e m in a rs  in  S a n tia g o  a n d  H e ls in k i .  B ru n o  
A lle m a n n , M e lis s a  F io re l l i,  M a rc  K la u  a n d  D e n is  P etre  ass is ted  w i t h  th e  d a ta .
1. F o r fu r th e r  d e ta ils  see BIS, 2 0 0 0 ; BIS, 2 0 0 2 ; F io re l l i,  2 0 0 0 .
2 . I t  has  b e e n  sugg es ted  t h a t  th e  m o re  re a d y  g ra n t in g  o f  g u a ra n te e s  a n d  s u p p o r t  b y  
e x p o r t  ag en c ie s  is  e n c o u ra g in g  in te r n a t io n a l le n d in g  b y  E u ro p e a n  b a n k s .
3 . H e d g in g  b e tw e e n  d o m e s t ic  a g e n ts  is  l ik e  p la y in g  'pass th e  p a rc e l' a n d  do es  n o t  
re d u c e  th e  n a t io n a l e x p o s u re .
4 . F o r a m o re  d e ta i le d  a n a ly s is  o f  f lo w s  t o  A s ia , in c lu d in g  a n  a n a ly s is  based  o n  
in d iv id u a l  b a n k  d a ta , see C a il lo u x  a n d  G r if f i th -J o n e s  (2 0 0 0 ).
5 . See W o o ld r id g e  (2 0 0 1 ) a n d  C o h e n  a n d  R e m o lo n a  (2 0 0 1 ).
6. A c c o rd in g  t o  US b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts  d a ta , n e t  in f lo w s  t o  th e  U n ite d  States 
f r o m  e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s  a ve ra g e d  a ro u n d  U S $ 7 0  b i l l i o n  d u r in g  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 0  
c o m p a re d  w i t h  a n e t  ave ra ge  o u t f lo w  o f  a ro u n d  U S $ 4 0  b i l l i o n  d u r in g  th e  th re e  
p re c e d in g  yea rs . W h i le  m u c h  o f  th is  w e n t  in t o  th e  p u rc h a s e  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  b o n d s  
o r  p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t,  s o m e  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  d e p o s ite d  in  b a n k s . P r iv a te  
p e n s io n  fu n d s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  are  n o w  e s t im a te d  to  h a v e  a ro u n d  U S $ 1 7 0  b i l l i o n  
in  fu n d s  u n d e r  m a n a g e m e n t.
7. See fo r  e x a m p le  C laessens a n d  K lin g e b ie l (1 9 9 9 ). C laessens et al. (2 0 0 1 ) s h o w  th a t  
s ig n if ic a n t  fo re ig n  b a n k  e n t r y  is  asso c ia te d  w i t h  a  re d u c t io n  in  o p e ra t in g  expenses 
a n d  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  d o m e s t ic  b a n k s .
8 . V e ry  h ig h  ra tes  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k  p e n e t ra t io n  o c c u r, f o r  e x a m p le , in  N e w  Z e a la n d  
(91  p e r  c e n t) ,  B o ts w a n a  (9 4  p e r  c e n t) , J o rd a n  (95  p e r  c e n t)  a n d  B a h ra in  (9 7  p e r  
c e n t) . A  ra re  case o f  th is  issue b e in g  ad d re ssed  f r o m  s c ra tc h  w as in  th e  w o r ld 's  
n e w e s t n a t io n  -  East T im o r .  R e p o r te d ly  th e  e c o n o m ic s  m in is te r  p re fe r re d  n o t  to  
h a v e  a n y  d o m e s tic  b a n k s , b u t  a n o th e r  s e n io r  p o l i t ic ia n  fo u n d  i t  h a rd  t o  im a g in e  
a n a t io n  w i t h o u t  a t le a s t o n e  d o m e s tic  b a n k  (The Economist, 2  S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 0 ). 
F o r d a ta  o n  shares  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k s  in  b a n k in g  assets, see H a w k in s  a n d  M ih a l je k  
(2 0 0 1 , ta b le  9 ).
9 . T h e  F in a n c ia l S ta b il i ty  F o ru m ’s (2 0 0 0 ) re p o r t  o n  c a p ita l f lo w s  suggests  t h a t  in  
e m e rg in g  e c o n o m ie s  w h e re  s u p e rv is o ry  resources  are  scarce, s im p le  re s tr ic t io n s  o n  
b a n k s ' fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e  e x p o su re s  m ig h t  b e  u s e d  u n t i l  a m o re  s o p h is t ic a te d  r is k  
m a n a g e m e n t a p p ro a c h  is  fe a s ib le . T h ese  re s tr ic t io n s  c o u ld  in c lu d e  l im i t s  o n  lo n g  
o r  s h o r t  p o s it io n s  re la t iv e  to  c a p ita l,  m in im u m  h o ld in g s  o f  l iq u id  assets, a n d  reserve 
re q u ire m e n ts . F o re ig n  c u r re n c y  lo a n s  c o u ld  b e  re s tr ic te d  to  a f ix e d  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  
c a p ita l o r  b a n k s  c o u ld  be  re q u ire d  t o  h o ld  m o re  c a p ita l a g a in s t th e s e  lo a n s .
10. S uch  in d e p e n d e n c e  b e co m e s  less l ik e ly  i f  b a n k s  use th e  sam e  c re d it  r is k  m o d e ls  
a n d  re ly  o n  th e  sam e d a tab ase  t o  q u a n t i f y  c re d it  losses.
11. W h i le  i t  is  re a s o n a b le  fo r  b o r ro w e rs  to  p a y  m o re  fo r  lo n g e r - te rm  lo a n s , th e  
p re m iu m  m a y  b e  d r iv e n  to o  h ig h  i f  th e  c a p ita l re q u ire m e n ts  are  in a p p ro p r ia te .
12 . T h e  e c o n o m ie s  are  A u s tra lia , A u s tr ia , B aham as, B a h ra in , B e lg iu m , C a n a d a , C a y m a n  
Is la n d s , D e n m a rk ,  F in la n d ,  F ran ce , G e rm a n y , G u e rn se y , H o n g  K o n g , In d ia ,  
Ire la n d , Is le  o f  M a n ,  I ta ly ,  Ja p a n , Jersey, L u x e m b o u rg , N e th e r la n d s , N e th e r la n d s  
A n t il le s ,  N o rw a y , P o rtu g a l, S in g a p o re , S p a in , S w eden , S w itz e r la n d , T a iw a n , T u rke y , 
th e  U n ite d  K in g d o m  a n d  th e  U n ite d  S tates.
13. S om e c o u n tr ie s  in c lu d e  th e  b a n k in g  o p e ra t io n s  o f  t h e i r  c e n t ra l b a n k  a n d  s o m e  
o n ly  p ro v id e  d a ta  o n  b a n k s  o p e ra t in g  in  t h e ir  o f fs h o re  b a n k in g  c e n tre s . S om e 
c o u n tr ie s  o n ly  p ro v id e  a re s tr ic te d  fo re ig n  c u r re n c y  b re a k d o w n . D iffe re n c e s  e x is t 
b e tw e e n  c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  a b a n k . A c c o u n t in g  d iffe re n c e s  m a y  a ffe c t 
th e  basis  o n  w h ic h  th e  v a lu e  o f  s e c u rit ie s  are  re p o r te d  a n d  th e  t re a tm e n t  o f  in t e r ­
est arrears.
14 . T h e  t r e a tm e n t o f  tra d e  c re d its  is  o n e  s u c h  area. See v o n  K le is t (2 0 0 2 ) a n d  F in a n c ia l 
S ta b il i ty  F o ru m  (2 0 0 0 ) fo r  a fu r th e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  d if fe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  c re d ito r  
a n d  d e b to r  d a ta .
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B a n k  L e n d i n g  t o  E m e r g i n g  M a r k e t s :  
C r o s s i n g  t h e  B o r d e r
David Lubin
Reflections on the collapse of short-term lending
W ith ou t q u estion  th e  w orld's banks have b een  th e  largest n e t taker o f  funds  
from  em erging m arkets since th e  1997 A sian crisis. From Table 5.1 it is clear 
th a t b etw een  th e  en d  o f  1997  -  w h en  banks' exposure peaked -  to  th e  en d  o f  
2000 , banks' n et c la im s o n  d eve lop in g  countries fe ll b y  a m assive U S$292.8  
billion . M oreover it  is clear from  th e sam e table th a t banks actually  becam e  
n et debtors to  th e  d eve lop in g  w orld  during th e  sam e period. W hereas in  
1997 th e  banks had  a n e t credit p o sitio n  o f  U S$147 b illion , b y  D ecem ber  
2 0 0 0  th is  had  turned in to  a n e t debtor p o sitio n  o f  U S$145 b illion . It is
Table 5.1 B a n k s ' n e t  c ro s s -b o rd e r  e x p o s u re  t o  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , 1 9 9 7  a n d  2 0 0 1  
(U S$ b i l l i o n )
1997 2001 (03) Change
B a n ks ' in te r n a t io n a l assets 1 0 5 1  2 0 6 8 7 4  5 1 2 - 1 7 6  6 9 4
A fr ic a  a n d  M id d le  East 141 0 2 6 141 151 125
A s ia  a n d  P a c ific 4 4 9  9 1 3 2 7 3  3 0 8 - 1 7 6  60 5
E u ro p e 1 5 6  2 3 7 165  9 8 5 9 748
L a t in  A m e r ic a 3 0 4  0 3 0 2 9 4  0 6 8 - 9  9 6 2
B a n k s ' in te r n a t io n a l l ia b i l i t ie s 9 0 3  9 3 4 1 0 9 0  001 1 8 6  0 6 7
A fr ic a  a n d  M id d le  East 2 6 7  0 8 8 3 2 9  9 3 2 6 2  8 4 4
A s ia  a n d  P a c ific 2 8 5  4 7 6 3 6 9  104 8 3  6 2 8
E u ro p e 1 0 6  0 5 3 131 551 25  4 9 8
L a t in  A m e r ic a 2 4 5  3 1 7 2 5 9  4 1 4 14  0 9 7
B a n k s ' n e t  e x p o s u re 14 7  2 7 2 - 2 1 5  4 8 9 - 3 6 2  761
A fr ic a  a n d  M id d le  East - 1 2 6  0 6 2 - 1 8 8  781 - 6 2  719
A s ia  a n d  P a c ific 16 4  4 3 7 - 9 5  79 6 - 2 6 0  2 3 3
E u ro p e 5 0 1 8 4 3 4  4 3 4 - 1 5  750
L a t in  A m e r ic a 5 8  713 3 4  6 5 4 - 2 4  0 5 9
Source: BIS.
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co m m o n  en o u g h  for th e  w orld's banks to  be n e t debtors to  th e  M iddle East 
and  African regions, prim arily due to  th e  assets o w n ed  b y  o il-exp ortin g  
countries. Yet for d ev e lo p in g  countries overall it is qu ite  unusual for th e  
w orld's banks to  b e  n e t debtors to  th e  d eve lop in g  w orld . O n th e  face o f it, 
th ese  data m ake a m ockery o f  th e  idea th at banks o u g h t to  be used  as a w ay  
o f ch a n n e llin g  foreign  savings to  d eve lop in g  countries.
Three p o in ts  are w orth  m aking  in  order to  h elp  us understand  w h y  
th e  banks' n e t exposure to  d eve lop in g  countries co llap sed  so th orou gh ly  
b etw een  th ese  years. First, th e  fall in  n e t c la im s o n  d ev e lo p in g  cou ntries is 
h a lf exp la in ed  b y  a rise in  d eve lop in g  countries' foreign  exch an ge  reserves. 
Table 5.1 sh o w s th a t there w as a U S$147 b illio n  increase in  banks' liab ilities  
to  d eve lop in g  coun tries b etw een  1997 and  2 000 , and  th is accou n ts for 
rough ly  h a lf o f  th e  U S$292  b illio n  fall in  n et cla im s. T he reason w h y  
th is is in terestin g  is th at it casts a sligh tly  d ifferent ligh t o n  th e  reason w h y  
n et exposure fell. If banks w ere reducing their gross exposure to  em erging  
m arkets -  w h ich  o f  course th ey  w ere d o in g  -  th is suggests an  increase in  risk 
aversion  o n  th e  part o f  th e  banks. Yet at th e  sam e tim e, if  d ev e lo p in g  c o u n ­
tries th em selves w ere increasing their h o ld in gs o f  foreign  exch an ge  reserves, 
th is suggests th a t there w as an increase in  risk aversion  in  th e  d eve lop in g  
w orld . In o ther w ords, it w as n o t just banks th a t w ere m ore risk-averse, bu t 
also countries.
In m an y  w ays th is  is iron ic , g iven  th e  w idespread sw itch  that h as taken  
place in  em erging  m arkets from  fixed  exch an ge rate regim es to  floa tin g  
regim es. In princip le  o n e  w ou ld  exp ect a cou n try  th at adopts a floa tin g  rate 
regim e to  w an t to  h o ld  few er foreign  exch an ge reserves, n o t  m ore, sin ce  
shocks can  be absorbed b y  ch an ges in  th e  exch an ge  rate rather th an  ch anges  
in  th e  qu an tity  o f  reserves. T he fact th at reserve h o ld in g s have risen so  
sharply seem s o n  th e  face o f  it to  suggest th a t d ev e lo p in g  countries are n o t  
entirely  h app y w ith  th e  com fort o f  h av in g  flexib le exch an ge  rates as a m eans 
o f  absorbing in tern ation a l shocks. This cou ld  m ean  o n e  o f  tw o  th ings: either  
coun tries have a 'fear o f  floa tin g ',1 in  o th er w ords, th ey  w a n t to  m in im ize  
exch an ge  rate vo la tility  in  order, for exam ple, to  im prove contro l over in fla ­
tionary  expectations; or th e y  are con cern ed  about th e  p o ten tia l reversibility  
o f capital flow s, w h ich  requires th em  to  h o ld  a greater cu sh io n  o f  reserves 
o n  th e  realistic assu m p tion  th at th e  exch an ge  rate ca n n o t b e exp ected  to  
absorb th e  entire sh ock  o f  a sustained  n e t capital outflow .
Second, th e  fall in  exposure w as m assively  con cen trated  in  Asia. Table 5.1  
sh ow s th at th e  fall in  n e t claim s to  d eve lop in g  countries b etw een  1997 and  
O ctober 2001  w as som e U S$363 b illion , but th at over 70 per cen t o f  th is fall 
w as exp la in ed  b y  a fall in  n e t c la im s to  Asia. Indeed  gross c la im s to  n o n -  
A sian d eve lop in g  countries w ere rather stable during th e  1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 1  period, 
rem ain ing  c lose  to  U S $600  b illio n  throu gh ou t.
Third, th e  fall in  banks' exposure is largely exp la in ed  b y  a fall in  short­
term  exposure. Table 5 .2  sh ow s that gross cross-border bank  exposure to
David Lubin 83
Table 5.2 Accounting for the fall in  banks' gross
cross-border exposure to  developing countries,
1997-2001 (Q3)
USS bn
T o ta l c h a n g e  in  b a n k s ' e x p o s u re - 1 4 6 .4
A fr ic a  a n d  M id d le  East 5 .0
A s ia  a n d  P a c ific - 1 6 7 .4
E u ro p e 6 .9
L a t in  A m e r ic a 9.1
C h a n g e  in  s h o r t - te rm  e x p o s u re - 1 2 7 .9
A fr ic a  a n d  M id d le  East - 0 . 9
A s ia  a n d  P a c ific - 1 1 0 .1
E u ro p e - 1 . 6
L a t in  A m e r ic a - 1 5 2 .5
Source: BIS.
d ev e lo p in g  countries fell b y  U S$146 b illion  b etw een  1997  an d  th e  third  
quarter o f  2001; y e t th e  fall in  short-term  exposure w as U S$128 b illion . In  
other w ords th e  co llapse in  cross-border len d in g  b y  banks to  d eve lop in g  
countries w as very  largely a fall in  short-term  exposure.
So in  m a n y  w ays th is is a story about a sharp fall in  short-term  loan s  
to  A sian borrowers. Yet th is  to o  sh ou ld  b e put in to  co n tex t, sin ce  th e  
u n w in d in g  o f th ese  p ositio n s in  1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 0  w as sim ply  th e  counterpart to  
th e  very sharp increase in  short-term  len d in g  to  Asia th at took  p lace during  
th e  late 1980s and  early 1990s. For exam p le short-term  loans as a share o f  
to ta l len d in g  to  th e  A sian region  rose from  47 per cen t in  th e  late 1980s to  
63 per cen t in  1997 . T he repaym ents th at banks have received  sin ce  th e  
A sian crisis is best described as a process o f  ba lance sheet co n so lid a tio n  th at 
has reduced th e  banks' short-term  loan s to  a m ore acceptable level. W hat 
has h ap p en ed  sin ce  th e  A sian crisis, in  effect, is th at banks have reduced  
their short-term  claim s tow ards th e  'norm al' level o f  47  per cen t o f  total 
loans. In oth er w ords th e  banks' reduction  o f  their gross short-term  ex p o s­
ure sin ce  1997 looks like th e  'revulsion' that o ften  characterizes creditor 
behaviour in  th e  afterm ath o f  a debt crisis. R evulsion, o f  course, is th e  flip  
side o f  'exuberance' -  th e  period  o f  excessive op tim ism  that precedes a crisis. 
In th is co n tex t it is w orth  bearing in  m in d  th at th e  gross repaym ents th at 
w ere m ade to  banks over th e  four years in  q u estion  w ere in  m a n y  w ays 
sim p ly  th e  u n w in d in g  o f an  increase in  exposure th at took  p lace in  th e  
run-up to  th e  crisis.
Gross cross-border bank exposure to  Asia reached U S$423 b illio n  in  
D ecem ber 1997, bu t had  fa llen  to  U S$270 b illio n  by  M arch 2001 . Yet even  
th is  level o f  exposure w as m assively  h igher th an  it had  b een  in  th e  early  
1990s: in  D ecem ber 1993 banks' exposure to  Asia had  b een  U S$190 b illion .
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O ne o f  th e  m a in  con seq u en ces o f  th is revu lsion  is th a t th e  prob lem  o f  
short-term  debt -  w h ich  has b een  a principal th em e  in  each  o f  th e  em erging  
m arket crises in  th e  past decade -  is largely n o  lon ger  a problem  for d eve lop ­
in g  countries as a w h o le . T here has b een  such  a h u ge  repaym ent o f  short­
term  debt to  th e  w orld's banks th at th ese  days short-term  debt poses little  
threat to  th e  hea lth  o f d evelop in g  countries' balance sheets. A useful indicator  
o f th is is th e  ratio o f  short-term  debt to  foreign  exch an ge  reserves, w h ich  has 
collapsed  during recent years as b o th  debtors and creditors h ave m o v ed  to  
con so lid ate  their b alan ce sheets. A ccording to  data from  th e  Institu te  o f  
In ternational F inance, in  1996  there w ere 14 large d ev e lo p in g  countries  
w h o se  stocks o f  short-term  external debt w ere greater th a n  their foreign  
exch an ge  reserves: A rgentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ind onesia , Israel, Korea, 
M exico , Pakistan, P h ilip p ines, R om ania, Russia, South  Africa, T hailand  and  
Turkey. By th e  en d  o f  2 0 0 0  th at num ber had  fa llen  to  just six: A rgentina, 
Brazil, M exico, Pakistan, South  Africa and  Turkey. Table 5 .3  sh ow s th e  b ig  
im p rovem en t in  d eve lop in g  countries' balan ce sheets o n  a regional basis: 
th e  ratio o f short-term  debt to  foreign  exch an ge  reserves co llapsed  b etw een  
1996  an d  20 0 0  b o th  in  Latin Am erica -  w here it fe ll from  83  per cen t to  
54  per cen t -  and, m ore spectacularly, in  Asia, w here it fell from  83  per cen t 
to  33 per cent.
T he process o f u n w in d in g  th e  short-term  debt overh ang o f  th e  m id  1990s  
has b een  reinforced b y  th e  sw itch  from  fixed  to  floa tin g  exch an ge  rate 
regim es in  m a n y  countries over th e  past few  years. T he p o in t is th at th e  
accu m u lation  o f  short-term  debt in  th e  1990s was at least partly a b y ­
product o f  th e  pervasiveness o f  fixed  exch an ge  rates. T his encou raged  b o th  
borrow ers and  lenders to  im agin e that currency risk h ad  disappeared. This 
in  turn m ade room  for th e  accu m u lation  o f  large stocks o f  short-term  
external debt in  order to  fin an ce loca l currency assets to  take advantage o f  
w h at w as perceived  to  b e a 'risk-free' in terest arbitrage. N o w  th at m a n y  large 
em erging  eco n o m ies h ave ab an d on ed  fixed  exch an ge  rates for floa tin g  on es  
there are fewer in cen tiv es for in stitu tio n s to  create short-term  liab ilities  
in  foreign  exch an ge. In other w ords th e  sw itch  to  floa tin g  exch an ge  rate 
regim es has g o n e  h an d  in  h a n d  w ith  th e  co llapse in  overall levels o f  short­
term  debt.
Table 5.3  Y es te rday 's  p ro b le m : r a t io  o f  s h o r t - te rm  d e b t  to  
fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e  reserves, 1 9 9 6  a n d  2 0 0 0  (p e r c e n t)
1996 2000e
A s ia 83 33
L a t in  A m e r ic a 83 54
Source: Derived from Institute of International Finance databases.
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In v iew  o f  all th is, o n e  q u estion  th at m ig h t b e w orth  asking is w h eth er  
there are an y  w ays in  w h ich  th e  w orld's fin an cia l regulators m ig h t try to  
avoid  th e  excessive b u ild -up  o f  short-term  len d in g  in  th e  future. Should  
th ere b e a prudential lim it o n  th e  am ou n t o f b ank  len d in g  for less th an  
o n e  year? Prudential lim its o n  short-term  debt are n orm ally  expressed in  
relation  to  a country's level o f  foreign  exch an ge  reserves. T he best k n ow n  
exp ression  o f th is  is th e  'G uidotti rule', w h ich  suggests th at a prud en tly  
m an aged  e co n o m y  w ill have a short-term  external debt th at is n o  greater 
th an  its stock  o f foreign  exch an ge reserves. In other w ords th e  G uidotti rule 
focuses o n  th e  m aturity  structure o f  a d eve lop in g  country's b a lance sheet. 
This is all very sensib le. Yet at th e  sam e tim e it m ig h t also b e w orth w h ile  
focu sin g  o n  th e  m aturity  structure o f  th e  banks' co llec tive  b a lance sheet.
T he reason for th is is th at it m akes sense to  th in k  th at th e  in cen tiv e  for 
herd-like b eh aviour o n  th e  part o f  banks w ill b eco m e greater as th e  ratio of 
short-term  loan s to  to ta l loan s b ecom es larger. T he in tu itio n  here is sim ple. 
If creditor A is th e  o n ly  short-term  lender to  cou n try  1, w h ile  th e  rest are 
longer-term  lenders, th en  th e  in cen tiv e  for th at creditor to  roll over its 
short-term  loan  w ill be relatively h ig h  since there w ill n o t  b e so  m a n y  banks 
scram bling for access to  cou n try  l's  reserves in  th e  even t o f  a deterioration  
in  cou n try  risk. T his w ill rem ain  true regardless o f  th e  cou n try ’s G uid otti 
rule ratio. All o ther th in gs b e in g  equal, it is better to  h ave a lo w  ratio o f  
short-term  debt to  to ta l debt th a n  a h ig h  on e . T his situ ation  is sum m arized  
in  Figure 5 .1 , w h ich  sh ow s com b in a tion s o f  tw o  ratios: th e  short-term  debt 
to  reserves ratio (w h ich  is essen tia lly  a m easure o f  th e  qu a lity  o f  a country's 
liq u id ity  in  foreign  currencies), and  th e  short-term  debt to  total debt ratio. 
T he im portan t aspect o f  th e  latter ratio is th at it h elp s us to  see th in gs from  
th e  p o in t o f  v iew  o f  th e  creditors' balance sh eet as o p p osed  to  th e  debtors'
Ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange 
reserves of country X
Low High
Low
Ratio of short-term loans to total 




Figure 5.1 C o m b in a t io n s  o f  s h o r t - te rm  d e b t to  reserves r a t io  a n d  s h o r t - te rm  d e b t to  
t o ta l  d e b t ra t io
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balance sheet. B ecause o f  th e  p ossib ility  o f  herd behaviour by  com m ercial 
creditors, a cou n try  sh ou ld  n o t  o n ly  try to  m in im ize  its short-term  debt to  
reserves ratio, bu t sh ou ld  also try to  m in im ize  its short-term  debt to  total 
debt ratio for an y  g iven  level o f  reserves.
It m ay even  m ake sense to  set a prudentia l lim it o n  short-term  d eb t as 
a share o f to ta l debt. At w h at level sh ou ld  it be set? O ne w ay o f  th in k in g  
about th is is to  look  at th e  experience o f  A sian countries during th e  1990s. 
At th e  start o f  th e  1990s th e  ratio o f  short-term  debt to  to ta l external debt 
for th e  reg ion  w as 5 0  per cen t. T his grew  during th e  course o f th e  early 
1990s to  peak at 65 per cen t in  1995. S ince th e  crisis, lenders' revu lsion  has 
pu sh ed  th e  ratio d o w n  to  levels w ell b e lo w  50  per cen t (it is currently at 
47  per cen t). Arguably, therefore, a co n v en ien t prudentia l m easure for th e  
ratio m igh t be set at 50  per cen t. This w o u ld  be n o  m ore th a n  a rule o f  
th u m b  to  coex ist w ith  th e  G uidotti rule o n  th e  ratio o f  short-term  debt to  
foreign  exch an ge reserves.
If short-term  debt is a central ind icator o f  risk in  em erging  m arkets, it is 
w orth  p o in tin g  ou t th at it is far from  b e in g  an in fa llib le  indicator, particu­
larly if  a country's stock  o f  short-term  debt fulfils certain  q ualitative criteria. 
Put flippantly, 'there is short-term  debt and  there is short-term  debt'. 
C onsider South  Africa, w h ich  has con sisten tly  b een  th e  e co n o m y  w ith  th e  
h igh est ratio o f  short-term  debt to  foreign  exch an ge reserves. The im portant 
q u estion  is h o w  S outh  Africa m anaged  to  survive th e  1990s w ith o u t a debt 
crisis w h en  th e  ex isten ce  o f  large stocks o f  short-term  debt appears to  have  
b een  such a reliable ind icator o f  th e  crises in  M exico , Asia, Russia, Brazil and, 
m ore recently, Turkey.
Two features o f  th e  South  African experience h elp  exp la in  w h y  th e  co u n ­
try m anaged to  avoid  a crisis. The first is th e  ex isten ce  o f  a floa tin g  exch an ge  
rate regim e, w h ich  h elp ed  to  m in im ize  th e  accum ulation  o f  a b ig  stock  o f  
short-term  liabilities to  finance a cross-border interest arbitrage, or 'carry 
trade'. The secon d  (related) feature is th at South  Africa's short-term  debt 
stock is w id ely  regarded to  b e  related to  trade finance. T his type o f len d ing , 
o f course, bears n o  currency risk (for lender or borrower), and  is related to  an  
u nderlying transaction  o f  real eco n o m ic  resources. All in  all, th en , South  
Africa's experience suggests th at early w arning indicators o f  crisis in  em erg­
in g  econ om ies are likely  to  be m ore useful if th ey  capture qualitative aspects 
o f short-term  debt stocks rather th an  sim ply  assessing th e  size o f  th ose  stocks. 
Trade-related debt stocks are likely  to  be m ore stable th an  stocks o f  debt, 
w h ich  are b e in g  used  to  finance cross-border interest arbitrage. Arguably 
M exico's stock o f  short-term  external debt is o f  a sim ilar nature th ese  days.
Banks 'crossing the border'
W h ile it is clear th at banks h ave b een  n et takers o f  cross-border fu n d s from  
em erging  m arkets in  recent years, it is n o t  true to  say th a t th is behaviour  
necessarily  sh ow s th at banks have w ithdraw n  from  em erging  markets.
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W h ile  cross-border exposure has fallen , in -cou n try  exposure has risen. In  
other w ords, w h at w e have seen  is better described as a redistribution  o f  
banks’ overall em erging-m arket portfolios, in  w h ich  banks h ave  substitu ted  
on sh ore for offshore len d in g . T he q u estion  th at arises from  th is  is w h eth er  
th is portfo lio  sh ift has brought an y  ben efits  to  d eve lop in g  countries, and  in  
particular w h eth er  it  w ill en d  up  red ucing  th eir  vu lnerab ility  to  crisis.
W hat is b ey o n d  doubt is th at foreign  banks have m assively  increased  
their ow n ersh ip  o f d eve lop in g  countries' b ank ing  sectors, an d  th at th is  
h ap p en ed  precisely  during th e  crisis period  o f  th e  late 1990s. T he increase  
in  foreign  p en etration  o f  em erging  markets' finan cia l system s is clear from  
Table 5 .4 , w h ich  sh ow s th e  percentage o f  ban k in g  sector assets o w n ed  by
Table 5.4  F o re ig n  o w n e rs h ip  o f  b a n k in g  s e c to r assets in  s e le c te d  e m e rg in g  m a rk e ts , 
1 9 9 4  a n d  1 9 9 9  (p e r  c e n t)
1994 1999
Total banking Share owned Total banking Share owned




C z e c h  R e p u b lic 4 6 .6 8 .3 6 3 .4 4 9 .3
H u n g a ry 2 6 .8 2 3 .8 3 2 .6 5 6 .6
P o la n d 3 9 .4 2 .3 9 1 .1 5 2 .8
T o ta l C e n tra l 
E u ro p e 1 1 2 .8 9 .9 187 .1 5 2 .3
Latin America
A rg e n t in a 7 3 .2 16 .5 1 5 7 .0 4 8 .6
B ra z il 4 8 6 .9 12 .2 7 3 2 .3 16 .8
C h ile 4 1 .4 17 .6 11 2 .3 5 3 .6
C o lo m b ia 2 8 .3 5 .4 4 5 .3 1 7 .8
M e x ic o 2 1 0 .2 0 .9 2 0 4 .5 18 .8
P e ru 12 .3 2 .9 2 6 .3 3 3 .4
V e n e z u e la 16 .4 10 .4 2 4 .7 4 1 .9
T o ta l L a t in  
A m e r ic a 8 6 8 .7 9 .7 1 3 0 2 .4 2 5 .0
T o ta l e x c lu d in g  
M e x ic o  a n d  
B ra z il 17 1 .5 13 .3 3 6 5 .6 4 4 .8
Asia
K o re a 6 0 1 .1 0 .8 6 4 2 .4 4 .3
M a la y s ia 148 .1 6 .8 2 2 0 .6 11 .5
T h a ila n d 1 9 2 .8 0 .5 1 9 8 .8 5 .6
T o ta l A s ia 9 4 2 .0 1.7 1 0 6 1 .8 6 .0
Source: Mathieson and Roídos (2001).
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foreign -contro lled  banks (defined  here as banks th at are at least 50 per cen t  
foreign -ow n ed ). S ince 1999  there have b een  further large increases in  for­
e ign  ow nersh ip , for exam ple in  M exico. T he m ost dram atic increase in  
foreign  p en etration  has b een  in  C entral Europe, w here th e  share o f  ban k in g  
assets con tro lled  by  foreign -ow n ed  in stitu tio n s rose from  9 .9  per cen t in  
1994  to  52.3  per cen t in  1999. D uring th e  sam e period  th e  foreign  penetra­
tio n  o f  th e  Latin A m erican b an k in g  system  rose from  9 per cen t to  25 per 
cen t. Foreign en try  to  Asia w as m ore lim ited , w ith  external ow nersh ip  rising  
from  o n ly  1 per cen t o f  assets in  1994 to  6 per cen t in  1999.
T he relatively sm all increase in  foreign  ow nersh ip  o f  th e  A sian b ank ing  
system  suggests th a t it w o u ld  b e  dangerous to  overem ph asize th e  id ea  th at  
banks have s im p ly  substitu ted  local exposure for cross-border exposure. 
Clearly, banks tak ing  repaym ents o f short-term  loan s to  A sian borrowers 
have n o t sim p ly  ch a n n e lled  th o se  p aym en ts in to  th e  purchase o f  A sian  
banks, so  th e  idea th at banks have b een  en gag in g  in  som e redistribution  o f  
their p ortfo lios m u st b e u n d erstood  in  an aggregate sense.
Foreign ow nersh ip  o f  d evelop in g  countries' banking system s is ev id en t n o t  
just from  th e  perspective o f  th e  share o f  assets ow n ed  b y  foreign  in stitu tion s  
b u t also from  th e  perspective o f  th e  lenders th em selves. Table 5.5 looks 
at th e  ch ange in  banks' cross-border len d in g  b etw een  1995 and  Septem ber  
2001 and  com pares th is  w ith  th e  ch ange in  foreign  banks' on sh ore  len d in g  
in  loca l currency d uring th e  sam e period. It sh ow s th at BIS-reporting banks' 
on sh ore loca l currency len d in g  rose from  a tota l o f  U S $123 .9  b illio n  in  1995  
to  U S$490.7  b illio n  in  Septem ber 2001 . N o t o n ly  d id  banks' local len d in g  
increase in  absolute term s, bu t it also increased substantia lly  as a share 
o f banks' overall em erging-m arket portfo lios. In total, foreign  banks' loca l
Table 5.5  B a n ks ' in - c o u n t r y  le n d in g  ve rsu s  c ro s s -b o rd e r  le n d in g ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  2 0 0 1  









as a share o f  
the total (%)
Total emerging markets
D e c e m b e r 1995 8 6 8 .7 1 2 3 .9 9 9 2 .6 12
S e p te m b e r 20 01 8 7 4 .5 4 9 0 .7 1 3 6 5 .2 3 6
Asia
D e c e m b e r 1995 3 7 3 .3 5 6 .5 4 2 9 .8 13
S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 1 2 7 3 .3 1 1 8 .9 3 9 2 .2 3 0
Latin America
D e c e m b e r 1995 2 4 7 .1 3 3 .9 2 8 1 .0 12
S e p te m b e r 20 01 2 9 4 .0 2 6 9 .0 5 6 3 .1 4 8
Source: BIS.
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len d in g  in  local currencies in  d eve lop in g  countries rose from  12 per cen t  
o f their to ta l exposure in  1995 to  36  per c en t in  Septem ber 2001 . This 
p h en o m en o n  confirm s a p o in t m ade by  Peek and  R osengreen (2000: 57): 
'As foreign  banks get estab lish ed  w ith  brick and  mortar operations, an  
increasing share o f  th e  len d in g  m oves from  offshore to  onshore.'
O f course o n e  m ust bear in  m in d  th at w h e n  an in tern ation a l bank  takes 
ow nersh ip  o f  a stock  o f  on sh ore loan s in  a d eve lop in g  country, th is is 
n o t eq u iva len t to  a flo w  th rough  th e  balance o f  paym en ts. In other w ords 
th e  increase in  a bank's con so lid a ted  balance sh eet th at results from  an  
acq u isition  o f a loan  b o o k  m ay  or m ay n o t result in  a capital in flow . This 
d ep en d s en tirely  o n  th e  cost to  th e  bank o f  acquiring th e  eq u ity  in  th e  loca l 
in stitu tion . This p o in t is crucial to  any d iscussion  o f  th e  benefits that a foreign  
bank brings to  a d eve lop in g  country's financia l system , sin ce  banks' FDI 
flow s in to  d eve lop in g  countries clearly are n o t replacing their cross-border 
flow s o f  len d in g . T he best w ay to  th in k  about th e  idea o f  'replacem ent' is as 
a stock  o f  on sh ore  loan s replacing a stock  o f  cross-border loans.
It is also w orth  bearing in  m in d  th a t there is som e c o n n ec tio n  b etw een  
banks' w ithdraw al from  short-term  cross-border len d in g  in  th e  late 1990s 
and  their  increasing p en etration  o f  d eve lop in g  countries' fin an cia l system s. 
T he co n n ec tio n  arises, o f  course, because th e  crises associated  w ith  th e  
failure to  roll over short-term  cross-border loan s -  th ose  in  M exico, Asia, 
Russia, Brazil an d  Turkey -  have h ad  th e  effect o f  substantia lly  reducing  
th e  entry cost for foreign  banks. T his reduction  has b een  ach ieved  n o t  o n ly  
th rou gh  th e  effects o f  currency devaluation , b u t also because th e  crises 
h ave led  to  an erosion  o f  th e  n e t w orth  o f  d eve lop in g  countries' finan cia l 
system s. T he reduction  in  entry cost m ay partially exp la in  th e  reason for th e  
'redistribution' o f  banks' em erging-m arket p ortfo lios tow ards loca l currency  
len d in g  and  aw ay from  cross-border short-term  lend ing .
A nother in cen tive  for 'crossing th e  border' is th a t th e  capital required to  
support a g iven  stock  o f  on sh ore len d in g  in  a d eve lop in g  cou n try  m ay  be  
sm aller th an  th at required to  support cross-border len d in g . T he reason for 
th is is th e  p rov ision in g  regim e th at banks face in  their cross-border len d in g  
(or their in -cou n try  len d in g  in  foreign  currencies). If cross-border len d in g  
to  a particular cou n try  requires provisions to  com p en sate  for th e  risk o f  
exch an ge  controls, th is 'tax’ o n  cross-border len d in g  is avoidable if  banks 
b ook  assets in  loca l currencies on shore.
T he q u estion  th at arises from  all th is is w h eth er  th e  process o f  ba lance  
sh eet redistribution  th at seem s to  h ave taken p lace over th e  past few  years 
has had  an y  iden tifiab le  im pact o n  (1) d eve lop in g  countries' vu ln erab ility  to  
fin ancia l crisis, or (2) th e  severity o f  fin ancia l crises in  d eve lop in g  countries 
w h e n  th ey  do  occur. This q u estion  is im portan t since b o th  th e  probability  
o f a crisis and th e  severity o f  a crisis in  a particular d eve lop in g  cou n try  
are u n iversally  th o u g h t to  b e p ositive ly  correlated w ith  th e  fragility o f  
th e  d om estic  ban k in g  system  in  th a t country. Indeed w h ile  an  overhan g o f
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short-term  debt m ig h t h ave  b een  th e  best sing le  predictor o f  currency crisis 
in  d eve lop in g  countries over th e  past few  years, fin an cia l system  w eakness 
is u sually  h ig h  o n  th e  list o f  ind icators o f  vu lnerab ility  to  crisis. T his is true 
to  th e  ex ten t th at a p oorly  regulated and  p oorly  m anaged  fin an cia l system  
w ill have relatively  few  w ays o f  exercising d isc ip lin e  over th e  structure 
o f banks' b a lance sheets, w h ich  can in  turn leave th em  burdened  b y  th e  
tw o  balance sh eet m ism atch es th at h ave proved  so p ain fu l in  recent crises, 
n am ely  a currency m ism atch  (foreign currency liab ilities used  to  finan ce  
loca l currency assets) and  a m aturity  m ism atch  (short-term  liab ilities used  
to  finan ce longer-term  assets). T he latter m ism atch  w as particularly ev id en t 
in  th e  recent Turkish crisis, and  certain ly contributed  to  th e  unsusta inab ility  
o f th e  exch an ge rate regim e.
In add ition  to  th is, fragile b an k in g  system s are a lso th o u g h t to  bear 
responsib ility  for perpetuating crises sin ce  (1) th e  w eaker th e  financial 
system  th e  greater th e  pub lic  sector resources n eed ed  to  recapitalize th e  
system  in  th e  afterm ath o f  th e  crisis, and  (2) th e  weaker th e  financia l system  
th e  less able it w ill b e to  h elp  th e  post-crisis recovery, sin ce  capital fligh t w ill 
b e m axim ized  an d  in term ed ia tion  m in im ized .
So if  it can  be sh o w n  th at foreign  ow nersh ip  h elp s to  m ake finan cia l crises 
either less probable or less severe, th e  process o f  'crossing th e  border' ou gh t 
to  bring long-term  b en efits to  d evelop in g  countries. How, th en , can  w e sh ow  
th a t foreign  ow n ersh ip  can  help?
First consider th e  case that foreign  ow nersh ip  m akes crises less severe.2 
Foreign ow nersh ip  can h e lp  to  diversify th e  capital base o f  a country's 
b ank ing  system , im prove th e  pricing o f  risk, an d  im prove regulation , 
accounting , in form ation  tech n o lo g y  and  th e  level o f  transparency. The 
value o f th ese  b en efits in  m aking a crisis less severe is that th ey  can  h elp  
to  create a s itu a tion  in  w h ic h  foreign -ow n ed  banks co n tin u e  to  len d  in  
an  eco n o m ic  d ow n turn , prim arily because foreign -ow n ed  in stitu tio n s have  
a m ore diversified  fu n d in g  base. As G oldberg e ta l.  (2000: 6) p u t it: 'If 
d om estica lly -ow n ed  banks rely m ore h eav ily  o n  local d em an d  d eposits and  
cyclica lly -sensitive sources o f  funds, basic aggregate d em an d  shocks sh ou ld  
generally  lead  to  m ore v o la tile  len d in g  b y  private d om estic  banks th an  
from  their foreign -ow n ed  counterparts.' Indeed G oldberg e ta l.  sh o w  th at in  
th e  m id  1990s foreign -ow n ed  banks in  A rgentina and  M exico  had  h igher  
rates o f loan  grow th  w ith  low er v o la tility  th an  d om estica lly  o w n ed  banks, 
b o th  private and  state-ow ned . At th e  least th is suggests th at th e  presence o f  
foreign -ow n ed  banks can m ake d eve lop in g  countries' fin ancia l crises less 
severe th an  th ey  w ou ld  oth erw ise be.
C ould  foreign  ow n ersh ip  o f a d eve lop in g  country's ban k in g  system  m ake 
a crisis less probable? There are tw o  w ays in  w h ich  th is m ig h t h ap pen . The  
first is that a better cap italized  and  better regarded b an k in g  system  cou ld  
lead  to  an increase in  th e  am ou n t o f  a country's savings h e ld  in  th e  financial 
system , rather th a n  under th e  m attress. If foreign  ow nersh ip  o f  a ban k in g
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system  reduces th e  proportion  o f  savings h eld  as 'm attress cash', th en  for­
e ign  ow nersh ip  cou ld  b e th o u g h t o f as reducing th e  probability  o f  crisis 
since th e  econ om y's reliance o n  foreign  savings w ill h ave b een  reduced. A 
secon d  w ay in  w h ich  foreign  ow nersh ip  m ig h t reduce th e  probability  o f  cri­
sis is b y  provid ing  a m ech an ism  for depositors to  engage in  w h at m igh t be 
called  'internal capital flight'. In a financia l system  w here there is n o  foreign  
ow nersh ip , depositors w h o  fear b o th  currency risk and cou n try  risk have  
n o  ch o ice  b ut to  liquidate their deposits and  rem it dollars offshore: pure 
capital flight. By contrast in  a finan cia l system  w here foreign  ow nersh ip  
exists, a foreign -ow ned  bank is likely  to  support its depositors even  during  
a 'country  risk event'. This is a version  o f  th e  'deep pocket' argum ent, w h ich  
suggests th at subsidiaries are capable o f  b e in g  recapitalized even  at a tim e o f  
serious deterioration  in  coun try  risk, o n  th e  grounds th at a foreign -ow n ed  
in stitu tio n  risks its reputation  if  it lets a foreign  subsidiary fail. W hat th is  
m eans is that th e  liab ilities o f  a foreign -ow n ed  bank in  a d eve lop in g  co u n ­
try can  be th o u g h t to  bear less cou n try  risk th a n  th e  country  itself. If th is  is 
th e  case, capital fligh t w ill b e m in im ized  in  an  e co n o m y  w ith  foreign -ow ned  
banks. This in  turn o u g h t to  reduce th e  probability  o f  crises in  em erging  
markets.
Yet all th is  clearly fails to  describe w h at h ap p en ed  in  A rgentina, w here a 
persistent fligh t o f  depositors from  th e  substantia lly  foreign -ow n ed  ban k in g  
system  u ltim ately  forced th e  g overn m en t to  devalue th e  exch an ge  rate, 
defau lt o n  its public debt and  im p ose  draconian  restrictions o n  th e  public's 
access to  deposits in  an  effort to  preserve w h at rem ained o f  th e  central bank's 
foreign  exch an ge reserves. O n  th e  face o f  it th e  failure o f  th e  A rgentinean  
fin an cia l system  to  prevent th e  crisis suggests th at d eve lop in g  countries m ay  
gain  little  from  en couragin g  a foreign  presence in  their d om estic  financia l 
system s. It m ay also m ean  th at th e  attractiveness o f  'crossing th e  border' w ill 
d im in ish  for banks, since A rgentina has sh o w n  th at there m ay  be little  to  
gain  from  su b stitu ting  cross-border exposure for on sh ore exposure. It is still 
far to o  early to  draw co n clu sio n s from  th e A rgentinean  experience. T he tw o  
critical b u t unansw erable q u estion s are (1) w ou ld  Argentina's fin an cia l crisis 
have h ap p en ed  m ore qu ick ly  if th e  financial system  had  n o t b een  substan­
tia lly  foreign-ow ned , and  (2) w ou ld  th e  crisis have b een  m ore severe?
Conclusion
A lth ou gh  banks h ave w ith o u t q u estion  b een  th e  largest n e t taker o f  cross- 
border fund s from  d eve lop in g  countries since 1997, th is has prim arily b een  
due to  th e  n et repaym ent o f  short-term  loans b y  A sian borrowers, w h o  have  
also substantia lly  increased their asset p osition s in  BIS-reporting banks. Yet 
th e  fall in  banks' n e t cross-border exposure has to  be exp la in ed  a lon gsid e  
anoth er  p h en o m en o n : th e  very large increase in  foreign  p en etration  o f  
em erging  markets' b an k in g  system s. T his chapter has argued th at th ese  tw o
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p h en o m en a  -  cross-border 'revulsion' an d  th e  large grow th  in  on sh ore  
exposure -  are co n n ected  to  each  other. In effect th e  process o f  'crossing th e  
border' con stitu tes a redistribution  o f  banks' em erging-m arket portfolios. 
M oreover th e  very  process o f crossing th e  border m ay  b e  th o u g h t o f as 
reducing th e  risk o f  financia l crises in  d eve lop in g  countries, a lth ou gh  th e  
case o f  A rgentina strongly  suggests th at h av in g  a foreign -ow n ed  b ank ing  
system  provides n o  guarantees against crisis.
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Introduction
As m atter o f policy, capital m arkets in  m a n y  parts o f th e  d eve lop in g  w orld  
w ere 'liberalized' during th e  1990s in  order to  o p en  up th e  m arkets to  greater 
flow s and  a w ider array o f  capital v eh ic le s .1 This p o licy  succeeded, and  pri­
vate  capital flow s to  d eve lop in g  countries b o th  increased  and  increasingly  
to o k  th e  form  o f  securities su ch  as stocks and  b o n d s (Tables 6.1 and  6.2). 
Even part o f th e  grow th in  direct foreign  in v estm en t to o k  th e  form  o f  
purchases o f eq u ity  securities.
This transform ation  in  d eve lop in g  cou n try  capital m arkets h ad  th e  effect 
o f broad en in g  th e  class o f global investors. W hereas in vestors in  th e  prior 
period  w ere prim arily banks (through  synd icated  loans) and  m u ltin ation a l 
corporations (direct in vestm en t), th e  securitization  b rought in  ind iv idual 
investors and  p rofession ally  m anaged  funds by  in stitu tion a l investors, p en ­
sion  funds, insurance com p an ies, u n iversity  en d ow m en ts and  fou n d ation s. 
T his contributed  to  th e  increase in  th e  overall flow  o f  capital to  d eve lop in g  
countries.
T he increased flow s o f  securitized capital b rough t forth  th e  n ew  threat o f  
their rapid reversal; th ey  also in trodu ced  or increased  th e  exposure o f  d evel­
o p in g  countries' financial m arkets to  greater vo la tility  o f  securities prices 
in  oth er d eve lop in g  countries as w ell as th ose  in  advanced  capital m arket 
countries.
A lon g  w ith  th is transform ation  o f  capital flow s to  d eve lop in g  countries  
and  th e  associated  n ew  m arket risks cam e a n ew  set o f  parallel fin ancia l 
transactions. T hese financia l transactions, th o u g h  less w ell understood , are 
integral to  m od ern  financia l m arkets and  are just as im portant in  their  
p oten tia l to  contribute to  fin an cia l sector instability . T hese 'shadow ' trans­
actions in clu d e derivatives,2 repurchase agreem ents and  securities lend ing . 
T he term  'shadow ' sh ou ld  n o t  necessarily  b e interpreted as nefarious or
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devious. Rather it reflects th e  fact that th ese transactions are o ften  built 
u p on , or are cast like a shadow , b y  capital flow s. M oreover su ch  transactions  
are far less transparent.
Shadow  transactions o ften  fu n ctio n  to  h ed ge or m anage th e  risks associ­
ated w ith  capital flow s. H ow ever in  som e cases th ey  a lso serve to  facilitate  
unprodu ctive activ ities, in c lu d in g  tax avoidance, th e  m an ip u la tion  o f  
accountin g  and reporting rules and  th e  outflanking o f  p m d en tia l regulations. 
W h en  used  to  d od ge financia l m arket regulations d esign ed  to  add safety  
and  sou n d n ess to  th e  m arkets an d  assure their transparency, th e n  th ese  
un produ ctive activ ities are a source o f  m arket in stab ility  and  reduce th e  
effic ien cy  o f  m arket pricing. In ad d ition  th e  use o f  derivatives, even  w h en  
th ey  are used  by  foreign  and  d om estic  enterprises for h edging , can  c o n ­
tribute to  dow nw ard  pressure o n  em erging m arket currencies as in vestors  
rush to  hedge their currency exposure in  an tic ip ation  o f  a finan cia l crisis or 
to  m eet collateral requirem ents o n ce  currency and  asset prices b eg in  to  fall. 
A lth ou gh  there are n o  precise figures o n  th e  m agn itu d e o f  th ese  trans­
actions, th is d oes n o t  m ean  th at th e  subject is n o t  im portant, and  it sh ou ld  
be exp lored  in  order to  understand  h o w  su ch  transactions can contribute to  
a fin ancia l crisis.
T he n ew  d eve lop m en ts in  financia l transactions in  d eve lop in g  countries  
require n ew  regulatory and  supervisory efforts to  ensure th at th e y  w ill 
contribute to  th e  im p rovem en t o f  liv in g  standards and  w ill n o t  result in  less 
stable financial system s and  greater eco n o m ic  vulnerability . T his chapter  
focuses o n  derivatives and  leaves repurchase agreem ents and  securities 
len d in g  transactions for an oth er tim e .3 It analyzes h o w  derivatives are 
related to  capital flow s and  h o w  th ey  in troduce add ition a l concern s for 
m arket stability. This inclu d es an  analysis o f  p o lic ies d esign ed  to  stabilize  
develop in g  countries financial markets, and  o f financial regulations in  in d u s­
trialized countries and  h o w  th ey  m igh t be adapted to  th e  circum stances 
in  d eve lop in g  countries an d  applied  to  reduce v o la tility  and  m itigate th e  
im p act o f financia l sector d isruptions o n  th e  overall econ om y.
Transforming capital flows
T he traditional status o f  ban k in g  as th e  fo u n t for n ew  capital w as som ew h at  
d im in ish ed  b y  capital m arket liberalization, w h ich  resulted in  th e  em ergence  
o f m odern  capital m arkets in  d eve lop in g  cou n tries.4 W hereas n ew  capital 
w as o n ce  raised w ith in  th e  firm  or from  th e  banking sector, th e  n ew  arrange­
m en t a llow ed  capital to  be raised th rou gh  th e  issue o f  stocks an d  b o n d s.5 
This securitization  o f  n ew  capital proved to  be m ore effic ien t in  several 
im portant w ays and  so o n  surpassed bank len d in g  as th e  p red om in an t source 
for n ew  capital form ation  and  sovereign  b orrow ing .6
In th e  trad itional m o d e l o f  raising n ew  capital from  len d in g , banks 
m ob ilized  savings an d  co llected  p oo ls o f  id le liq u id ity  in  th e  p aym en ts and
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settlem en ts system  and  turned th em  in to  loan ab le funds for n ew  in v est­
m en ts. Banks trad itionally  h eld  loan s o n  their balance sh eet as assets, and  
th is form ed th e  basis for o n g o in g  relationsh ips that prom oted  greater 
in form ation  sharing and  trust. A n other ben efic ia l feature o f  b ank  len d in g  
w as th at banks cou ld  m ore easily  restructure th e  debt o f  a borrower because  
th e  bank  -  or a num ber o f  banks in  a syndicate -  h eld  all o f  th e  debt.
Traditionally, bank profits w ere earned th rou gh  m aturity  con version . 
Banks accepted  short-term  deposits, o n  w h ich  th ey  paid short-term  interest 
rates, and  th en  transform ed th e  funds in to  longer-term  loan s o n  w h ich  th ey  
earned h igher, long-term  in terest rates. T hese earnings d ep en d ed  o n  th e  
steepness o f th e  y ie ld  curve and  h o w  far th e  bank  was w illin g  and  able to  
m o v e  a lon g  th e  curve. Banks o ften  avoided  th is  in terest rate risk b y  issu in g  
loan s o f  m ed iu m - to  long-term  m aturity w h o se  interest rate w as frequently  
adjusted accord ing to  a short-term  interest rate over th e  life  o f  th e  loan . This 
enab led  th em  to  m atch  th e  costs o f  their deposits to  th e  earnings o n  their  
loan s w h ile  a v o id in g  th e  m arket risk o f in terest rate fluctu ations.
Traditional b an k in g  h ad  som e sign ifican t sh ortcom ings. T he loan s o n  th e  
portfo lio  w ere illiqu id , and  all b u t th e  very largest banks fou n d  it d ifficu lt to  
in trodu ce geographic and  sectoral d iversification  in to  th eir  loan  portfo lio . 
O n a m acroecon om ic level, capital form ation  in  th e  form  o f  bank  len d in g  
m ean t th at in v estm en t d ecision s w ere con tro lled  b y  a sm all num ber o f  bank  
execu tives and  m anagers and  n o t  th rough  th e  in teraction  o f  a large num ber  
o f an o n y m o u s m arket participants, as in  securities m arkets. A nother short­
co m in g  o n  th e  m acroecon om ic leve l w as that b ank  loan s d id  n o t generate  
m arket prices for th e  in vestm en t assets -  th at is, there was n o  price d iscovery  
process, as fou n d  in  stock  and  b o n d  markets.
In n ovation  and  tech n o lo g ica l d eve lop m en ts in  advan ced  capital m arkets 
estab lished  a precedent and  h elp ed  to  p rom ote capital m arket liberalization  
in  d eve lop in g  countries. T he m od ern iza tion  o f  th e  advanced  financial 
m arkets had  a p rofou nd  effect o n  th e  shape o f  capital flow s to  th e  d eve lop ­
in g  w orld  during th e  1990s. D uring th e  1970s an d  1980s th ese  flow s were 
prim arily in  th e  form  o f  syndicated , variable rate, foreign  bank  loan s. Large 
m on ey-cen tre  banks recycled  petrodollars b y  underw riting synd icated  bank  
loan s to  d eve lop in g  countries th at w ere stm gg lin g  to  pay for o il im ports and  
w ere eager for n ew  n et capital in flow s. T he loan s were m o stly  adjustable rate 
and  d en om in ated  in  US dollars or som e o ther m ajor currency.7
T his created a d istribution  o f  risk th at w as n o t b alanced  b etw een  borrower  
and  lender. The borrower carried b o th  th e  exchange rate risk and th e  interest 
rate risk. T he lender faced credit risk, b u t th is w as m in im ized  b y  restricting  
credit to  sovereign  en tities and  th rough  th e  use o f cross-default clauses.8 T he  
lender also reduced credit risk th rou gh  d iversification  and  th e  loan  syn ­
d ication  process. W h en  in terest rate and  exch an ge rate m o v em en ts  w en t  
against th e  borrow er its debt p o sitio n  deteriorated so b ad ly  th at it was 
u nab le properly to  service its foreign  currency bank loan s. T his failure was
transform ed in to  increased  credit exposure to  th e  lender. Painful debt n eg o ­
tia tion s fo llow ed  and  led  to  debt resch ed u ling  co m b in ed  w ith  n ew  len d in g . 
This approach w as ack now ledged  to  be a failure at th e  en d  o f  th e  1980s and  
a n ew  round o f  d eb t reschedu ling  com m en ced . This co m b in ed  som e debt 
forgiveness w ith  n ew  collateralized  len d in g  k n ow n  as Brady b on d s. In th e  
end , b o th  th e  in tern ation a l lenders and  th e  d eve lop in g  cou n try  borrow ers 
suffered; th e  10 years o f  debt overhan g in  Latin America, b eg in n in g  in  1982, 
has co m e to  be called  'the lo st decade'.
C apital flow s began  to  ch an ge in  th e  late 1980s and  early 1990s. Table 6.1  
sh ow s th e  great transform ation  th at occurred in  capital flow s to  d eve lop in g  
countries. As a percentage o f  to ta l capital flow s, bank  len d in g  fell from  
n early  64 per cen t in  1 9 7 3 -8 1  to  a lm ost 12 per cen t in  1 9 9 0 -9 7 , w h ile  
capital flow s in  th e  form  o f  stocks rose from  0 .3  per cen t to  16 .4  percent. The  
use o f  b on d s as a d ev e lo p m en t fin an ce veh ic le  rose from  3.5  percent to  15.2  
per cen t over th e  sam e period . This n o t o n ly  elevated  th e  status o f  th e  East 
A sian b o n d  m arket bu t a lso estab lished  East A sian eq u ity  m arkets as p lat­
form s o n  w h ich  to  raise capital and  d estin ation s in  w h ich  to  locate  th e  port­
fo lio  in vestm en ts o f  h igh  n e t w ealth  ind iv idu als as w ell as in stitu tion a l 
in vestm en ts (D alla and  Khatkate, 1996).
Two o f  th e  key indicators o f  financial m arket d eep en in g  and  sop h istica tion  
is th e  num ber o f firm s listed  o n  th e  stock  m arkets and  th e  size o f m arket 
cap italization . As can  b e seen  in  Table 6.2, th ese  key indicators grew  rapidly  
b etw een  1990 and  1999. In Table 6.1 th e  percentages m easure th e  proportion  
o f total capital flow s, and  th e  sum  o f th e  percentages equals th e  share o f  
private flow s. Private capital flow s accou n ted  for 84 .5  per cen t o f  flow s in  
th e  earlier period, w h ile  th e  capital m arket liberalization  p o lic ies o f  th e  
1990s resulted in  9 3 .6  per cen t o f  capital flow s b e in g  from  private sources in  
th e  later period. Table 6.3 sh ow s th e  flow s to  d eve lop in g  countries during  
th e  1990s.
T he result o f  th e  transform ation  was n o t just greater flow s an d  greater 
vo la tility  of flow s and  asset prices; it was also a redistribution  o f risk b etw een
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Table 6.1 P r iv a te  c a p ita l f lo w s  to  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , 1 9 7 3 -8 1  
a n d  1 9 9 0 -9 7  (p e rc e n ta g e  o f  to ta l  o f f ic ia l  a n d  p r iv a te  f lo w s ) *
Type o f  flow 1973-81 1990-97
B o n d s 3 .5 15 .2
B a n k  le n d in g 6 3 .9 11 .7
F o re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 16 .8 50 .3
P o r t fo l io  e q u i ty 0 .3 16 .4
* Figures are calcu la ted  as percen tage  o f to ta l flow s a n d  therefo re  p riva te  flows 
d o  n o t add  u p  to  100 p e r  cen t.
Source: W orld B ank (2000: 126).
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Table 6.2 M aturation of East Asian stock markets, 1990-99
Num ber o f  listed companies Capitalization (US$ million)
1990 1999 1990 1999
In d o n e s ia 125 2 7 7 8  08 1 6 4  0 6 7
K o re a 6 6 9 725 1 1 0  5 9 4 3 0 8  5 3 4
M a la y s ia 2 8 2 757 4 8  611 14 5  4 4 5
P h i lip p in e s 153 2 2 6 5 9 2 7 4 8  105
S in g a p o re 15 0 3 5 5 3 4  3 0 8 19 8  4 0 7
T h a ila n d 2 1 4 3 9 2 2 3  8 9 6 5 8  3 6 5
T o ta l 1 5 9 3 2  732 2 3 1 4 1 7 8 2 2  9 2 3
(+ 7 2 % ) (+ 2 5 6 % )
Source: W orld  Bank (2001).
investors in  advanced  capital m arkets and  capital recip ients in  d eve lop in g  
countries. This m ore d iversified flow  o f  foreign  capital (diversified in  th e  
sense th at various capital veh ic le s  were used  to  ch a n n e l th e  capital flow s) 
generated  a d ifferent d istribution  o f  m arket an d  credit risks. C om pared w ith  
th e  bank  loans o f  th e  1970s and  early 1980s, th is  m ore d iversified flow  o f  
capital ten d ed  to  distribute risk tow ards investors in  th e  advanced  capital 
m arket econ om ies. Stocks or eq u ity  shares sh ifted  price risk, exch an ge  rate 
risk and  credit risk to  foreign  investors. Local currency b o n d s sh ifted  price, 
in terest rate risk, exch an ge rate risk and  credit risk to  foreign  investors. Even  
m ajor-currency-denom inated  b on d s issued b y  d evelop in g-cou n try  borrowers 
sh ifted  interest rate risk, as w ell as credit risk, to  foreign  investors. D irect 
foreign  in v estm en t in  p hysica l capital -  w h eth er  eq u ip m en t, p lan t or real 
estate -  sim ilarly sh ifted  price and  exch an ge  rate risks and  credit risk to  
foreign  investors. T he co m b in ed  effect w as p o ten tia lly  to  reduce th e  d evel­
o p in g  econ om ies' exposure to  th e  m arket risk.9
Growth of shadow transactions 
O v erv iew
D erivative trading grew  up  a longside th ese  n ew  form s o f  capital flow  as part 
o f an effort to  im prove th e  m an agem en t o f  th e  risks o f  global in vestin g . 
D erivatives a llow ed  risk to  be sh ifted  aw ay from  investors w h o  did n o t  w an t 
it and  tow ards th o se  w h o  w ere m ore w illin g  and  able to  bear it. At th e  sam e 
tim e, how ever, derivatives created n ew  risks th at were p o ten tia lly  destabiliz­
in g  for d evelop in g  econ om ies. T he fo llow in g  is an analysis o f  h o w  derivatives 
played  a constructive role in  ch a n n e llin g  capital from  advanced  capital 
m arkets to  d eve lop in g  econ om ies, and  h o w  at th e  sam e tim e th ey  p layed  
a p o ten tia lly  destructive role in  lay ing  th e  fou n d ation s o f  th e  subsequent
\o00
Table 6,3  N e t lo n g - te rm  f lo w s  to  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , 1 9 9 0 -9 8  (US$ b i l l i o n )
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
O ff ic ia l 5 5 .9 6 2 .3 54 .0 5 3 .4 4 5 .9 5 3 .9 3 1 .0 3 9 .9 5 0 .6 5 2 .0
P r iv a te  ( to ta l) 4 2 .6 6 1 .6 99 .8 1 6 5 .8 1 7 4 .5 2 0 3 .3 2 8 2 .1 3 0 4 .0 2 6 7 .7 2 3 8 .7
B a n k  lo a n s 3 .2 5 .0 16.4 3 .5 8 .8 3 0 .4 37 .5 5 1 .6 4 4 .6 - 1 1 . 4
B o n d 1 .2 10 .9 11.1 3 6 .6 3 8 .2 3 0 .8 6 2 .4 4 8 .9 3 9 .7 2 5 .0
O th e r  d e b t 1 1 .3 2 .8 10.7 8 .7 3 .5 1.0 2 .2 3 .0 - 3 . 1 5 .5
E q u ity - p o r t fo l io 2 .8 7 .6 14.1 5 1 .0 3 5 .2 36 .1 4 9 .2 3 0 .2 15 .6 2 7 .6
D F I 24 .1 3 5 .3 47 .5 6 6 .0 8 8 .8 1 0 5 .0 1 3 0 .8 1 7 0 .3 1 7 0 .9 1 9 2 .0
T o ta l 9 8 .5 1 2 3 .9 153 .8 2 1 9 .2 2 2 0 .4 2 5 7 .2 3 1 3 .1 3 4 3 .9 3 1 8 .3 2 9 0 .7
P riv a te  (% ) 
B a n k  lo a n s 7.5 8.1 16.4 2 .1 5 .0 15 .0 13 .3 1 7 .0 16 .7 - 4 . 8
B o n d 2 .8 17 .7 11.1 22 .1 2 1 .9 1 5 .2 22 .1 16 .1 1 4 .8 10 .5
O th e r  d e b t 2 6 .5 4 .5 10.7 5 .2 2 .0 0 .5 0 .8 1 .0 - 1 . 2 2 .3
E q u ity - p o r t fo l io 6 .6 12 .3 14.1 3 0 .8 2 0 .2 17 .8 17 .4 9 .9 5 .8 1 1 .6
D F I 5 6 .6 5 7 .3 4 7 .6 3 9 .8 5 0 .9 5 1 .6 4 6 .4 5 6 .0 6 3 .8 8 0 .4
Source: W orld B ank (2001).
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crisis. T hese capital instrum ents, their associated  risks and  th e  associated  
derivatives used  to  m anage th e  risks are listed  in  Table 6.4.
D erivatives facilitate capital flow s b y  u n b u n d lin g  risk in to  its co m p o n en t  
parts and  th en  m ore effic ien tly  redistributing th e  various sources o f  risk 
associated w ith  each  capital instrum ent, in clu d in g  bank loans, equities, bond s  
and  direct foreign  in vestm en t. Foreign currency loan s exp ose  th e  foreign  
in vestor to  credit risk and  th e  d om estic  borrow er to  exch an ge  rate risk; 
a fixed  interest rate loan  exp oses th e  foreign  lender to  in terest rate risk and
Table 6.4  C a p ita l in s tru m e n ts ,  t h e i r  a s so c ia te d  r is ks  a n d  th e  d e r iv a t iv e s  u s e d  to  
m a n a g e  th e  r isks
Capital instrument Risk exposure Derivative, or risk management
Bank loans1 
In v e s to r C re d itw o r th in e s s C re d it  d e r iv a tiv e s , c ro s s -d e fa u lt
D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y In te re s t ra te
c la u se  o r  d iv e r s if ic a t io n  
In te re s t ra te  sw ap
F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd ,  sw a p
L iq u id i t y
o r  o p t io n
L in e  o f  c re d it  (e m b e d d e d  o p t io n )
C a r ry  tra d e F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e TRS ( to ta l r e tu r n  sw a p )
Bonds2
M a jo r  c u r re n c y  b o n d  
In v e s to r In te re s t ra te In te re s t  ra te  sw a p  o r  fu tu re
C re d itw o r th in e s s D iv e rs i f ic a t io n
P rice TRS
D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd ,  sw a p
L o c a l c u r re n c y  b o n d  
In v e s to r F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e
o r  o p t io n
F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd  o r  sw a p
In te re s t ra te In te re s t ra te  sw ap
D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y n .a .
Equity
P o r t fo l io /D F I
In v e s to r F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd ,  sw a p
P rice
o r  o p t io n
TRS, e q u i ty  fu tu re s  a n d  o p t io n s
D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y n .a .
F D I (n o n -s e c u r it iz e d )  
In v e s to r F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd ,  sw a p
D e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y n .a .
o r  o p t io n
Notes:
1 Bank loans are p resum ed  to  be  den o m in a ted  in  a  m ajor currency  (for exam ple  US dollars), a t 
variab le  (floating) in te res t ra tes a n d  u n d e rw ritte n  by  a  synd ica te  o f banks.
2 B ond  refers to  co n v en tio n a l n o tes  a n d  bo n d s, floa ting  ra te  n o te s  a n d  s tru c tu red  notes.
Source: A u tho r's  o w n  analysis.
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a variable rate lo a n  exp oses th e  d om estic  borrow er to  in terest rate risk; and  
a long-term  lo a n  exposes th e  foreign  lender to  greater credit risk and  a short­
term  loan  exp oses th e  d om estic  borrower to  refunding risk (som etim es called  
liq u id ity  risk). Equities exp ose  th e  foreign  investor to  credit risk a lon g  w ith  
th e  m arket risk from  chan ges in  th e  exch an ge  rate, m arket price o f  th e  stock  
and  th e  uncertain  d iv id en d  paym ents. N otes and b on d s exp ose  th e  foreign  
investor to  credit risk and  m arket interest rate risk, and  hard currency bon d s  
exp ose  th e  d om estic  borrower to  exch an ge  rate risk. T he finan cia l in n o v ­
a tion  o f  in trod u cin g  derivatives to  capital m arkets a llow s th ese  traditional 
arrangem ents o f  risk to  b e redesigned  in  order better to  m eet th e  desired risk 
profiles o f  th e  issuers and  holders o f  th ese  capital instru m ents.
W h ile  th e  risk-sh ifting fu n ctio n  o f  derivatives serves th e  usefu l role o f  
h ed g in g  and  thereby  facilita ting  capital flow s, th e  increased  use o f  deriva­
tives raises con cern  about th e  stab ility  o f th e  e co n o m y  as a w h o le . T he use  
o f  derivatives can  lead  to  less transparency b etw een  counterparties and  
b etw een  regulators and  m arket participants. T hey can be used  for u n pro­
ductive activ ities such  as avo id in g  prudentia l regulations, m an ip u la tin g  
accou n tin g  rules and  credit ratings, and  evad ing  tax. T hey  can  also b e  used  
to  raise th e  level o f  m arket risk exposure relative to  capital in  th e  pursuit o f  
higher y ie ld in g  -  an d  h igher risk -  in v estm en t strategies.
The greater th e  m arket exposure -  p ossib ly  created b y  o p en  p osition s in  
derivative contracts -  th e  greater th e  im pact o f  a ch an ge in  th e  exch an ge  
rate or o ther m arket price o n  th e  finan cia l sector and  e co n o m y  as a w h o le . 
In th is con tex t th e  use o f  derivatives to  reduce th e  am ou n t o f  capital relative 
to  th e  am ou n t o f  risk-taking activ ities reduces th e  ab ility  o f  capital to  serve 
as a buffer against m arket turbulence and  to  serve as a governor o n  total 
risk taking. T his increases th e  lik e lih ood  o f  system ic failure an d  h e ig h ten s  
doubts about th e  stability o f  th e  financial sector and th e  eco n o m y  as a w hole.
A n a ly sis  o f  tra n sa c tio n s
T he rem ainder o f  th is  section  is organized  as fo llow s. T he risk characteristics 
o f each  type o f  capital in stru m en t is analyzed , together w ith  th e  types o f  
derivative th at are lik ely  to  be used  in  co n ju n ctio n  w ith  th at in strum ent. 
N ext, each  o f  th e  relevant derivatives is briefly  described before jo in in g  th e  
tw o  d iscu ssions to  sh o w  h o w  th e  capital in stru m ents an d  derivatives are 
used  together or as substitutes.
Foreign exchange forw ard
A foreign  exch an ge  forward is a contract in  w h ich  counterparties agree to  
exch an ge specified  am ou n ts o f  foreign currencies at a specified  exch an ge rate 
o n  a specified  future date (Figure 6.1). T he forward exch an ge  rate is th e  price 
at w h ich  th e  counterparties w ill exch an ge currency o n  th e  future exp iration  
date. The forward rate is n egotia ted  so th at th e  p resent va lu e  o f  th e  forward  
contract is zero at th e  tim e it is traded; th is  is referred to  as trading at par or
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Figure 6.1 F o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  fo rw a rd
'at th e  m arket'. As a result n o  m o n ey  n eed  be paid  at th e  co m m en cem en t  
o f th e  contract, a lth ou gh  th e  counterparties m ay  agree to  p ost collateral in  
order to  ensure each  other's adherence to  th e  contract.
Foreign exchange swap
A  foreign  exch an ge sw ap is sim p ly  th e  co m b in in g  o f a sp ot and  a forward  
transaction  (or p ossib ly  tw o  forwards). T he starting leg  o f th e  sw ap usually  
con sists o f  a sp ot foreign  exch an ge  transaction  at th e  current sp ot exch an ge  
rate, and  th e  c lo s in g  leg  con sists o f  a secon d  foreign  exch an ge  transaction  
at th e  contracted  forward rate. For exam ple, a loca l investor enters a 
foreign  exch an ge  swap o f p esos against dollars in  w h ich  th e  investor buys 
U S$100 0 0 0  tod ay  at an  exch an ge  rate o f  U S$0.05 per p eso  (thus p aying  
2  0 0 0  0 0 0  pesos), an d  contracts to  sell U S$100 0 0 0  (that is, b u y  pesos) 
at U S$0.0475  in  180 days. T he loca l in vestor receives U S$100  0 0 0  in  th e  
starting leg, and  th en  u p o n  th e  sw ap exp iration  date pays U S$100  0 0 0  in  
exch an ge  for receiv ing  2 105 263  pesos in  th e  c lo s in g  leg. T his 10 .8  per cen t  
an n u al rate o f return in  pesos is due to  th e  depreciation  o f  th e  peso  against 
th e  dollar (or appreciation  o f  th e  dollar against th e  peso), an d  it reflects 
th e  presum ed fact th at th e  p eso  rate o f  return from  in vestin g  in  peso- 
d en om in ated  assets is h igher th a n  th e  US dollar rate o f  return.
Foreign exch an ge forwards and  sw aps are used  by  b o th  foreign  and  
d om estic  in vestors to  h ed ge foreign  exch an ge  risk. Foreign investors from  
advanced  capital m arkets w h o  purchase securities d en o m in a ted  in  loca l 
currencies use foreign  exch an ge  forwards and  sw aps to  h ed ge their lo n g  
loca l currency exposure. Sim ilarly foreign  direct in vestm en ts in  p hysica l real 
estate, p lant or eq u ip m en t are exp osed  to  th e  risk o f loca l currency depreci­
a tion . Local d evelop in g-cou n try  in vestors w h o  borrow  in  m ajor currencies
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in  order to  in vest in  local currency assets are also exposed  to  foreign exchange  
risk, and  th ey  to o  u se foreign  exch an ge forwards and  sw aps -  as w ell as 
futures and  o p tio n s w h en  available -  to  m an age their risks.
O f course foreign  exch an ge forwards and  sw aps are also used  for specu la­
tio n  in  th ese loca l currencies. D erivatives enab le speculators to  leverage  
their capital in  order to  take larger p osition s in  th e  va lue o f  loca l currencies. 
T his in  turn m ean s th at d evelop in g -cou n try  central banks m ust w atch  th e  
exch an ge rate in  tw o  m arkets, th e  spot and  forward, in  order to  m ain ta in  
their fixed  exch an ge  rates.
Forwards and  foreign  exch an ge  swaps are n o t alw ays h ig h ly  collateralized  
(m arket exposure m easured as a percentage o f  th e  principal). C ollateral is 
less likely  to  b e used  for trading b etw een  th e  m ajor m arket dealers, and  
collateral is usually  low er for less vo la tile  financial in stru m en ts such  as 
foreign  currency.10 This enab les foreign -exch ange derivative users to  obta in  
greater am ou n ts o f  currency exposure relative to  capital, and  therefore it can  
leave foreign -exchan ge derivative counterparties exp osed  to  greater credit 
risk. T he largest credit losses in  th e  derivatives m arkets in  recent years w ere  
due to  defaults o n  foreign  currency forwards in  East Asia and  R ussia.11
Foreign exchange forwards and  swaps -  capital outflow  problems 
In add ition  to  th e  above dangers o f u sing  foreign exch an ge derivatives, there  
is an additional prob lem  w ith  reverse capital flow s. This arises from  th e  n eed  
o f derivative dealers to  create b o th  lo n g  and  short p o sitio n s in  develop in g- 
coun try  currencies in  order to  m ake a m arket in  derivatives.
Every derivative contract in v o lv es a short and  a lo n g  p o sition . T he party  
b u yin g  pesos in  exch an ge  for US dollars in  th e  forward m arket is lo n g  in  
p esos (and sh ort in  dollars), w h ile  th e  counterparty is short in  pesos. In  th e  
m arket for p eso  forwards and  sw aps there is likely  to  be o n e  or m ore dealers. 
A dealer m akes a m arket b y  q u otin g  b id  and  offer (ask)12 prices and  th en  
stan d in g  b eh in d  th em . Ideally  th e  dealer faces a m arket th at is fu ll o f  
participants w h o  are w illin g  to  b u y  and  sell in  equal am ou n ts. In th is  case 
th e  dealer reacts to  investors h ittin g  h is b id  (selling  p esos for dollars forward 
to  th e  dealer) b y  trying to  lay  o ff  th e  lo n g  peso  exposure b y  se llin g  p esos to  
oth er  participants in  th e  m arket (th ose  w h o  are liftin g  th e  dealer's offer). 
H ow ever it is lik ely  that a dealer in  d evelop in g-cou n try  foreign -exch an ge  
derivatives w ill o ften  face a on e-sid ed  or im balanced  m arket in  w h ich  m ost 
participants w an t to  b e short in  th e  loca l currency.13 T his m ean s th at it is 
o ften  d ifficu lt or exp en sive  for dealers to  lay o ff their  lo n g  p osition s by  
sellin g  short to  others in  th e  forward or other derivatives m arkets. As a 
result, either th e  forward rate m u st rise (or fall) su ffic ien tly  to  com p en sate  
th e  dealer and  o th er  risk takers for h o ld in g  greater am ou n ts o f risk, or th e  
dealer m ust fin d  other, cheaper m eans to  lay o ff th e  risk.
O n e alternative m eth o d  used  b y  dealers in  th e  face o f  an  im balanced  
m arket is to  create a sy n th etic  forward or sw ap contract th rou gh  th e  u se o f  
th e  local credit m arkets. In order to  create a syn th etic  short forward peso
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p o sitio n  against th e  dollar, th e  dealer borrows in  th e  local peso  credit market 
(thus creating a p eso  liability), uses th e  lo a n  proceeds to  b u y  dollars spot and  
th en  in vests th e  dollars (thus o b ta in in g  a dollar asset). Ideally  th e  m aturity  
o f th e  forward, p eso  lo a n  and  dollar in v estm en t w ill m atch . T he product o f  
th ese  three transactions g ives th e  dealer a sp ecified  am ou n t o f  dollars in  
futures (the lo a n  repaym ent) th at can  b e so ld  for p esos at a specified  
exch an ge  rate in  settlin g  th e  forward contract, th e  proceeds from  w h ich  
w ill repay th e  p eso  loan  and  leave th e  dealer w ith  a profit. In th is m anner  
th e  dealer can  co n tin u e  to  q u ote  b id  and  offer prices w ith o u t h o ld in g  m ar­
ket risk.
N o te  th at in  th e  process o f  creating a syn th etic  short forward p o sitio n  
to  m ake a m arket in  foreign exch an ge  derivatives, th e  dealer has generated  
a capital ou tflow  b y  borrow ing  at h o m e and  len d in g  abroad in  th e  dollar 
market. Thus in  th e  con tex t o f  im balanced  markets, w here m ore participants 
are w illin g  to  h o ld  short rather th a n  lo n g  p osition s, h ed g in g  can  generate  
capital ou tflow s. If a foreign  in vestor trades a foreign  exch an ge  forward or 
sw ap in  order to  h ed ge an in v estm en t in  a local-currency security or direct 
in vestm en t, th en  th e  derivatives m arket w ill p o ten tia lly  generate a capital 
ou tflow  equal to  th e  size o f  th e  hedge. If th e  foreign  in vestor  w ish es to  
h ed ge  th e  fu ll va lue o f  th e  in vested  princip le, th en  th e  h ed g in g  process can  
p oten tia lly  neutralize or n et-ou t th e  capital in flow . O f course th e  flow  is 
again  reversed and  returns to  th e  d eve lop in g  cou n try  w h en  th e  dealer's 
loan  m atures and  h e  or she uses th e  dollar proceeds to  u n w in d  h is or her 
syn th etic  forward p o s itio n .14
There is an ad d ition a l con cern  w ith  foreign  exch an ge  sw aps and  their  
effect o n  capital flow s. N ote  th at th e  cash  flow s from  su ch  a sw ap resem ble  
th e  cash  flow  from  a short-term  foreign  currency loan  (see exam p le above). 
D ollars are received  tod ay  and  are repaid in  th e  future, and  th e  'loan' cost 
is paid  in  p esos based  o n  th e  dollar and  p eso  in terest rates. In recogn ition  
o f th is, M alaysia p roh ib ited  foreign  exch an ge sw aps as part o f  its effort to  
im p ed e capital in flow s prior to  th e  1997  finan cia l crisis.
Interest rate swap
T he basic in terest rate swap, called  th e  van illa  in terest rate swap, is an  agree­
m en t b etw een  tw o  parties to  exch an ge th e  n e t o f  tw o  series o f  paym en ts. 
O ne series o f p aym en ts is based  o n  a fixed  in terest rate applied  to  a n o tio n a l 
principal, such  as 6 per cen t o n  US$1 m illio n , and  th e  o th er series o f  
paym en ts is based  o n  a floa tin g  rate, such  as a 3 -m o n th  LIBOR (L ondon  
in terbank offered rate), app lied  to  th e  sam e n o tio n a l principal. In order to  
sim plify  p aym en ts an d  other clearing issues, m ost swap contracts a llow  th e  
tw o  parties to  pay (or receive) o n ly  th e  n e t or th e  d ifference b etw een  th ese  
tw o  series o n  each  p aym en t or 'drop' date. Borrowers w ith  variable interest 
rate loan s can  h ed ge their in terest rate risk w ith  a sw ap in  w h ich  th ey  
receive th e  floa tin g  rate and  pay th e  fixed  rate (that is, b u y  a swap), and  
th ereby sw ap their floa tin g  rate p aym ents for fixed  rate paym ents.
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Total return swap
A  total return swap (TRS) is a contract in  w h ich  at least o n e  series o f paym ents  
is based o n  th e  to ta l rate o f  return (the ch an ge in  m arket price p lus in terest 
or d iv id en d  p aym ents) o n  som e un d erly in g  asset, security or security index . 
The other leg  o f  th e  sw ap is typ ica lly  based  o n  a variable in terest rate such  
as th e  LIBOR, b ut m ay  be a fixed  rate or th e  total rate o f  return o n  som e  
other financial in strum ent. Based o n  w h at is k n ow n  abou t th e  precrisis 
situation s in  M exico  and  East Asia, TRSs in  th ose  situations usually  con sisted  
o f sw apping th e  LIBOR against th e  to ta l rate o f  return o n  a govern m en t  
security.
A TRS replicates th e  p ositio n  o f  borrow ing at th e  LIBOR in  order to  fin ance  
th e  h o ld in g  o f  a security. T he returns are th e  sam e, b u t u n lik e  an actual 
cash  m arket transaction , it d oes n o t  in v o lv e  ow nersh ip  or debt. Instead th e  
o n ly  capital in v o lv ed  in  a TRS is th e  p ostin g  o f  collateral. In add ition  to  th e  
reduction  in  th e  n eed  to  co m m it capital to  th e  transaction, a TRS also has n o  
im pact on  a firm's balance sh eet and  is n o t  likely  to  b e subject to  regulatory  
restrictions o n  foreign  exch an ge  exp osu re.15 In short, TRSs a llow  finan cia l 
in stitu tion s and  investors to  raise their risks and  p o ten tia l returns, relative  
to  capital.
O ne o f  th e  troub lesom e uses o f  TRSs is to  capture th e  gains from  th e  carry 
trade or carry business. A profitable carry trade exists w h en  exch an ge  rates 
are fixed  and  in terest rate differentials persist b etw een  tw o  econ om ies. T hen  
it is possib le  to  borrow  in  th e  lo w  in terest rate currency and  len d  in  th e  h igh  
in terest rate currency w ith  n o  risk other th a n  th at o f  a failure in  th e  fixed  
exch an ge  rate regim e.
T he use o f  a TRS alters th e  form , but n o t  necessarily  th e  quantity, o f  cap­
ital flow s to  d ev e lo p in g  countries. A lternatively, w h en  d evelop in g-cou n try  
financial in stitu tion s engage in  th e  carry business, th e  capital flow s are 
in  th e  form  o f  m ajor-currency (usually  short-term ) bank  loans. W h en  th ey  
pursue th e  sam e profit op p ortu n ities b y  u sin g  a TRS, th is  generates indirect 
capital flow s as th e  TRS counterparties, usually  dealers from  advanced capital 
m arkets, b u y  th e  u n d erly in g  asset as a h ed ge against their side o f  th e  TRS.
C onsider th e  dealer's side o f  th e  transaction . T he dealer contracts to  
receive th e  LIBOR p lus a spread in  exch an ge for p ay in g  th e  total return o n  
a local currency security. T he dealer does n o t  in ten d  to  profit b y  in vestin g  
in  th e  exp ecta tion  th at th e  LIBOR w ill rise or that th e  to ta l return o n  th e  
security w ill fall. Instead th e  dealer lays o ff th e  risk by  borrow ing  at th e  
LIBOR and  u sin g  th e  proceeds to  buy  th e  local currency security. T he dealer 
th en  passes-through in  th e  regular swap p aym en t th e  proceeds from  h o ld in g  
th e  loca l security, w h ile  th e  dealer's cost o f  borrow ing to  b u y  th e  security  
is covered  by  th e  receipt o f LIBOR paym ents. T he spread above th e  LIBOR 
paid  to  th e  dealer is th e  dealer's profit, and  th e  dealer en d s up h o ld in g  n o  
m arket risk.16
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N o te  th at in  th e  process o f  h ed g in g  th e  dealer's p o sitio n  in  th e  TRS there  
is a capital in flo w  to  th e  d eve lop in g  country  because th e  advanced  capital 
m arket dealer has purchased local currency security. N orm ally  a flow  o f  
capital in  th e  form  o f  loca l currency securities w ill sh ift th e  exch an ge  rate 
risk to  th e  advanced capital m arkets, bu t n o t  in  th is case. Instead it fu n ction s  
in  con ju n ctio n  w ith  th e  TRS to  leave th e  loca l d evelop in g-cou n try  investor  
h o ld in g  th e  foreign  exch an ge  risk (the short dollar p osition ), m u ch  like a 
m ajor currency bank loan .
O n  th e  o n e  h a n d  th e  u se o f a TRS results in  a sim ilar foreign  exch an ge  
exposure to  th at described before. H ow ever in  som e w ays it is far w orse. In 
com parison  w ith  usin g  foreign  b ank  loan s to  capture profit from  th e  carry 
trade, th e  use o f  a TRS causes an even  greater surge in  cross-border flow s  
th a n  d o  short-term  bank  loans. T he surge orig inates from  th e  collateral 
requirem ents for th e  swap. If th e  present value o f  th e  sw ap sud d en ly  drops 
as a result o f a rise in  loca l in terest rates or a drop in  th e  va lue o f  th e  
currency, or b o th , th en  th e  loca l sw ap holder is required to  p ost add itional 
collateral w ith  th e  sw ap counterparty. G enerally  th is m ean s se llin g  other  
assets, o ften  other d evelop in g -cou n try  assets, in  order to  ob ta in  dollars to  
m eet th e  requirem ent to  post ad d itional collateral b y  th e  n ex t day -  if n o t  
later th e  sam e day. Thus TRSs can  result in  large and  im m ed iate  m ajor 
currency ou tflow s. If short-term  bank  loan s are considered  h o t m oney, 
th en  p aym en ts to  m eet m argin and  collateral requirem ents are m icrow ave  
m o n e y  -  th ey  b ecom e h o t m ore quickly.
As an  in d ica tion  o f  th e  p o ten tia l m agn itu d e o f  th ese  collateral outflow s, 
Garber and  Lall (1996) cite th e  IMF and  'industry sources', w h ich  reported  
that M exican  banks h e ld  U S$16 b illio n  in  tesob on os to ta l return swaps at th e  
tim e o f  th e  d eva luation  o f  th e  M exican  peso . T he authors calcu lated  th at th e  
in itia l peso  d eva luation  depressed th e  va lu e o f  tesob on os b y  15 per cent, and  
th at th is w ou ld  h ave required th e  delivery o f  U S$2.4  b illio n  in  collateral 
th e  n ex t day. This w o u ld  exp la in  about h a lf o f  th e  US$5 b illio n  o f  foreign  
reserves lo st b y  th e  M exican  central bank th e  day after d evalu ation . In th is  
way, collateral or m argin  calls o n  derivatives can  accelerate th e  pace o f  a 
financia l crisis, and  th e  greater leverage that derivatives provide can  also  
m u ltip ly  th e  size o f  th e  losses and  thereby d eep en  th e  crisis.
T he u se o f TRSs also increases th e  lik e lih o o d  o f con tag ion . T h ey  o ften  
in v o lv e  cross-currency assets and  p aym en ts an d  are therefore m ore likely  to  
transfer d isruptions from  o n e  m arket to  another. N eftc i (1998) c la im s that 
o n e  reason w h y  Korean banks en gaged  in  so  m a n y  In d on esian  TRSs w as that 
th ey  were seeking h igh er rates o f  return in  response to  a rise in  their fu n d in g  
costs. 'But, n o te  th at at th e  en d  o f  th is process, Korean banks are b e in g  
exp osed  to  In d on esian  credit. This, how ever, is n o t  v isib le  o n  their balance  
sheets. This situ ation  n o t o n ly  creates th e  p ossib ility  for con tag ion , b u t m ay  
also m ake th e  co n ta g io n  unpred ictab le and  severe' (ibid.).
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Structured notes
Structured n o tes , a lso  k n ow n  as hybrid instru m ents, are a co m b in a tio n  o f  
a credit m arket in strum ent, such  as a b o n d  or n o te , w ith  a derivative, such  
as an o p tio n  or futures-like contract. Hybrid in strum en ts in clu d e such  c o n ­
ven tio n a l securities as convertib le  stocks, convertib le  b on d s and  callable  
b on d s. T hese have lo n g  b een  am on g  th e  set o f  traditional securities regularly  
issued and  traded in  US finan cia l markets.
Structured n o tes  w ere part o f  th e  n ew  w ave o f  in n o v a tio n  in  capital flow s  
to  d eve lop in g  coun tries in  th e  1990s. T hey offered issuers and  investors  
either better y ie ld s th an  sim ilarly rated securities, or better com b in a tion s or 
bu n d les o f  risk characteristics. In som e cases structured n o tes  w ere designed  
to  c ircum vent accou n tin g  rules or govern m en t regu lations and  th u s a llow  
low er capital charges, greater foreign  exch an ge  exposure or greater overall 
risk to  capital.
The n otes u sed  in  d eve lop in g  countries w ere u su ally  structured so  th at 
their y ie ld  w as linked  to  th e  va lue o f  o n e  or m ore o f  th e  currencies or stock  
in d ices in  th e  d ev e lo p in g  eco n o m ies in  qu estion . T he issuers o f  th ese  
structured n o tes w ere fin an cia l in stitu tion s from  ad van ced  capital m arket 
econ om ies, and  th e  investors w ere o ften  d evelop in g-cou n try  finan cia l in s ti­
tu tion s and  investors w h o  w ere m ore w illin g  to  h o ld  th eir  o w n  exch an ge  
rate risk or th at o f  their  n e igh b ou rin g  d eve lop in g  countries.
Putable debt
T he largest threat to  fin ancia l m arket stab ility  th at d id  n o t d irectly  in v o lv e  
foreign  exch an ge  exposu re w as th e  use o f  em b ed d ed  derivatives, called  'put 
op tion s', in  lo a n  and  b o n d  debt contracts. T hese put o p tio n s o n  th e  debt 
principal en ab led  lenders to  recall their principal in  th e  ev en t o f  eco n o m ic  
trouble. T he effect was to  drain th e  d eve lop in g  cou n try  fin an cia l m arkets o f  
liq u id ity  at just th e  tim e it w as m ost urgently  needed .
It is n o t un u su a l for credit instrum en ts to  h ave attached  o p tion s. Callable 
bon d s are fam iliar fin an cia l instrum ents in  advanced  capital m arkets. T hey  
are a co m b in a tio n  o f  a co n v en tio n a l b o n d  and  a call o p tio n  th at allow s  
th e  issuer (that is, th e  borrower) to  recall th e  principal o n  th e  b o n d  at a 
specified  va lue (usually  par) after som e future date. C allable b o n d s are used  
b y  borrowers to  reduce th e  risk o f  b e in g  locked  in to  h igh er th an  m arket rates 
o f interest o n  their ou tstan d in g  debt.
In th e  case o f  d ev e lo p in g  cou n try  debt, th e  attached  o p tio n s w ere usually  
puts rather th an  calls. This granted  th e  lenders, n o t th e  borrowers, th e  right 
to  reclaim  their principal. Lenders in  advanced  capital m arkets a ttached  put 
provisions to  loan s and  b on d s in  order to  reduce th e  risk th a t adverse m acro- 
eco n o m ic  co n d itio n s or other circum stances w ou ld  reduce th e  ability  o f  their  
borrowers to  repay their debts. It also reduced their exposure to  increases  
in  dollar or o th er  hard currency in terest rates. Yet an oth er m o tiv a tio n
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in vo lved  ou tflan k in g  tax  and  regulatory requirem ents because th e  putable  
loans cou ld  be treated like long-term  debts ev en  th o u g h  th ey  fu n ctio n ed  like 
short-term  on es.
T hese put o p tio n s w ere in  th e  form  o f 'hard' and  'soft' puts. Hard puts, 
u sually  attached  to  a n o te  or b on d , gave th e  lender th e  right to  d em an d  
principal repaym ent after a certain date, for exam p le a five-year n o te  m igh t  
b e putab le after o n e  year. Soft puts, u sually  attached  to  loans, gave lenders 
th e  right to  reschedule th e  term s o f  their credit if certain adverse even ts  
occurred. Table 6.5 sh ow s th e  breakdow n b etw een  loans and  b on d s in  East 
Asia. M ost o f  th e  'hard' pu t o p tio n s w ere closer to  th e  European- th an  to  th e  
A m erican-style o p tion . In th ese  cases op tio n  holders had th e  right to  exercise 
th e  o p tio n  o n ly  o n  specific days, or perhaps sem iannually; in  very few  cases 
were th e  op tion s exercisable o n  a con tin u ou s basis, as w ith  Am erican op tions.
A ttached put op tion s facilitated len d in g  by  low ering th e  costs to  borrowers 
and  ensuring  th at lenders w ou ld  have len d in g  alternatives in  th e  even t o f  
adverse m arket d isruptions. This putab le debt in stru m en t w as used  w id ely  
in  th e  rapidly grow ing  d evelop in g-cou n try  b o n d  m arket. T he IMF estim ated  
in  1999, u sin g  p ublic databases, th at there w ere U S$32 b illio n  in  debts 
putab le th rou gh  th e  en d  o f  2 0 0 0  for all em erging  countries. O f th e  total, 
U S$23 b illio n  w as from  East A sian issuers and  US$8 b illio n  w as from  Brazil.
T he presence o f  putable debt in  len d in g  to  d eve lop in g  eco n o m ies raises 
several policy  concerns. First, th e  attached put lowers th e  borrow ing costs and  
th is  in  turn encourages m ore borrow ing and  len d in g . Second, th e  tax and  
regulatory treatm ent o f  putable debt o ften  incorrectly  treats it as long-term  
debt even  th o u g h  it fu n ction s like short-term  debt. Third, it creates liq u id ity  
shortages in  the: even t o f  a fin ancia l d isruption , and it does so just at th e  
tim e w h en  liqu id ity  is crucial for th e  successfu l fu n ctio n in g  o f  th e  financia l 
sector. In sum , putab le debt ten d s to  increase in d eb ted n ess and  does so  in  
a m anner that exacerbates finan cia l disruptions.
Table 6 .5  P u ta b le  d e b t is su e d  f r o m  East A s ia  (U S$ m i l l io n ,  
d u e  in  19 99  o r  2 0 0 0 )
Loans Bonds
H o n g  K o n g 1 5 4 9 2  6 4 2
In d o n e s ia 2  8 7 6 9 6 3
K o re a 3 2 6 3 3 9 8 6
M a la y s ia 547 1 7 3 0
P h i lip p in e s 75 -
S in g a p o re 53 2 -
T h a ila n d 1 6 8 0 1 3 1 3
T o ta l 10  5 2 2 10  6 3 4
Source-. IMF (1999).
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Threats to currency stability: derivatives a n d  fixed exchange 
rate regimes
T he presence o f  derivatives m arkets poses a special set o f  ch allen ges for 
govern m en ts w ith  a fixed  exch an ge rate regim e. This is true w h eth er  it is 
a soft peg, a craw ling peg  or a hard peg. D evelop in g-cou n try  govern m en ts  
pursue a fixed  exch an ge  rate p o licy  in  order to  encourage trade and  in v est­
m en t by  low erin g  exch an ge  rate risk. A fixed  exch an ge rate can  p rom ote  
grow th  th rou gh  th e  exp an sion  o f  trade and  foreign  in v estm en t b y  m aking  
th ose  eco n o m ic  d ecis ion s less uncertain  and  m ore dependab le. T his reduces 
th e  costs o f  th e  foreign  exch an ge  risk in v o lv ed  in  im p ortin g  capital and  raw  
m aterial, exp ortin g  good s an d  repaying foreign  debts. A nother w ay  is to  stop  
th e  acceleration  o f  in fla tio n  b y  an ch orin g  to  external price levels.
A gainst th is  backdrop, th e  presence o f  exchange-rate-related  derivatives  
raises several im p ortan t problem s th at are expressed in  th e  fo llow in g  
questions:
• O f w h at use are foreign  exch an ge forwards or sw aps w h en  th e  fixed  
exch an ge rate regim e elim in ates norm al m arket price vo latility?  In other  
w ords, h o w  and  w h y  can  th ey  be used  if  there is n o  m arket vo la tility  to  
hedge?
• W hat purpose is served b y  th e  price discovery o f  th e  forward rate (d iscount 
or prem ium ) an d  w h at signals does it send?
• H ow  does it affect th e  ab ility  o f  th e  central bank to  m ain ta in  th e  fixed  
exch an ge rate?
The first problem  is th at in  th e  absence o f  norm al m arket price fluctuations, 
exch an ge rate derivatives fu n ctio n  as a specu lative or h ed g in g  in strum en t 
against th e  success o f  th e  governm ent's policy . In a fixed  exch an ge  rate c o n ­
text, th e  o n ly  exch an ge  rate m o v em en t th at investors n eed  to  h ed ge against 
is a failure o f  th e  fixed  rate regim e th at results in  either a d eva luation  o f  
th e  pegged  exch an ge  rate or com p lete  ab an d on m en t o f  th e  regim e. T here is 
a m u ch  sm aller risk th at a d eve lop in g  country's currency w ill appreciate, 
and  so th e  m ore relevant risk is a d eclin e  in  its value. U sin g  a forward, swap  
or o p tio n  to  take a p o ten tia lly  profitable p o sitio n  o n  a p ossib le  fall in  th e  
currency's va lue is practically  a on e-w ay  bet. T he future exch an ge  rate deter­
m in ed  in  a forward or sw ap derivative m arket is n o t  an  expression  of 
eco n o m ic  va lue b ut reflects th e  lik e lih ood  o f  g overn m en t failure, or is a 
m easure o f th e  lack o f  co n fid en ce  in  th e  governm en t's ab ility  to  m ain ta in  
a fixed  exch an ge  rate. In short it is a p o litica l price or th e  price o f  a p o licy  
e v e n t.17
D erivative m arkets also provide leverage to  speculators and  'players' w h o  
m ig h t m o u n t an attack o n  th e  fixed  exch an ge  rate. This leverage in  tak ing  
a p osition  o n  th e  currency's value, w heth er usin g  foreign  exch an ge forwards,
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s w a p s  o r  o p t i o n s ,  l o w e r s  t h e  c o s t  o f  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  r a i s e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  g a i n  
f r o m  s u c h  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g .  D e r i v a t i v e s  p r o v i d e  l o w e r  c o s t  p r i c e  e x p o s u r e  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  h i g h e r  l e v e r a g e  ( w h i c h  s a v e s  o n  t h e  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ) ,  h i g h e r  
l e v e l s  o f  l i q u i d i t y  ( s o m e t i m e s )  a n d  l o w e r  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  T h u s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  e m p o w e r s  t h o s e  w h o  a r e  b e t t i n g  o r  p l o t t i n g  a g a i n s t  
t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y .
M o r e o v e r ,  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  a  p o l i t i c a l  p r i c e  a n d  p r a c t i c a l l y  a  o n e - w a y  b e t ,  t h e r e  
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  f a r  m o r e  i n v e s t o r s  w h o  w a n t  t o  b e  s h o r t  -  r a t h e r  t h a n  l o n g  
-  i n  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  m a r k e t ,  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  
d e r i v a t i v e s  d e a l e r s  w i l l  h a v e  t o  c r e a t e  s y n t h e t i c  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s  ( d e s c r i b e d  
a b o v e )  i n  o r d e r  t o  l a y  o f f  t h e i r  l o n g - s i d e  r i s k .  T h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i s  a  c a p i t a l  
o u t f l o w ,  a n d  a s  t h e  s h o r t  i n t e r e s t  g r o w s  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e s  m a r k e t  t h e  c a p i t a l  
o u t f l o w  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  a n d  t h u s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h e  c u r r e n c y .
T h e  s e c o n d  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  f i x e d - r a t e  s y s t e m ,  t h e  f o r ­
w a r d  a n d  s w a p  m a r k e t  w i l l  c r e a t e  a  m a r k e t  p r i c e  ( a  p r o c e s s  k n o w n  a s  p r i c e  
d i s c o v e r y )  t h a t  w i l l  r e f l e c t  t h e  l a c k  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c y .  T h a t  p r i c e  w i l l  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  w i l l  b e  b e l o w  t h e  p r e s e n t  p e g g e d  s p o t  r a t e .  I f  t h a t  p r i c e  
i s  m i s u n d e r s t o o d ,  t h e n  i t  w i l l  r e g u l a r l y  s e n d  s i g n a l s  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n c y  i s  
g o i n g  t o  m o v e  o f f  o f  t h e  p e g .
T h e  t h i r d  p r o b l e m  c o n c e r n s  h o w  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  f o r w a r d  a n d  s w a p  
m a r k e t s  a f f e c t s  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
r e g i m e  a g a i n s t  d o w n w a r d  p r e s s u r e  c a u s e d  b y  a  s h o r t - t e r m  i m b a l a n c e  o r  
a  l a r g e  s p e c u l a t i v e  a t t a c k .  I f  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  a  s p o t  m a r k e t  f o r  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y ,  
t h e n  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  c a n  d e f e n d  i t s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p e g  b y  i n t e r v e n i n g  
d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  s p o t  m a r k e t  t o  b u y  i t s  c u r r e n c y  w i t h  f o r e i g n  r e s e r v e s ,  a n d  
b y  t i g h t e n i n g  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  c o n d i t i o n s .  D i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c a n  b e  
e f f e c t i v e ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  m a r k e t  i s  l a r g e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  
c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  b o t h  a  l a r g e  n e t  p u r c h a s e  w i t h i n  t h a t  m a r k e t  
a n d  b e c a u s e  i t  s e n d s  a  s i g n a l .  T i g h t e n i n g  c r e d i t  c o n s i s t s  o f  e i t h e r  r a i s i n g  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  -  w h i c h  w i l l  a t t r a c t  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s ,  d i s c o u r a g e  o u t f l o w s  
a n d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  c o s t  o f  c a r r y i n g  s y n t h e t i c  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s  -  o r  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  
s u p p l y  o f  c r e d i t  ( t h a t  i s ,  i m p o s i n g  c a p i t a l  c o n t r o l s )  t o  c e r t a i n  b o r r o w e r s ,  
s u c h  a s  f o r e i g n e r s  o r  n o n - c o m m e r c i a l  f i r m s .
T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  o n e  o r  m o r e  f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  a d d s  
p o l i c y  t a r g e t s  f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k .  M o r e o v e r  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  a r e  i n  
s o m e  w a y s  m o r e  p r o b l e m a t i c  a s  t a r g e t s  t h a n  t h e  s p o t  m a r k e t .  W h i l e  t h e  s p o t  
m a r k e t  i s  l a r g e ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s i z e  o f  t h e  f o r w a r d  a n d  s w a p  m a r k e t  i s  i n f i n i t e .  
I f  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  r a i s e s  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h e n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n ­
t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  a n d  s e r v e s  a s  a  l a r g e r  b a s i s  f o r  d i s c o u n t i n g  t h e  f o r w a r d  a n d  
s w a p  r a t e s .  I f  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  i n t e r v e n e s  d i r e c t l y ,  p e r h a p s  i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  
a v o i d  t h e  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t  s i g n a l l i n g  a  l a c k  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  r e g i m e ,  t h e n  
t h e r e  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  n o  e n d  t o  t h e  e f f o r t .  I f  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  i n t e r v e n t i o n
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s u c c e e d s  i n  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  f o r w a r d  o r  s w a p  r a t e ,  t h i s  o f f e r s  a t t a c k e r s  a  b e t t e r  
p r i c e  a t  w h i c h  t o  s e l l  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  I f  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  
d o e s  n o t  i n t e r v e n e ,  t h e n  t h e  f o r w a r d  c a n  c o n t i n u e  t o  s i g n a l  a  d e v a l u a t i o n  
a n d  f u r t h e r  g r o w t h  i n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  f o r w a r d  o r  s w a p  m a r k e t  w i l l  s p u r  
c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s  a s  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  c o n s t m c t  s y n t h e t i c  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s .
T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  b e c o m e s  h o p e l e s s .  I n  t h e  f a c e  o f  a  
c u r r e n c y  a t t a c k ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  c a n  t a k e  t h e  e x t r a  s t e p  o f  i m p o s i n g  c a p i t a l  
c o n t r o l s  t h a t  p r o h i b i t  b a n k s  f r o m  d e l i v e r i n g  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  t o  f o r e i g n  
e n t i t i e s .  T h i s  p r e v e n t s  f o r e i g n  s p e c u l a t o r s  f r o m  d e l i v e r i n g  o n  t h e i r  f o r w a r d  
c o n t r a c t s .  T h i s  m e a s u r e ,  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
a m o u n t s  t o  a  b e a r  s q u e e z e .  T h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  a s  u s e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  T h a i l a n d  i n  
t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1 9 9 7 ,  i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  L a l l  ( 1 9 9 7 )  a n d  G a r b e r  a n d  L a l l  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .
P o lic y  so lu tio n s
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s  c o n s i s t  o f  a  s e t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t  r e g u l a t i o n s  
t h a t  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  m a k e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  l e s s  s u s ­
c e p t i b l e  t o  d i s r u p t i o n s  a n d  d i s t o r t i o n s . 18 T h e y  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  u s e  
o f  d e r i v a t i v e s  f o r  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  p u r p o s e s  w h i l e  d i s c o u r a g i n g  t h e i r  u s e  i n  
u n p r o d u c t i v e  p u r s u i t s  t h a t  m i g h t  c r e a t e  d a n g e r o u s  l e v e l s  o f  e x p o s u r e  t o  
m a r k e t  r i s k ,  a s  w e l l  a s  c r e d i t  r i s k ,  o r  l e a d  t o  r e v e r s e  c a p i t a l  f l o w s .
T h e s e  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  o f  t w o  t y p e s .  
T h e  f i r s t  r e l a t e s  t o  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  i s  d e s i g n e d  
t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  -  a n d  t h u s  t h e  p r i c i n g  e f f i c i e n c y  -  o f  t h e  
m a r k e t s .  R e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a l s o  m a k e s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  o t h e r  
m a r k e t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  d e t e c t  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d  a n d  
m a n i p u l a t i o n .  R e g i s t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  
f r a u d .
T h e  s e c o n d  t y p e  o f  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  c o n s i s t s  o f  c a p i t a l  
a n d  c o l l a t e r a l  ( a l s o  k n o w n  a s  m a r g i n )  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  C a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
f u n c t i o n  t o  p r o v i d e  b o t h  a  b u f f e r  a g a i n s t  t h e  v i c i s s i t u d e s  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  a n d  
a  g o v e r n o r  o n  t h e  t e n d e n c y  o f  m a r k e t  c o m p e t i t i o n  t o  d r i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
t o  s e e k  h i g h  r e t u r n s  a n d  t h u s  h i g h e r  r i s k s . 19 C o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  h a v e  
b a s i c a l l y  t h e  s a m e  e f f e c t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  a p p l y  t o  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a n d  n o t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  H e n c e  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  w o u l d  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  b e  
s u b j e c t  t o  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  c o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
o n  t h e i r  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s .
M o r e o v e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  p r a c t i c e  f o r  m a n a g i n g  c o l l a t e r a l ,  i n s o f a r  a s  
t h e r e  i s  o n e ,  i s  d a n g e r o u s .  I t  r e q u i r e s  a  f i r m  t o  b e c o m e  ' s u p e r - m a r g i n e d '  i f  
i t s  c r e d i t  r a t i n g  d r o p s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i f  i t  d r o p s  b e l o w  i n v e s t m e n t  
g r a d e ) .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  a  d e r i v a t i v e  c o u n t e r p a r t y  t o  p o s t  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  a m o u n t  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  c o l l a t e r a l ,  a n d  a m o u n t s  t o  a  l a r g e  d e m a n d  f o r  f r e s h  c a p i t a l  a t  j u s t  
t h e  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  f i r m  i s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  i n a d e q u a t e  c a p i t a l .  
T h i s  m a r k e t  p r a c t i c e  c r e a t e s  a  ' c r i s i s  a c c e l e r a t o r ' .
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T h e  p r o p o s a l s  o f f e r e d  h e r e  a r e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w o  g r o u p s .  T h e  f i r s t  a p p l y  t o  
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  m a r k e t s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  o r  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
D e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s '  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a r e  n o t  i s o l a t e d  f r o m  t h e i r  c o u n t e r ­
p a r t s  i n  t h e  a d v a  n c e d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  o f  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  t h i s  i n t e r ­
c o n n e c t e d n e s s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  t h r o u g h  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  -  i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t .  
A s  o n e  s e n i o r  I M F  o f f i c i a l  o n c e  r e m a r k e d  t o  t h e  a u t h o r  i n  p r i v a t e ,  ' I  h a v e  
n e v e r  s e e n  o n e  s i n  i n  d e v e l o p i n g - c o u n t r y  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  t h a t  d i d  n o t  
h a v e  a s  i t s  c o u n t e r p a r t y  s o m e o n e  f r o m  N e w  Y o r k  o r  F o n d o n ' .
T h e  s e c o n d  s e  t  i n c l u d e s  a l l  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  p l u s  s o m e  a d d i t i o n a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  m a r k e t s  i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
O n e  m e r i t  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  u s e f u l  r e g u l a t o r y  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i s  t h a t  e a c h  d e v e l ­
o p i n g  c o u n t r y  c a n  a d o p t  t h e s e  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  i t s  o w n  i n i t i a t i v e .  
A n o t h e r  m e r i t  i s  t h a t  m o s t  o f  t h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  s a m e  o r  s i m i l a r  t o  
o n e s  u s e d  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
o b j e c t i o n a b l e  b y  t h e  I M F  o r  o t h e r  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .
Developed countries: registration, reporting, transparency and  
liquidity
Reporting and registration requirements
• R e q u i r e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  ( c o u n t e r p a r t i e s )  i n  d e r i v a t i v e  c o n t r a c t s  t o  r e p o r t  t h e i r  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  d e s i g n a t e d  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t y .
A l l  e x c h a n g e - t r a d e d  d e r i v a t i v e s  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  e x c h a n g e  a n d  
i t s  c l e a r i n g  h o u s e .  T h e  e x c h a n g e  h o u s e  c o l l e c t s  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  e i t h e r  
r e p o r t s  i t  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  o r  k e e p s  t h e  r e c o r d s  s o  t h a t  t h e y  c a n  b e  c a l l e d  
f o r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  M o s t  o v e r - t h e - c o u n t e r  ( O T C )  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a r e  
t r a d e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  I S D A  M a s t e r  T r a d i n g  A g r e e m e n t  ( ' M a s t e r  A g r e e m e n t ' ) ,  
w h i c h  r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o u n t e r p a r t i e s  t o  d e r i v a t i v e s  t r a d e  t o  e x c h a n g e  c o n f i r m ­
a t i o n  m e s s a g e s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  k e y  t e r m s  a r e  u n d e r s t o o d .  T h e  r e p o r t i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t  w o u l d  e n t a i l  t h e m  s e n d i n g  a  c o p y  o f  t h e  e m a i l  m e s s a g e  o r  f a x  
t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t y .
•  R e q u i r e  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  t o  r e p o r t  t h e i r  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  
d e s i g n a t e d  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t y .  T h e  d a t a  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  p r i c e ,  v o l u m e ,  
o p e n  i n t e r e s t ,  p u t - c a l l  v o l u m e  a n d  r a t i o s ,  m a t u r i t y ,  i n s t r u m e n t ,  u n d e r ­
l y i n g  i t e m ,  a m o u n t s  t r a d e d  b e t w e e n  o t h e r  d e a l e r s  a n d  w i t h  e n d - u s e r s ,  
a n d  c o l l a t e r a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
T h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  c o m p i l e d ,  a n d  t h e  n o n - p r o p r i e t a r y  d a t a  w o u l d  
b e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  m a r k e t  i n  o r d e r  t o  i m p r o v e  t r a n s p a r e n c y .  
O n c e  a g g r e g a t e d ,  t h i s  d a t a  w o u l d  r e v e a l  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  w h i l e  
p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  d e a l e r s '  m a r k e t  p o s i t i o n s  ( a s s u m i n g  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  
d e a l e r s ) .  D a t a  o f  a  p r o p r i e t a r y  n a t u r e  w o u l d  b e  r e t a i n e d  b y  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  i n  
o r d e r  t o  d e t e c t  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d ,  m a n i p u l a t i o n  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  s y s t e m i c  b r e a k s  
i n  t h e  m a r k e t s .
1 1 2  D eriv a tiv e s , C a p ita l F low s a n d  P ru d e n tia l R egu la tion
• R e q u i r e  p u b l i c l y  t r a d e d  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  m a k e  a n  e x p l i c i t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  
t h e i r  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s .  A m e n d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  r u l e s  t o  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  a l l  r e g u l a r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  i n c l u d e  t h e  a c t u a l ,  u n d e r ­
l y i n g  e c o n o m i c  p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  b u s i n e s s  p u r p o s e s  o f  m i n o r i t y  i n t e r e s t s ,  
s p e c i a l  p u r p o s e  e n t i t i e s  a n d  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  o f f - b a l a n c e  s h e e t  a c t i v i t i e s  i n t o  t h e  s a m e  l i g h t  a s  b a l a n c e  
s h e e t s ,  d e r i v a t i v e s  w o u l d  b e  r e p o r t e d  b y  n o t i o n a l  v a l u e  ( l o n g  a n d  s h o r t ) ,  
m a t u r i t y ,  i n s t r u m e n t  a n d  c o l l a t e r a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  T h i s  w o u l d  e n a b l e  i n v e s t o r s  
t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  a  f i r m  w a s  u n d e r -  o r  o v e r h e d g e d ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  i t  w a s  
p r i m a r i l y  a c t i n g  a s  a  p r o d u c e r  o r  a  w h o l e s a l e r .
•  R e g i s t e r  a l l  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  a n d  b r o k e r s .
I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  b a n k s ,  t h r i f t  a n d  o t h e r  d e p o s i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  
b r o k e r s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  d e a l e r s ,  f u t u r e s  a n d  o p t i o n s  b r o k e r s  a n d  i n s u r a n c e  s a l e s ­
p e r s o n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e g i s t e r  w i t h  t h e i r  r e l e v a n t  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t y .  T h i s  
e s t a b l i s h e s  a  m i n i m u m  c o m p e t e n c e  l e v e l  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  b a c k g r o u n d  
c h e c k s  t o  d e t e c t  f r a u d  a n d  t h e f t  c o n v i c t i o n s  f o r  s a l e s p e o p l e  a n d  p r o p e r  
b u s i n e s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  E v e n  t h o u g h  o v e r - t h e - c o u n t e r  
d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  d e a l e r  m a r k e t s ,  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  s h o u l d  a l s o  
a p p l y  t o  b r o k e r s .  S o m e  e l e c t r o n i c  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a d i n g  p l a t f o r m s  f u n c t i o n  l i k e  
b r o k e r s ,  a n d  u n f o r e s e e a b l e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t s  m a y  a g a i n  e l e v a t e  t h e  
r o l e  o f  b r o k e r s .
•  M o d e r n i z e  a c c o u n t i n g  r u l e s  a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  
o r d e r  p r o p e r l y  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  e m b e d d e d  d e r i v a t i v e s .
A  l a r g e  a n d  g r o w i n g  a m o u n t  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  a n d  l o a n s  h a v e  d e r i v a t i v e s  a t t a c h e d  
t o  o r  e m b e d d e d  i n  t h e m .  T h i s  h a s  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  a l t e r e d  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  m l e s  f o r  m a k i n g  c a p i t a l  c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  h o l d i n g  o r  i s s u i n g  t h e s e  s e c u r i t i e s ,  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  o n  i n v e s t m e n t s  
i n  t h e s e  s e c u r i t i e s  a n d  e v e n  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  m i g h t  o t h e r w i s e  p r o h i b i t  
c e r t a i n  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  p e n s i o n  f u n d s  o r  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s ,  
f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  t h e s e  s e c u r i t i e s .  U p - d a t e d  r u l e s  s h o u l d  r e f l e c t  t h e  m a r k e t  
r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  a t t a c h e d  o r  e m b e d d e d  d e r i v a t i v e  a n d  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e  
c r e d i t  r i s k  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y .
Liquidity requirements
• I n  o r d e r  t o  a s s u r e  m a r k e t  l i q u i d i t y ,  r e q u i r e  O T C  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  t o  a c t  a s  
m a r k e t  m a k e r s  a n d  m a i n t a i n  b i d / a s k  q u o t e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t r a d i n g  d a y .
D e a l e r s  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e i r  p r i v i l e g e d  r o l e  i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
e a r n i n g  t h e i r  b i d / a s k  s p r e a d ,  d e a l e r s  a r e  a l s o  p r i v y  t o  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  c h a n g e s  
i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  A l o n g  w i t h  t h i s  p r i v i l e g e  s h o u l d  c o m e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
h e l p i n g  t o  m a i n t a i n  l i q u i d i t y  a n d  a n  o r d e r l y  m a r k e t .  U S  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e s ,  
s u c h  a s  t h e  N Y S E  a n d  N A S D A Q ,  a l r e a d y  r e q u i r e  ' s p e c i a l i s t s '  t o  a c t  a s  d e a l e r s
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o r  m a r k e t  m a k e r s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t r a d i n g  d a y .  L i k e w i s e  i n  t h e  O T C  c a s h  
m a r k e t  f o r  U S  T r e a s u r y  s e c u r i t i e s ,  p r i m a r y  d e a l e r s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a c t  a s  m a r k e t  
m a k e r s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t r a d i n g  d a y .  T h o s e  m a r k e t s  h a v e  p r o v e n  t o  b e  s o m e  
o f  t h e  m o s t  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  m o s t  l i q u i d  i n  t h e  w o r l d ,  a n d  s o  t h i s  s u p p o r t i n g  
m a r k e t  r u l e  h a s  a l r e a d y  p r o v e n  i t s  m e r i t .
Antifraud and antimanipulation authority
• S t r i c t l y  p r o h i b i t  f r a u d  o n  t h e  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t  
p r i c e s  a n d  m a k e  t r a n s g r e s s i o n s  s u b j e c t  t o  c i v i l  a n d  c r i m i n a l  p e n a l t i e s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  m a r k e t  p r i c e s  s o  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  e n c o u r a g e  
t h e  w i d e s t  p o s s i b l e  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  w i l l  n o t  s e n d  d i s t o r t i n g  s i g n a l s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  f r a u d  a n d  m a n i p u l a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  s t r i c t l y  p r o ­
h i b i t e d  a n d  m a d e  p u n i s h a b l e  b y  c i v i l  a n d  c r i m i n a l  l a w .
•  R e q u i r e  r e p o r t s  o f  l a r g e  t r a d e r s '  p o s i t i o n s .
D e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  a n d  e x c h a n g e s  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  r e p o r t  e a c h  e n t i t y  t h a t  
r e a c h e s  a  c e r t a i n  p o s i t i o n a l  s i z e  i n  t h e  m a r k e t .  T h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  
c o m p i l e d  a c r o s s  m a r k e t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e c t  a n d  d e t e r  m a r k e t  m a n i p u l a t i o n .  
S u c h  l a r g e  t r a d e r  r e p o r t i n g  d a t a  h a s  p r o v e n  v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  t h e  U S  C o m m o d i t y  
F u t u r e s  T r a d i n g  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  t e r m s  o f  m a r k e t  s u r v e i l l a n c e .
•  E x t e n d  t h e  k n o w  t h y  c u s t o m e r '  r u l e  t o  a l l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  
e n g a g e  i n  l e n d i n g ,  u n d e r w r i t i n g ,  r e p u r c h a s e  a g r e e m e n t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a n d  
s e c u r i t i e s  l e n d i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  a n d  t o  a l l  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w i t h  
e n t i t i e s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  w o u l d  d i s c o u r a g e  f i n a n c i a l  s h a r p s t e r s  f r o m  ' b l o w i n g  u p '  t h e i r  
c u s t o m e r s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  c e r t a i n  s t r u c t u r e d  s e c u r i t i e s  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e  p r i n c i p a l  
e x c h a n g e - r a t e - l i n k e d  n o t e s ,  o r  P E R L s )  s e r v e d  n o  p o s i t i v e  p u r p o s e  f o r  E a s t  
A s i a n  i n v e s t o r s  a n d  w e r e  p r i m a r i l y  a  s t e a l t h  v e h i c l e  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a c q u i r e  l o n g - d a t e d  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  c u r r e n c i e s . 20 T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  i n  U S  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s  
a n d  a  c o m p a r a b l e  m e a s u r e  e x i s t s  f o r  U S  b a n k i n g  m a r k e t s .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  
e x t e n d e d  t o  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s ,  w h e r e  t h e r e  i s  e v e n  g r e a t e r  c o n c e r n  w i t h  
t h e  l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  d e g r e e  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .
Developed countries: capital and collateral requirements
Capital requirements
• U p d a t e  t h e  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  a l l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  t h a t  m i g h t  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  b e  r e g i s t e r e d  a s  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  c a p i t a l  i s  h e l d  i n  a n  a m o u n t  t h a t  i s  c o m m e n s u r a t e  
n o t  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  e x p o s u r e  t o  c r e d i t  l o s s ,  b u t  a l s o  w i t h  p o t e n t i a l  f u t u r e  
e x p o s u r e  a n d  t h e  v a l u e  a t  r i s k .
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T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  b e g i n n i n g  t o  b e  a p p l i e d  i n  s o m e  f i n a n c i a l  s p h e r e s  i n  d e v e l ­
o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  t h e  U S  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  
h a s  a d o p t e d  i t  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  r e g i s t e r e d  u n d e r  r u l e s  k n o w n  a s  'B r o k e r -  
D e a l e r  L i t e ' .
C a p i t a l  s e r v e s  t w o  f u n c t i o n s :  i t  a c t s  a s  a  b u f f e r  w h e n  a  f i r m  s u f f e r s  f r o m  
a n  a d v e r s e  e v e n t ;  a n d  i t  l i m i t s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  a  f i r m 's  r i s k - t a k i n g  i n  t h a t  t h e  
c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  t o  b e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  r i s k  e x p o s u r e .  C a p i t a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  p r o b l e m s  a t  o n e  f i r m  f r o m  b e c o m i n g  
p r o b l e m s  a t  o t h e r  f i r m s .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  d e a l e r s  i n  f i n a n c i a l  
m a r k e t s  b e c a u s e  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  c a n  l e a d  t o  m a r k e t  p r o b l e m s  s u c h  a s  i l l i q u i d i t y  
( m a r k e t  f r e e z e - u p )  o r  m e l t d o w n .
Collateral requirements
• R e q u i r e  a d e q u a t e  a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o l l a t e r a l  o r  m a r g i n  t o  b e  p o s t e d  a n d  
m a i n t a i n e d  o n  a l l  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s . 21
C o l l a t e r a l  ( m a r g i n )  o n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  c a p i t a l  
d o e s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  h e l p s  t o  p r e v e n t  p r o b l e m s  a t  o n e  f i r m  o r  
w i t h  o n e  t r a n s a c t i o n  f r o m  c a u s i n g  p e r f o r m a n c e  p r o b l e m s  f o r  o t h e r  t r a n s ­
a c t i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  f i r m s .  I n  d o i n g  s o  i t  r e d u c e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  d e f a u l t  
o r  o t h e r  c r e d i t - r e l a t e d  l o s s e s ,  a n d  i t  r e d u c e s  t h e  m a r k e t ' s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  
a  f r e e z e - u p  o r  m e l t d o w n .
T h e  c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  p r a c t i c e s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  c o l l a t e r a l  a r e  f a r  f r o m  a d e q u a t e .  
O n e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d a n g e r o u s  p r a c t i c e  i s  t o  r e q u i r e  a  s m a l l  i n i t i a l  c o l l a t e r a l  
l e v e l ,  b u t  t h e n  t o  r e q u i r e  a  f i r m  t o  b e c o m e  ' s u p e r - m a r g i n e d '  i f  i t s  c r e d i t  
r a t i n g  d r o p s .  T h i s  c a u s e s  a  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c o l l a t e r a l  p r e c i s e l y  
w h e n  t h e  f i r m  i s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  i n a d e q u a t e  c a p i t a l .  I n  e f f e c t  i t  
a c t s  a s  a  ' c r i s i s  a c c e l e r a t o r ' .
Developing countries: registration, reporting, transparency and  
liquidity
Additional registration and reporting requirements
•  R e p o r t i n g  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  a n d  d e r i v a ­
t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  s a m e  a s  t h o s e  i n  
d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
P r e v e n t i n g  f r a u d  a n d  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  t r a n s p a r e n t  m a r k e t  e n v i r o n m e n t  a r e  
n o  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m i e s  t h a n  i n  d e v e l o p e d  o n e s .  T h e  
n e e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  j u s t  
a s  g r e a t .  T h e  c o s t  o f  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  a n d  e n f o r c i n g  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i s  n o t  
s u b s t a n t i a l .
T h e  a b i l i t y  t o  e n f o r c e  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o u l d  b e  e n h a n c e d  b y  
s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  a n y  d e r i v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n  t h a t  w a s  n o t  r e p o r t e d  c o u l d  
n o t  b e  p u t  b e f o r e  t h e  c o u r t  f o r  l e g a l  e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o r  a  b a n k r u p t c y  c l a i m .
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T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  w o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  d e r i v a t i v e  c o u n t e r p a r t i e s  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  
r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t u a l  i n t e r e s t s .  O t h e r ­
w i s e  i t  w o u l d  a m o u n t  t o  g i v i n g  a  c o u n t e r p a r t y  a n  o p t i o n  l e g a l l y  t o  a b r o g a t e  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t .
Developing countries: capital and collateral requirements
Capital requirements in addition to those for developed countries listed above
• L i m i t  e x p o s u r e  t o  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a n d  o t h e r  m a r k e t  
p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  t o  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  c a p i t a l .
T h e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  f i g u r e d  a s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  b e  a u g m e n t e d  
b y  a n  a b s o l u t e  l i m i t .  T h e  l i m i t a t i o n  s h o u l d  a p p l y  t o  a  c o n s o l i d a t e d  b a l a n c e  
s h e e t  a n d  o f f - b a l a n c e  s h e e t  m e a s u r e  o f  e x p o s u r e .  T h e  l i m i t s  c o u l d  b e  m a d e  
t i g h t e r  f o r  h i g h e r  d e g r e e s  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  m a n a g e m e n t .
E x a m p l e s  o f  p o s i t i o n  o r  e x p o s u r e  l i m i t s  a l r e a d y  e x i s t  o n  U S  d e r i v a t i v e  
e x c h a n g e s .  T h e s e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a m o u n t  t o  e x p l i c i t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  r i s k  t a k i n g ,  
b u t  n o t  h e d g i n  g . T h i s  m e a s u r e  c a n  b e  v e r y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  l i m i t i n g  t h e  a m o u n t  
o f  c a r r y  t r a d e  o r  ' h o t  m o n e y '  r e l a t e d  t r a n s a c t i o n s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  r e s u l t  i n  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  e x p o s u r e  a n d  s o m e t i m e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  e x p o s u r e .  H e n c e  t h e  
m e a s u r e  d i s e n c o u r a g e s  l e v e r a g e d  e x p o s u r e  t o  d e v a l u a t i o n  o r  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  
a n d  e n c o u r a g e s ;  l o n g - t e r m  o r  m o r e  d i v e r s i f i e d  i n v e s t m e n t .
•  L i m i t  t h e  m i  s m a t c h i n g  o f  m a t u r i t y  o n  a s s e t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s .
A n o t h e r  s o u r c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t h a t  c a n  p l a g u e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n ­
t r i e s  m o r e  t h a n  t h e i r  w e a l t h i e r  d e v e l o p e d  n e i g h b o u r s  i s  t h e  r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  m i s m a t c h i n g  t h e  m a t u r i t y  o f  a s s e t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s .  N o t  o n l y  i s  t h e r e  
a n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r i s k  f r o m  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  a n d  s l o p e  o f  t h e  y i e l d  c u r v e ,  
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  l i q u i d i t y  o r  r e f u n d i n g  r i s k  i n h e r e n t  i n  n o t  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  
r o l l - o v e r  o r  r e n e w  l o a n s .
Collateral requirements
• T h e  c o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e  d e a l e r s  a n d  o t h e r  d e r i v a t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  s a m e  a s  t h o s e  i n  d e v e l ­
o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
C o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  n o  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  i n  d e v e l ­
o p i n g  e c o n o m i e s  t h a n  f o r  t h o s e  i n  d e v e l o p e d  e c o n o m i e s .  T h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
l e v e l  o f  c o l l a t e r a l  s h o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i g h  t o  p r o v i d e  a  s a f e  a n d  s o u n d  
f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  m a r k e t  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  b u t  n o t  s o  h i g h  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  r i s k  
m a n a g e m e n t  t o o l s  w o u l d  b e  d i s c o u r a g e d  b y  t h e i r  l a c k  o f  a f f o r d a b i l i t y .
D e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e a s o n s  t o  m a i n t a i n  e v e n  s t r o n g e r  
c o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T h e y  n e e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  m a r k e t  s a f e t y  
a n d  s o u n d n e s s .  B e c a u s e  t h e y  t e n d  t o  s u f f e r  m o r e  t h a n  w e a l t h y  c o u n t r i e s  
w h e n  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  d i s r u p t i o n s  o c c u r ,  t h e y  r e q u i r e  a  g r e a t e r  b u f f e r  a g a i n s t
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s u c h  d i s r u p t i o n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  b y  r a i s i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  r i s k  t a k i n g ,  r e l a t i v e l y  
h i g h e r  c o l l a t e r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w i l l  s e r v e  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  e x c e s s i v e  r i s k  t a k i n g .
T h e  a b o v e  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  s h o u l d  a p p l y  t o  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  a l i k e  a n d  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  m a k i n g  t h e  c h a n g e  s h o u l d  b e  s h a r e d .  
B u r d e n  s h a r i n g  w o u l d  a p p l y  n o t  j u s t  t o  d e b t  f o r g i v e n e s s  o r  d e b t  w o r k - o u t s ,  
b u t  a l s o  t o  t h e  s h a r i n g  o f  r i s k s .  T h i s  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  b a s i c  i n s i g h t  t h a t  
d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  h a d  m o r e  y e a r s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  r e g u l a t i n g  t h e i r  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s ,  a n d  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  w i s d o m  o f  t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  s h o u l d  b e  
s h a r e d .  I t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  a  o n e - w a y  p r o c e s s  b e c a u s e  a  m i r r o r  c o u l d  b e  h e l d  u p  
t o  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i f  t h e y  p u s h e d  f o r  c h a n g e s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
t h a t  w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  w h a t  w a s  a c t u a l l y  p r a c t i s e d  a t  h o m e .  A f t e r  a l l  
t h e  U S  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  -  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  O T C  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  -  
a r e  c l o s e l y  r e g u l a t e d  a n d  s o  t h e  ' W a s h i n g t o n  C o n s e n s u s '  f o r  a  l i b e r a l i z e d ,  
f r e e - m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a m o u n t s  t o  
a d v o c a t i n g  ' d o  a s  w e  s a y ,  n o t  a s  w e  d o ' .  T h e  a d v o c a t e d  r e g u l a t i o n s  w o u l d  
h o l d  b o t h  s i d e s  a c c o u n t a b l e  i n  t h e i r  o w n  w a y .
Notes
1. The term 'vehicle' refers to the form in which capital is raised and traded: 
bank loans, bonds (including local currency, major currency and structured notes), 
equities and foreign direct investment.
2. The term 'derivative' is used in the most generic sense to mean a contract that is 
used to create price exposure by having its price derived from that of an under­
lying commodity, security, rate, index or event. It also creates leverage and does 
not generally require the transfer of title or principal. Examples of derivatives 
are futures, options, forwards, swaps and the derivative component of hybrid 
instruments such as structured notes.
3. A repurchase is similar to a foreign exchange swap in that it includes an obligation 
first to purchase (sell) and then to sell (purchase) a security at agreed-upon prices. 
A securities loan is comparable but is treated as a loan on which collateral is posted 
and rent is paid instead of a matching set of transactions.
4. An excellent discussion of the traditional role of the banking sector can be found 
in Ron Chernow (1997).
5. The term 'bond' will be used here for the broad class of credit instmments that are 
also known as notes, debentures and 'paper'.
6. A discussion of how securities markets surpassed the traditional banking business 
can be found in Lowell and Farrell (1996).
7. 'Major currency' refers to the US dollar, the euro, the yen or the pound sterling, 
which are the currencies most likely to be used to denominate loans and securities 
issued by developing countries.
8. A cross-default clause in a loan contract means that a default by a borrower against 
any one lender is considered a default against all lenders.
9. The term 'market risk' refers to a set of all investment risks except credit risk 
and settlement risk. Market risk includes price risk, interest rate risk and exchange 
rate risk.
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10. Volatility is less in comparison with local currency securities, whose risk is the 
product of both foreign exchange risk and security price risk.
11. Data from Swaps Monitor (Spraus, 1999) and the US Treasury's Controller of the 
Currency.
12. A bid is the price at which the dealer is willing to buy, and the ask or offer is 
the price at which the dealer is willing to sell.
13. If investors seek to acquire mostly long local currency positions, then the deriva­
tive dealer will do the opposite and this will create a capital inflow.
14. Similarly the purchase of dollars in the spot market by the dealer is u lti­
mately reversed when the dealer purchases pesos in settlement of the forward 
contract.
15. It would incur a capital charge only if it were to move into the money.
16. The dealer's credit risk -  the risk of the counterparty failing to act on the 
contract -  is mitigated by the use of collateral. In addition there may be some 
basis risk between the TRS and the returns on the actual security.
17. This is not to say that there is no economic value to a political or policy event.
18. These proposals were prepared as part of a presentation by the author to the 
North-South Institute in Ottawa, October 2001.
19. John Eatwell has expressed serious concern about whether the capital held to 
meet capital requirements can successfully function as a buffer against such 
changes (Eatwell, 2001).
20. For descriptions of these structured securities and how they are transacted, see 
Partnoy (1999) and Dodd (2002).
21. For good background reading on collateral provision in OTC derivative markets 
in the United States, see Johnson (2002).
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H e lm u t Reisen
In tro d u ctio n
I n  t e r m s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c e ,  t h e  s i n g l e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  v i s i t o r  t o  a  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  w a s  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f r o m  a  W e s t e r n  a i d  a g e n c y ;  i n  t h e  
1 9 7 0 s  i t  w a s  a  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k e r  e a g e r  t o  r e c y c l e  O P E C  s u r p l u s e s ;  a n d  i n  
t h e  1 9 8 0 s  i t  w a s  a n  I M F  o f f i c i a l .  S i n c e  t h e n  i t  h a s  b e e n  a  s o v e r e i g n  a n a l y s t  
f r o m  o n e  o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s :  M o o d y ' s  I n v e s t o r  S e r v i c e s ,  S t a n d a r d  
&  P o o r  o r  F i t c h .
T h e  r i s e  i n  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  a n d  t h e  s t a g n a t i o n  o f  c o n c e s s i o n a l  f i n a n ­
c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  h a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  o n  
t h e  t e r m s  ( a n d  m a g n i t u d e )  o n  w h i c h  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  c a n  t a p  w o r l d  
b o n d  m a r k e t s .  S i n c e  b o n d  m a r k e t s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  u n r e g u l a t e d ,  c r e d i t  r a t i n g  
a g e n c i e s  h a v e  b e c o m e  t h e  m a r k e t s '  de facto r e g u l a t o r s .  I n d e e d ,  u n l i k e  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  w h e r e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  i s  u s u a l l y  t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d ,  
s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  a r e  v i t a l  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a s  t h e i r  a c c e s s  t o  c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s  i s  p r e c a r i o u s  a n d  v a r i a b l e .  T h e  r e c e n t  p r o p o s a l  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  
B a n k i n g  S u p e r v i s i o n  f o r  a  n e w  B a s e l  C a p i t a l  A c c o r d  m a y  m e a n  e v e n  g r e a t e r  
i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  ( R e i s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
T h e  i n c r e a s e d  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  f o r  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  f i n a n c e  
h a s  b r o u g h t  t h e i r  w o r k  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  a  w i d e r  g r o u p  o f  o b s e r v e r s  -  a n d  
s u b j e c t e d  t h e m  t o  c r i t i c i s m .  T h e  M e x i c a n  c r i s i s  o f  1 9 9 4 - 9 5  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  c r e d i t  
r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s ,  l i k e  a l m o s t  e v e r y b o d y  e l s e ,  w e r e  r e a c t i n g  t o  e v e n t s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  a n t i c i p a t i n g  t h e m ,  a n  o b s e r v a t i o n  r e i n f o r c e d  b y  r a t i n g  p e r f o r m a n c e s  
b e f o r e  a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  ( R e i s e n  a n d  v o n  M a l t z a n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  R a t i n g  
a g e n c i e s  w e r e  a c c u s e d  ( f o r  e x a m p l e  b y  t h e  I M F  i n  1 9 9 9 )  o f  b e i n g  g u i d e d  b y  
o u t d a t e d  r a t i n g  m o d e l s  a n d  o f  i g n o r i n g  l i q u i d i t y  r i s k s  a n d  c u r r e n c y  c r i s i s  
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s .  T h e y  e v e n  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h i s  t h e m s e l v e s  ( H u h n e ,  1 9 9 8 ) .
T h i s  c h a p t e r  a s s e s s e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  r a t i n g s  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g -  
c o u n t r y  f i n a n c e  h a s  c h a n g e d  a n d  w h e t h e r  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  h a v e  c h a n g e d  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e i r  r a t i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  I t  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  r e c e n t  
s u g g e s t i o n s  b y  t h e  B a s e l  C o m m i t t e e  o n  B a n k i n g  S u p e r v i s i o n ,  a s  t h e s e  a r e
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v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  g a u g i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  r o l e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  f o r  f o r e i g n  
d e b t  f i n a n c e  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  t h e n  l o o k s  a t  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  
b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  t o  s e e  w h a t  h a s  c h a n g e d  a n d  w h e t h e r  r a t i n g  
m o d e l s  h a v e  m o v e d  t o w a r d s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  s t r e s s e d  i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  o n  c r i s i s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  b e f o r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  
r a t i n g  e v e n t s ,  l o o k i n g  a g a i n  a t  c h a n g e s  a f t e r  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s .  
I t  t h e n  e v a l u a t e s  w h e t h e r  r e c e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  e n d e a v o u r s  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  r o l e  
o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  i n  s e t t i n g  b a n k s '  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
l i g h t  o f  t h e i r  r o l e  i n  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g - c o u n t r y  l e n d i n g .  T h e  
c h a p t e r  e n d s  w i t h  s o m e  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s .
S o v ere ig n  ra tin g  d eterm in a n ts: w h a t  h a s ch a n g ed ?
O n e  o f  t h e  s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  w a s  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  r a t i n g  c r i s i s  
( J i i t t n e r  a n d  M c C a r t h y ,  2 0 0 0 ) ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  r a t i n g s  o f  t h e  a f f e c t e d  c o u n t r i e s  
w e r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d o w n g r a d e d .  K o r e a ' s  r a t i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  f e l l  o n  a v e r a g e  
b y  t h r e e  l e t t e r  g r a d e s  a n d  n i n e  r a t i n g  n o t c h e s ;  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  c h a n g e s  o f  
t h a t  m a g n i t u d e  h a d  n e v e r  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  b e f o r e ,  a n d  t h e y  h a d  r a r e l y  b e e n  
o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  l o n g  h i s t o r y  o f  r a t i n g  t r a n s i t i o n s  f o r  U S  c o r p o r a t e  b o n d s  
( B o n t e  etal., 1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e  r a t i n g  i n s t a b i l i t y  r e f l e c t e d  m o r e  t h a n  c h a n g e s  i n  a  
c o u n t r y ' s  u n d e r l y i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l s ;  i t  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  d e t e r ­
m i n a n t s  u n d e r l y i n g  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  f o r  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s .
S o v e r e i g n  r i s k  r e f l e c t s  t h e  a b i l i t y  a n d  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t  i s s u e r  
t o  m e e t  i t s  f u t u r e  d e b t  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  b i n d i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b a n k r u p t c y  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  c r e d i t o r s  h a v e  o n l y  l i m i t e d  l e g a l  r e d r e s s  a g a i n s t  
s o v e r e i g n  b o r r o w e r s ,  w h o  m a y  a l s o  d e f a u l t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s .  B o t h  q u a l i ­
t a t i v e  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  f a c t o r s  a r e  e x a m i n e d  t o  f o r m  a  v i e w  o f  o v e r a l l  
c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s .  M e a s u r e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  a r e  u s e d  
i n  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t  w h i l e  p o l i t i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  
w h i c h  b e a r  o n  f i s c a l  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  f o r m  t h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n .  
W h i l e  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  p e r i o d i c a l l y  u p d a t e  t h e  l i s t  o f  t h e  n u m e r o u s  e c o n o m i c ,  
s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  u n d e r l i e  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s ,  s o m e  
o f  t h e m  a r e  n o t  q u a n t i f i a b l e  a n d  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  g u i d a n c e  a b o u t  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  
w e i g h t s .
T h e  locus classicus f o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e v i d e n c e  o n  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n ­
a n t s  i s  C a n t o r  a n d  P a c k e r  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .  U s i n g  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  d a t a  f o r  4 9  c o u n t r i e s  
( S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 ) ,  t h e  a u t h o r s  e s t i m a t e d  w h i c h  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s  
w e i g h e d  m o s t  h e a v i l y  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r i s k  r a t i n g s  b y  
M o o d y ' s  a n d  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r ' s ,  a n d  t h e i r  a v e r a g e  r a t i n g s .  P e r  c a p i t a  i n c o m e  
( + ) ,  G D P  g r o w t h  ( + ) ,  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  ( - ) ,  f o r e i g n  d e b t  a s  a  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e x p o r t s  ( - ) ,  a  d u m m y  f o r  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  ( + )  
a n d  a  d u m m y  f o r  d e f a u l t  h i s t o r y  ( - )  w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d  h a d  
t h e  e x p e c t e d  s i g n ,  w h i l e  f i s c a l  b a l a n c e  ( + )  a n d  e x t e r n a l  b a l a n c e  ( + )  w e r e  n o t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  a u t h o r s '  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  e s t i m a t e s .  T h e  a d j u s t e d  R 2 w a s
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a b o v e  0 . 9 0  f o r  a v e r a g e  r a t i n g s  a s  w e l l  a s  M o o d y ' s  a n d  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r ' s  
r a t i n g s .  T h e  r e s u l t s  c o n f i r m  t h a t  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  w e r e  
e x p l a i n e d  b y  a  l i m i t e d  n u m b e r  o f  k e y  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  v a r i a b l e s  b e f o r e  t h e  
A s i a n  c r i s i s .
S o m e  o f  t h e  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  i d e n t i f i e d  a b o v e ,  s u c h  a s  G D P  g r o w t h  
a n d  f i s c a l  b a l a n c e s ,  a r e  t o  a  c e r t a i n  d e g r e e  e n d o g e n o u s  t o  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s .  
T o  i g n o r e  t h e  e n d o g e n e i t y  o f  s u c h  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  r i s k s  i n t r o d u c i n g  
a  p r o c y c l i c a l  e l e m e n t  i n t o  t h e  r a t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  i n t e n s i f y i n g  b o o m - b u s t  
c y c l e s  i n  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  l e n d i n g  b y  u n d e r p i n n i n g  t h e  b u i l d - u p  o f  u n s u s ­
t a i n a b l e  i n f l o w s  w i t h  i m p r o v e d  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s .  F u r t h e r m o r e  t h e r e  s e e m s  
l i t t l e  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  f l o w s :  t h e  d e b t  c y c l e  h y p o t h e s i s  r e q u i r e s  
i n f l o w s  t o  b e  i n v e s t e d  i n  t r a d e - r e l a t e d  a r e a s  a n d  m a r g i n a l  s a v i n g s  r a t e s  t o  
e x c e e d  t h e  a v e r a g e  s a v i n g s  r a t e  u p o n  r e c e i p t  o f  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s  ( F f r e n c h - D a v i s  
a n d  R e i s e n ,  1 9 9 8 ) .
D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  t h e  p r e c r i s i s  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  i d e n t i f i e d  b y  C a n t o r  
a n d  P a c k e r  h a d  l i t t l e  i n  c o m m o n  w i t h  t h e  d o m e s t i c  r o o t s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
c r i s e s  ( b a n k i n g ,  c u r r e n c y  a n d  d e b t )  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  ( s e e  f o r  e x a m p l e  
R e i s e n ,  1 9 9 8 ;  G o l d s t e i n ,  1 9 9 9 ) :  w e a k  n a t i o n a l  b a n k i n g  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s ,  
p r e m a t u r e  a n d  p o o r l y  s u p e r v i s e d  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  p o o r  p u b l i c  a n d  
p r i v a t e  d e b t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  w i t h  i n a d e q u a t e  l i q u i d i t y  d e f e n c e s  a g a i n s t  s h o c k s ,  
a n d  v u l n e r a b l e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r e g i m e s .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s  i t  s e e m s  t h a t  s o v e r e i g n  
r a t i n g s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  l e a d i n g  u p  t o  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  w e r e  d r i v e n  b y  a n  o u t ­
d a t e d  r a t i n g  m o d e l .
T a b l e  7 . 1  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r  o f  t h e  C a n t o r - P a c k e r  m o d e l  
d e t e r i o r a t e d  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  1 9 9 8  ( o n e  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  A s i a n  
c r i s i s  b r o k e  o u t ) ,  w i t h  t h e  a d j u s t e d  R 2 d r o p p i n g  f r o m  o v e r  0 . 9 0  t o  0 . 8 6  f o r  
M o o d y ' s  a n d  0 . 8 3  f o r  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r .  T h e  m o d e l  d e t e r i o r a t e d  d u r i n g  1 9 9 7  
d u e  t o  a  s t r u c t u r a l  b r e a k  ( J i i t t n e r  a n d  M c C a r t h y ,  2 0 0 0 ) ,  b u t  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
n e w  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  h a s  h e l p e d  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r .  I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  e i g h t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  u s e d  i n  t h e  C a n t o r - P a c k e r  m o d e l ,  J i i t t n e r  
a n d  M c C a r t h y  h a v e  a d d e d  f i v e  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  f r o m  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  
c r i s i s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y :
Table 7.1 Explanatory power of the conventional determinants of sovereign ratings, 
1995-98 (adjusted R2 of Cantor-Packer model)
Average rating Moody's rating Standard & Poor's rating
1995 0.924 0.905 0.926
1996 0.902 0.884 0.902
1997 0.913 0.909 0.893
1998 0.856 0.863 0.834
Sources : C a n to r  a n d  P a ck er  (1 9 9 6 ) ;  J i it tn e r  a n d  M c C a r th y  (2 0 0 0 ) .
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• S h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  vis-à-vis t h e  U S  a s  a  p r o x y  o f  c u r r e n c y  
r i s k .
•  A  r a n g e  ( 1 - 5 )  o f  p r o b l e m a t i c  a s s e t s  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P  ( S t a n d a r d  
&  P o o r ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  b a n k s ) .
•  T h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o n t i n g e n t  l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  G D P .
•  T h e  r o l l i n g ,  f o u r - y e a r  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  a s  a  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P .
•  T h e  p e r c e n t a g e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  f r o m  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  a v e r a g e s .
F o r  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s ,  J i i t t n e r  a n d  M c C a r t h y  u s e  a  v a r i a b l e - s e l e c t i o n  p r o ­
c e s s  t o  i d e n t i f y  w h i c h  o f  t h e  t w e l v e  v a r i a b l e s  h a v e  t h e  h i g h e s t  e x p l a n a t o r y  
p o w e r  f o r  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s .  F o r  m i d  1 9 9 8 ,  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  ( - ) ,  
e x t e r n a l  d e b t  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e x p o r t s  ( - ) ,  a  d u m m y  d e f a u l t  h i s t o r y  ( - ) ,  
a n d  t w o  o f  t h e  n e w  v a r i a b l e s  -  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a n d  t h e  r e a l  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  -  e n t e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n t o  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a s  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s ,  
w i t h  a n  a d j u s t e d  R 2 o f  9 1 . 2  p e r  c e n t .  N e i t h e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  n o r  
t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  v a r i a b l e  w e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e  r a t i n g s  i n  
m i d  1 9 9 7 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  w e r e  o v e r l o o k e d  b y  t h e  a g e n c i e s  
b e f o r e  t h e  c r i s i s .  M o r e o v e r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l - s e c t o r  v a r i a b l e s  w e r e  n o t  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  t h e  r a t i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  1 9 9 7  o r  1 9 9 8 .  T h i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  s t r e n g t h / f r a g i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r s  i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  
w e r e  s t i l l  n o t  e m p h a s i z e d  i n  r a t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  a  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  T h a i  b a h t  
p l u n g e d .  J i i t t n e r  a n d  M c C a r t h y  ( i b i d . :  2 2 )  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  ' n o  s e t  
m o d e l  o r  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  j u d g e m e n t  w h i c h  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  a s s i g n m e n t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  o v e r  t i m e ' .
T h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  -  d e s p i t e  t h e  l e s s o n s  f r o m  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  -  v a r i a b l e s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  f i n a n c i a l - s e c t o r  s t r e n g t h  d o  n o t  s e e m  t o  f i g u r e  l a r g e l y  i n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  i s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  m o r e  r e c e n t  r a t i n g  d e v e l ­
o p m e n t s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  W h i l e  M e x i c o ,  w h i c h  i s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  
s u f f e r  f r o m  a  w e a k  d o m e s t i c  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r ,  m o v e d  u p  t o  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t -  
g r a d e  r a t i n g  l e v e l  ( M o o d y 's ) ,  A r g e n t i n a ,  w h i c h  i s  o f t e n  p r a i s e d  f o r  t h e  s t r e n g t h  
o f  i t s  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r ,  h a s  s u f f e r e d  s e v e r a l  d o w n g r a d e s  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s .  T h e  a g e n c i e s  j u s t i f i e d  t h e s e  d i v e r g e n t  r a t i n g  t r e n d s  b y  e m p h a s i z i n g  
r a t h e r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  i n d i c a t o r s  s u c h  a s  f i s c a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  e x t e r n a l  s o l v e n c y  
( G r a n d e s ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
T h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  o f  Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook ( 2 0 0 1 a )  l i s t s  
t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  i t s  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  T h e  
a g e n c y  a c k n o w l e d g e s  t h a t
T h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  s p e c i f i c  e c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  v a r i a b l e s  c a n  v a r y
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  b r o a d  l e v e l  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c o u n t r i e s  F o r  e x a m p l e ,
m o r e  d e t a i l  o n  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n d i c a t o r s  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  m o r e  a d v a n c e d  
c o u n t r i e s ,  w h i l e  a  l a r g e r  r a n g e  o f  i n d i c a t o r s  i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  a n d
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b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  a r e a s  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  [ e m e r g i n g -  
m a r k e t ]  c o u n t r i e s  ( i b i d . :  3 ) .
T h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s  f a l l  i n t o  f o u r  b r o a d  c a t e g o r i e s :
•  E c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e :  i n c l u d e s  v a r i o u s  m e a s u r e s  o f  G D P  
( g r o w t h ) ,  i n f l a t i o n ,  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  t r a d e .  M o o d y ' s  e m p h a s i z e s  a m o n g  
t h e s e  G D P  g r o w t h  ( + )  a n d  e x p o r t  g r o w t h  ( + )  i n  t h e  h a n d b o o k .
•  F i s c a l  i n d i c a t o r s :  g e n e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e ,  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  f i n a n c i a l  
b a l a n c e ,  p r i m a r y  b a l a n c e  a n d  d e b t  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  M o o d y ' s ,  ' T h e  f i s c a l  b a l a n c e s  a n d  d e b t  s t o c k s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t  a r e  a m o n g  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i n d i c a t o r s  e x a m i n e d  b y  
s o v e r e i g n  r i s k  a n a l y s t s .  T h e  a b i l i t y  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  e x t r a c t  r e v e n u e s  
f r o m  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t a x p a y e r s  a n d  u s e r s  o f  s e r v i c e s ,  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
r e v e n u e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  o r  d e c l i n e  o f  n a t i o n a l  i n c o m e ,  a n d  t h e  
r i g i d i t y  o f  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  k e y  f a c t o r s  
t h a t  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  c e n t r a l  a n d  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  
m a k e  f u l l  a n d  t i m e l y  p a y m e n t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  a n d  p r i n c i p a l  o n  o u t s t a n d i n g  
d e b t '  ( i b i d . :  6 ) .
•  E x t e r n a l  p a y m e n t s  a n d  d e b t :  m e a s u r e s  f o r  t h e  r e a l  e f f e c t i v e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
( p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e ) ,  r e l a t i v e  u n i t  l a b o u r  c o s t s  ( p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e ) ,  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  ( U S  d o l l a r s  a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P ) ,  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  
d e b t  ( U S  d o l l a r s ,  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P  a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e x p o r t s ) ,  a n d  t h e  
d e b t  s e r v i c e  r a t i o  ( p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e x p o r t s ) .  N o t e w o r t h y  h e r e  i s  M o o d y ' s  
s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  'H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e b t  h a s  b e e n  t h e  c e n t r a l  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r i s k  a n a l y s i s . . . b u t  t h a t . . . i s  n o t  a  m e a n i n g f u l  
c a t e g o r y  i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  l o w  i n f l a t i o n ,  h i g h  m o n e t a r y  
c r e d i b i l i t y ,  a n d  d e e p  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a n d / o r  u n i v e r s a l  b a n k s  t h a t  a l l o w  
g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  b o r r o w  l o n g  t e r m  a t  f i x e d  r a t e s  i n  d o m e s ­
t i c  c u r r e n c i e s . . .  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  i s  " d o l l a r i z a t i o n "  o r  " e u r o i z a t i o n " .  I n  
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  o p e r a t i n g  w i t h o u t  a  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y ,  t h e  
b o r d e r l i n e  b e t w e e n  " d o m e s t i c "  a n d  " f o r e i g n "  d e b t  b e c o m e s  q u i t e  f u z z y '  
( i b i d . :  8 ) .
•  M o n e t a r y  a n d  l i q u i d i t y  i n d i c a t o r s :  i n c l u d e  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
( p e r  c e n t ) ,  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  ( p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e ) ,  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t / G D P ,  
M 2 / f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s ,  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s  ( U S  d o l l a r s ) ,  
s h o r t - t e r m  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  a n d  c u r r e n t l y  m a t u r i n g  l o n g - t e r m  e x t e r n a l  
d e b t / f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s ,  a n d  a  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  ( e x t e r n a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  
o f  b a n k s / e x t e r n a l  a s s e t s  o f  b a n k s ' .  M o o d y ' s  s t i l l  s e e m s  t o  b e  r a t h e r  l u k e ­
w a r m  a b o u t  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e s e  i n d i c a t o r s  a s  i t  p r e s e n t s  t h e m  a s  ' o f  
u s e  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  a  c o u n t r y ' s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  a  c u r r e n c y  o r  b a n k i n g  c r i s i s '  
( i b i d . :  9 ) .  I t  r e f e r s  t o  e c o n o m e t r i c  m o d e l s  a s  ' o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l ,  w i t h  
t h e  b e s t  o f  t h e  m o d e l s  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  o n l y  s o m e  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  
c r i s e s  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  a n d  p r e d i c t i n g  t o o  m a n y  t h a t  d i d  n o t '  ( i b i d . :  1 0 ) .
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I t  i s  f a i r  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  i n d i c a t o r s  e m p h a s i z e d  b y  M o o d y ' s  b e t t e r  
p r e p a r e s  i t  t o  g i v e  a d v a n c e  w a r n i n g  o f  f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n  c u r r e n c y  c r i s e s  ( w h e r e  
d o m e s t i c  m a c r o  f u n d a m e n t a l s  t r i g g e r  a  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s )  t h a n  o f  s e c o n d -  
g e n e r a t i o n  ( w h e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  b e t w e e n  e x t e r n a l  a n d  i n t e r n a l  i m b a l a n c e s  
m a t t e r )  o r  t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n  c r i s e s ,  i n  w h i c h  i l l i q u i d i t y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l - s e c t o r  
w e a k n e s s e s  p l a y  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e .  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r  ( f o r  e x a m p l e  S & P , 2 0 0 1 )  
s e e m s  t o  p u t  m o r e  w e i g h t  o n  l i q u i d i t y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l - s e c t o r  v a r i a b l e s  i n  i t s  
a s s e s s m e n t s ;  i t  e x p l i c i t l y  l i s t s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  b a n k s  a s  c o n t i n g e n t  l i a b i ­
l i t i e s  i n  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  i n  i t s  r a t i n g s - m e t h o d o l o g y  p r o f i l e .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  e m p h a s i s  o b s e r v e d  h e r e  -  w h i c h  c a n  o n l y  b e  c a s u a l  -  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
M o o d y ' s  h a s  a  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  i n  d e t e c t i n g  c r i s i s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i n  
A r g e n t i n a ,  w h i l e  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r  i s  b e t t e r  p r e p a r e d  t o  w a r n  a b o u t  T u r k e y 's  
p r o b l e m s .  T h i s  i s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  r e c e n t  c r i s e s  i n  T u r k e y  a n d  A r g e n t i n a  
( F i g u r e s  7 . 1  a n d  7 . 2 ) .
I n  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 1  a n o t h e r  e x c h a n g e - r a t e - b a s e d  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  s c h e m e  f a i l e d  
i n  T u r k e y  w h e n  t h e  l i r a  p l u n g e d  b y  m o r e  t h a n  3 0  p e r  c e n t .  A  w e a k  b a n k i n g  
s y s t e m ,  i n  a c u t e  c r i s i s  s i n c e  l a t e  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ,  a n d  a n  o v e r r e l i a n c e  o n  
h o t  m o n e y  i n f l o w s  h a d  m a d e  t h e  c o u n t r y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  
( O E C D ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  T h e  c r i s i s  w a s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  t h e  n o w - c l a s s i c  ' t a b l i t a '  f a i l u r e  
e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  t h e  S o u t h e r n  C o n e  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t w e n t y  y e a r s  e a r l i e r .
Figure 7.1 Turkey's exchange rate and sovereign ratings, 1990-2001
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Figure 7.2 Argentina's sovereign spreads and ratings, 1990-2001 
* E m e rg in g  M a rk e ts  B o n d  I n d e x  (A rg e n tin a )
A s  s e e n  i n  F i g u r e  7 . 1 ,  M o o d y ' s  d o w n g r a d e  o n c e  a g a i n  c a m e  o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  
c r a s h  w h i l e  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r ' s  c a m e  s l i g h t l y  e a r l i e r .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  A r g e n t i n a ,  f r o m  a t  l e a s t  e a r l y  2 0 0 0  A r g e n t i n a ' s  c u r r e n c y  
b o a r d  f a i l e d  t o  d e l i v e r  a  s u s t a i n e d  r e d u c t i o n  i n  d e v a l u a t i o n  a n d  s o v e r e i g n  
r i s k .  T h e r e  w e r e  t h r e e  m a j o r  c a u s e s  o f  t h i s  ( B r a g a  etal., 2 0 0 1 ) .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
c u r r e n c y  b o a r d  h a d  c e a s e d  t o  c o n f e r  s u f f i c i e n t  f i s c a l  d i s c i p l i n e  f r o m  1 9 9 5  
o n w a r d s .  T h i s  h a d  s e t  i n  m o t i o n  a  v i c i o u s  c i r c l e  o f  r i s i n g  c o u n t r y  r i s k  a n d  
d e p r e s s e d  g r o w t h ,  w h i c h  i n  t u r n  h a d  w o r s e n e d  t h e  p u b l i c  d e f i c i t  t h r o u g h  
l o w e r  t a x  r e c e i p t s  a n d  h i g h e r  d e b t  s e r v i c e  c o s t s .  S e c o n d ,  i n i t i a l  i n f l a t i o n  
i n e r t i a ,  w a g e  r i g i d i t y  a n d  a n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  a n c h o r  c u r r e n c y  i m p l i e d  e f f e c t i v e  
o v e r v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e s o .  B u s i n e s s  c y c l e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ( t o  w h i c h  
j u s t  8  p e r  c e n t  o f  A r g e n t i n a ’s  e x p o r t s  w e r e  d i r e c t e d )  a n d  A r g e n t i n a  h a d  b e e n  
a s y n c h r o n o u s  f o r  m u c h  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  w h i l e  B r a z i l ' s  d e v a l u a t i o n  i n  e a r l y  1 9 9 9  
h a d  s t r o n g l y  w e a k e n e d  A r g e n t i n a ' s  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .  T h i r d ,  h i g h  l i q u i d i t y  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  h a d  b e e n  i m p o s e d  o n  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  ( t o  m a k e  
u p  f o r  t h e  l a c k  o f  t h e  l e n d e r - o f - l a s t  r e s o r t  f u n c t i o n  i n  a  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d ) .  J u s t  
l i k e  a n y  r e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  h i g h  l i q u i d i t y  n e e d s  h a d  d r i v e n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
w e d g e  b e t w e e n  l e n d i n g  r a t e s  a n d  s a v i n g  r a t e s ,  d i s c o u r a g i n g  b o t h  s a v i n g s  
a n d  i n v e s t m e n t .  T h i s  a g a i n ,  b y  c o n s t r a i n i n g  g r o w t h  a n d  f u e l l i n g  t h e  n e e d  
f o r  f o r e i g n  s a v i n g s ,  h a d  l e d  t o  a  g r a d u a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  A r g e n t i n a ' s  d e b t  
d y n a m i c s .  A g a i n ,  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  w e r e  f a i r l y  l a t e  t o  g i v e  w a r n i n g  o f  d e t e r i ­
o r a t i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l s ,  b u t  t h e y  a r g u a b l y  p e r f o r m e d  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e y  d i d  i n
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t h e  c a s e  o f  T u r k e y  a s  t h e y  d o w n g r a d e d  A r g e n t i n a  b e f o r e  t h e  b o n d  c r a s h  ( t h e  
p e s o  r e m a i n e d  f i x e d )  i n  2 0 0 1  ( F i g u r e  7 . 2 ) .
T h e m ark et im p a c t  o f  so v ere ig n  ratin gs
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  g l o b a l  f i n a n c i a l  a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  e x p l o r e  
t h e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  e v e n t s  b e c a u s e  r a t i n g s  m a y  h a v e  a n  
i m p a c t  o n  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s  i n  l e n d i n g  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  c o u l d  h e l p  t o  a t t e n u a t e  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s  i n  e m e r g i n g -  
m a r k e t  l e n d i n g .  D u r i n g  t h e  b o o m ,  e a r l y  r a t i n g  d o w n g r a d e s  w o u l d  h e l p  
d a m p e n  e u p h o r i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a n d  r e d u c e  p r i v a t e  s h o r t - t e r m  c a p i t a l  f l o w s ,  
w h i c h  h a v e  r e p e a t e d l y  f u e l l e d  c r e d i t  b o o m s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i n  
c a p i t a l - i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  I f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  h a d  n o  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  t h e y  
w o u l d  b e  u n a b l e  t o  s m o o t h  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s .  W o r s e ,  i f  t h e y  l a g g e d  b e h i n d  
r a t h e r  t h a n  l e d  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a n d  h a d  a  m a r k e t  i m p a c t ,  i m p r o v e d  r a t i n g s  
w o u l d  r e i n f o r c e  e u p h o r i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a n d  s t i m u l a t e  e x c e s s i v e  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s  
d u r i n g  t h e  b o o m .  D u r i n g  t h e  b u s t ,  d o w n g r a d i n g  m i g h t  a d d  t o  p a n i c  a m o n g  
i n v e s t o r s ,  d r i v i n g  m o n e y  o u t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  f o r c i n g  u p  s o v e r e i g n  
y i e l d  s p r e a d s .  F o r  e x a m p l e  t h e  d o w n g r a d i n g  o f  A s i a n  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  t o  
' j u n k  s t a t u s '  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e  r e g i o n ' s  c r i s i s  i n  m a n y  w a y s :  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  
c o u l d  n o  l o n g e r  i s s u e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  l o c a l  e x p o r t e r s  a n d  
i m p o r t e r s ;  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  h a d  t o  o f f l o a d  A s i a n  a s s e t s  a s  t h e y  w e r e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  p o r t f o l i o s  o n l y  i n  i n v e s t m e n t - g r a d e  s e c u r i t i e s ;  a n d  
f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r s  w e r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  c a l l  i n  l o a n s  u p o n  t h e  d o w n g r a d e s .
I f  g u i d e d  b y  o u t d a t e d  c r i s i s  m o d e l s ,  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  w o u l d  f a i l  t o  p r o v i d e  
e a r l y  w a r n i n g  s i g n a l s  o f  a  l i k e l y  c u r r e n c y  c r i s i s ,  w h i c h  a g a i n  m i g h t  c a u s e  h e r d  
b e h a v i o u r  b y  i n v e s t o r s .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  f a r  a s  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  
t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  w h y  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  c a n n o t  b e  e a s i l y  
e s t a b l i s h e d .  F i r s t ,  s o v e r e i g n  r i s k  r a t i n g s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  b a s e d  o n  p u b l i c l y  
a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( L a r r a i n  et al., 1 9 9 7 ) ,  s u c h  a s  l e v e l s  o f  f o r e i g n  d e b t  a n d  
f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  f i s c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  
a n y  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t  w i l l  b e  ' c o n t a m i n a t e d '  w i t h  o t h e r  p u b ­
l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e  n e w s .  R a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  m a y  b e  l a r g e l y  a n t i c i p a t e d  b y  
t h e  m a r k e t .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  e x c l u d e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  s u c h  n e w s  b y  t h e  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s i g n a l  
o f  c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s .  S e c o n d ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  c r e d i b l e  s u p r a n a t i o n a l  
m e c h a n i s m  t o  s a n c t i o n  s o v e r e i g n  d e f a u l t ,  t h e  d e f a u l t  r i s k  p r e m i u m  -  u n l i k e  
i n  n a t i o n a l  l e n d i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  -  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  b o r r o w e r ' s  w i l l i n g ­
n e s s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a b i l i t y  t o  p a y  ( E a t o n  et ah, 1 9 8 6 ) .  A g a i n ,  i t  i s  n o t  e a s y  f o r  
r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  t o  a c q u i r e  p r i v i l e g e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h i s  a r e a  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  
c o n v e y e d  t o  t h e  m a r k e t  t h r o u g h  r a t i n g s .
B y  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  l i n k s  b e t w e e n  s o v e r e i g n  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  a n d  d o l l a r  b o n d  
y i e l d  s p r e a d s ,  R e i s e n  a n d  v o n  M a l t z a n  ( 1 9 9 9 )  a i m e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  
t h e  t h r e e  l e a d i n g  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  -  M o o d y ' s ,  S t a n d a r d  &  P o o r  a n d  F i t c h
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I B C A  -  c o u l d  i n t e n s i f y  o r  a t t e n u a t e  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s  i n  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  
l e n d i n g .  T h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  p e r i o d  w a s  f r o m  1 9 8 9  -  w h e n  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  
r a t i n g s  s t a r t e d  t o  g a i n  m o m e n t u m  -  t o  1 9 9 7 ,  t h e  y e a r  w h e n  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  
e r u p t e d .  T h e  a u t h o r s  p r o d u c e d  a n  e v e n t  s t u d y  e x p l o r i n g  t h e  m a r k e t  r e s p o n s e  
( c h a n g e s  i n  d o l l a r  b o n d  y i e l d  s p r e a d s )  f o r  3 0  t r a d i n g  d a y s  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  
t h e  r a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t s .  T h r e e  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  e m e r g e d  f r o m  t h e  e v e n t  
s t u d y  d e s e r v e  s p e c i a l  e m p h a s i s :
•  W h i l e  i n  g e n e r a l  t h e  r a t i n g  ' e v e n t s '  b y  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  l e a d i n g  a g e n c i e s  
d i d  n o t  p r o d u c e  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s p o n s e  i n  s o v e r e i g n  y i e l d  
s p r e a d s ,  t h e i r  a g g r e g a t e d  r a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  p r o d u c e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e f f e c t s  o n  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  i n  t h e  e x p e c t e d  d i r e c t i o n ,  n o t a b l y  o n  e m e r g i n g -  
m a r k e t  b o n d s .
•  R a t i n g  d o w n g r a d e s  w i d e n e n e d  t h e  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  o n  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  
b o n d s .  W h i l e  t h e  r i s e  i n  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  p r e c e d e d  t h e  d o w n g r a d e s ,  i t  w a s  
s u s t a i n e d  f o r  a n o t h e r  2 0  t r a d i n g  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  r a t i n g  e v e n t .
•  I m m i n e n t  r a t i n g  u p g r a d e s  o f  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  b o n d s  w e r e  p r e c e d e d  b y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  y i e l d  c o n v e r g e n c e .  S u b s e q u e n t  t o  t h e  r a t i n g  e v e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h e r e  w a s  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a r k e t  r e s p o n s e .
H o w e v e r ,  b o t h  t h e  r a t i n g  e v e n t s  a n d  t h e  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  e x o g e n o u s  s h o c k s ;  t h i s  c a l l e d  f o r  a n  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  w o u l d  
c o r r e c t  t h e  y i e l d  d e t e r m i n a n t s  f o r  f u n d a m e n t a l  f a c t o r s .
R e i s e n  a n d  v o n  M a l t z a n  ( 1 9 9 9 )  t h e r e f o r e  r a n  a  G r a n g e r  c a u s a l i t y  t e s t  -  
c o r r e c t i n g  f o r  t h e  j o i n t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  r a t i n g s  a n d  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  -  a n d  
f o u n d  t h a t  c h a n g e s  i n  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  w e r e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  w i t h  c h a n g e s  
i n  b o n d  y i e l d s .  T h e  G r a n g e r  t e s t  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  b y  
t h e  t h r e e  l e a d i n g  a g e n c i e s  d i d  n o t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  l e a d  t h e  m a r k e t ,  b u t  t h a t  
t h e y  w e r e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  w i t h  b o n d  y i e l d  s p r e a d s  o n c e  t h e  r a t i n g s  a n d  t h e  
s p r e a d s  w e r e  c o r r e c t e d  f o r  f u n d a m e n t a l  d e t e r m i n a n t s .  W h i l e  t h e  r e s u l t s  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  r a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  a r e  s e e n  a s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  s i g n a l  o f  c r e d i t ­
w o r t h i n e s s ,  t h e i r  i m p a c t  m a y  b e  d u e  t o  t h e  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  
i n t e r n a l  g u i d e l i n e s  t o  w h i c h  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  a n d  w h i c h  
d e b a r  t h e m  f r o m  h o l d i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  b e l o w  c e r t a i n  r a t i n g  c a t e g o r i e s . 1
T h e  t w o - w a y  c a u s a l i t y  b e t w e e n  r a t i n g s  a n d  s p r e a d s  o b s e r v e d  o v e r  t h e  p a s t  
d e c a d e  m a y  a l s o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  a d v a n c e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  a g e n c i e s  i n  
t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  M e x i c a n  a n d  A s i a n  c u r r e n c y  c r i s e s  s t i l l  h o l d s  t r u e  w h e n  i t  i s  
b a s e d  o n  m o r e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  t h a n  j u s t  t h o s e  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e s e  p r o m i n e n t  
c r i s i s  e p i s o d e s .  W h i l e  t h e  e v e n t  s t u d y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  d o  s e e m  
t o  h a v e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  m o d e r a t e  t h e  b o o m s  t h a t  p r e c e d e  c u r r e n c y  c r i s e s ,  
t h e  G r a n g e r  t e s t s  m a y  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  h a s  n o t  y e t  b e e n  
p r o d u c t i v e l y  e x p l o i t e d  b y  t h e  a g e n c i e s  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  l e a d i n g  t h e  m a r k e t s  
w i t h  t i m e l y  r a t i n g  c h a n g e s .  A s  s e e n  i n  t h e  l a t e s t  c r i s e s  i n  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  
T u r k e y ,  a n d  a s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  m o r e  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  t h a t  s t r e t c h  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n
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p e r i o d  b e y o n d  1 9 9 7  t o  2 0 0 0  ( K a m i n s k y  a n d  S c h m u k l e r ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  r a t i n g  a g e n ­
c i e s  c a n  s t i l l  b e  s e e n  a s  l a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  e a r l y  w a r n i n g  s y s t e m s .
B u t  a r e  t h e y  ' g u i l t y  b e y o n d  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t ' ?  A c c o r d i n g  t o  M o r a  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,  
t h e  a n s w e r  i s  n o .  H e r  f i n d i n g s  c o n f i r m  t h a t  r a t i n g s  m o v e  i n  a  p r o c y c l i c a l  
w a y ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  c a u s a l  e f f e c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  o n  b o t h  t h e  h i g h e r  c o s t  
o f  b o r r o w i n g  a n d  c a p i t a l - f l o w  r e v e r s a l s  r e m a i n  a m b i g u o u s  a f t e r  c o n t r o l l i n g  
f o r  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  v a r i a b l e s  a n d  l a g g e d  s p r e a d s  ( a  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  s t a n d s  f o r  
t h e  p a s s i v e  r e s p o n s e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  m a r k e t  s e n t i m e n t ) .  
M o r a  ( 2 0 0 1 )  h a s  a n o t h e r  p u z z l i n g  f i n d i n g :  h i g h e r  r a t i n g  l e v e l s  m e a n  a  h i g h e r  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c u r r e n c y  c r a s h e s  o n c e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  a r e  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r .  T h i s  
f i n d i n g  i s  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  
b e t t e r  r a t i n g s  c a n  o b t a i n  a n d  t h a t  m a k e  t h e m  m o r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  c a p i t a l  
f l o w  r e v e r s a l s .
W h a t  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s ?  I n  a  r e c e n t  
r e v i s i o n  t o  i t s  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g  p o l i c y ,  M o o d y ' s  ( 2 0 0 1 b )  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  a l l o w  c e r t a i n  b o r r o w e r s  t o  ' p i e r c e '  t h e  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  
o b t a i n  b e t t e r  r a t i n g s  t h a n  t h e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  b o n d s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  d o m i c i l e s .  T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g s  
h a s  b e e n  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t s  c o n f r o n t e d  b y  a n  e x t e r n a l  p a y m e n t s  c r i s i s  h a v e  
t h e  p o w e r  a n d  m o t i v a t i o n  t o  l i m i t  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  o u t f l o w s ,  i n c l u d i n g  d e b t  
p a y m e n t s .  A s  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  s e r v e  a s  a  c e i l i n g  f o r  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  r a t i n g s  
o f  a n y  g i v e n  c o u n t r y ,  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  s t r e t c h e s  f a r  b e y o n d  g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r ­
i t i e s .  S e v e r a l  m o n t h s  e a r l i e r  S & P  ( 2 0 0 0 )  h a d  a n n o u n c e d  e n h a n c e d  r a t i n g s  
f o r  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s s u e r s  f r o m  s u b i n v e s t m e n t  g r a d e  c o u n t r i e s  i f  t r a n s f e r  a n d  
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  w a s  u t i l i z e d .
P o i n t i n g  t o  r e c e n t  e x a m p l e s  o f  d e f a u l t  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  d e b t  -  n o t a b l y  
E c u a d o r ,  P a k i s t a n ,  R u s s i a  a n d  U k r a i n e  -  M o o d y ' s  ( 2 0 0 1 b :  1 )  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  
T a r g e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d  e n t i t i e s  t h a t  h a v e  r e l i e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  o n  
a c c e s s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a n d  w h o s e  d e f a u l t  w o u l d  i n f l i c t  
s u b s t a n t i a l  d a m a g e  o n  t h e  e c o n o m y '  w e r e  b e i n g  a l l o w e d  t o  s e r v i c e  f o r e i g n  
c u r r e n c y  d e b t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  i n  J u n e  2 0 0 1  t h e  a g e n c y  p l a c e d  3 8  e n e r g y  
c o m p a n i e s ,  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  c o m p a n i e s  i n  
e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s ,  m a n y  i n  B r a z i l  a n d  M e x i c o ,  o n  r e v i e w  f o r  u p g r a d e .  T h e  
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g  a p p r o a c h  s h o u l d  n o t  o n l y  a l l o w  t h e  r a t i n g s  
o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  d e b t o r s  t o  e x c e e d  t h e i r  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g s ,  b u t  s h o u l d  a l s o  
d i m i n i s h  t h e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  e v e n t s  a s  f e w e r  b o r r o w e r s  
w i l l  b e  i m m e d i a t e l y  c o n c e r n e d  b y  t h e m .
I n d i c a t o r s  o f  c r e d i t  r a t i n g  p r e s s u r e  a s  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  t r a d i n g  e m e r g i n g -  
m a r k e t  b o n d s ,  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  d e v e l o p e d  b y  D e u t s c h e  B a n k  ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  m a y  
i n c r e a s e  a n t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  h e n c e  r e d u c e  t h e  m e a s u r e d  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  
r a t i n g  e v e n t s .  R a t i n g  a c t i o n s  a r e  d e l i v e r e d  i n  a  d i s c r e t e  a n d ,  a s  d o c u m e n t e d  
a b o v e ,  l a t e  f a s h i o n  w h i l e  c r e d i t  f u n d a m e n t a l s  m o v e  c o n t i n u o u s l y .  Y e t  
r a t i n g  e v e n t s  h a v e  a n  i m p a c t  o n  s p r e a d s  a n d  t h i s  c a n  b e  e x p l o i t e d  b y  b o n d  
t r a d e r s .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  L a r r a i n  et al. ( 1 9 9 7 )  a n d  R e i s e n  a n d  v o n  M a l t z a n  ( 1 9 9 9 ) ,
H e lm u t  Reisen  1 2 9
D e u t s c h e  B a n k  h a s  b u i l t  a  r e g r e s s i o n  m o d e l  t o  e x p l a i n  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  a n d  
c a l i b r a t e d  t w e l v e - m o n t h  f o r e c a s t s  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  c u r r e n t  f i t t e d  r a t i n g .  R a t i n g  
p r e s s u r e  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  f i t t e d  a n d  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t i n g  
f o r  a  g i v e n  c o u n t r y .  L o n g  a n d  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s  c a n  t h e n  b e  e n g a g e d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  r a t i n g  p r e s s u r e  i n d i c a t o r  i s  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e .  W h e n  t h e  
r a t i n g  a c t i o n  f i n a l l y  h i t s  t h e  m a r k e t ,  t h e s e  i n v e s t m e n t  b e t s  c a n  b e  d i s s o l v e d  
( ' s e l l  t h e  n e w s ' ) ,  w h i c h  c a n  t r i g g e r  p e r v e r s e ,  m e a s u r e d  m a r k e t  r e s p o n s e s  
t o  r a t i n g  c h a n g e s .  A s  D e u t s c h e  B a n k  ( 2 0 0 0 )  c l a i m s  t o  h a v e  p r o f i t a b l y  u s e d  
i n d i c a t o r s  o f  r a t i n g  p r e s s u r e  f o r  i t s  t r a d i n g  s t r a t e g i e s ,  o t h e r  i n v e s t o r s  m a y  
h a v e  s t a r t e d  t o  p l a y  r a t i n g  e v e n t s  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y .
R ev ision s to  th e  B asel A ccord  a n d  so v e r e ig n  ra tin gs
T h e  B a s e l  C o m m i t t e e  o n  B a n k i n g  S u p e r v i s i o n  h a s  r e l e a s e d  t w o  c o n s u l t a t i v e  
p a p e r s  o n  a  N e w  B a s e l  C a p i t a l  A c c o r d  ( B a s e l  C o m m i t t e e ,  1 9 9 9 ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  w h i c h  
a i m s  t o  s e t  a  s t a n d a r d  f o r  r e g u l a t o r y  b a n k  c a p i t a l  p r o v i s i o n .  I t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  
g r a n t  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  a n  e x p l i c i t  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i s k  w e i g h t s  
a p p l i e d  t o  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  b o r r o w e r .  
R i s k  w e i g h t s  d e t e r m i n e  b a n k s '  l o a n  s u p p l y  a n d  f u n d i n g  c o s t s ,  a s  t h e y  h a v e  
t o  a c q u i r e  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a m o u n t  o f  c a p i t a l  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  r i s k - w e i g h t e d  
a s s e t s .
I t  i s  w i d e l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  c r o s s - b o r d e r  l e n d i n g  h a s  f a c e d  r e g u l a t o r y  d i s t o r t i o n s  
u n d e r  t h e  1 9 8 8  B a s e l  A c c o r d .  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  s h o r t - t e r m  b a n k  l e n d i n g  t o  
e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  h a s  b e e n  e n c o u r a g e d  b y  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  2 0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  
w e i g h t ,  w h i l e  b a n k  c r e d i t  t o  n o n - O E C D  b a n k s  w i t h  a  r e s i d u a l  m a t u r i t y  o f  
o v e r  o n e  y e a r  h a s  b e e n  d i s c o u r a g e d  b y  a  1 0 0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t .  T h i s  h a s  
s t i m u l a t e d  c r o s s - b o r d e r  i n t e r b a n k  l e n d i n g ,  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  
'A c h i l l e s  h e e l '  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m .  O E C D - b a s e d  b a n k s  a n d  
g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  m o r e  l e n i e n t  t r e a t m e n t ,  e v e n  i f  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n  
r i s k s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  o r  w o r s e  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  n o n - O E C D  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s .  
H e n c e  a  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  B a s e l  A c c o r d  s h o u l d  b e  w e l c o m e .
W h i l e  t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  B a s e l  A c c o r d  o n  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  
w i l l  m a i n t a i n  t h e  8  p e r  c e n t  r i s k - w e i g h t e d  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  t h e  B a s e l  
C o m m i t t e e  i n i t i a l l y  p r o p o s e d  a  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  r i s k  w e i g h t ­
i n g s  t h a t  w o u l d  s u b s t i t u t e  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  f o r  a  s p l i t  b e t w e e n  t h e  O E C D  a n d  
n o n - O E C D  a s  t h e  m a i n  d e t e r m i n a n t  ( R e i s e n ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  i s  
n o w  p r o p o s i n g  t w o  m a i n  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  r i s k  w e i g h t s :  
a  ' s t a n d a r d i z e d '  a n d  a n  ' i n t e r n a l  r a t i n g s - b a s e d '  ( I R B )  a p p r o a c h  ( G r i f f i t h -  
J o n e s  a n d  S p r a t t ,  2 0 0 1 ;  R e i s e n ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  c h a n g e s  f r o m  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e ' s  1 9 9 9  c o n s u l t a t i v e  p a p e r  ( B a s e l  C o m m i t t e e ,  1 9 9 9 )  i s  t h e  c l e a r  
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  l e a d i n g  b a n k s  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  u s e  t h e  I R B  a p p r o a c h  t o  s e t  r i s k  
w e i g h t s .  T h e  m a j o r  c h a n g e  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  1 9 8 8  B a s e l  A c c o r d  i s  t h a t  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  e x p o s u r e ,  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  O E C D  w i l l  n o  l o n g e r  
p r o v i d e  t h e  b e n c h m a r k  f o r  r i s k  w e i g h t s .
1 3 0  R atings since the A s ia n  C risis
T a b l e  7 . 2  s u m m a r i z e s  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  r i s k  w e i g h t s  u n d e r  t h e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  
a p p r o a c h .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  r i s k  w e i g h t s  w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  b y  ' e l i g i b l e  
e x t e r n a l  c r e d i t  a s s e s s m e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s '  ( n o t  j u s t  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s ,  a s  u n d e r  
t h e  1 9 9 9  p r o p o s a l ,  b u t  a l s o  e x p o r t  c r e d i t  a g e n c i e s ,  E C A s ) 2 f o r  a  s p l i t  b e t w e e n  
t h e  O E C D  a n d  n o n - O E C D  a s  t h e  m a i n  d e t e r m i n a n t .  R i s k  w e i g h t s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  
t o  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  c a t e g o r y  o f  b o r r o w e r  -  s o v e r e i g n ,  b a n k  o r  c o r p o r a t e  -  
b u t  c h a n g e s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  w i t h i n  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s .  U n d e r  t h e  
p r o p o s a l  a  s o v e r e i g n  w i t h  a n  A A A  r a t i n g  ( o r  1  E C A  r i s k  s c o r e  u n d e r  t h e  
O E C D  1 9 9 9  m e t h o d o l o g y )  w i l l  r e c e i v e  a  0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t ;  l o w e r  r a t i n g s  
t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  a  j u m p  i n  r i s k  w e i g h t s  v i a  2 0 ,  5 0 ,  1 0 0  a n d  1 5 0  p e r  c e n t  f o r  
s o v e r e i g n s  w e i g h t e d  b e l o w  B  m i n u s  ( o r  E C A  r i s k  s c o r e  7 ) .  T h e r e  a r e  t w o  
o p t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  c l a i m s  o n  b a n k s .  T h e  f i r s t  i s  f o r  b a n k s  t o  b e  
a s s i g n e d  a  r i s k  w e i g h t  t h a t  i s  o n e  c a t e g o r y  l e s s  f a v o u r a b l e  t h a n  t h a t  a s s i g n e d  
t o  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i o n .  N a t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s o r s  i n  l o w - r a t e d  d e v e l ­
o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  m a y  o p t  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  o p t i o n ,  w h i c h  b a s e s  t h e  r i s k  w e i g h t  
o n  a n  e x t e r n a l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  b a n k .  F o r  c l a i m s  o n  c o r p o r a t e s ,  a  m o r e  r i s k -  
s e n s i t i v e  f r a m e w o r k  i s  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  m o v e s  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  u n i f o r m  1 0 0  p e r  
c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t  f o r  a l l  c o r p o r a t e  c r e d i t s  u n d e r  t h e  1 9 8 8  A c c o r d .
B o t h  t h e o r y  a n d  e v i d e n c e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  B a s e l  I I  A c c o r d  w i l l  d e s t a b i l i z e  
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i f  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l  t o  
l i n k  r e g u l a t o r y  b a n k  c a p i t a l  t o  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  i s  a d a p t e d .  T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  
c o n t a i n s  t w o  e l e m e n t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  l i n k i n g  b a n k  l e n d i n g  t o  
r e g u l a t o r y  c a p i t a l  t h r o u g h  a  r i g i d  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  r a t i o  s e r v e s  t o  a m p l i f y  
m a c r o e c o n o m i c  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  t h e

















1 2 3 4-6 4-6 7
Sovereigns 0 20 50 100 100 150
Banks -  option l 1 20 50 100 100 100 150
Banks -  option 22 20 503 503 1003 100 150
Corporates 20 50 100 100 150 150
Notes:
1 R isk w e ig h t in g  b a s e d  o n  r isk  w e ig h t in g  o f  s o v e re ig n  in  w h ic h  th e  b a n k  is in c o rp o ra te d .  T h e  
r a t in g  s h o w n  th u s  re fe rs  t o  th e  so v e re ig n  ra t in g .
2  R isk w e ig h t in g  b a s e d  o n  th e  r a t in g  o f  t h e  in d iv id u a l  b a n k .
3 C la im s  o n  b a n k s  w i th  a n  o r ig in a l  m a tu r i t y  o f  le ss  t h a n  th r e e  m o n t h s  w o u ld  re c e iv e  a 
w e ig h t in g  o n e  c a te g o ry  m o re  fa v o u ra b le  th a n  th e  r isk  w e ig h t in g  s h o w n  a b o v e , s u b je c t  t o  a  f lo o r  
o f  2 0  p e r  c e n t .
Source: B asel c o m m it te e  o n  b a n k in g  s u p e rv is io n , 'T h e  N ew  B asel C a p i ta l  A cco rd : a n  e x p la n a to ry  
n o te ’, s e c o n d  c o n s u lta t iv e  p a p e r, Basel, J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1  (w w w .b is .o rg ).
H e lm u t  Reisen  1 3 1
p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  l a g  b e h i n d  r a t h e r  t h a n  
l e a d  t h e  m a r k e t s ,  a n d  i t  s e e m s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  s c o p e  f o r  i m p r o v i n g  t h a t  
p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h u s  a s s i g n i n g  f i x e d  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  t o  b a n k  a s s e t s  w h o s e  
r i s k  w e i g h t s  a r e  i n  t u r n  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  m a r k e t - l a g g i n g  r a t i n g s  w i l l  r e i n f o r c e  
t h e  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  r a t i o  t o  w o r k  i n  a  p r o c y c l i c a l  w a y .  T h e  B a s e l  I I  
p r o p o s a l s  w i l l  r e i n f o r c e  t h a t  t e n d e n c y  a s  a  s t r o n g  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  i n  t r e a t i n g  
A  a n d  b e l o w - r a t e d  a s s e t s  w i l l  m a k e  b a n k s '  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s  m o r e  l i q u i d i t y -  
h u n g r y ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  t o  l i q u i d i t y  
r i s k .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  t h e o r y ,  a s s u m i n g  a  n o n - M o d i g l i a n i - M i l l e r  w o r l d  w h e r e  
i n v e s t m e n t  d e m a n d  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  f i r m s  t o  r e t a i n  e a r n i n g s  o r  
o b t a i n  b a n k  l o a n s ,  B l u m  a n d  H e l l w i g  ( 1 9 9 5 )  s h o w  h o w  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  
r e g u l a t i o n  f o r  b a n k s  m a y  r e i n f o r c e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  I f  n e g a t i v e  
s h o c k s  t o  a g g r e g a t e  d e m a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  d e b t o r s  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e i r  
d e b t s  t o  b a n k s ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  d e b t  s e r v i c e  w i l l  l o w e r  b a n k  e q u i t y ,  w h i c h  
w i l l  i n  t u r n  r e d u c e  b a n k  l e n d i n g  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  L i n k i n g  b a n k  l e n d i n g  t o  b a n k  e q u i t y  t h u s  a c t s  a s  a n  a u t o m a t i c  
a m p l i f i e r  f o r  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  f l u c t u a t i o n s :  b a n k s  l e n d  m o r e  w h e n  t i m e s  a r e  
g o o d  a n d  l e s s  w h e n  t i m e s  a r e  b a d .  M o r e o v e r  t h e  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  r a t i o  c a n  
a l s o  b e  s h o w n  t o  r a i s e  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  d e m a n d  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  
o u t p u t  a n d  p r i c e s .
A n  i m p o r t a n t  a s s u m p t i o n  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  B l u m - H e l l w i g  m o d e l  i s  t h a t  
t h e  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  b i n d i n g .  W i t h  a  b i n d i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  c ,  
a n  a d d i t i o n a l  d o l l a r  o f  b a n k  p r o f i t s  i n d u c e s  1 / c  a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t s  o f  b a n k  
l e n d i n g .  A s  b a n k s '  m i n i m u m  r a t i o s  h a v e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  h o v e r  a r o u n d  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  8  p e r  c e n t  i n  t h e  m a j o r  a d v a n c e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e y  c a n  g e n e r a l l y  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  b i n d i n g ;  h e n c e  t h e  l o g i c  o f  t h e  B l u m - H e l l w i g  m o d e l  i s  o f  m o r e  
t h a n  p u r e l y  a c a d e m i c  i n t e r e s t .
I t  m a y  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a  s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l  i n  t h e  B a s e l  I I  A c c o r d  r i s k s  
r e i n f o r c i n g  t h e  p r o c y c l i c a l  i m p a c t  o f  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  A  l a r g e  
d i s c o n t i n u i t y  i s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  B a s e l  I I  b e t w e e n  t h e  r i s k  w e i g h t s  o n  b o r r o w e r s  
r a t e d  A  a n d  b e l o w .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a  h i g h  s h a r e  o f  b a n k s '  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s  
i s  i n v e s t e d  i n  A - r a t e d  b o r r o w e r s ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  m a y  b e c o m e  v u l n e r ­
a b l e  t o  a  l i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s  i n  a  d o w n t u r n  i n  w h i c h  b o r r o w e r s  a r e  d o w n g r a d e d .  
B a n k s  w o u l d  c o n f r o n t  h i g h e r  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  b o r r o w e r s .  
O n e  r e s p o n s e  w o u l d  b e  t o  c u t  b a c k  o n  l e n d i n g  t o  l o w e r  r a t e d  c r e d i t o r s .
L i n k i n g  r e g u l a t o r y  b a n k  c a p i t a l  t o  a g e n c y  r a t i n g s  m i g h t  m o v e  b a n k s '  l o a n -  
p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v i o u r  c l o s e r  t o  t h e i r  s h o r t - t e r m  t r a d i n g  b e h a v i o u r .  G o v e r n e d  
b y  t h e  m a r k - t o - m a r k e t  r u l e s  o f  t h e  v a l u e  a t  r i s k  ( V a R )  a p p r o a c h ,  i t  h a s  
b e e n  s h o w n  t h a t  b a n k s  f i r s t  e n c o u r a g e d  e x c e s s i v e  b a n k  l e n d i n g  a n d  t h e n  
i n t e n s i f i e d  t h e  g l o b a l  c o n t a g i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 9 8  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  ( R e i s e n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  
U n d e r  V a R  c r i s i s  c o n t a g i o n  i s  i n t e n s i f i e d  a s  a  v o l a t i l e  e v e n t  i n  o n e  c o u n t r y  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  g e n e r a t e s  a n  u p w a r d  r e - e s t i m a t e  o f  c r e d i t  a n d  m a r k e t  r i s k  i n  
a  c o r r e l a t e d  c o u n t r y .  T h e  B a s e l  I I  p r o p o s a l s  w i l l  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  p r o c y c l i c a l
1 3 2  R atings since the A s ia n  C ris is
t e n d e n c y  a s  a  s t r o n g  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  b e t w e e n  r i s k  w e i g h t s  o n  d i f f e r e n t l y  r a t e d  
a s s e t s  w i l l  m a k e  b a n k s '  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s  m o r e  l i q u i d i t y - h u n g r y ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  t o  l i q u i d i t y  r i s k .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
a  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  b a n k s '  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s  i s  i n v e s t e d  i n  t r i p l e - B - r a t e d  
s o v e r e i g n s  a n d  c o r p o r a t e s  ( w i t h  a  5 0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t ,  T a b l e  7 . 2 ) ,  t h e  
d o w n g r a d i n g  o f  s u c h  a s s e t s  ( i m p l y i n g  a  1 0 0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  ' s t a n d a r d i z e d '  a p p r o a c h )  w i l l  f o r c e  b a n k s  t o  r e s e r v e  m o r e  l i q u i d i t y  
o r  t o  c u t  b a c k  l e n d i n g  t o  t h e  d o w n g r a d e d  b o r r o w e r s .  H e n c e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s y s t e m  w o u l d  b e c o m e  m o r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a  l i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e v i d e n c e ,  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  a n d  n a t u r e  o f  s o v e r e i g n  
r a t i n g s  r i s k  i n t e n s i f y i n g  t h e  p r o c y c l i c a l  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  u n d e r  t h e  B a s e l  I I  p r o p o s a l s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  r e a l  r a t e  o f  ( a n n u a l )  
G D P  g r o w t h  h a s  r e p e a t e d l y  b e e n  f o u n d  t o  b e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  
r a t i n g s ,  w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  s i g n .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  w i l l  i m p r o v e  
d u r i n g  b o o m  p e r i o d s  a n d  d e c l i n e  d u r i n g  b u s t  p e r i o d s ,  t h u s  r e i n f o r c i n g  
b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s .  S e c o n d ,  a s  i t  i s  h a r d  f o r  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  t o  a c q u i r e  a n  e d g e  
o n  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  s o v e r e i g n  r i s k ,  t h e y  t e n d  t o  l a g  b e h i n d  r a t h e r  t h a n  l e a d  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  ( R e i s e n  a n d  v o n  M a l t z a n ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  M o r e o v e r  t h e i r  r a t i n g s  o n  
l o w - r a t e d  b o r r o w e r s  a r e  a t  t i m e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  a  l o w  d e g r e e  o f  d u r a b i l i t y  
( I M F ,  1 9 9 9 ) ,  i n d i c a t i n g  a  w e a k  p r e d i c t i o n  v a l u e .  T h e  B a s e l  I I  A c c o r d  w o u l d  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s ,  b u t  a s  l o n g  a s  s o v e r e i g n  
r a t i n g s  f a i l  t o  c o n v e y  p r i v i l e g e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r k e t s ,  i m p r o v i n g  
r a t i n g s  w i l l  r e i n f o r c e  e u p h o r i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a n d  s t i m u l a t e  e x c e s s i v e  c a p i t a l  
i n f l o w s  t o  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s ;  d u r i n g  a  b u s t ,  d o w n g r a d i n g  m i g h t  c a u s e  c r e d ­
i t o r s  a n d  i n v e s t o r s  t o  p a n i c ,  d r i v i n g  m o n e y  o u t  o f  t h e  a f f e c t e d  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  
f o r c i n g  u p  s o v e r e i g n  y i e l d  s p r e a d s .
M o r e o v e r  t h e  N e w  B a s e l  A c c o r d  d i s c o u r a g e s  l o n g - t e r m  i n t e r b a n k  l e n d i n g  
t o  e m e r g i n g  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  F o r  s p e c u l a t i v e - g r a d e  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r b a n k  l e n d i n g  w i l l  
t h e r e f o r e  t i l t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  i m p o r t s  t o w a r d s  s h o r t - t e r m  d e b t .  
S h o r t - t e r m  f o r e i g n  d e b t ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  o f f i c i a l  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s ,  h a s  
b e e n  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  t h e  s i n g l e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  p r e c u r s o r  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  
t r i g g e r e d  b y  c a p i t a l  f l o w  r e v e r s a l s .
T a b l e  7 . 3  s h o w s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  i m p a c t  o f  r i s k  w e i g h t s  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  ( l e s s  
t h a n  t h r e e  m o n t h s )  b a n k - t o - b a n k  l e n d i n g .  L e t  u s  f i r s t  l o o k  a t  h o w  t h e  
( 1 9 8 8 )  B a s e l  A c c o r d  h a s  d i s c o u r a g e d  l o n g - t e r m  i n t e r b a n k  l e n d i n g  t o  b a n k s  
f r o m  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  n e u t r a l  i n c e n t i v e s  p r o v i d e d  
f o r  l e n d i n g  t o  O E C D - b a s e d  b a n k s .  T h e  r i s k - a d j u s t e d  r e t u r n  f o r  l e n d i n g  t o  
t r i p l e - B - r a t e d  n o n - O E C D  b a n k s  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  a s  1 2 . 5  p e r  c e n t  f o r  l o n g  
m a t u r i t i e s  a n d  6 2 . 5  p e r  c e n t  f o r  s h o r t  m a t u r i t i e s ;  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  n u m b e r s  
a r e  5 0  p e r  c e n t  a n d  2 5 0  p e r  c e n t  f o r  d o u b l e - B - r a t e d  b a n k s ,  a n d  8 7 . 5  p e r  
c e n t  a n d  4 3 7  p e r  c e n t  f o r  s i n g l e - B - r a t e d  b a n k s .  T h e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  a p p r o a c h  
s u g g e s t e d  i n  B a s e l  I I  w o u l d  a t t e n u a t e  t h e  b i a s  t o w a r d s  s h o r t - t e r m  l e n d i n g  
t o  t r i p l e - B - r a t e d  a n d  d o u b l e - B - r a t e d  b o r r o w e r s ,  b u t  w o u l d  n o t  e n t i r e l y
T a b le  7 .3  R e g u l a t o r y  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r b a n k  l e n d i n g
Long-term, option 2 Short-term, option 2
Assumed Risk1 Capital Risk-adj. Break-even
LIBOR weight required return, spread
spread per $100 (%)2 change (bp)3
Assumed Risk Capital Risk-adj. Break-even
LIBOR weight1 required return spread
spread per $100 (%)2 change (bp)3
Double-A (OECD-based)
Current 10 20 1.6 6.3 - 10 20 1.6 6.3 -
Standardized - 20 1.6 6.3 - - 20 1.6 6.3 -
IRB approach - 7 0.6 16.7 - 6 - 0 0.0 n.a. n.a.
Triple-B (non-OECD)
Current 100 100 8.0 12.5 - 100 20 1.6 62.5 -
Standardized - 50 4.0 25.0 -5 0 - 20 1.6 62.5 -
IRB approach - 40 3.2 31.3 -6 0 - 10 0.8 125.0 -5 0
Double-B (non-OECD)
Current 400 100 8.0 50.0 - 400 20 1.6 250.0
Standardized - 100 8.0 50.0 - - 50 4.0 100.0 + 600
IRB approach - 379 30.3 13.2 + 1 115 - 60 4.8 83.3 +800
Table  7 .3  (C o n tin u e d )




Risk1 Capital Risk-adj. 








Risk Capital Risk-adj. Break-even 
weight' required return spread
per $100 (%)2 change (bp)1
Single-B (non-OECD) 
Current 700 100 8.0 87.5 700 20 1.6 437.5
Standardized - 100 8.0 87.5 - - 100 8.0 87.5 +2 800
IRB approach - 630 50.4 13.9 +3 709 - 400 32.0 21.9 + 13 300
Notes:
1 F or th e  IRB a p p ro a c h , lo n g - te rm  ( th re e -y e a r)  r isk  w e ig h ts  a re  o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  c u b ic  r e g re s s io n  e s t im a te  in  F igu re  7 .1 . T h e  u n d e r ly in g  d e fa u l t  
ra te s  fo r  s h o r t- te rm  e x p o s u re s  h a v e  b e e n  o b ta in e d  f ro m  M o o d y 's  -  th e y  a re  0  p e r  c e n t  fo r  d o u b le -A  b o rro w e rs , 0 .1  p e r  c e n t  fo r  trip le -B , 0 .6  p e r  c e n t  fo r 
do u b le -B  a n d  6 .8  p e r  c e n t  fo r  sing le -B  (M o o d y 's , 2 0 0 1 : e x h ib i t  16). F o r th e  s ta n d a rd iz e d  a p p ro a c h , c la im s  o n  b a n k s  ra te d  b e tw e e n  A +  a n d  B B -  w ith  a n  
o r ig in a l m a tu r i t y  o f  less t h a n  th r e e  m o n th s  w o u ld  rece iv e  a  r a t in g  t h a t  w as  o n e  c a te g o ry  m o re  fa v o u ra b le  t h a n  th e  risk  w e ig h t  o n  lo n g e r  m a tu r it ie s .
2  A ssu m e s  LIBOR f la t  f u n d in g .  T h e  r is k -a d ju s te d  r e tu rn  o n  c a p ita l  is  1 00  d iv id e d  b y  th e  r e g u la to ry  c a p ita l  re q u ire d  p e r  $ 1 0 0  m u l t ip l ie d  b y  th e  sp read  
o v e r  LIBOR; q u o te d  as  r e tu r n  in  excess  o v e r  LIBOR.
3 In d ic a te s  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  s p re a d  m o v e m e n t  n e e d e d  ( in  b a s is  p o in t s )  to  p ro d u c e  th e  r is k -a d ju s te d  r e tu r n  a c h ie v e d  u n d e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  B asel I e n v i r o n m e n t .  
B rea k -e v en  s p re a d  c h a n g e  is  th e  d iffe re n c e  i n  r is k -a d ju s te d  r e tu r n  b e tw e e n  'c u r r e n t ' a n d  's t a n d a rd iz e d ';  'IRB a p p r o a c h ' m u l t ip l ie d  b y  c a p ita l  r e q u ire d  
p e r  $ 1 0 0  in  's t a n d a rd iz e d ' r e s p e c t iv e  'IRB a p p ro a c h '.
Source: A u th o r 's  c a lc u la t io n  b a s e d  o n  th e  p ro c e d u re  d e v e lo p e d  b y  D e u ts c h e  B an k  (2 0 0 1 ).
H e lm u t  R eisen  1 3 5
r e m o v e  i t .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  b a n k - t o - b a n k  l e n d i n g  t o  s i n g l e - B - r a t e d  b o r r o w e r s  
w o u l d  n o  l o n g e r  b e  d i s t o r t e d  b y  h i g h e r  r i s k - a d j u s t e d  r e t u r n s  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  
l e n d i n g  u n d e r  t h e  ' s t a n d a r d i z e d '  a p p r o a c h .
S t r o n g  i n c e n t i v e s  w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  p r o v i d e d  u n d e r  t h e  i n t e r n a l -  
r a t i n g s - b a s e d  a p p r o a c h  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  b a n k  l e n d i n g ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t r i p l e - B  
b a n k s .  T h e  r e q u i r e d  b r e a k - e v e n  s p r e a d  c h a n g e  w o u l d  b e  m i n u s  5 0  b a s i s  
p o i n t s  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  l e n d i n g  u n d e r  t h e  IR B  a p p r o a c h  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  
c u r r e n t  B a s e l  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  a s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r i s k  w e i g h t  w o u l d  d r o p  
t o  1 0  p e r  c e n t  ( a s s u m i n g  a  0 . 1  p e r  c e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e f a u l t  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  
e x p o s u r e ) ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  e v i d e n c e  p r o v i d e d  b y  M o o d y ' s  ( 2 0 0 1 a ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
w h i l e  f o r  e x p o s u r e s  w i t h  a  r e s i d u a l  m a t u r i t y  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e f a u l t  ( 0 . 4 1  p e r  c e n t )  w o u l d  t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  a  r i s k  w e i g h t  o f  
4 0  p e r  c e n t  a n d  a  r i s k - a d j u s t e d  r e t u r n  o f  3 1 . 3  p e r  c e n t  ( f o r  a n  a s s u m e d  s p r e a d  
o v e r  L I B O R  o f  1 0 0  b a s i s  p o i n t s ) ,  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  r i s k - a d j u s t e d  r e t u r n  w o u l d  b e  
m u c h  h i g h e r  -  1 2 5  p e r  c e n t  -  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  e x p o s u r e s  t o  t r i p l e - B - r a t e d  b a n k s .
S o m e p o lic y  c o n c lu s io n s
U n l i k e  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  w h e r e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  i s  u s u a l l y  t a k e n  
f o r  g r a n t e d ,  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  p l a y  a  v i t a l  r o l e  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  a s  
t h e i r  a c c e s s  t o  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i s  p r e c a r i o u s  a n d  v a r i a b l e .  T h e  r e c e n t  p r o p o s a l  
b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  B a n k i n g  S u p e r v i s i o n  f o r  a  n e w  B a s e l  C a p i t a l  A c c o r d  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  w i l l  b e  o f  e v e n  g r e a t e r  r e g u l a t o r y  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  
f u t u r e  d e c a d e s .
R a t i n g  b e h a v i o u r  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  c r i s e s  i n  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  
T u r k e y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  m o d i f i e d  
t o  p u t  t h e  a g e n c i e s  a h e a d  o f  m a r k e t  e v e n t s ,  a n d  t h a t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  r a t i n g  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  h a v e  l o s t  s o m e  o f  t h e i r  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r .  F i n a n c i a l - s e c t o r  
w e a k n e s s e s  a n d  i l l i q u i d i t y  h a v e  n o t  y e t  b e e n  g i v e n  t h e  w e i g h t i n g  t h e y  
d e s e r v e .  P r o c y c l i c a l  r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a n t s  r e m a i n  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i n g r e d i e n t  i n  
a g e n c i e s '  n o t e s ,  a n d  i t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a g e n c i e s  s h o u l d  c o r r e c t  t h e m  
f o r  t h e  e n d o g e n o u s  e f f e c t s  o f  ( s h o r t - t e r m )  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s .
B u t  e v e n  w i t h  s u c h  i m p r o v e m e n t s ,  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  a r e  b o u n d  t o  l a g  
b e h i n d  t h e  m a r k e t s .  F i r s t ,  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  a n d  r a t i n g  a c t i o n s  a r e  d e l i v e r e d  i n  
a  d i s c r e t e  f a s h i o n ,  w i t h  a c t i o n  b e i n g  t a k e n  w h e n  s u f f i c i e n t  u p w a r d  o r  d o w n ­
w a r d  p r e s s u r e  h a s  b e e n  p u t  o n  t h e  c r e d i t  f u n d a m e n t a l s ,  w h i c h  t h e m s e l v e s  
m o v e  i n  a  c o n t i n u o u s  f a s h i o n .  S e c o n d ,  s o v e r e i g n  r i s k  r a t i n g s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  
b a s e d  o n  p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  a n y  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g  
a n n o u n c e m e n t  w i l l  b e  ' c o n t a m i n a t e d '  b y  o t h e r  p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e  n e w s .  
T h i r d ,  r a t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  m a y  b e  l a r g e l y  a n t i c i p a t e d  b y  t h e  m a r k e t  
( a l t h o u g h  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  s u c h  n e w s  b y  t h e  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  m a y  b e  
s e e n  a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s i g n a l  o f  c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s ) .
W h i l e  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  o f t e n  l a g  b e h i n d  t h e  m a r k e t s ,  j o i n t  d o w n g r a d e s  o f  
e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  d e b t  b y  t h e  l e a d i n g  a g e n c i e s  c a n  h a v e  a  l a s t i n g  m a r k e t
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i m p a c t ;  u p g r a d e s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  a r e  l a r g e l y  a n t i c i p a t e d .  T h e  i m p a c t  o f  d o w n ­
g r a d e s  m a y  b e  d u e  t o  t h e  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  i n t e r n a l  i n d u s t r y  g u i d e ­
l i n e s  t o  w h i c h  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  a n d  w h i c h  d e b a r  t h e m  f r o m  
h o l d i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  b e l o w  c e r t a i n  r a t i n g  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a n d  t o  d e b t  c o n t r a c t s  
t h a t  a l l o w  c r e d i t o r s  t o  w i t h d r a w  l o a n s  w h e n  b o r r o w e r  r a t i n g s  d r o p  b e l o w  
a  c e r t a i n  t h r e s h o l d .  B u t  u n l e s s  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  B a s e l  
A c c o r d ,  r e i n f o r c e s  t h e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  o f  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s ,  t h e i r  i m p a c t  m i g h t  
d i m i n i s h  s o m e w h a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h e  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  h a v e  s t a r t e d  t o  l o o s e n  
t h e i r  c o u n t r y  c e i l i n g  p o l i c y ,  a l l o w i n g  c e r t a i n  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  b o r r o w e r s  b e t t e r  
r a t i n g s  t h a n  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n s .  A n d  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  b o n d  t r a d i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  
s e e m  t o  h a v e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e x p l o i t e d  t h e  l a t e  n a t u r e  o f  r a t i n g  a c t i o n s  b y  
a n t i c i p a t i n g  t h e m .
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  c h a p t e r  h a s  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h e  B a s e l  I I  A c c o r d  
w i l l  d e s t a b i l i z e  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i f  t h e  c u r r e n t  
p r o p o s a l  t o  l i n k  r e g u l a t o r y  b a n k  c a p i t a l  t o  s o v e r e i g n  r a t i n g s  i s  a d o p t e d .  
A s s i g n i n g  f i x e d  m i n i m u m  c a p i t a l  t o  b a n k  a s s e t s  w h o s e  r i s k  w e i g h t s  a r e  
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  m a r k e t - l a g g i n g  r a t i n g s  w i l l  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  
c a p i t a l  r a t i o  t o  w o r k  i n  a  p r o c y c l i c a l  w a y .  C r e d i t  s p r e a d s  w i l l  m o r e  c l o s e l y  
r e f l e c t  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  a s  a  p r o x y  o f  d e f a u l t  p r o b a b i l i t y .  W h i l e  t h i s  i s  e x a c t l y  
w h a t  s u p e r v i s o r s  a r e  a i m i n g  a t ,  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  h e r e  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  t h e  c h a s m  b e t w e e n  i n v e s t m e n t - g r a d e  b o r r o w e r s  -  b a s e d  m o s t l y  i n  t h e  
O E C D  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  i n  s o m e  o f  t h e  m o r e  s u c c e s s f u l  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  -  a n d  
s p e c u l a t i v e - g r a d e  b o r r o w e r s ,  m o s t l y  f r o m  t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d ,  w i l l  d e e p e n .  
T h i s  w o u l d  c l e a r l y  r u n  a g a i n s t  t h e  e n d e a v o u r  o f  t h e  g l o b a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
c o m m u n i t y  t o  b r o a d e n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  b e n e f i t  f r o m  
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s .  T h e  B a s e l  I I  p r o p o s a l s  n o t  o n l y  r i s k  r a i s i n g  t h e  
c a p i t a l  c o s t s  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e - g r a d e  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e y  m a y  a l s o  s e r v e  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  v o l a t i l i t y  o f  b a n k  c r e d i t  s u p p l y  t o  t h i s  g r o u p  o f  c o u n t r i e s .
N o t e s
* The author alone is responsible for the content of this chapter, which should not 
be attributed to the OECD or the OECD Development Centre.
1. In particular, upgrades to investment grade open up a much wider investor base 
to emerging and developing countries. As they become eligible for inclusion in 
benchmark investment-grade indices, portfolio managers will have consciously 
to justify a country's exclusion rather than start from the presumption that the 
country will not be included in investment-grade portfolios. Such portfolios are 
particularly held by long-term contractual institutions, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies. An upgrade to investment grade will therefore result in 
a higher and more stable demand for a developing country's bonds, as the demand 
for the country's bonds will not be limited to unconstrained investors, such as 
high-yield managers and hedge funds, that are able to trade opportunistically in 
and out of speculative-grade bonds.
2. See Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001) for a discussion of the use of export credit 
agencies in regulating bank capital and the potential impact of this on developing 
countries.
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Proposals for Curbing the Boom-Bust 
Cycle in the Supply of Capital to 
Emerging Markets*
John W illia m s o n
In tro d u ctio n
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e s  i n  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  t o  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  i s  
w e l l  r e c o g n i z e d .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  e x a m i n e s  w h i c h  f o r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w  a r e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p r o b l e m a t i c  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  a n d  w h i c h  a r e  m o r e  s t a b l e ,  a n d  t h e n  
c o n s i d e r s  w h a t  m i g h t  b e  d o n e  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  o v e r a l l  f l o w  o f  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l .  
T h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  h e r e  i n v o l v e  a l t e r i n g  e i t h e r  t h e  v o l u m e  o r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  
t h e  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  f l o w .  T h e r e  i s  n o t  m u c h  t h a t  c a n  b e  d o n e  f r o m  t h e  
s u p p l y  s i d e  t o  a l t e r  t h e  r e l a t i v e  v o l u m e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w ;  
s u c h  p o l i c i e s  a s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  c o n c e r n  t h e  c a p i t a l  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  
c a n  b e  e x e r c i s e d  b y  c a p i t a l - i m p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  a  s u b j e c t  t h a t  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  
i n  C h a p t e r  1 2 .  H e n c e  t h i s  c h a p t e r  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  w a y s  i n  w h i c h  s u p p l y - s i d e  
r e f o r m s  m i g h t  b e  a b l e  t o  a l t e r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w .
D ia g n o s is  o f  w h ere  th e  p ro b lem s lie
C o n v e n t i o n a l  w i s d o m  h a s  l o n g  h e l d  t h a t  s o m e  f o r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w  a r e  
m u c h  m o r e  p r o n e  t o  r a p i d  r e v e r s a l  t h a n  o t h e r s .  T h i s  v i e w  w a s  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  
C l a e s s e n s  et al. ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  w h o  f a i l e d  t o  f i n d  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  t h e  t i m e  s e r i e s  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w  ( F D I ,  p o r t f o l i o  
e q u i t y ,  l o n g - t e r m ,  s h o r t - t e r m ,  b a n k s ,  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  p r i v a t e ) .  B u t  i n  h i s  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  p a p e r ,  C a l v o  ( 1 9 9 8 )  p r e s c i e n t l y  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r s '  
e s t i m a t e s  o f  v o l a t i l i t y  ( w h i c h  e s s e n t i a l l y  f o c u s  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  m o m e n t  o f  t h e  
t i m e  s e r i e s )  m i g h t  f a i l  t o  g i v e  d u e  w e i g h t  t o  w h a t  i s  o f  m o s t  i m p o r t a n c e :  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  o c c a s i o n a l  m a j o r  d i s r u p t i o n s  ( w h i c h  a r e  m e a s u r e d  b y  h i g h e r  
m o m e n t s  i n  t h e  t i m e  s e r i e s ) . 1 T o  j u d g e  b y  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  i n  E a s t  A s i a  
d u r i n g  i t s  r e c e n t  c r i s i s ,  w h e n  F D I  w a s  l a r g e l y  m a i n t a i n e d  w h i l e  b a n k  c a p i t a l  
r e v e r s e d  o n  a  g r a n d  s c a l e ,  i t  i s  i n d e e d  p r o p e r  t o  w o r r y  m u c h  m o r e  a b o u t  t h e  
v o l a t i l i t y  o f  s o m e  f o r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w  t h a n  o f  o t h e r s .  A  m o r e  r e c e n t  s t u d y
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b y  L i p s e y  ( 2 0 0 1 )  c o n f i r m e d  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  w i s d o m  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  F D I  f l o w s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  w i l l  r e f r a i n  f r o m  
s h i f t i n g  w o r k i n g  b a l a n c e s  a m o n g  c u r r e n c i e s  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e i r  v i e w  o f  t h e  
m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p r o s p e c t s ,  b u t  j u s t  t h a t  s u c h  s h i f t s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  b e  l a r g e  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  t o t a l  s u m  s u n k  i n  c a p i t a l  i n v e s t m e n t .  L a r g e - s c a l e  r e v e r s a l  i s  i n  
m o s t  c a s e s  p h y s i c a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e .
B a n k  l e n d i n g ,  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  c o m p o n e n t  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  f l o w  
r e v e r s a l  i n  E a s t  A s i a ,  w a s  a t  t h e  o t h e r  e x t r e m e  t o  F D I .  T h e  s a m e  w a s  t r u e  i n  
t h e  d e b t  c r i s i s .  C o m m o n  s e n s e  ( a n d  r e c e i v e d  w i s d o m )  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s h o r t ­
t e r m  b a n k  l o a n s  a r e  m o r e  p r o n e  t o  i n s t a b i l i t y  t h a n  l o n g - t e r m  l o a n s ,  a n  
e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  a g a i n  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  v e r i f i e d  b y  t h e  e v a p o r a t i o n  o f  
i n t e r b a n k  c r e d i t  l i n e s  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  K o r e a  i n  l a t e  1 9 9 7 .  O n e  r e a s o n  w h y  
C l a e s s e n s  etal. ( 1 9 9 4 )  f a i l e d  t o  f i n d  a n y  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  v o l a t i l i t y  b a s e d  o n  
m a t u r i t y  m a y  b e  t h a t  t h e y  l u m p e d  t r a d e  c r e d i t s  w i t h  o t h e r  s h o r t - t e r m  c r e d i t s  
e x t e n d e d  b y  b a n k s .  T h e  u s u a l  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  t r a d e  c r e d i t s  a r e  o n e  o f  t h e  l e s s  
v o l a t i l e  s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c e  -  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  c r e d i t  i s  
s h o r t  t e r m  -  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  r e n e w e d  a s  n e w  t r a d e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
n e e d  t o  b e  f i n a n c e d .  I t  i s  t h e  r e s i d u a l  i t e m  -  b a n k  c l a i m s  t h a t  h a v e  a  s h o r t  
t e r m  t o  m a t u r i t y  a n d  a r e  n o t  t r a d e - r e l a t e d  -  t h a t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  w i s d o m  h o l d s  
t o  b e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  v o l a t i l e .
I t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  b y  P e r s a u d  ( 2 0 0 0 )  t h a t  t h e  r e c e n t  m o v e s  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
b a n k  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t ,  s t r e n g t h e n  p r u d e n t i a l  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  i n c r e a s e  t r a n s ­
p a r e n c y  m a y  e v e n  i n t e n s i f y  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  p r o c y c l i c a l  b e h a v i o u r  b y  b a n k s .  
H e  p o i n t s  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  u s e  o f  D E A R  ( d a i l y  e a r n i n g s  a t  r i s k )  l i m i t s  a s  
a  t o o l  o f  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  s e e m s  p e r f e c t l y  r a t i o n a l  w h e n  v i e w e d  
f r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b a n k ,  b u t  w h i c h  c a n  s e r v e  t o  i n c r e a s e  
v o l a t i l i t y .  T h e  D E A R  s e t s  a  l i m i t  o n  h o w  m u c h  t h e  b a n k  i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  r i s k  
l o s i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d a y  w i t h ,  s a y ,  1  p e r  c e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y :
I t  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  t a k i n g  t h e  b a n k ' s  p o r t f o l i o . . .  a n d  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d a i l y  r e t u r n s  b a s e d  o n  p a s t  m e a s u r e s  o f  m a r k e t  c o r r e l a t i o n  
a n d  v o l a t i l i t y .  B o t h  r i s i n g  v o l a t i l i t y  a n d  r i s i n g  c o r r e l a t i o n  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e
p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  o f  t h e  p o r t f o l i o ,  i n c r e a s i n g  D E A R  W h e n  D E A R  e x c e e d s
t h e  l i m i t ,  t h e  b a n k  r e d u c e s  e x p o s u r e ,  o f t e n  b y  s w i t c h i n g  i n t o  l e s s  v o l a t i l e  
a n d  l e s s  c o r r e l a t e d  a s s e t s .
T h e  d a i l y  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  c a n  a c c e l e r a t e  a n d  i n t e n s i f y  t h e  s p r e a d  
o f  a n y  b a d  n e w s  t h a t  m a y  b r e a k ,  w i t h  d e c l i n i n g  a s s e t  v a l u e s  a n d  i n c r e a s i n g  
v o l a t i l i t y  s e r v i n g  a s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  p o s i t i v e  f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s .
S o  m u c h  f o r  t h e  e a s y  c a s e s .  T h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n  c o n c e r n s  t h e  v o l a t i l ­
i t y  o f  o t h e r  c l a i m s  t h a t  c a n  b e  s o l d  q u i c k l y ,  n o t a b l y  p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  a n d  
l o n g - t e r m  b o n d s .  T h e r e  w a s  i n d e e d  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  f l o w  o f  p o r t f o l i o  
i n v e s t m e n t  t o  E a s t  A s i a  i n  1 9 9 7 - 9 8 ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t h i n g  l i k e  t h e  r e v e r s a l  s e e n  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  b a n k  l e n d i n g .  T h e r e  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n  w h y  o n e  s h o u l d
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e x p e c t  l e s s  v o l a t i l i t y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  t h a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s h o r t ­
t e r m  l o a n s :  t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  a s s e t  ( s h a r e s )  c a n  a d j u s t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
a l l  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  t h e  v o l u m e .  I n d e e d  i f  a  s h o c k  h a s  t h e  
s a m e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  f u t u r e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  i n  
s h a r e s ,  t h e n  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t h a t  a l l  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  a d j u s t m e n t  w o u l d  s h o w  
u p  i n  a  c h a n g e  i n  s h a r e  p r i c e s ,  w i t h  n o  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  o r  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .  ( L a r g e  a n d  a b r u p t  d e c l i n e s  i n  s h a r e  p r i c e s  c a n  a l s o  c r e a t e  
p r o b l e m s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  e n d o g e n o u s  a n d  e x t r a p o l a t i v e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  e x o g e n o u s  a n d  r e g r e s s i v e .  I  w o u l d  n o n e t h e l e s s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  
s t o c k  m a r k e t  i s  a  r a t h e r  g o o d  p l a c e  t o  a b s o r b  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  l i n k s  f r o m  t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t  t o  t h e  r e a l  e c o n o m y  t e n d  t o  
b e  w e a k  i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m . )  I t  i s  o n l y  w h e n  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  l o s e  t h e i r  n e r v e  
a b o u t  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  a  c o u n t r y  o r  r e g i o n  i n  a  w a y  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  i n v e s t o r s  
d o  n o t ,  a s  i n  E a s t  A s i a  i n  1 9 9 7 ,  t h a t  o n e  s h o u l d  e x p e c t  a n  i m p a c t  o n  c a p i t a l  
f l o w s .
T h e  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  i s  n o t  a s  r e a s s u r i n g  a s  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
m i g h t  h a v e  l e d  o n e  t o  e x p e c t .  F r o o t  etal. ( 1 9 9 8 )  h a v e  f o u n d  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
e q u i t y  f l o w s  a r e  p e r s i s t e n t  o v e r  t i m e  a n d  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  o f t e n  b u y  ( s e l l )  i n  
r e s p o n s e  t o  a  p r i c e  r i s e  ( d e c l i n e ) .  K a m i n s k y  etal. ( 1 9 9 9 )  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  m u t u a l  
f u n d s  h a v e  a  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  i m p a c t  a n d  h a v e  h e l p e d  s p r e a d  c o n t a g i o n  i n  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  I t  a l s o  s e e m s  t h a t  C h i l e a n  p e n s i o n  f u n d s  m a d e  a l m o s t  n o  
u s e  o f  t h e i r  n e w  r i g h t s  t o  i n v e s t  a b r o a d  d u r i n g  C h i l e ' s  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w  s u r g e ,  
b u t  t h e n  b e g a n  p l a c i n g  f u n d s  a b r o a d  o n  a  l a r g e  s c a l e  w h e n  c a p i t a l  f l o w  
r e v e r s a l  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h e  E a s t  A s i a n  c r i s i s  ( F f r e n c h - D a v i s  a n d  T a p i a ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  
B e k a e r t  etal. ( 1 9 9 9 )  h a v e  f o u n d  t h a t  w h e n  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  l e a v e s  i t  d o e s  s o  
f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e  s p e e d  a t  w h i c h  i t  e n t e r e d ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s o  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  f i n d  d o m e s t i c  p u r c h a s e r s .  O n l y  B a r t h  a n d  Z h a n g  ( 1 9 9 9 )  c a n  f i n d  n o  
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  h a v e  p l a y e d  a  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  r o l e :  i n d e e d  t h e y  
c l a i m  t h a t  i t  w a s  o n l y  i n  o n e  m o n t h  ( D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 7 )  t h a t  m u t u a l  f u n d s  
w e r e  n e t  s e l l e r s  i n  t h e  f o u r  m a i n  c r i s i s  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E a s t  A s i a  ( i b i d . :  2 0 1 ) .  A n d  
w h i l e  t h e y  r e f e r  t o  s o m e  i n v e s t o r s  a s  h a v i n g  b e e n  a t t r a c t e d  ' i n t o  t h e  A s i a n  
m a r k e t s  w i t h  a  s h o r t - t e r m  h o r i z o n  s e e k i n g  h i g h  r e t u r n s '  ( i b i d . :  1 9 9 ) ,  t h e y  
a l s o  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  f i g u r e s  s h o w  t h a t  f o r e i g n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  w e r e  
s l o w  t o  e x i t  a f t e r  t h e  c r i s i s  s t a r t e d ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  w h i c h  t h e y  l o s t  a  l o t  o f  
m o n e y  ( i b i d . :  2 0 2 - 5 ) .
K o r e a  h a s  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r i c h  d a t a  s e t  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  d o u b t s  a b o u t  
i t s  r e l i a b i l i t y ) ,  a n d  t h i s  h a s  e n a b l e d  r e s e a r c h e r s  t o  t r a c e  t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  i n d i ­
v i d u a l  i n v e s t o r s  i n  a  w a y  t h a t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  e l s e w h e r e .  T h e  f i r s t  s t u d y  t o  
e x p l o i t  t h i s  s o u r c e ,  t h a t  b y  C h o e  etal. ( 1 9 9 9 ) ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  t r a d e  
b y  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  w a s  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  c r i s i s ,  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  
a c t e d  a s  a  s t a b i l i z i n g  f o r c e  d u r i n g  t h e  c r i s i s .  H o w e v e r  t h e i r  d a t a  e x t e n d e d  
o n l y  b r i e f l y  i n t o  t h e  c r i s i s  p e r i o d ,  a n d  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  s t u d y  b y  K i m  a n d  W e i  
( 1 9 9 9 a )  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  f o r e i g n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  ( e v e n  m o r e )  i n d i v i d u a l  
i n v e s t o r s  w e r e  p o s i t i v e - f e e d b a c k  t r a d e r s  ( t h a t  i s ,  b o u g h t  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o
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a  p r i c e  r i s e  a n d  s o l d  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  p r i c e  f a l l )  b o t h  b e f o r e  a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  
c r i s i s .  T h e  o n l y  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  p r o c y c l i c a l  b e h a v i o u r  w a s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  c r i s i s  
b y  f o r e i g n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  a  K o r e a n  o f f i c e :  t h e s e  w e r e  c o n t r a r i a n  t r a d e r s  
( t h a t  i s ,  t e n d e d  t o  b u y  r e c e n t  l o s e r s  a n d  s e l l  r e c e n t  w i n n e r s ) .  K i m  a n d  W e i  
a l s o  c a l c u l a t e  t h a t  a  c o n t r a r i a n  s t r a t e g y  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  m o r e  p r o f i t a b l e  
t h a n  a  p o s i t i v e - f e e d b a c k  s t r a t e g y ,  w h i c h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  K o r e a n s  w h o  h a d  
b e e n  f o l l o w i n g  s u c h  a  s t r a t e g y  ( a s  t h e  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o s i t i v e -  
f e e d b a c k  s t r a t e g i e s )  m u s t  h a v e  m a d e  m o n e y ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  l o s t  l e s s  m o n e y  
t h a n  f o r e i g n e r s .  K i m  a n d  W e i  ( 1 9 9 9 b )  a l s o  f o u n d  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  m u t u a l  
f u n d s  b a s e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  e n g a g e d  i n  p o s i t i v e -  
f e e d b a c k  t r a d i n g ,  a n d  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  i n  h e r d i n g  b e h a v i o u r ,  i n  K o r e a  i n  
1 9 9 7 - 9 8 . 2
N o t e  t h a t  a l l  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  f o c u s  o n  p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  
s t o c k  m a r k e t s  o f  e m e r g i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  A s  B a r t h  a n d  Z h a n g  ( 1 9 9 9 )  p o i n t  o u t ,  
p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  i s  i n v e s t e d  i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  t h r o u g h  t w o  a d d i t i o n a l  
c h a n n e l s ,  o n e  o f  w h i c h  i s  p r i v a t e  ( t h a t  i s ,  n o n - t r a d e d )  e q u i t y .  B a r t h  a n d  
Z h a n g ' s  f i g u r e  6 . 2  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  E a s t  A s i a  t h i s  i s  a  s m a l l  b u t  r a t h e r  s t a b l e  
f l o w .  I n  t h e  o t h e r  c h a n n e l ,  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  c o m p a n i e s  l i s t  t h e i r  s h a r e s  o n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  s u c h  a s  N e w  Y o r k  ( o f  d o m i n a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  c o m p a n i e s )  o r  L o n d o n  ( d i t t o  f o r  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  c o m p a n i e s ) .  B a r t h  
a n d  Z h a n g ' s  t a b l e s  6 - 1 2  s h o w  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p l a c e m e n t s  r o s e  t o  m a j o r  
i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  m i d  1 9 9 0 s  a n d  p e a k e d  i n  1 9 9 7 ,  b e f o r e  f a l l i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
i n  1 9 9 8 .  T h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p l a c e m e n t s  w a s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  m o d e s t  
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h a t  i n  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  l o c a l  s t o c k  m a r k e t s :  i t  m o v e d  
f r o m  U S $ 6  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 6  t o  U S $ 1 1  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 7  a n d  U S $ 4  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 8 ,  
w h i l e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  l o c a l  m a r k e t s  f e l l  f r o m  U S $ 9  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 6  t o  m i n u s  
U S $ 3  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 7  a n d  p l u s  U S $ 1  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 8 .
A u t h o r i t a t i v e  s o u r c e s  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  s h a r p  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  i n f l o w  o f  
p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  t o  E a s t  A s i a  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 7  c r i s i s  r e f l e c t e d  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
b e h a v i o u r  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s  o f  i n v e s t o r s  ( a n  a c c o u n t  t h a t  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  r e p o r t  b y  B a r t h  a n d  Z h a n g ,  1 9 9 9 : 1 9 7 ) .  T h e  w i t h d r a w a l s  
w e r e  m a d e  b y  g l o b a l  f u n d s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  s e a r c h i n g  f o r  h i g h - y i e l d i n g  
i n v e s t m e n t s  a n d  h a d  b e e n  a t t r a c t e d  b y  t h e  h i g h  y i e l d s  i n  E a s t  A s i a n  s h a r e  
m a r k e t s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  c r i s i s ,  b u t  w h i c h  h a d  n o t  a d v e r t i s e d  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  
i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s .  T h e y  w e r e  e m b a r r a s s e d  t o  b e  h o l d i n g  a s s e t s  w h o s e  
v a l u e  h a d  c o l l a p s e d ,  a n d  g o t  o u t  a s  f a s t  a s  t h e y  c o u l d  b e f o r e  t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  
b e c a m e  w i d e l y  k n o w n  a n d  c r i t i c i z e d .  B u t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  a c c o u n t  t h e  
h o l d i n g s  b y  f u n d s  t h a t  h a d  a d v e r t i s e d  t h e y  w e r e  i n v e s t i n g  i n  e m e r g i n g  
m a r k e t s  r e m a i n e d  s t e a d y ,  a n d  t h e y  m a y  e v e n  h a v e  p i c k e d  u p  s o m e  o f  t h e  
s h a r e s  b e i n g  s o l d  b y  t h e  f o r m e r  g r o u p ,  p e r h a p s  t o  s u s t a i n  t h e i r  t a r g e t  a s s e t  
a l l o c a t i o n s .  T h e s e  i n v e s t o r s  w e r e  i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  f o r  t h e  l o n g  h a u l ,  
w e r e  a w a r e  t h a t  t h e s e  w e r e  i n h e r e n t l y  r i s k y  m a r k e t s  t h a t  w o u l d  h a v e  d o w n s  
a s  w e l l  a s  u p s ,  a n d  n e i t h e r  t h e  m a n a g e r s  o f  t h e  f u n d s  n o r  t h e i r  i n v e s t o r s  
p a n i c k e d .  W o r r y i n g l y ,  G r i f f i t h - J o n e s  ( 2 0 0 1 )  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s
John W illia m s o n  1 4 3
t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  g l o b a l  f u n d s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h a t  o f  d e d i c a t e d  
e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  f u n d s .
D o e s  M i l t o n  F r i e d m a n ' s  f a m o u s  1 9 5 3  t h e o r e m  -  w h i c h  s a y s  t h a t  d e s t a ­
b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t o r s  m u s t  l o s e  m o n e y  ( b e c a u s e  t o  d e s t a b i l i z e  a  m a r k e t  o n e  
m u s t  b u y  n e a r  t h e  p e a k  a n d  s e l l  n e a r  t h e  t r o u g h ,  w h e r e a s  m a k i n g  m o n e y  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  o p p o s i t e )  -  p r o v i d e  r e a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  f u n d s  t h a t  a m p l i f y  t h e  
b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e  w i l l  l o s e  m o n e y  a n d  s o  a t  l e a s t  e n r i c h  d o m e s t i c  i n v e s t o r s ?  
N o t  n e c e s s a r i l y .  O n e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  a l l u d e d  t o  e a r l i e r ,  i s  t h a t  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t e r ­
p a r t  t o  s a l e s  b y  f o r e i g n e r s  w i l l  b e  p u r c h a s e s  b y  o t h e r  f o r e i g n e r s .  B u t  e v e n  i f  
f o r e i g n  p o r t f o l i o  i n v e s t o r s  d o  i n d e e d  t e n d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  h e r d ,  b u y i n g  w h e n  
t h e  m a r k e t  i s  r i s i n g  a n d  s e l l i n g  w h e n  i t  i s  f a l l i n g ,  s o  t h a t ,  i n  t o t a l ,  d o m e s t i c  
i n v e s t o r s  a r e  s e l l i n g  w h e n  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  r i s i n g  a n d  b u y i n g  w h e n  i t  i s  f a l l i n g ,  
i t  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l l o w  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n e r s  w i l l  l o s e  m o n e y .  B u y i n g  o n  
a  r i s i n g  m a r k e t  a n d  b u y i n g  n e a r  t h e  p e a k  a r e  n o t  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g ;  s p e c u l a t o r s  
w h o  a r e  a l e r t  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  t r e n d  m a y  b e  a b l e  t o  q u i t  b u y i n g ,  a n d  s e l l  o u t  
s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  p e a k  i s  p a s t  a n d  m a k e  m o n e y .  T h e  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  r e p o r t e d  
a b o v e  o f f e r  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  v e r d i c t s  o n  w h e t h e r  m a n y  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  i n  f a c t  
g o t  o u t  o f  E a s t  A s i a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  q u i c k l y  t o  s a v e  t h e i r  s k i n s .  W h a t  i s  q u i t e  
c l e a r  i s  t h a t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  a s  a  w h o l e  l o s t  a n  e n o r m o u s  s u m  o f  m o n e y  i n  
E a s t  A s i a ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  o n  p a p e r :  s o m e  U S $ 1 6 6  b i l l i o n  d u r i n g  1 9 9 7 ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  b y  B a r t h  a n d  Z h a n g  ( 1 9 9 9 :  2 0 4 ) .
M u c h  t h e  s a m e  a n a l y s i s  a p p l i e s  t o  l o n g - t e r m  b o n d s ,  w h o s e  p r i c e s  a l s o  f l u c ­
t u a t e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  
t h e  t o t a l  s t o c k  o f  b o n d s  c o n t i n u e s  t o  b e  w i l l i n g l y  h e l d .  F l o w e v e r ,  n o m i n a l l y  
l o n g - t e r m  b o n d s  s o m e t i m e s  i n c l u d e  p u t  o p t i o n s ,  g i v i n g  t h e  h o l d e r  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  d e m a n d  e a r l y  r e p a y m e n t  a t  h i s  o r  h e r  d i s c r e t i o n  o n  c e r t a i n  d a t e s .  I f  s u c h  
d a t e s  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  a  c r i s i s ,  t h e n  t h e  l o a n  t e n d s  t o  d i s a p p e a r  j u s t  w h e n  i t  i s  
m o s t  n e e d e d ,  a s  h a p p e n e d  i n  K o r e a  i n  l a t e  1 9 9 7 .
W h i l e  t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h o s e  w h o  b u y  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  a s s e t s  w i t h  t h e  
i n t e n t i o n  o f  h o l d i n g  o n  t o  t h e m  m a y  n o t  b e  a s  s t a b l e  a s  o n e  m i g h t  w i s h ,  
a  l a r g e l y  s e p a r a t e  a n d  p e r h a p s  m o r e  a c u t e  p r o b l e m  i s  p o s e d  b y  o v e r t l y  
s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s .  H e d g e  f u n d s  -  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w h o s e  m a n a g e r s  q u i t e  c o n ­
s c i o u s l y  r a n g e  t h e  w o r l d  l o o k i n g  f o r  m a r k e t  a n o m a l i e s  o r  g o o d  s p e c u l a t i v e  
b e t s  t h a t  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  y i e l d  h i g h  r e t u r n s  a n d  a r e  t o t a l l y  u n r e g u l a t e d  o n  
t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  o n l y  r i c h  p e o p l e  w h o  d o  n o t  n e e d  p r o t e c t i o n  i n v e s t  i n  
t h e m  -  a r e  t h e  a r c h e t y p e .  T h e  p r o p r i e t a r y  t r a d i n g  d e s k s  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k s  
a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  c o m p a n i e s  ( c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  f i r m s  a n d  e v e n  
a  f e w  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s )  b e h a v e  s i m i l a r l y .  H e d g e  f u n d s  w e r e  t h e  b u t t  
o f  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  M a h a t h i r ' s  c r i t i c i s m s  i n  1 9 9 7 ,  b u t  K a u f m a n  ( 2 0 0 0 )  a s s e r t s  
t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  i n v e s t m e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  n o w  a d o p t e d  t h i s  i n v e s t m e n t  
s t y l e  f o r  a t  l e a s t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .
T h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  i n v e s t o r s  i n  1 9 9 8  c o m e  u n d e r  o f f i c i a l  s c r u t i n y  i n  
t h e  r e p o r t  b y  t h e  M a r k e t  D y n a m i c s  S t u d y  G r o u p  o f  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  
S t a b i l i t y  F o r u m ' s  W o r k i n g  G r o u p  o n  H i g h l y  L e v e r a g e d  I n s t i t u t i o n s  ( H L I s )
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( F i n a n c i a l  S t a b i l i t y  F o r u m ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e  g r o u p  e x a m i n e d  t h e  ' p o s s i b l e  d e s t a ­
b i l i z i n g  i m p a c t  o f  l a r g e  a n d  c o n c e n t r a t e d  H L I  p o s i t i o n s  [ i n  1 9 9 8 ]  a n d  t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  m a r k e t  i n t e g r i t y  o f  v a r i o u s  a g g r e s s i v e  p r a c t i c e s '  ( i b i d . :  9 7 ) .  
T h e  e c o n o m i e s  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d  w e r e  A u s t r a l i a ,  F l o n g  K o n g ,  
M a l a y s i a ,  N e w  Z e a l a n d ,  S i n g a p o r e  a n d  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  a l t h o u g h  N e w  Z e a l a n d  
a n d  S i n g a p o r e  e x p r e s s e d  l e s s  c o n c e r n  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  f o u r .  T h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
e x p e r i e n c e d  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  a n d  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n ­
c i a l  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  1 9 9 8 .  B y  t h e n  i t  w a s  p r e t t y  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  t h e  
c u r r e n c i e s  ( e x c e p t  t h e  F l o n g  K o n g  d o l l a r ,  w h i c h  w a s  f i x e d  b y  a  c u r r e n c y  
b o a r d )  w e r e  u n d e r v a l u e d ,  y e t  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r e s s u r e s  w e r e  a l l  f o r  f u r t h e r  
d e p r e c i a t i o n .  T h i s  w a s  t h e  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  H o n g  K o n g  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t y  
u p s e t  t h e  f r e e  m a r k e t  f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s  b y  b u y i n g  a  b i g  c h u n k  o f  t h e  e q u i t y  
m a r k e t  t o  d e f e n d  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  t h e  d o u b l e  p l a y .  T h e  p r e s s u r e s  w e r e  r e l i e v e d  
i n  S e p t e m b e r  a n d  g a v e  w a y  t o  a  s h a r p  r e b o u n d  i n  e a r l y  O c t o b e r  w h e n  t h e  
H L I s  w e r e  f o r c e d  t o  d e l i v e r  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  L T C M .
T h e  r e p o r t  d o c u m e n t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  h a n d f u l  o f  H L I s  e s t a b l i s h e d  s u c h  
l a r g e  s h o r t  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  c u r r e n c i e s  t h a t  t h e y  s t r e t c h e d  t h e  c a p a c i t y  
o f  n a t u r a l  c o u n t e r p a r t i e s  ( s u c h  a s  e x p o r t e r s )  t o  o f f s e t  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .  T h e  
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a n  e c o n o m i s t  i n s t i n c t i v e l y  a s k s  i s  h o w  t h e y  e x p e c t e d  t o  m a k e  
m o n e y  o u t  o f  s u c h  o p e r a t i o n s .  I t  i s  o n e  t h i n g  t o  h a v e  t h e  m a r k e t  p o w e r  t o  
f o r c e  a  p r i c e  b e l o w  i t s  f u n d a m e n t a l  v a l u e ,  b u t  i t  i s  q u i t e  a n o t h e r  t o  m a k e  
m o n e y  o u t  o f  f o r c i n g  i t  t h e r e .  T o  d o  t h a t ,  o n e  n e e d s  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  g e t  o t h e r s  
t o  s e l l  t h e  c u r r e n c y  a t  e v e n  m o r e  u n d e r v a l u e d  l e v e l s  i n  o r d e r  t o  c l o s e  o u t  
o n e ' s  s h o r t  s a l e s  a t  a  p r o f i t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  H o n g  K o n g ,  t h e  H L I s  s o u g h t  t o  
p r o f i t  b y  ' d o u b l e  p l a y ' ,  w h i c h  i n v o l v e d  s e l l i n g  e q u i t i e s  s h o r t  a n d  t h e n  
s e l l i n g  t h e  H o n g  K o n g  d o l l a r  s h o r t ,  r e l y i n g  o n  t h e  a u t o m a t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
r i s e  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d  r u l e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f o r c e  d o w n  e q u i t y  
p r i c e s .  T h i s  w o u l d  h a v e  y i e l d e d  t h e m  a  p r o f i t  e v e n  i f  t h e  H o n g  K o n g  d o l l a r  
w a s  n o t  d e v a l u e d  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  H o n g  K o n g  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t y  p l a y e d  b y  
t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  g a m e  ( w h i c h  i t  d i d  n o t ,  b e c a u s e  i t  i n t e r v e n e d  t o  b u y  t h e  
e q u i t y  i n d e x ) .  B u t  i n  o t h e r  c a s e s  t h e  H L I s  c o u l d  h a v e  e x p e c t e d  t o  p r o f i t  o n l y  
i f  t h e y  p a n i c k e d  t h e  m a r k e t .
T h e  e v i d e n c e  i s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  e x a c t l y  w h a t  t h e y  t r i e d  t o  d o .  T h e  r e p o r t  d i s c u s s e s  
a g g r e s s i v e  p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  ' t a l k i n g  t h e  b o o k ' ,  w h i c h  m e a n s  d i s s e m ­
i n a t i n g  r u m o u r s  d e s i g n e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p r i c e s  s o  a s  t o  b e n e f i t  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  
a l r e a d y  t a k e n .  A  m a n a g e r  o f  a n  H L I  l a r g e  e n o u g h  t o  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a r k e t  
p o w e r  m i g h t  m a k e  n e g a t i v e  c o m m e n t s  o n  a  c u r r e n c y  t h a t  w o u l d  d i s c o u r a g e  
o t h e r  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  f r o m  t a k i n g  c o n t r a r y  p o s i t i o n s .  S o m e  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  p u b l i s h e d  ' r e s e a r c h  c o n c l u s i o n s '  t h a t  w e r e  
d e s i g n e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  m a r k e t  ( ' p o s i t i o n s  l e d  r e s e a r c h  r a t h e r  t h a n  v i c e  
v e r s a ' ,  i b i d . :  1 0 6 ) .  T h e y  e x p l o i t e d  m o m e n t u m  t r a d i n g  b y  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
b y  t r a d i n g  h e a v i l y  a t  i l l i q u i d  h o u r s ,  a p p a r e n t l y  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  m o v e  r a t e s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  g e t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  e x e c u t e d  a t  t h e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  p r i c e .  H L I s  a t  
t i m e s  t o o k  c o r r e l a t e d  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  a n d  a c r o s s  m a r k e t s ,  p r e s u m a b l y  b y
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d e s i g n  t h o u g h  n o  o n e  c o u l d  p r o v e  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  b y  c o i n c i d e n c e .  T h e s e  
t a c t i c s  a t  t i m e s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  d r i v i n g  m a n y  r e g u l a r  t r a d e r s  o u t  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  
f o r  f e a r  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  b e  o v e r w h e l m e d  b y  H L I s  t h a t  w e r e  n o t  p l a y i n g  
b y  t h e  n o r m a l  r u l e s  o f  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  m a r k e t .  A t  o t h e r  t i m e s  o t h e r  m a r k e t  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  ' e m b o l d e n e d  t o  a d d  t o  m o m e n t u m '  ( i b i d . :  1 0 7 ) ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  
n o t  t o  s t a n d  i n  t h e  w a y  o f  p o s i t i o n i n g  b y  l a r g e  H L I s .  A n d  s o m e  H L I s  w e r e  
a b l e  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e i r  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  p r i c e  c h a n g e s ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e  p r o p r i e t a r y  t r a d i n g  d e s k s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e i r  
k n o w l e d g e  a b o u t  w h e n  d e c l i n i n g  b o n d  p r i c e s  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  b o n d  s a l e s  b y  
s w a p  d e s k s ,  o r  t h e y  m i g h t  h a v e  p u s h e d  r a t e s  t o  l e v e l s  t h a t  t h e y  k n e w  w o u l d  
t r i g g e r  s t o p - l o s s  o r d e r s  o r  k n o c k - o u t  o p t i o n s .
T h e  s t u d y  g r o u p  d i d  n o t  r e a c h  a  c o n s e n s u s  o n  t h e  r o l e  a n d  i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  t h e  a g g r e s s i v e  t r a d i n g  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  i t  d o c u m e n t e d ,  b u t  i t  i s  p r e t t y  c l e a r  
t h a t  m o s t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  s u c h  p r a c t i c e s  t h r e a t e n e d  
m a r k e t  i n t e g r i t y .  A f t e r  m a k i n g  a  h o s t  o f  c a r e f u l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  r e p o r t  
c o n c l u d e d :
T h e  g r o u p  i s  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i m p a c t  o n  m a r k e t  d y n a m i c s  
o f  s o m e  o f  t h e  a g g r e s s i v e  p r a c t i c e s  c i t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e - s t u d y  e c o n o m i e s  
d u r i n g  1 9 9 8 ;  i t  i s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  a b l e  t o  r e a c h  a  c o n c l u s i o n  o n  t h e  s c a l e  
o f  t h e s e  p r a c t i c e s ,  w h e t h e r  m a n i p u l a t i o n  w a s  i n v o l v e d  a n d  t h e i r  i m p a c t  
o n  m a r k e t  i n t e g r i t y .  S o m e  g r o u p  m e m b e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  t h r e s h o l d  
f o r  a s s e s s i n g  m a n i p u l a t i o n  c a n  b e  s e t  t o o  h i g h  a n d  t h a t  s o m e  o f  t h e  
a g g r e s s i v e  p r a c t i c e s  r a i s e  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  f o r  m a r k e t  i n t e g r i t y .  T h e y  a r e  
o f  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a t t e m p t e d  
m a n i p u l a t i o n  c a n  a n d  d o e s  o c c u r  i n  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t s  a n d  s h o u l d  
b e  a  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  f o r  p o l i c y m a k e r s  ( i b i d . )
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m a g i n e  a  m u c h  m o r e  d a m n i n g  i n d i c t m e n t  c o m i n g  f r o m  
a  g r o u p  o f  o f f i c i a l s .
Strateg ic  issu es
T h e  f o c u s  h e r e  w i l l  b e  o n  h o w  t o  m a k e  i n d i v i d u a l  t y p e s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w  l e s s  
u n s t a b l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  t r y i n g  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  m i x  o f  d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s  o f  
c a p i t a l  f l o w s .  A  g o o d  p l a c e  t o  s t a r t  c o n s i d e r i n g  w h a t  m i g h t  b e  d o n e  i n  t h i s  
c o n n e c t i o n  i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  w h y  p o r t f o l i o  e q u i t y  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  d i s a p p o i n t e d  
t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h o s e  w h o  a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  u n l i k e l y  t o  p o s e  p r o b l e m s  
o f  i n s t a b i l i t y .  I t  c a n  b e  c o n j e c t u r e d  t h a t  t h e  r e a s o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  w a y  t h a t  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  o p e r a t e .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  w o r d s  o f  K a u f m a n  ( 2 0 0 0 :  6 1 ) :
A s  m a r k e t s  a n d  a s s e t s  h a v e  c h a n g e d  d r a m a t i c a l l y  w i t h  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  
a  n e w  g l o b a l  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m ,  s o  h a s  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s  t h e m s e l v e s .  T h e  p o w e r  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o m m e r c i a l
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b a n k s ,  s a v i n g s  a n d  l o a n s ,  a n d  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  d i m i n i s h e d ,  
w h i l e  a  n e w  b r e e d  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  h a s  c o m e  t o  t h e  f o r e .  
T h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  b y  t h e i r  e m p h a s i s  o n  s h o r t - t e r m  
i n v e s t m e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  t h e i r  h e a v y  u s e  o f  l e v e r a g e ,  a n d  t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  
t o  m o v e  i n  a n d  o u t  o f  m a r k e t s  -  w h e t h e r  e q u i t i e s ,  b o n d s ,  c u r r e n c i e s ,  o r  
c o m m o d i t i e s  -  i n  a  r e l e n t l e s s  q u e s t  t o  m a x i m i z e  r e t u r n s .  T h e  n e w  b r e e d  
i n c l u d e s  t h e  o f t e n - r e v i l e d  h e d g e  f u n d s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  a r e  n e i t h e r  t h e  s o l e  
n o r  t h e  l e a d i n g  c o n t e s t a n t s .  I n  f a c t ,  m o s t  p r o m i n e n t  b a n k s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  
f i r m s ,  a n d  e v e n  a  f e w  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s  p o s s e s s  d e p a r t m e n t s  t h a t  
e m u l a t e  t h e  t r a d i n g  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e  h e d g e  f u n d s .  E v e n  
t h e  c o r p o r a t e  t r e a s u r i e s  o f  a  n u m b e r  o f  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  
e n g a g e d  i n  t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  O n c e  a r c a n e  a n d  e x o t i c ,  t h e  h e d g e  f u n d  a p p r o a c h  
t o  i n v e s t m e n t  h a s  b e e n  m a i n s t r e a m e d .
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  d o m i n a t e d  b y  i n v e s t ­
m e n t  m a n a g e r s  w i t h  a  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  p h i l o s o p h y ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  t r u i s m  t h a t  
t o  m a x i m i z e  r e t u r n s  i n  e a c h  a n d  e v e r y  s h o r t  r u n  n e c e s s a r i l y  m a x i m i z e s  
r e t u r n s  o v e r  t h e  l o n g  r u n  a s  w e l l .  W h a t  i t  c l e a r l y  d o e s  n o t  m a x i m i z e  i s  t h e  
u s e f u l n e s s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  t o  t h o s e  w h o  r a i s e  f u n d s  f r o m  t h e m .
A  k e y  q u e s t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  r e a l l y  i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  i n v e s t o r s :  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  b u y  m u t u a l  f u n d s  a n d  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w h o s e  e n d o w m e n t s  a n d  w o r k i n g  a s s e t s  a r e  u n d e r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t .  T h e  c o n t r a r y  a r g u m e n t  h a s  b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  b y  S w e n s e n  ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  w h o  
i s  t h e  c h i e f  i n v e s t m e n t  o f f i c e r  o f  Y a le  U n i v e r s i t y  a n d  inter alia m a n a g e s  
i t s  e n d o w m e n t .  T h e  b a s i c  a r g u m e n t  i s  t h a t  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  m a n a g e m e n t  r i s k s  
w h i p l a s h  ( s e l l i n g  a n  a s s e t  j u s t  b e f o r e  i t  r i s e s  o r  b u y i n g  i t  j u s t  b e f o r e  i t s  p e a k )  
a n d  u n d e r m i n e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s y s t e m a t i c  c o n t r a r i a n  i n v e s t m e n t  ( b u y i n g  
w h a t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  o u t  o f  f a s h i o n  a n d  s e l l i n g  w h a t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  i n  f a s h i o n ) .  
S u c h  a c t i o n s  o f t e n  s e e m  u n t h i n k a b l e  i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m ,  b u t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  i s  
t h a t  o n  a v e r a g e  t h e y  a r e  m o r e  o f t e n  r i g h t  t h a n  w r o n g .
T h e  b a s i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a  l o n g - t e r m  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r a t e g y ,  a s  l a i d  o u t  b y  
S w e n s e n ,  i n v o l v e  a  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  t o  d i v i d e  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  a m o n g  a s s e t  
c l a s s e s  i n  t a r g e t  p r o p o r t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  l o n g - t e r m  r i s k - r e t u r n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
W i t h i n  e a c h  a s s e t  c l a s s ,  a s s e t s  a r e  m a n a g e d  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  m a n a g e r s  w h o  a r e  
s e l e c t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  p e r f o r m a n c e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  a s s e t  c l a s s ,  
a s  i n  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  a p p r o a c h .  B u t  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  e l e m e n t  i n  
t h i s  s t r a t e g y  l e a d s  t o  r e s u l t s  t h a t  a r e  e x a c t l y  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h o s e  y i e l d e d  b y  t h e  
D E A R  a p p r o a c h  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e .  F o r  e x a m p l e  a  m a r k e t  r u n  o n  e m e r g i n g  
m a r k e t  a s s e t s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  m o r e  o f  s u c h  a s s e t s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e s t o r e  
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  i n  t h a t  a s s e t  c l a s s  t o  i t s  t a r g e t  s h a r e ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t o  t h e  s a l e  o f  s i m i l a r  a s s e t s ,  a s  u n d e r  D E A R .  T h i s  t e n d s  t o  s t a b i l i z e  
m a r k e t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e s t a b i l i z e  t h e m .
W h i c h  s t r a t e g y  p r o d u c e s  b e t t e r  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  u l t i m a t e  i n v e s t o r ?  T h e  Y a le  
e n d o w m e n t  m a n a g e d  b y  S w e n s e n  h a s  i n d e e d  a c h i e v e d  s u p e r i o r  r e t u r n s .  B u t
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s o  h a v e  m o s t  o f  t h e  h e d g e  f u n d s ,  t h e  e x a m p l e  par excellence o f  t h e  s h o r t -  
t e r m i s t  a p p r o a c h .  W h a t  b o t h  h a v e  i n  c o m m o n  i s  s u p e r i o r  m a n a g e m e n t .  O n e  
w o u l d  n e e d  a  m u c h  m o r e  s y s t e m a t i c  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  d r a w  a n y  
s t r o n g  c o n c l u s i o n  a b o u t  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  o n e  a p p r o a c h  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r  f r o m  
t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  g e n e r a t e  r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  u l t i m a t e  i n v e s t o r .  
W h a t  o n e  c a n  s u r e l y  s a y  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  t o  a c c e p t  a s  a x i o m a t i c  t h e  
s e l f - s e r v i n g  c l a i m  o f  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m i s t s  t h a t  a n y  a p p r o a c h  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r s  
i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t l y  a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  i n v e s t o r .
P e r h a p s  t h e  b i g g e s t  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  a p p r o a c h  i s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  m o n i t o r i n g  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  m a n a g e r s  i n  r e a l  t i m e .  I f  o n e  
a b a n d o n s  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o f  r e g u l a r  c o m p a r i s o n s  w i t h  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  a  p e e r  
g r o u p ,  p o o r l y  p e r f o r m i n g  m a n a g e r s  h a v e  t o o  m u c h  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p l e a d  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  i n v e s t i n g  i n  w h a t  i s  u n f a s h i o n a b l e  a n d  t h a t  p a t i e n c e  
i s  n e e d e d  t o  g i v e  t h e  m a r k e t  t i m e  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  e r r o r  o f  i t s  w a y s .  B u t  t h e  
b e s t  a n t i d o t e  t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  t h a t  d i s c i p l i n e  i s  t o  d e m a n d  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t y p e  
o f  d i s c i p l i n e  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  c o h e r e n t  l o n g - t e r m  s t r a t e g y  s u c h  a s  t h a t  
d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e .  I t  i s  t r u s t e e s  w h o  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  d i s c i p ­
l i n e  i s  i n  p l a c e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  c a n  b e  a s  p r o n e  t o  p a n i c  ( t h e  g r e a t  e n e m y  o f  
c o n t r a r i a n  i n v e s t i n g )  a s  a n y o n e  e l s e .
E v e n  t h o u g h  i t  c a n n o t  b e  p r o v e d  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t  
u l t i m a t e  i n v e s t o r s  a n d  b o r r o w e r s  s h a r e  a  c o m m o n  i n t e r e s t  i n  s e c u r i n g  a  s h i f t  
f r o m  t h e  c u r r e n t l y  d o m i n a n t  m o d e  o f  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  i n v e s t m e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  
t o  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  s t r a t e g y  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e .  T h e y  s h a r e  a  c o m m o n  e n e m y  i n  
t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  m a n a g e m e n t  i n d u s t r y ,  a s  i t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  o r g a n i z e d .  
T h i s  h a s  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  r e m u n e r a t i o n  b a s e d  l a r g e l y  o n  f r e q u e n t  
s h o r t - t e r m  c o m p a r i s o n s  w i t h  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  p e e r s ,  w h i c h  g e n e r a t e s  
h i g h  r e m u n e r a t i o n  a n d  l o t s  o f  p o r t f o l i o  c h u r n i n g  t o  g e n e r a t e  c o m m i s s i o n  
i n c o m e  t o  p a y  t h e  h i g h  s a l a r i e s .  T h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  a n y t h i n g  c a n  b e  
d o n e  b y  m e a n s  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  t o  t i l t  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  a d v a n t a g e  t o w a r d s  
t h o s e  i n v e s t m e n t  m a n a g e r s  w h o  e m p l o y  a  l o n g - t e r m  s t r a t e g y .  T h e  r e m a i n d e r  
o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  c o n s i s t s  o f  b r i e f  e x p l o r a t i o n s  o f  s e v e r a l  i d e a s  t h a t  m i g h t  h e l p  
p u s h  t h i n g s  t h a t  w a y .
A n a m e n d e d  UDROP
P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  p r o m i s i n g  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  a n  i d e a  t h a t  
h a s  s u r f a c e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e p e a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  a n d  t h e  c o s t s  t h e y  
h a v e  i m p o s e d  o n  t h e i r  v i c t i m s :  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  d e c l a r e  a  m o r a ­
t o r i u m  o n  d e b t  s e r v i c e  p a y m e n t s .  M a n y  o b s e r v e r s  h a v e  c o m e  t o  f e e l  t h a t ,  
w i t h  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  a s  l a r g e  a n d  v o l a t i l e  a s  t h e y  a r e  n o w ,  t h e  o n l y  
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  a  c u r r e n c y  c r i s i s  i s  t o  i n t e r r u p t  a  r u n  b y  force 
majeure. T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  r e i n f o r c e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
c a m e  o u t  o f  r e c e n t  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  r e l a t i v e l y  q u i c k l y  a n d  l e a s t  b a d l y  s c a r r e d
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w e r e  t h o s e  ( n o t a b l y  K o r e a  a n d  B r a z i l  i n  1 9 9 9 )  i n  w h i c h  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
q u i c k l y  n e g o t i a t e d  a  l e n g t h e n i n g  o f  d e b t  m a t u r i t i e s  w i t h  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
c l a s s  o f  c r e d i t o r s .  T h e  t h i n k i n g  i s  t h a t  i n  m a n y  s u c h  c r i s e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  i s  
o n e  o f  i l l i q u i d i t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n s o l v e n c y ;  t h e  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  b e  c a p a b l e  o f  
h o n o u r i n g  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  w i t h o u t  a  c u t  i n  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  ( ' d e b t  r e l i e f ' )  
i f  o n l y  t h e  r e p a y m e n t  o b l i g a t i o n s  w e r e  s p r e a d  o v e r  a  l o n g e r  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  
b u t  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  o f  a n y  i n d i v i d u a l  c r e d i t o r  i s  t o  c u t  a n d  r u n .  I n  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  o n e  n e e d s  t o  s o l v e  t h e  c r e d i t o r s '  c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r o b l e m  b y  g i v i n g  
t h e m  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  c o m e  t o  t h e  t a b l e  a n d  q u i c k l y  n e g o t i a t e  a  d e b t  
r e s t r u c t u r i n g .  A  m o r a t o r i u m  o r  s t a n d s t i l l  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h a t  i n c e n t i v e  b y  
e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  n e e d  t o  c u t  a n d  r u n .  T h e  p r o b l e m  i s  h o w  t o  o f f e r  t h a t  
p o s s i b i l i t y  w i t h o u t  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  s a n c t i t y  o f  t h e  d e b t  c o n t r a c t s  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t  u n d e r l i e s  a n y  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t .  N o t e  a l s o  t h a t  a  s u c c e s s f u l l y  d e s i g n e d  
s t a n d s t i l l  m e c h a n i s m  m i g h t  h a v e  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e  o f  s a b o t a g i n g  t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t  s t r a t e g y  o f  s h o r t - t e r m i s t s  w h i l e  l e a v i n g  l o n g - t e r m  s t r a t e g i e s  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n s c a t h e d .
T o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  w e  s h a l l  s t a r t  w i t h  t h e  m o s t  c o n c r e t e  p r o p o s a l  
f o r  a  s t a n d s t i l l  t h a t  h a s  y e t  b e e n  t a b l e d ,  t h e  U D R O P  p r o p o s a l  b y  B u i t e r  a n d  
S i b e r t  ( 1 9 9 9 ) .  U D R O P  i s  t h e  a c r o n y m  f o r  ' u n i v e r s a l  d e b t  r o l l o v e r  o p t i o n  w i t h  
a  p e n a l t y ' .  I n  B u i t e r  a n d  S i b e r t ' s  w o r d s :
A l l  f o r e i g n - c u r r e n c y  I O U s  m u s t  h a v e  a  r o l l o v e r  o p t i o n  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e m .  
T h i s  i n c l u d e s  p r i v a t e  a n d  s o v e r e i g n ,  l o n g - t e r m  a n d  s h o r t - t e r m ,  m a r k e t a b l e  
a n d  n o n - m a r k e t a b l e ,  n e g o t i a b l e  a n d  n o n - n e g o t i a b l e  d e b t ,  i n c l u d i n g  o v e r ­
d r a f t s ,  c r e d i t  l i n e s ,  a n d  c o n t i n g e n t  c l a i m s  A l l  b o r r o w e r s ,  p u b l i c  a n d
p r i v a t e ,  m u s t  b e  g i v e n  [ a n ]  o p t i o n . . .  [ t h a t ]  w o u l d  e n t i t l e  t h e  b o r r o w e r ,  a t  
h i s  s o l e  d i s c r e t i o n ,  t o  e x t e n d  m a t u r i n g  d e b t  f o r  a  s p e c i f i e d  p e r i o d  ( s a y  
t h r e e  o r  s i x  m o n t h s )  at a penalty rate. T h e  b o r r o w e r  w o u l d  b e  e n t i t l e d  t o  
t h e  r o l l o v e r  o n l y  i f  t h e  d e b t  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a d  b e e n  s e r v i c e d  i n  f u l l ,  b a r r i n g  
t h e  f i n a l  r e p a y m e n t . . .
W e  e x p e c t  t h e  p e n a l t y  s p r e a d  a n d  o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  r o l l o v e r  c o n t r a c t  
t o  b e  n e g o t i a t e d  b e t w e e n  d e b t o r s  a n d  c r e d i t o r s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e c r e e d  b y  
a  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o d y  ( i b i d . :  2 3 1 - 2 ) .
B u i t e r  a n d  S i b e r t  e m p h a s i z e  t h a t  t h e i r  s c h e m e  i s  i n t e n d e d  o n l y  t o  h e l p  
o t h e r w i s e  s o l v e n t  b o r r o w e r s  w h o  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  r o l l  o v e r  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  
c u r r e n c y  d e b t  b e c a u s e  o f  a  l i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s .  H o w e v e r  m o s t  c r i s e s  a r e  n o t  
p u r e  p a n i c s  t h a t  a r e  r e s o l v e d  s i m p l y  b y  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t i m e .  T h e y  a r i s e  w h e n  
c r e d i t o r s  d e v e l o p  d o u b t s  a b o u t  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  d e b t o r s  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e i r  d e b t s  
o n  t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l l y  a g r e e d  t e r m s ,  a n d  t h e y  e n d  w h e n  t h o s e  d o u b t s  a r e  
r e s o l v e d .  O n e  h a s  t o  a s k  w h y  a  s i x - m o n t h  d e l a y  w i t h o u t  a n y  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  
o f  d e b t  b e y o n d  t h a t  p o i n t  s h o u l d  a l l a y  s u c h  f e a r s :  s u r e l y  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  i s
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t h a t  t h e  d e b t o r ' s  c o n d i t i o n  w i l l  b e  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  s a m e  a s  i t  w a s  w h e n  t h e  
U D R O P  w a s  e x e r c i s e d ,  w h i c h  s u g g e s t s  a  d a n g e r  t h a t  a l l  i t  w o u l d  a c c o m p l i s h  
w o u l d  b e  t o  d e l a y  t h e  c r i s i s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  a n  a m e n d e d  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  U D R O P  p r o p o s a l  w o u l d  b e  a  
n a t u r a l  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  t h e  i d e a s  f o r  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k r u p t c y  m e c h a n i s m  
t h a t  w e r e  r e c e n t l y  f l o a t e d  b y  A n n e  K r u e g e r  ( 2 0 0 1 ) .  E n f o r c i n g  t h e  s t a n d s t i l l  
s h e  e n v i s a g e s  w o u l d  b e  m u c h  e a s i e r  i f  a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l o a n s  i n c l u d e d  a  
c l a u s e  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  i n v o k e d  t o  e x t e n d  t h e  m a t u r i t y  o f  t h e  l o a n  i n  t h e  e v e n t  
o f  t h e  b o r r o w i n g  c o u n t r y  f a c i n g  a  c r i s i s .  T o  t r a n s f o r m  t h i s  i n t o  a  p r o p o s a l  
t h a t  c o u l d  s e r v e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  a  s t a n d s t i l l ,  h o w e v e r ,  o n e  w o u l d  n e e d  t o  
a l t e r  t h e  t e r m  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  r o l l o v e r  w o u l d  a p p l y .
T h e  a b o v e  d i a g n o s i s  o f  w h a t  i s  n e e d e d  t o  e n d  a  d e b t  c r i s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a n  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  m u c h  m o r e  t h a n  s i x  m o n t h s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  n e e d e d .  T h e  t h r e e -  
y e a r  e x t e n s i o n  o f  m a t u r i t i e s  t h a t  w a s  n e g o t i a t e d  b e t w e e n  K o r e a  a n d  i t s  
b a n k  c r e d i t o r s  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  1 9 9 7  s e e m s  m u c h  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  t y p i c a l .  
I n  f a c t  t h i s  i s  a  d i m e n s i o n  t h a t  p r o b a b l y  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  p r e s p e c i f i e d ,  b u t  
i n s t e a d  n e g o t i a t e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e b t o r  a n d  a  c r e d i t o r  c o m m i t t e e  ad hoc a s  
a n d  w h e n  t h e  r o l l o v e r  o p t i o n  i s  i n v o k e d .  T h e  c r e d i t o r s  w i l l  p r e s u m a b l y  s e e k  
t h e  s h o r t e s t  r o l l o v e r  p e r i o d  t h a t  w i l l  a l l o w  t h e  d e b t o r  t o  r e s t o r e  i t s  l i q u i d i t y  
a n d  e s c a p e  f r o m  t h e  c r i s i s .  B u t  i f  t h e y  a r e  r e c a l c i t r a n t  a b o u t  a g r e e i n g  t o  
a  r e a l i s t i c  t i m e  f r a m e ,  t h e  d e b t o r  w o u l d  b e  r e l i e v e d  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  
p a y i n g  a m o r t i z a t i o n  pro tern. T h e  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  d e b t o r  t o  a g r e e  t o  t h e  
s h o r t e s t  r e a l i s t i c  p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  r o l l o v e r  i s  t o  p r e s e r v e  i t s  s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .
C r e d i t o r s  h a v e  r e a c t e d  a d v e r s e l y  t o  t h e  U D R O P  i d e a .  I f  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h e y  
a r e  s o  s t r o n g l y  a v e r s e  t o  i t  a s  t o  b r i n g  l e n d i n g  t o  a  h a l t ,  o n e  s o l u t i o n  m i g h t  
b e  t o  e x e m p t  l o n g - t e r m  l o a n s  a b o v e  a  c e r t a i n  m a t u r i t y .  T r a d e  c r e d i t s  m i g h t  
b e  a l l o w e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  b y  m e a n s  o f  a  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  a  g i v e n  
v o l u m e  o f  c r e d i t s  t o  r e v o l v e  o v e r  t i m e ,  o n  t h e  m o d e l  o f  t h e  b a n k s '  1 9 9 8  
a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  B r a z i l .  B u t  l o a n s  t h a t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  e x e m p t e d ,  n o  m a t t e r  
h o w  s e v e r e  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  v o l u m e ,  a r e  s h o r t - t e r m  l o a n s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  
U D R O P  w o u l d  a d d  t o  t h e  r i s k  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  l e n d i n g  t o  a  d e b t o r  w h o s e  
m e d i u m - t e r m  p o s i t i o n  l o o k e d  d o u b t f u l ,  b u t  t h a t  i s  t h e  p o i n t .  S h o r t - t e r m i s t  
l e n d e r s  f i n d  i t  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e m s e l v e s  t h a t  t h e y  c a n  b u y  
s h o r t - t e r m  a s s e t s  a n d  t h e n  w i n  t h e  r a c e  t o  e x i t  i f  t h i n g s  g o  w r o n g .  T h e  g a m e  
w h e r e  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k e r s  a d v i s e  t h e i r  c l i e n t s  t h a t  i t  i s  s a f e  t o  b u y  s h o r t ­
t e r m  a s s e t s  f r o m  c o u n t r y  X  b e c a u s e  i t  l o o k s  s a f e  e n o u g h  f o r  t h e  n e x t  
n m o n t h s  w o u l d  b e  u n d e r c u t .  O n l y  i n v e s t o r s  w h o  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  m a k e  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  l o n g - t e r m  c o m m i t m e n t  w o u l d  i n v e s t  i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  l o a n s ,  
a n d  t h o s e  a r e  t h e  o n l y  i n v e s t o r s  w o r t h  h a v i n g .
U D R O P  w o u l d  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  r e s o l v e  t h e  p r o b l e m  p o s e d  b y  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  
i n v e s t o r s  i n  t h e  e q u i t y  m a r k e t s .  P e r h a p s  t h a t  i s  a  p r o b l e m  w e  a r e  g o i n g  t o  
h a v e  t o  l i v e  w i t h .
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T rading g u id e lin e s  fo r  fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  m ark ets
I n  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  b y  t h e  S u b - G r o u p  o n  M a r k e t  D y n a m i c s  o f  
t h e  S t u d y  G r o u p  o n  H i g h l y  L e v e r a g e d  I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  S t a b i l i t y  
F o r u m  r e f e r r e d  t o  a b o v e ,  i n  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 1  a  g r o u p  o f  1 6  l e a d i n g  b a n k s  
a n n o u n c e d  a  v o l u n t a r y  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t .  T h e  i d e a  w a s  t h a t  i f  a l l  t h e  l e a d i n g  
b a n k s  w e r e  t o  s u b s c r i b e  t o  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  a n d  d e n y  l i q u i d i t y  t o  p a r t i e s  
w h o m  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t o  b e  v i o l a t i n g  t h e m ,  t h e n  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  f u r t h e r  
i n c i d e n t s  l i k e  t h o s e  o f  A u g u s t - S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 8 .  T h e  p r i n c i p l e s  t h e y  
a n n o u n c e d  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
•  B a n k s  s h o u l d  b e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  m a r k e t  r i s k  a n d  c r e d i t  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  
p a y  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t r a d e s  i n  a  c u r r e n c y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  
h i g h  v o l a t i l i t y .
•  F o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  m a n a g e r s  s h o u l d  p a y  p a r t i c u l a r  c a r e  w h e n  e x e c u t i n g  
o r d e r s  i n  t i m e s  o f  v o l a t i l i t y  a n d  m a r k e t  m a k e r s  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
r e f u s e  c u s t o m e r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e y  f e l t  m i g h t  f u r t h e r  d i s r u p t  o r  i n t e n d  
t o  d i s r u p t  m a r k e t s .
•  S t o p / l o s s  o r d e r s :  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  m a n a g e r s  s h o u l d  c o m m u n i c a t e  f r e ­
q u e n t l y  w i t h  c u s t o m e r s  o n  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  i n d i v i d u a l  t r i g g e r  l e v e l s .
•  C a r e  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  t h a t  c u s t o m e r s '  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  n o t  e x p l o i t e d  w h e n  
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  t r a d e d  f o r  t h e i r  o w n  a c c o u n t .
•  I n s t i t u t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  a t t e n t i v e  a t  a l l  t i m e s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
a n d  i n t e g r i t y  o f  a n y  m a r k e t - r e l a t e d  r e s e a r c h  t h e y  p u b l i s h e d .
•  F i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  s h o u l d  i m p l e m e n t  r i g o r o u s  g u i d e l i n e s  o n  t h e  
h a n d l i n g  o f  r u m o u r s .  D e a l e r s  s h o u l d  n o t  r e l a y  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  
k n e w  t o  b e  f a l s e  o r  s u s p e c t e d  m i g h t  b e  i n a c c u r a t e .
•  M a n i p u l a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  b y  b a n k s  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r  o r  w i t h  c l i e n t s  c o n s t i ­
t u t e d  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t r a d i n g  b e h a v i o u r .
•  F o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  t r a d i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  p r o h i b i t  t h e  d e l i b e r a t e  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  e l e c t r o n i c  d e a l i n g  s y s t e m s  t o  g e n e r a t e  a r t i f i c i a l  p r i c e  
b e h a v i o u r .
I t  i s  r a t h e r  s a d  t h a t  i t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  l e a d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  
a n n o u n c e  t h a t  i n  f u t u r e  t h e y  w o u l d  c o n s i d e r  i t  b a d  f o r m  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  
t h e i r  c l i e n t s  o r  t o  p u b l i s h  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  l a c k e d  i n t e g r i t y ,  b u t  p e r h a p s  w e  
s h o u l d  b e  t h a n k f u l  f o r  s m a l l  m e r c i e s .  A t  p r e s e n t  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  n o  
i n t e n t i o n  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  w h e t h e r  b a n k s  a r e  l i v i n g  u p  t o  t h e i r  v o l u n t a r y  c o d e .  
I t  w o u l d  b e  w o r t h  a d d i n g  t h i s  t o  t h e  t a s k s  i m p o s e d  o n  s u p e r v i s o r s .
L im ita tio n s  o n  in v estm en t-g ra d e  b o n d s
I n v e s t o r s  w i t h  f i d u c i a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  s u c h  a s  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s ,  a r e  
f o r b i d d e n  ( a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s )  t o  h o l d  b o n d s  t h a t  a r e  l e s s  t h a n
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i n v e s t m e n t  g r a d e .  A t  f i r s t  g l a n c e  i s  m a y  s e e m  s e n s i b l e ,  s i n c e  i t  p r e c l u d e s  
t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a b u s i n g  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  o f  t r u s t  b y  u s i n g  i n v e s t o r s '  m o n e y  
t o  b u y  r i s k y  a s s e t s .  W h a t  d o e s  n o t  m a k e  s e n s e ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e ­
m e n t  i s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  w h a t  t h e y  m a y  h o l d  r a t h e r  t h a n  w h a t  t h e y  m a y  
a c q u i r e .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  c a n  b e  c r u c i a l .  I n  l a t e  1 9 9 7  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s  
h o l d i n g  K o r e a n  b o n d s  w e r e  f o r c e d  b y  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  s e l l  t h e m  i n  t h e  
m i d s t  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  i m p l o s i o n ,  w h e n  t h e  c r e d i t  r a t i n g  a g e n c i e s  h a d  p a n i c k e d  
a n d  s u d d e n l y  c u t  K o r e a ' s  r a t i n g  t o  b e l o w  i n v e s t m e n t  g r a d e .  T h e  h o l d e r s  
w e r e  n o t  a l l o w e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  j u d g e m e n t  o f  w h e t h e r  K o r e a n  b o n d s  
r e m a i n e d  a  g o o d  i n v e s t m e n t  ( w h i c h  t h e y  c e r t a i n l y  w e r e  a f t e r  t h e i r  p r i c e  h a d  
c o l l a p s e d )  b u t  w e r e  f o r c e d  t o  s e l l  a n d  t h e r e b y  a d d  t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  o n  K o r e a ,  
a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e i r  c l i e n t s .  A n y  s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  r e d r a f t e d  t o  
l i m i t  w h a t  f i d u c i a r y  i n v e s t o r s  c a n  b u y  r a t h e r  t h a n  w h a t  t h e y  c a n  h o l d .  T h a t  
w o u l d  p r e v e n t  t h e i r  b e i n g  f o r c e d  t o  s e l l  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  c r e d i t  d o w n g r a d i n g ,  
a s  h a p p e n e d  i n  K o r e a  i n  l a t e  1 9 9 7 .  A s  w e l l  a s  m a k i n g  b o n d  l e n d i n g  s o m e ­
w h a t  m o r e  s t a b l e ,  t h i s  c h a n g e  w o u l d  r e d u c e  t h e  p r e m i u m  o n  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  w h e t h e r  a n d  w h e n  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  m a y  c h a n g e .
P u t o p t io n s  in  b o n d  co n tra cts
A  f i v e - y e a r  l o a n  w i t h  a  p u t  o p t i o n  e x e r c i s a b l e  i n  s i x - m o n t h s '  t i m e  i s  n o t  
r e a l l y  a  f i v e - y e a r  b o n d ;  f r o m  a n  e c o n o m i c  s t a n d p o i n t  i t  i s  a  s h o r t - t e r m ,  s i x -  
m o n t h  l o a n  w i t h  a  r o l l o v e r  p r o v i s i o n  i f  t h e  l e n d e r  c o n s e n t s  a n d  i t  s h o u l d  
b e  c o u n t e d  a s  s u c h  i n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s .  C o r r e c t  r e p o r t i n g  w o u l d  f o r c e  b o t h  
b o r r o w e r s  a n d  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  r i s k s  b e i n g  t a k e n .  
O n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h i s  w o u l d  d i m i n i s h  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  a g r e e i n g  t o  
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  p u t  o p t i o n s  i n  b o n d  c o n t r a c t s ,  a n d  h e n c e  l e n g t h e n  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e  m a t u r i t y  o f  b o n d s .
C o lle c tiv e  a c t io n  c lau ses
O n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  s w i t c h  f r o m  b a n k  l e n d i n g  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  t o  b o n d  
l e n d i n g  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  w a s  w i t h o u t  m u c h  d o u b t  t h e  l e s s e r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  
b o n d s  t o  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  w h e n  a  c o u n t r y  r a n  i n t o  d e b t  s e r v i c i n g  p r o b l e m s .  
T h i s  w a s  b a s e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o n  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  N e w  
Y o r k  l a w  i n  1 9 3 9  t o  r e s t r a i n  a b u s i v e  d e b t  b u y b a c k s  t h a t  h a d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
a r b i t r a r i l y  e x p r o p r i a t i n g  s o m e  c r e d i t o r s  ( B u c h h e i t  a n d  G u l a t i ,  2 0 0 0 :  6 6 - 7 ) .  
T h e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n  r e q u i r e d  u n a n i m o u s  c o n s e n t  b y  b o n d h o l d e r s  t o  
a n y  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  p a y m e n t  c l a u s e s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  t h o s e  c l a u s e s  
t h a t  s p e c i f i e d  t h e  s u m s  t o  b e  p a i d  i n  d e b t  s e r v i c e  a n d  t h e  d a t e s  w h e n  
p a y m e n t s  w e r e  d u e .  T h i s  g a v e  a  s i n g l e  r e c a l c i t r a n t  b o n d h o l d e r  -  o r  a  v u l t u r e  
f u n d  t h a t  b o u g h t  u p  d i s t r e s s e d  d e b t  -  t h e  a b i l i t y  e i t h e r  t o  p r e v e n t  a  d e b t  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  w h e n  t h a t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  o r  t o  i n s i s t  o n  f u l l  r e p a y m e n t  e v e n  
w h e n  o t h e r  h o l d e r s  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  a c c e p t  l e s s .  I n d e e d  s u c h  a  b o n d h o l d e r  
c o u l d  n o r m a l l y  e x p e c t  t o  d e m a n d ,  a n d  w i n  f r o m  t h e  c o u r t s ,  a c c e l e r a t e d
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r e p a y m e n t  w h e n  n o r m a l  d e b t  s e r v i c e  w a s  i n t e r r u p t e d  b e f o r e  t h e  d e b t  r e c o n ­
s t r u c t i o n .  N a t u r a l l y  t h e  p r o s p e c t  t h a t  s o m e  c r e d i t o r s  w o u l d  n o t  m a k e  
s a c r i f i c e s  w h e n  o t h e r s  d i d ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  d e b t o r  w o u l d  i n d e e d  b e  a b l e  t o  
s e r v i c e  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  t h e  h o l d o u t s  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  o t h e r s  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  
a c c e p t  a  w r i t e - d o w n  o f  t h e i r  c l a i m s ,  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  w e r e  r e l u c t a n t  
t o  e n d o r s e  b o n d  r e s t r u c t u r i n g s .  I t  c o u l d  e v e n  b e  t h a t  t h e  d e b t o r  w o u l d  b e  
u n a b l e  t o  h o n o u r  t h e  r e v i s e d  d e b t  t e r m s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p a y m e n t  i t  w a s  
f o r c e d  t o  m a k e  t o  t h e  h o l d o u t  b o n d h o l d e r s .
A s  l o n g  a s  b o n d s  w e r e  a  s m a l l  p a r t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c l a i m s  o u t s t a n d i n g ,  i t  w a s  
s i m p l e r  t o  a l l o w  t h e m  t o  r e m a i n  i n t a c t  w h e n  b a n k  c l a i m s  w e r e  r e s t r u c t u r e d .  
I t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  c o u l d  n o t  c o n t i n u e  i f  d e b t o r s  r a n  i n t o  t r o u b l e  w h e n  
b o n d s  h a d  b e c o m e  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  d e b t ,  a n d  i n d e e d  i n  l a t e r  y e a r s  t h e  
o f f i c i a l  s e c t o r  s t a r t e d  t o  c a l l  f o r  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  d e b t  w o r k o u t s  
( t h e  G 1 0  i n  1 9 9 6 ) .  L e d  b y  E i c h e n g r e e n  a n d  P o r t e s  ( 1 9 9 5 ) ,  a  n u m b e r  o f  
e c o n o m i s t s  h a d  a l r e a d y  s t a r t e d  t o  a d v o c a t e  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
c l a u s e s  i n  a l l  b o n d  c o n t r a c t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  b o n d s  
w h e n  n e c e s s a r y . 3 W h e n  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  f i r s t  m o o t e d  t h e r e  w e r e  d i r e  p r e ­
d i c t i o n s  b y  s o m e  N e w  Y o r k - b a s e d  l e n d e r s ,  e c h o e d  b y  s o m e  o f  t h e i r  c l i e n t s ,  
t h a t  a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  i n c l u d e  s u c h  c l a u s e s  w o u l d  b r i n g  l e n d i n g  t o  a  h a l t ,  o r  
a t  t h e  l e a s t  l e a d  t o  d r a s t i c  i n c r e a s e s  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  T h e n  i t  w a s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  
a b o u t  o n e  t h i r d  o f  s u c h  b o n d s ,  n a m e l y  m o s t  o f  t h o s e  s i g n e d  i n  L o n d o n ,  
a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e d  s u c h  c l a u s e s .  E i c h e n g r e e n  a n d  M o d y  ( 2 0 0 0 a ,  2 0 0 0 b )  t h e r e ­
f o r e  e x a m i n e d  w h e t h e r  t h e  c l a u s e s  h a d  r e s u l t e d  i n  h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
f o r  b o r r o w e r s ,  a s  p e r  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n .  I t  t u r n e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  i m p a c t  w a s  
m o d e s t  a n d ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  i m p a c t  d e p e n d e d  o n  t h e  
b o r r o w e r ' s  c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s .  C o u n t r i e s  w i t h  p o o r  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  d i d  i n d e e d  
h a v e  t o  p a y  s o m e w h a t  m o r e  t o  b o r r o w  w h e n  t h e y  h a d  t h e  a d d e d  s e c u r i t y  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s ,  p r e s u m a b l y  r e f l e c t i n g  l e n d e r s '  c o n c e r n  t h a t  u n w i l l ­
i n g n e s s  t o  p a y  m i g h t  c a u s e  b o r r o w e r s  t o  a b u s e  t h e  c l a u s e s ,  e v e n  i f  t h e y  w e r e  
a b l e  t o  p a y .  B u t  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  g o o d  c r e d i t  r a t i n g s  a c t u a l l y  p a i d  s o m e w h a t  
l e s s ,  p r e s u m a b l y  r e f l e c t i n g  l e n d e r s '  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c l a u s e s  w o u l d  r e d u c e  
t h e  c o s t  o f  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  d e b t  ( a n d  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r r u p t i o n  i n  d e b t  s e r v i c e  
p a y m e n t s  w h i l e  t h i s  h a p p e n e d )  i n  t h e  r e m o t e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  u n a b l e  t o  p a y .
L a w y e r s  h a v e  n o w  f o u n d  a  w a y  o f  r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  b o n d s  i s s u e d  u n d e r  N e w  
Y o r k  l a w ,  e v e n  w i t h o u t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s  ( B u c h h e i t  a n d  G u l a t i ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  
T h e  k e y  i s  t o  a c c o m p a n y  t h e  o f f e r  t o  s w a p  o l d  b o n d s  f o r  n e w  o n e s  t h a t  
c o n t a i n  t h e  r e v i s e d  p a y m e n t  t e r m s  b y  a m e n d i n g  t h e  n o n - p a y m e n t  c l a u s e s  
o f  t h e  o l d  b o n d s  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  t o  m a k e  t h e s e  b o n d s  m u c h  l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  
a n d  i m p e d e  h o l d o u t  b o n d h o l d e r s  f r o m  s u c c e s s f u l l y  l i t i g a t i n g  f o r  c o n t i n u e d  
o r  a c c e l e r a t e d  p a y m e n t .  F o r  e x a m p l e  t h e  o l d  b o n d s  m a y  b e  d e l i s t e d ,  t h e  
w a i v e r  o f  s o v e r e i g n  i m m u n i t y  m a y  b e  w i t h d r a w n  a n d  n e g a t i v e  p l e d g e  
p r o t e c t i o n  m a y  b e  r e m o v e d ,  a l l  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  t h e  u n a n i m i t y  t h a t  p r e ­
v e n t s  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  p a y m e n t s  c l a u s e s .  S i n c e  t h e s e  d i s f i g u r i n g  a m e n d m e n t s
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t o  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  o l d  b o n d s  a r e  a d o p t e d  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  b o n d h o l d e r s  
e x c h a n g i n g  t h e i r  o l d  b o n d s  f o r  t h e  n e w  d e b t  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  t h e y  a r e  k n o w n  
a s  ' e x i t  c o n s e n t s ' .  E x i t  c o n s e n t s  w e r e  u s e d  w h e n  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  j u n k  b o n d s  i n  
t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  i n  1 9 9 9  E c u a d o r  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  c o u n t r y  t o  u s e  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  
t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  s o v e r e i g n  b o n d s .
E x i t  c o n s e n t s  h a v e  o n e  g r e a t  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s :  t h e y  
c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  s t o c k  o f  o l d  b o n d s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  s i m p l y  a l l o w i n g  
t o d a y ' s  n e w  i s s u e s  t o  b e  r e s t r u c t u r e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h e y  a l s o  h a v e  o n e  g r e a t  
d i s a d v a n t a g e :  t h e y  d o  n o t  g i v e  t o t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  l i t i ­
g a t i o n  b y  h o l d o u t s .  A n  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g y  f o r  a n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  ( o r  a t  l e a s t  
f o r  o n e  w i t h  a  r e p u t a t i o n  a s  a  g o o d  c r e d i t o r )  w o u l d  b e  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  
n e w  b o n d s  c o n t a i n e d  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s ,  w h i l e  b e i n g  r e a d y  t o  u s e  e x i t  
c o n s e n t s  o n  o l d  b o n d s  s h o u l d  t h e  n e e d  a r i s e .  I t  w o u l d  b e  v e r y  e a s y  t o  e n s u r e  
t h a t  i t s  n e w  b o n d s  c o n t a i n e d  s u c h  c l a u s e s :  a l l  i t  w o u l d  n e e d  t o  d o  w o u l d  b e  
t o  s h i f t  i t s  b o r r o w i n g  t o  L o n d o n  u n t i l  N e w  Y o r k  l a w  w a s  a m e n d e d  s o  t h a t  
t h e  t e r m s  o f  i t s  s t a n d a r d  b o n d  c o n t r a c t  i n c l u d e d  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s .
M i g h t  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s  i n  b o n d  c o n t r a c t s  a c t u a l l y  
m a k e  b o n d s  m o r e  a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  c r e d i t o r s  t o  h o l d  a s  w e l l  a s  m a k i n g  l i f e  e a s i e r  
f o r  d e b t o r s  i f  t h e  w o r s t  h a p p e n s ?  T h a t  w o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  n e t  o u t c o m e  o f  
t w o  o p p o s i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s  
w o u l d  r e d u c e  t h e  c o s t  a n d  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  d e b t  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  s h o u l d  t h e  
d e b t o r  b e c o m e  u n a b l e  t o  p a y  o n  t h e  o r i g i n a l l y  c o n t r a c t e d  t e r m s .  O n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  e a s e  o f  r e n e g o t i a t i n g  t e r m s  m i g h t  e n c o u r a g e  a  
d e b t o r  t o  s u c c u m b  t o  t h e  t e m p t a t i o n  t o  a v o i d  p a y i n g  w h e n  i t  c o u l d  d o  s o .  
E i c h e n g r e e n  a n d  M o d y ' s  e v i d e n c e  o n  b o n d  p r i c i n g  i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  
a b l e  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  w h i c h  e a c h  e f f e c t  d o m i n a t e s ,  
w h i c h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  s u f f e r  i f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s  
b e c o m e  r o u t i n e .  B y  m a k i n g  m o r e  e x p l i c i t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  b o n d s  w i l l  
h a v e  t o  b e  r e s t r u c t u r e d ,  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c l a u s e s  t o  m a k e  
p o t e n t i a l  b u y e r s  w e i g h  u p  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  t h e i r  b e i n g  i n v o k e d ,  w h i c h  w i l l  
h e l p  t o  c u r b  s h o r t - t e r m i s m .  T h o s e  w h o  s t i l l  b u y  t h e m  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  m o r e  
l i k e l y  t o  p r o v e  p a t i e n t  h o l d e r s .
C u rren cy  o f  d e n o m in a t io n
O n e  r e a s o n  w h y  c u r r e n c y  c r i s e s  t e n d  t o  b e  s o  d i s r u p t i v e  i s  t h a t  f o r e i g n  
l e n d i n g  t o  a n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  c o u n t r y  i s  a l m o s t  a l w a y s  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  
e i t h e r  d o l l a r s  o r  ( i f  d i f f e r e n t )  t h e  c u r r e n c y  o f  t h e  l e n d e r .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  a n y  
d e v a l u a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  b o r r o w i n g  c o u n t r y ' s  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  i n  t e r m s  
o f  i t s  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y ,  w h i c h ,  i n  e x t r e m e  c a s e s  c a n  t h r e a t e n  w i d e s p r e a d  
b a n k r u p t c y  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a n d / o r  c o r p o r a t e  s e c t o r s  ( a s  h a p p e n e d  i n  E a s t  
A s i a  i n  1 9 9 7 ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t  m a n y  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  b o r r o w  p r e d o m i n ­
a n t l y  i n  t h e i r  o w n  c u r r e n c i e s ,  w h i c h  m a k e s  a n  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  c h a n g e  f a r  l e s s  
t h r e a t e n i n g .
1 5 4  C u rb in g  the  B o o m -B u s t C ycle
T h e r e f o r e  o n e  c h a n g e  t h a t  s e e m s  h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e  w o u l d  b e  t o  u s e  t h e  
b o r r o w e r ' s  c u r r e n c y  t o  d e n o m i n a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l o a n s .  E i c h e n g r e e n  a n d  
H a u s m a n n  ( 1 9 9 9 )  i m p l y  t h a t  t h i s  i s  i n c o n c e i v a b l e  b y  d e s c r i b i n g  e m e r g i n g -  
m a r k e t  c o u n t r i e s  a s  s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  ' o r i g i n a l  s i n ' .  N o  e v i d e n c e  i s  p r e s e n t e d  
t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  i n n u e n d o  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  d e n o m i n a t i n g  l o a n s  i n  f o r e i g n  
c u r r e n c i e s  i s  u n a l t e r a b l e .  I n  f a c t  t h e r e  a r e  o c c a s i o n a l  i n s t a n c e s  o f  e m e r g i n g  
c o u n t r i e s  b o r r o w i n g  i n  t h e i r  o w n  c u r r e n c i e s ,  o f  w h i c h  t h e  m a j o r  e x a m p l e  i s  
S o u t h  A f r i c a .  I n s t e a d  o f  d i s m i s s i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c h i e v i n g  s u c h  a  d e s i r ­
a b l e  r e f o r m ,  i t  m a k e s  m o r e  s e n s e  t o  t r y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  i t  h a p p e n s  s o  
r a r e l y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  w h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  m i g h t  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  m a k e  i t  t h e  n o r m .
W h y  m i g h t  l e n d e r s  s e e k  t o  a v o i d  c u r r e n c y  e x p o s u r e ?  T h e  s t r o n g e s t  r e a s o n  
i s  a  d e s i r e  t o  a v o i d  h o l d i n g  a s s e t s  i n  a  c u r r e n c y  w h o s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  h a v e  
a  r e c o r d  o f  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  
u n p r e d i c t a b l e  l o s s e s  t h r o u g h  d e v a l u a t i o n .  B u t  m o s t  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  h a v e  
g o t  b e y o n d  t h e  s t a g e  o f  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  c h e a t i n g  t h e i r  c r e d i t o r s  i s  a  c l e v e r  
s t r a t e g y .  S i n c e  m o s t  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s '  d o m e s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  h i g h e r  
t h a n  d o l l a r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a t  m o s t  t i m e s ,  i t  c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  a  l e n d e r  w i l l  
e a r n  m o r e  f r o m  l o a n s  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  t h e  b o r r o w e r s ’ c u r r e n c y  i n  n o r m a l  
t i m e s .  I n d e e d  t h e r e  i s  a  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n  t h e  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  
p r e m i u m  w i l l  t e n d  t o  m a k e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  b o r r o w i n g  m o r e  e x p e n s i v e  t o  
t h e  b o r r o w e r  a n d  m o r e  r e m u n e r a t i v e  t o  t h e  l e n d e r .  W h a t  i t  w i l l  a c c o m p l i s h  
i s  t o  m o v e  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  p a y  a w a y  f r o m  a  t i m e  w h e n  p a y m e n t  i s  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  o n e r o u s  t o  a  t i m e  w h e n  i t  i s  l e s s  p r o b l e m a t i c .  A g r e e m e n t  t o  d e n o m i n a t e  
l o a n s  i n  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  w o u l d  e s s e n t i a l l y  r e d i s t r i b u t e  e a r n i n g s  o v e r  t i m e  
i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o n  b o r r o w e r s  a t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  
t i m e s ,  w i t h o u t  r e d u c i n g  -  i n d e e d ,  p r o b a b l y  i n c r e a s i n g  -  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  
o f  e x p e c t e d  e a r n i n g s .  A  l e n d e r  t h a t  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c o n c e r n e d  t o  a v o i d  
s h o w i n g  a  b a l a n c e - s h e e t  l o s s  c o u l d  c o v e r  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t  
( w h e t h e r  t h e  b o r r o w i n g  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  s t i l l  r e d u c e  i t s  r i s k s  i n  t h e  e v e n t  
o f  a  d e v a l u a t i o n  w o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o v e r  w a s  p r o v i d e d  b y  a  
d o m e s t i c  o r  a  f o r e i g n  p a r t y ) .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  i s  p r e t t y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  j u s t i f y  
l e n d e r s '  o b s e s s i o n  w i t h  a v o i d i n g  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  e x p o s u r e .
T h e  g r e a t e r  s e c u r i t y  o f  o w n - c u r r e n c y  b o r r o w i n g  w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  i n  t h e  1 9 8 8  
B a s e l  A c c o r d ,  w h i c h  a l l o w e d  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  2 0  p e r  c e n t  r i s k  w e i g h t  t o  a p p l y  
t o  l o n g - t e r m  b a n k  l e n d i n g  i n  n o n - O E C D  c o u n t r i e s  w h e n  i t  w a s  d e n o m i n ­
a t e d  i n ,  a n d  f i n a n c e d  i n ,  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y .  T h e  p o l i c y  q u e s t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  n o t  g o  f u r t h e r  a n d  d r o p  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  
l e n d i n g  b e  f i n a n c e d  b y  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  o r  b o r r o w i n g ,  a n d  t h u s  g i v e  
a n  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  f o r e i g n  l e n d i n g  t o  b e  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y .
R em u n era tio n  p ra ctices
M o s t  m a n a g e r s  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a n a g e m e n t  b u s i n e s s  f a c e  a  r e m u n e r a t i o n  
s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  a l i g n  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  i n c e n t i v e s  w i t h  t h e  
w e l f a r e  o f  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l s .  T h i s  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  b a s e  s a l a r y  a u g m e n t e d
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b y  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  b o n u s  i f  a  s u p e r i o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  i s  a c h i e v e d .  T h e  b a s e  
s a l a r y  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  s e c u r e  a  r e a s o n a b l e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  f o r  m a n a g e r s  
e v e n  i f  t h e i r  p e r f o r m a n c e  i s  a v e r a g e ,  w h i l e  t h e  b o n u s  p a y s  t h e m  p a r t  
o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  t h a t  w o u l d  a c c r u e  t o  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l s  i f  t h e i r  r e t u r n s  a r e  
e x c e p t i o n a l ,  t h u s  p r o v i d i n g  t h e m  w i t h  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  s t r i v e  t o  a c h i e v e  
e x c e p t i o n a l  r e t u r n s .  T h e  b o n u s  i s  n o r m a l l y  b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  
t h e  p o r t f o l i o s  t h e y  m a n a g e  a c h i e v e  a  h i g h e r  r e t u r n  t h a n  t h e  n o r m  f o r  t h e  
a s s e t  c l a s s  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  i n v e s t i n g ,  a s  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  i n d e x  f o r  t h a t  
a s s e t  c l a s s .
T h e  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  t i m e  f r a m e  o v e r  w h i c h  b o n u s e s  
a r e  d e f i n e d  m a y  n o t  b e  l o n g  e n o u g h  f o r  a  c o n t r a r i a n  i n v e s t m e n t  p o l i c y  t o  
b e a r  f r u i t .  I f  b o n u s e s  a r e  p a i d  a n n u a l l y  a n d  a  f a d  l a s t s  o n l y  a  f e w  m o n t h s ,  
t h e n  t h e  b o n u s  s y s t e m  w i l l  g i v e  m a n a g e r s  t h e  r i g h t  i n c e n t i v e .  B u t  i f  b o n u s e s  
a r e  p a i d  o n  a n  a n n u a l  b a s i s  ( o r  w o r s e ,  a s  i s  n o r m a l  i n  m u t u a l  f u n d s ,  q u a r ­
t e r l y ) ,  a n d  a  f a d  l a s t s  f o r  y e a r s ,  t h e n  r e s p o n s i b l e  i n v e s t m e n t  m a n a g e r s  w h o  
m a k e  l o n g - t e r m  c o n t r a r i a n  i n v e s t m e n t s  c a n  f i n d  t h e m s e l v e s  f o r e g o i n g  
b o n u s e s  f o r  l o n g  p e r i o d s .  W o r s e ,  t h e y  m a y  r i s k  b e i n g  f i r e d  f o r  f a l l i n g  b e h i n d  
t h e  i n d e x  f o r  a  p e r i o d  s h o r t e r  t h a n  a  f a d  c a n  l a s t .  T h e  b o n u s  s y s t e m  i s  a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  r e a l  p r o b l e m  o f  m a k i n g  s u r e  t h a t  m a n a g e r s  a c t  i n  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l s ,  b u t  i t  c a n  p r o v i d e  a n  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  m a n a g e r s  
t o  c o m p e t e  t o  b e a t  t h e  i n d e x  i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m  a n d  m a k e  s u r e  t h e y  d o  n o t  
d e p a r t  t o o  f a r  f r o m  i t  i n  t h e  l o n g e r  t e r m ,  a  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  c a n  a m p l i f y  a n d  
p r o l o n g  f a d s .
T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  t o  m a n a g e r s '  p e r f o r m a n c e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  
c h o s e n  b e n c h m a r k  h a s  t h e  u n f o r t u n a t e  e f f e c t  o f  i n d u c i n g  h e r d  b e h a v i o u r  
o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  m a n a g e r s .  N o  m a t t e r  h o w  s t r o n g l y  t h e y  b e l i e v e  a  s e c u r i t y  
t o  b e  m i s v a l u e d  b y  t h e  m a r k e t ,  t h e y  s i m p l y  c a n n o t  a f f o r d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e i r  
c o n v i c t i o n s  i f  t h e y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  c r o w d  i s  g o i n g  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  i t s  e r r o r  f o r  
a n y  l e n g t h  o f  t i m e .  T h a t  w a y  t h e y  r i s k  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e i r  b o n u s e s ,  b u t  p e r h a p s  
e v e n  t h e i r  j o b s .  P r o f e s s i o n a l  p r u d e n c e  d i c t a t e s  n o t  s t r a y i n g  t o o  f a r  f r o m  t h e  
b e n c h m a r k ,  t h a t  i s ,  n o t  d e f y i n g  t h e  h e r d .
S i n c e  t h e  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  t h e  b o n u s  d e s i g n  p r o v i d e s  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  f o l l o w  
t h e  h e r d  i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m  w i t h o u t  p a y i n g  p r o p e r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  l i k e l y  
l o n g - t e r m  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  w h e r e  t h e  h e r d  i s  h e a d i n g ,  i t  s e e m s  n a t u r a l  t o  
e x p l o r e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  l o n g e r - t e r m  p e r f o r m a n c e  i n t o  t h e  
d e s i g n .  S u p p o s e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  m a n a g e r s  w e r e  p a i d  t h e i r  b o n u s  o n l y  
a f t e r  a  d e l a y ,  a n d  t h e n  o n l y  i f  s u b s e q u e n t  e v e n t s  h a d  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  
t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  w e r e  f l a w e d .  T h i s  w o u l d  p r o v i d e  a  v e r y  c o n c r e t e  
i n c e n t i v e  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  l o n g e r - t e r m  s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  t h e y  
w e r e  c h o o s i n g  t o  p u r s u e .  A n d  i t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  u s e  t a x  p o l i c y  t o  
e n c o u r a g e  a l l  a s s e t  m a n a g e m e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  r e v i s e  t h e i r  r e m u n e r a t i o n  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h i s  w a y :  a  p r o v i s i o n  c o u l d  b e  i n t r o d u c e d  t h a t  b o n u s e s  p a i d  
p r o m p t l y  o r  w i t h o u t  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n d i t i o n a l i t y  w o u l d  n o t  c o u n t  a s  a n  
e x p e n s e  t h a t  e m p l o y e r s  w e r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  d e d u c t  f r o m  r e v e n u e  w h e n  c a l c u ­
l a t i n g  t a x a b l e  p r o f i t .
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S u c h  a n  a p p r o a c h  w o u l d  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  i f  a s s e t  m a n a g e r s  s t a y e d  i n  
t h e  s a m e  j o b  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e i r  c a r e e r ,  b u t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w o u l d  a r i s e  w h e n  
a  m a n a g e r  q u i t t e d .  O n e  w o u l d  n o t  w a n t  t o  g i v e  a n  a r t i f i c i a l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  
a c c e l e r a t e  t u r n o v e r  b y  p a y i n g  o u t  t h e  b o n u s  u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  t o  a n y  m a n a g e r  
w h o  q u i t  h i s  o r  h e r  j o b .  C o u l d  o n e  n o t i o n a l l y  f r e e z e  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  a s  i t  w a s  
o n  t h e  l e a v i n g  d a t e  a n d  a p p l y  t h e  a g r e e d  t e s t  t o  t h a t  h y p o t h e t i c a l  p o r t f o l i o ?  
S i n c e  m a n a g e r s  c h a n g e  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s  q u i t e  f r e q u e n t l y ,  t h a t  w o u l d  h a r d l y  
s e e m  j u s t .  W o u l d  o n e  l o o k  a t  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  a c h i e v e d  b y  h i s  o r  h e r  
s u c c e s s o r  a n d  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  d e p a r t i n g  m a n a g e r ' s  p o l i c y  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  
t h e  s a m e ?  I f  t h a t  w e r e  a  g o o d  a s s u m p t i o n ,  o n e  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  d o u b t  w h e t h e r  
i t  w a s  w o r t h  c h a n g i n g  t h e  m a n a g e r .  W o u l d  o n e  r e q u i r e  t h e  d e p a r t i n g  
m a n a g e r  t o  c o n t i n u e  m a n a g i n g  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  p o r t f o l i o  f o r  t h e  n e x t  f i v e  
y e a r s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  s h e  o r  h e  c o u l d  h a v e  a c h i e v e d  t h e  h u r d l e  l e v e l  o f  
p e r f o r m a n c e ?  T h i s  i s  a  p r o b l e m  f o r  w h i c h  m o r e  r e s e a r c h  i s  n e e d e d .
A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  w o u l d  i n v o l v e  a  m o r e  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  w a y  
t h e  i n d u s t r y  f u n c t i o n s ,  w i t h  t r u s t e e s  t a k i n g  o n  a  b i g g e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  b u r d e n .  
I n s t e a d  o f  h i r i n g  m a n a g e r s  t o  m a k e  t h e  c r i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  s e e k i n g  t o  
b l a m e  t h o s e  m a n a g e r s  w h e n  t h i n g s  w e n t  w r o n g ,  t r u s t e e s  c o u l d  t h e m s e l v e s  
d e c i d e  t o  b u y  a n d  h o l d  f o r  t h e  l o n g  t e r m .  O r  t h e y  c o u l d  d e c i d e  t o  i n v e s t  
a  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o  i n ,  s a y ,  e m e r g i n g - m a r k e t  b o n d s  a n d  
t h e n  h i r e  a  m a n a g e r  t o  l o o k  a f t e r  i t  f o r  f i v e  o r  t e n  y e a r s ,  w i t h  t h e  b o n u s  
t o  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  o n l y  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c u m u l a t i v e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o v e r  t h e  w h o l e  p e r i o d .  T h e y  m i g h t  e v e n  e x p e r i m e n t  w i t h  
a s s i g n i n g  a  p o r t f o l i o  t o  a  m a n a g e r  f o r  a  t e n - y e a r  p e r i o d  a n d  r e l y i n g  o n  
h i s  o r  h e r  s e n s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  m o t i v a t e  h i m  o r  h e r  t o  a c t  
i n  t h e  b e s t  l o n g - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l s .  T h i s  a s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
c o m p e t e n t  p e o p l e  w h o  f i n d  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  c h a l l e n g e  s u f f i c i e n t  m o t i v a t i o n  
f o r  e x c e p t i o n a l  e f f o r t ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  m o n e t a r y  i n c e n t i v e s ,  w h i c h  i s  
t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d  i n  m a n y  o t h e r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a r e a s .
C o n c lu d in g  rem arks
T h e  b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e  i n  l e n d i n g  t o  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t s  i s  e x a g g e r a t e d  b y  
t h e  s h o r t - t e r m i s t  n a t u r e  o f  m o d e r n  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a n d  t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  
t o  w h i c h  i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h o s e  m a r k e t s  a r e  s u b j e c t .  W h i l e  s o m e  
m e a s u r e s ,  s u c h  a s  p e r s u a d i n g  b a n k s  t o  a b i d e  b y  t h e i r  v o l u n t a r y  c o d e  o f  
c o n d u c t ,  m a y  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  a c h i e v e ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  e a s y  o n e s  ( s u c h  
a s  r e q u i r i n g  p r o p e r  a c c o u n t i n g  o f  b o n d s  w i t h  p u t  o p t i o n s )  s e e m  u n l i k e l y  t o  
a c h i e v e  a  g r e a t  d e a l .  C h a n g i n g  r e m u n e r a t i o n  p r a c t i c e s  m i g h t  b e  i m p o r t a n t ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t  w i l l  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  a  f o r m u l a  t h a t  w i l l  w o r k  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  f o r  
p e o p l e  w h o  c h a n g e  j o b s .  P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  p r o m i s i n g  m e a s u r e  w o u l d  b e  t o  
a l l o w  s t a n d s t i l l s  t o  b e  i n v o k e d  i n  a  c r i s i s ,  i n  w h i c h  c o n t e x t  a n  a m e n d e d  
U D R O P  c l a u s e  i n  l o a n  c o n t r a c t s  m i g h t  p r o v e  h e l p f u l .
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* The author acknowledges the helpful discussion of other participants at the UNU/ 
WIDER workshop in Santiago in March 2001.
1. Calvo described this more clearly in his oral version than in his written version.
2. They set out to test the hypothesis that mutual funds based offshore are more prone 
to heavy trading, positive (procyclical) feedback trading, and herding behaviour 
than are onshore funds. To their surprise they found that funds based in the 
United States and United Kingdom were more prone to positive feedback trad­
ing and herding behaviour, although the offshore funds did tend to trade more 
heavily.
3. Collective action clauses would allow a bondholders' meeting to be convened to 
consider a debt reconstruction, rules allowing interest and amortization terms to 
be modified by a qualified majority of bondholders, sharing clauses, and so on.
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In tro d u ctio n
A f t e r  t h e  T e q u i l a  a n d  A s i a n  c r i s e s  t h e r e  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  d e b a t e  o n  t h e  
i m p a c t  o f  c a p i t a l - f l o w  v o l a t i l i t y  o n  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  g r o w t h  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
c o u n t r i e s .  I n  p o l i c y  c i r c l e s  -  i n c l u d i n g  a m o n g  p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d  a c a d e m i c s  -  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  c e n t r e d  o n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  f u n d a m e n t a l  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  a r c h i t e c t u r e . 1 T h e  a c a d e m i c  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  t i m e  f o c u s e d  
o n  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w s .
T h i s  c h a p t e r  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  t y p e  o f  a n a l y s i s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  
A  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  m a d e  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  r e v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  
i n v e s t m e n t  f r o m  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e  f l o w  o f  f u n d s  l i n k e d  t o  
i t .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  c e n t r e s  o n  e p i s o d e s  o f  c u r r e n c y  o r  f i n a n c i a l  s h o c k s  a n d  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  f i r m s  t h a t  e x p e c t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e v a l u a t i o n .  T h i s  
a l l o w s  u s  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  m i c r o e c o n o m i c  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  a n d  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t ,  b a s e d  
o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s :
•  I s  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  b y  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a f f e c t e d  b y  
f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  v o l a t i l i t y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t a g i o n ?
•  D o  t h e  d i v e r s e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t s  o n  m u l t i n a ­
t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s '  c a s h  f l o w  m a n a g e m e n t ?
•  C a n  w e  i d e n t i f y  m i c r o - m a c r o  t r a n s m i s s i o n  m e c h a n i s m s  b e t w e e n  c u r r e n c y  
r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t ?
T h e  s t u d y  o n  w h i c h  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  b a s e d  u s e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m e t h o d o l o g y :  
i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t h e  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  i n  v a r i o u s  
s e c t o r s  b u t  a l l  w i t h  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  h e a d q u a r t e r s  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  o r  S p a i n ;  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  b u s i n e s s  a n d  c u r r e n c y
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r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t ;  a n d  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  s u r v e y s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  
i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s . 2
S i x t e e n  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  w e r e  i n t e r v i e w e d  i n  1 2  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s .  
T h e  i n d u s t r i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  w e r e  m i n i n g ,  o i l  a n d  g a s ,  e n e r g y ,  t e l e c o m m u n i ­
c a t i o n s ,  f o o d  a n d  f i n a n c e .  F o u r  o f  t h e  c o m p a n i e s  r a n k e d  a m o n g  t h e  t o p  t e n  
f i r m s  i n  t e r m s  o f  s a l e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  a n d  a l l  o f  t h e m  h a d  i n v e s t e d  h e a v i l y  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f i v e  y e a r s .  A s  a  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  t h e  
r e s e a r c h  t h e  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  o f  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l s '  s u b s i d i a r i e s  w e r e  i n t e r ­
v i e w e d  i n  C h i l e .  T h e r e  w e r e  f o u r  r e a s o n s  f o r  c h o o s i n g  C h i l e  f o r  t h e  s t u d y :  
( 1 )  t h e  C h i l e a n  e x p e r i e n c e  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  p a r a d i g m a t i c  a f t e r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
r e f o r m s ,  ( 2 )  i t  h a d  a  v e r y  s t a b l e  e c o n o m i c  r e g i m e ,  ( 3 )  i t  h a d  g o o d  c o u n t r y -  
r i s k  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a n d  ( 4 )  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  w a s  r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  d e v e l o p e d .
A s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  a n d  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  n o t  b a s e d  o n  s t a t i s t i c a l  s a m p l e s  
a n d  t h e r e  a r e  n o  f i n d i n g s  t h a t  c a n  b e  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  t e s t e d ,  t h i s  s t u d y  c a n  o n l y  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a n  e s s a y  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  a s  a n  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  
f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .
Foreign  d irec t in v e s tm e n t  a n d  ca p ita l f lo w  v o la t il ity
D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  ( F D I )  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  t h e  
C a r i b b e a n  r o s e  f r o m  a n  a n n u a l  a v e r a g e  o f  $ 6  b i l l i o n  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
d e c a d e  t o  $ 8 5  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 9 .  E i g h t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h a t  a m o u n t  w a s  c o n c e n ­
t r a t e d  i n  f o u r  c o u n t r i e s :  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l ,  C h i l e  a n d  M e x i c o .
F D I  a n d  c a p i t a l  f o r m a t i o n  m a i n t a i n e d  a  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  d u r i n g  t h e  
1 9 8 0 s  a n d  1 9 9 0 s  ( F f r e n c h - D a v i s  a n d  R e i s e n ,  1 9 9 8 ) ,  b u t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p e r ­
c e n t a g e  o f  F D I  d u r i n g  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 0  c a m e  f r o m  m e r g e r s ,  a c q u i s i t i o n s  a n d  
p r i v a t i z a t i o n s .  E C L A C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  e s t i m a t e s  a n  a c c u m u l a t e d  f i g u r e  o f  $ 9 0  b i l l i o n  
i n  t w o  y e a r s ,  o r  h a l f  o f  t h e  t o t a l  F D I  i n  t h a t  p e r i o d .  M o s t  o f  t h a t  i n v e s t m e n t  
w a s  i n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  e n e r g y  
s e c t o r s .
A  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  s h o w s  t h a t  F D I  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  w a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  l e s s  v o l a t i l e  t h a n  n e t  c a p i t a l  t r a n s f e r s 3 ( s e e  
t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n / a v e r a g e  o f  t h e  s e r i e s  i n  T a b l e  9 . 1 ) .  T h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  f i n d i n g  b y  S a r n o  a n d  T a y l o r  ( 1 9 9 9 )  t h a t  F D I  h a s  a  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
p e r m a n e n t  c o m p o n e n t ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  m o r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  
s t r u c t u r a l  f o r c e s  b e h i n d  a  c o u n t r y ' s  e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  t h a n  o t h e r  f o r m s  
o f  f i n a n c i n g .  H a u s m a n n  a n d  F e r n á n d e z  A r i a s  ( 2 0 0 0 a ,  2 0 0 0 b )  a n d  L i p s e y  
( 2 0 0 1 )  a l s o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  F D I  l i a b i l i t i e s  s e e m  t o  b e  s a f e r  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  
b e i n g  l e s s  c r i s i s  p r o n e )  t h a n  d e b t  o r  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  n o n - F D I  o b l i g a t i o n . 4
H o w e v e r  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  a l w a y s  b e e n  a w a r e  o f  c u r r e n c y  
v o l a t i l i t y .  D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s  t h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  c a u s e d  b y  
c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e  s h o c k s ,  i n c o n s i s t e n t  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c i e s  a n d  h i g h  
i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  -  i n  s o m e  c a s e s  h y p e r i n f l a t i o n .  M u l t i n a t i o n a l s  a d d r e s s e d  
t h i s  p r o b l e m  b y  a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  r e m i t t a n c e  o f  d i v i d e n d s  a n d  d e p r e c i a t i o n
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r e s e r v e s .  W i t h  t h e  o p e n i n g  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  g l o b a l i z a t i o n ,  
m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  d e b t  f i n a n c i n g .  T h i s  w a s  s t i m u l a t e d  
b y  t h e  r e v a l u a t i o n  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c u r r e n c i e s  d u r i n g  1 9 9 0 - 9 7  ( F f r e n c h -  
D a v i s ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
F o r e i g n  d e b t  e x p o s u r e  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
c o m p a n y ,  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  
t h e  b u s i n e s s  s e c t o r  i n  w h i c h  i t  i s  l o c a t e d ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
C h i l e ,  s t a t i s t i c s  f r o m  t h e  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  C o m m i t t e e  s h o w  t h a t  i n  t h e  
m i n i n g  s e c t o r  7 0  p e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  F D I  c o m e s  f r o m  l o a n s  f r o m  h e a d q u a r t e r s  
o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m ,  w h i l e  i n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  t h e  f i g u r e  i s  
o n l y  2 2  p e r  c e n t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r ,  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  
t h e  1 9 9 0 s  f i r m s  h a d  a  v e r y  l o w  l e v e l  o f  d e b t  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  b u t  t h e  s h a r e  
i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y  d u r i n g  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  d e c a d e .  I n  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
C h i l e ,  f i n a n c i n g  w i t h  f o r e i g n  l o a n s  w a s  e n c o u r a g e d  b y  t a x  b e n e f i t s .
F oreign  e x c h a n g e  risk  m a n a g e m e n t b y  m u lt in a t io n a l firm s
F i n a n c i a l  a n d  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  b e c o m e  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  p a r t  
o f  b u s i n e s s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  1 0 - 1 5  y e a r s ,  b u t  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
f i r m s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  m a n a g i n g  t h e i r  r i s k  e x p o s u r e  l o n g  b e f o r e  
t h a t .  I t  m u s t  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  v e r y  
u n s t a b l e  a n d  h a d  e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s ,  a n d  c u r r e n c y  c r i s e s  w e r e  
f r e q u e n t .  M a t c h i n g  a s s e t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  c u r r e n c y  s o  t h a t  p a y ­
m e n t s  a n d  r e c e i p t s  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c u r r e n c y  c o u l d  b e  o f f s e t ,  w a s  t h e  m o s t  
c o m m o n  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r i s k .
A n o t h e r  m e c h a n i s m  s t i l l  i n  u s e  i s  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  a p p r o a c h .  T h i s  m e c h - ' 
a n i s m ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  f i r m  m a n a g e s  a  g r e a t  d i v e r s i t y  o f  c u r r e n t  f l o w s ,  p r o v i d e s  
p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  c u r r e n c y  r i s k .  I t  i m p l i e s  g e o g r a p h i c a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
b u s i n e s s ,  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t y p e s  o f  b u s i n e s s  a n d  g e o g r a p h i c a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
i n  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  s o u r c e s .  T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  f o r  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  
a  l a r g e  v a r i e t y  o f  g o o d s  a n d  b u s i n e s s e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  a n d  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  c h e m i c a l  a n d  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  m a n u f a c ­
t u r e r s  o f  f o o d ,  b e v e r a g e s  a n d  o t h e r  g o o d s .
T h a n k s  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m ,  d u r i n g  
t h e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  m o s t  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  
a d o p t e d  n e w  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  i n s t r u m e n t s  -  s w a p s ,  f o r w a r d  c o n t r a c t s  a n d  
o p t i o n s ,  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  d e r i v a t i v e s  -  t o  d e a l  w i t h  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  e x p o s u r e . 5 B u t  
i s  t h e r e  a n  o p t i m a l  m e a n s  o f  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t ?
A typology o f financial strategies in  currency risk m anagem ent
T h e r e  i s  n o  s i n g l e  a c c e p t e d  f r a m e w o r k  t h a t  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  g u i d e  h e d g i n g  
s t r a t e g i e s .  A s  F r o o t  etal. ( 1 9 9 3 )  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 9 0 s ,  t h e r e  a r e  m u l t i p l e  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  o p t i m a l  h e d g i n g  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .  A  f i r m ' s  o p t i m a l  
h e d g i n g  s t r a t e g y  -  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  h e d g i n g  a n d  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s
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u s e d  -  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t ,  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o p p o r t u n ­
i t i e s ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  m a r k e t  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  
t h e  h e d g i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  a d o p t e d  b y  i t s  c o m p e t i t o r s .  T h e r e f o r e  d e t e r m i n i n g  
w h e t h e r  a  h e d g i n g  s t r a t e g y  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  i s  a  v e r y  c o m p l e x  m a t t e r .
I n  t h e  r e a l  w o r l d  e n t e r p r i s e s  h a v e  n e u t r a l ,  a v e r s e  o r  a c t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t  
p o l i c i e s .  E v e n  i f  t h e y  a r e  r i s k  r e l u c t a n t  t h e r e  m a y  b e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h i c h  
m a t c h i n g  c u r r e n c i e s  b e t w e e n  i n c o m e s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  o r  t h e  
i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  h e d g i n g  a r e  s o  e x p e n s i v e  t h a t  t h e  f i r m  p r e f e r s  t o  h a v e  s o m e  
e x p o s u r e  t o  r i s k .  W e  s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  a s s u m e  t h a t  e n t e r p r i s e s  a l w a y s  h a v e  
s o m e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  r i s k  e x p o s u r e .  B u t  h e d g i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r  a m o n g  f i r m s .  
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  t h i s  c h a p t e r  d e v e l o p s  a  t y p o l o g y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t r a t e g i e s ,  c l a s s i f y i n g  f i r m s  b y  d e g r e e  o f  r i s k  e x p o s u r e ,  w h i c h  d e p e n d s  o n  
m a r k e t  o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
Multinational companies in the export sector
I n  a s c e n d i n g  o r d e r  o f  r i s k  e x p o s u r e  a r e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  d e a l  
w i t h  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  m i n e r a l  o i l  a n d  g a s ,  w o o d  p u l p ,  f i s h m e a l ,  a n d  s u b s i d i a r i e s  
i n  e x p o r t  p r o c e s s i n g  z o n e s  ( a s s e m b l y  p l a n t s ) .  I n  g e n e r a l  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  
a r e  f i n a n c e d  w i t h  e q u i t y  ( F D I )  a n d  l o a n s  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y ,  a n d  t h e y  m a t c h  
i n t e r e s t  s e r v i c e s  a n d  r e m i t t a n c e s  o f  d i v i d e n d s  w i t h  i n c o m e  i n  t h e  s a m e  
c u r r e n c y ,  s o  t h e y  a r e  n a t u r a l l y  h e d g e d 6 ( B o x  9 . 1 ) .
Box 9.1 C u rren cy  ex p o su re  in  th e  m in in g  secto r
I n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  m i n i n g  s e c t o r  ( m i n e r a l s ,  o i l  a n d  g a s )  p r e d o m ­
i n a n t l y  t a k e  t h e  f o r m  o f  p r o j e c t  f i n a n c i n g .  A  m a i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
t h i s  t y p e  o f  f u n d i n g  i s  t h a t  t h e  g u a r a n t e e  i s  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
T h e  l o a n  i s  p a i d  u n d e r  a  l o n g - t e r m  c o n t r a c t  w i t h  t h e  g r o s s  e a r n i n g s  
o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  i t s e l f .  I n  s o m e  c a s e s  t h e  m i n i n g  c o m p a n i e s  e n t e r  i n t o  
p a y m e n t  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h  o u t p u t  i n s t e a d  o f  i s s u i n g  o r d i n a r y  d e b t .  
A  b a n k  p r o v i d e s  u p - f r o n t  c a s h  a n d  t h e  c o m p a n y  u n d e r t a k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  
t h e  o u t p u t  t o  t h e  b a n k  a n d  a r r a n g e s  f o r  t h e  o u t p u t  t o  b e  r e p u r c h a s e d  
a t  a  g u a r a n t e e d  p r i c e .
A  s e c o n d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  t h a t  b e f o r e  i n v e s t i n g  m i n i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
a l w a y s  o b t a i n  f r o m  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  a  f u l l  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  
n o  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  f r e e d o m  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  
c o m m e r c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  l o a n  r e p a y m e n t s .  
T h e y  o p e r a t e  w i t h  a n  ' e s c r o w  a c c o u n t '  a b r o a d ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  
h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  d e p o s i t  t h e  e x p o r t  p r o c e e d s ,  a n d  f r o m  t h a t  a c c o u n t ,  
w i t h o u t  i n f l o w  i n t o  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t o  p a y  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a n d  m o r t g a g e s  o n  
t h e  l o a n s .
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B o t h  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l o n g  m a t u r i t y  o f  m i n i n g  i n v e s t ­
m e n t .  T h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  a n d  b a n k e r s ,  a t  t h e  m o m e n t  o f  
i n v e s t i n g ,  b u i l d  a  p r o t e c t i v e  u m b r e l l a  a g a i n s t  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s .  I f  t h e  
p r o j e c t  p r o d u c e s  s u f f i c i e n t  m i n e r a l s ,  o i l  o r  g a s  t h e y  s e l l  t h e  o u t p u t  i n  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t ,  r e c e i v e  t h e  i n c o m e  a b r o a d  a n d  p a y  o f f  t h e  
f o r e i g n  l o a n s ,  a n d  a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  e c o n o m i c  c h a n g e s  i n  
t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .
B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  t h a t  p r e v a i l s  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  
m i n i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  m a n a g e  a  m i n i m u m  o f  t h e i r  l i q u i d  f u n d s  i n s i d e  
t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .  T h e  h e a d  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  c h o o s e s  a n  
o p t i m u m  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  r i s k  a n d  t a x  e x p o s u r e  t o  m a k e  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  i t  i s  a l w a y s  d o n e  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  w h i c h  t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t  i s  l o c a t e d .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  s o m e  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  c h o s e n  t o  h e d g e  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  e x p e c t e d  c o s t s  b y  i n t r o d u c i n g  d e r i v a t i v e s  i n t o  t h e i r  c u r r e n c y  
r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  a  g e n e r a l  p r a c t i c e .  T h e  d e v a l u a t i o n s  
t h a t  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h e  T e q u i l a  a n d  A s i a n  c r i s e s  b r o u g h t  b e n e f i t s  t o  
t h e s e  f i r m s  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o s t  o f  s a l a r i e s  a n d  o t h e r  l o c a l  i n p u t s  i n  t e r m s  
o f  s t r o n g  c u r r e n c i e s  ( y e n ,  m a r k ,  p o u n d  o r  e u r o )  d e c r e a s e d .
(Source: B a s e d  o n  i n t e r v i e w s  a t  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  i n  t h e  m i n i n g  
s e c t o r . )
Multinational companies that are regionally and geographically diversified
N e x t  i n  t h e  o r d e r  o f  d e g r e e  o f  c u r r e n c y  e x p o s u r e  c o m e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m ­
p a n i e s  w h o s e  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  l o c a l  m a r k e t  b u t  w h i c h  
i n v e s t  i n  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  r e g i o n s .  S u c h  c o m p a n i e s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  
e v e r y  b r a n c h  o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r .  W h i l e  t h e  e a r n i n g s  a r e  o b t a i n e d  
i n  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y ,  l i a b i l i t i e s  s u c h  a s  s h o r t - t e r m  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  l o a n s  a r e  p a i d  
m a i n l y  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y .  T h e s e  f i r m s  f a c e  t w o  p r i n c i p a l  t y p e s  o f  c u r r e n c y  
r i s k  e x p o s u r e .
T h e  f i r s t  i s  e c o n o m i c  r i s k .  I n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  l i t e r a t u r e ,  a n d  a l s o  a m o n g  
m a n a g e r s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  a  s i n g l e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h i s .  I n  g e n e r a l  t h e  
c o n c e p t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  a  d e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
f u t u r e  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  f i r m .  I t  i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m e a s u r e  t h i s  c o n c e p t  b e c a u s e  
i t  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  f i r m  a n d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
c u r r e n c y  s h o c k  o n  c o m p e t i t o r s  a n d  c u s t o m e r s .  A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  i n  T a b l e  9 . 1 ,  
m a n a g e r s  r a r e l y  h e d g e  t h i s  t y p e  o f  r i s k .
T h e  s e c o n d  r i s k  i s  t r a n s a c t i o n  r i s k  e x p o s u r e ,  w h i c h  i s  e a s i e r  t o  m e a s u r e  
a n d  t o  h e d g e .  T r a n s a c t i o n  e x p o s u r e  o r  c a s h  f l o w  e x p o s u r e  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  r e a l  
c a s h  f l o w  i n v o l v e d  i n  s e t t l i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n s  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y .
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Table 9.1 Latin America: FDI and net capital transfer volatility, 1980-99 (coefficient 
of variation, per cent)
1980-85 1986-89 1990-95 1996-99
FDI 0.22 0.35 0.50 0.23
Net capital transfers 1.51 0.24 1.45 1.31
Source: ECLAC; b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts  o f  19 L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s .
Table 9.2 Most important subjects of hedging strategies (per cent)
Accounting
earnings




United States 44 49 0.9 8
Germany 55 34 7.4 12
Source: B o d n a r  a n d  G e b h a rd t  (1 9 9 8 ).
A s  T a b l e  9 . 2  s h o w s ,  4 9  p e r  c e n t  o f  U S  f i r m s  a n d  3 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  G e r m a n  f i r m s  
h e d g e  a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s k  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s .
I n  o u r  s t u d y ,  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  b u s i n e s s  i n  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s  
a n d  r e g i o n s  a l w a y s  h e d g e d  a g a i n s t  t r a n s a c t i o n  e x p o s u r e  b u t  v e r y  s e l d o m  
a g a i n s t  b a l a n c e  s h e e t  a c c o u n t  o r  t r a n s l a t i o n  e x p o s u r e ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
c u r r e n c y  v o l a t i l i t y  o n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  a s s e t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s .  T h e r e  a r e  t w o  m a i n  
r e a s o n s  f o r  s u c h  a  p o l i c y :  ( 1 )  d e v a l u a t i o n  i n  o n e  c o u n t r y  c a n  b e  c o m p e n s a t e d  
w i t h  r e v a l u a t i o n  i n  a n o t h e r ;  a n d  ( 2 )  i n  t h e  v e r y  l o n g  t e r m ,  a s s e t s  a n d  
n e t  w o r t h  w i l l  n o t  b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  c u r r e n c y  v o l a t i l i t y  b e c a u s e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
m o v e m e n t s  m a i n l y  d e p e n d  o n  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
Multinational companies with investments concentrated in one region
U n l i k e  t h e  a b o v e  t y p e  o f  c o m p a n y ,  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  c o n c e n ­
t r a t e  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  j u s t  a  f e w  c o u n t r i e s  o r  a  s i n g l e  r e g i o n  a n d  p r o ­
d u c e  e i t h e r  f o r  f o r e i g n  o r  f o r  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  u s u a l l y  t a k e  b a l a n c e  s h e e t  
e x p o s u r e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h e  e x p o s u r e  a r i s e s  f r o m  t h e  p e r i o d i c  n e e d  t o  
r e p o r t  t h e  c o n s o l i d a t e d  w o r l d - w i d e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  i n  o n e  r e p o r t i n g  
c u r r e n c y .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e y  t r y  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  a s  m u c h  a s  t h e y  c a n ,  o r  i n  a  b a s k e t  o f  c u r r e n c i e s  t h a t  
a r e  h i g h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y  i n  t h e  l o n g  t e r m .  T h e y  a l s o  
h e d g e  t r a n s l a t i o n  a n d  t r a n s a c t i o n  r i s k  w i t h  d e r i v a t i v e  i n s t r u m e n t s :  d e b t ,  
e x p e c t e d  d i v i d e n d s  a n d  c a s h  f l o w  m o v e m e n t s ,  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  a  n u m b e r  
o f  s t u d i e s  ( f o r  e x a m p l e  D a v i s  etal., 1 9 9 1 ;  G u a y ,  1 9 9 9 ;  P r é v o s t  et al., 2 0 0 0 ;  
B a r t r a m ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
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M a n y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  e n t e r e d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  p r i ­
v a t i z a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  ( t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  w a t e r  a n d  
s a n i t a t i o n ,  r o a d s  a n d  p o r t s ) .  T h e s e  c o m p a n i e s  c o u l d  b e  v i e w e d  a s  b e i n g  
m o s t  e x p o s e d  t o  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  v o l a t i l i t y  b e c a u s e  t h e y  o b t a i n  t h e i r  i n c o m e  i n  
t h e  l o c a l  m a r k e t  a n d  m a k e  h u g e  i n v e s t m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  l o c a l  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s  
c a n n o t  a f f o r d .  S o  i f  t h e y  f o l l o w  a  r i s k  a v e r s e  p o l i c y  t h e y  h a v e  t o  e n g a g e  i n  
f i n a n c i a l  h e d g i n g .
S o m e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  -  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l i e s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  r e g u l a t e d  
m a r k e t s  -  h a v e  n e g o t i a t e d  t a r i f f s  t h a t  a r e  f u l l y  i n d e x e d  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  
o f  t h e  d o l l a r .  I n  o t h e r  c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  p a r t i a l  i n d e x a t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  b e c a u s e  
i n p u t s  s u c h  a s  g a s  a n d  o i l  a r e  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  t h a t  c u r r e n c y ,  f o r  r e p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  a s s e t s  o r  t h e  c o s t  o f  e x p a n s i o n  ( m a c h i n e r y  f o r  e l e c t r i c  p o w e r  p l a n t s  
a n d  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  p l a n t s ,  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  e q u i p m e n t ,  c o m p u t e r s  a n d  
o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  e q u i p m e n t  a r e  a l w a y s  i m p o r t e d  f r o m  i n d u s ­
t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s ) .
A m o n g  t h i s  g r o u p  t h e r e  a r e  v a r i o u s  k i n d s  o f  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  s t r a t e g y .  S o m e  
c o m p a n i e s  a r e  v e r y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  a n d  h a v e  a  c e n t r a l i z e d  r i s k  p o l i c y .  T h e  
s u b s i d i a r y  r e p o r t s  f i n a n c i n g  m o v e m e n t s  t o  i t s  h e a d  o f f i c e ,  w h i c h  h e d g e s  
t h e  m a x i m u m  o f  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e x p o s u r e .  O t h e r  s t r a t e g i e s  s e t  a  g l o b a l  l i m i t  o f  
r i s k  e x p o s u r e ,  s u c h  a s  o n e  y e a r ' s  t o t a l  e a r n i n g s .  T h e r e  a r e  a l s o  c a s e s  o f  p u b l i c  
s e r v i c e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  b e i n g  h i g h l y  i n d e b t e d  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  
a n d  h a v i n g  b u s i n e s s e s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  o n e  r e g i o n .  F o r  t h e m ,  t r a n s l a t i o n  r i s k  
i s  t h e  m a i n  f a c t o r  i n  h e d g i n g .  I f  a  s t e p  d e v a l u a t i o n  o c c u r r e d  t h e r e  c o u l d  b e  
a  s h a r p  r i s e  i n  t h e i r  i n d e b t e d n e s s  a n d  a  c o n s e q u e n t  f a l l  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
c o m p a n y .
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n ie s  in  p u b l ic  s e rv ices
I n  s u m m a r y ,  i t  c a n  b e  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  c o m p a n i e s '  r i s k  e x p o s u r e  
d e p e n d s  n o t  o n l y  o n  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e i r  i n d e b t e d n e s s  b u t  a l s o  o n  t h e i r  
m a r k e t  o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  d e g r e e  o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  S o m e  c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  a s  
e x p o r t  f i r m s ,  d o  n o t  u s e  h e d g i n g  a t  a l l  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o s t s  w o u l d  b e  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  t h e  b e n e f i t s .  F o r  o t h e r  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  a s  f i r m s  t h a t  a r e  
o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  l o c a l  m a r k e t  a n d  h a v e  l a r g e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e b t s ,  
t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e s  i s  v e r y  h i g h .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i n s t r u m e n t s  i n  t h e  
d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t  a r e  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o m p o n e n t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t ,  
b e i n g  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  f o r  s m o o t h i n g  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a n d  f o r e i g n  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .
Statistics in  derivative markets
C o m p r e h e n s i v e  g l o b a l  s t a t i s t i c s  o n  d e r i v a t i v e  i n s t r u m e n t s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f r o m  
t h e  B a n k  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e t t l e m e n t s  ( B I S ) ,  w h i c h  m e a s u r e s  t h e  t r a d i n g  
v o l u m e  ( t u r n o v e r  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c o n t r a c t s )  a n d  t h e  n o t i o n a l  a m o u n t
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o u t s t a n d i n g  ( i n  U S  d o l l a r s )  o f  d e r i v a t i v e s  b y  t y p e  o f  i n s t r u m e n t .  T h e  
n o t i o n a l  a m o u n t  r e f e r s  t o  c a s h  f l o w s  u n d e r  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r a c t s  a n d  
p r o v i d e s  a  r o u g h  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t r a n s f e r  o f  t h e  r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  t h e m .
P r e s s  r e l e a s e s  f r o m  t h e  B I S 7 s h o w  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 9 5  t o  J u n e  1 9 9 8  
t h e  t o t a l  a m o u n t  o f  d e r i v a t i v e s  i n c r e a s e d  v e r y  r a p i d l y  a t  a  g l o b a l  r a t e  o f  
1 4  p e r  c e n t  p e r  y e a r .  T h e n  i n  t h e  s i x - m o n t h  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  J u n e  a n d  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 8  -  i n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  -  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i n s t r u m e n t s  
u n d e r w e n t  a n  e x p l o s i v e  r i s e  w h i l e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  c o n t r a c t s  b e g a n  t o  
f a l l .  T h i s  w a s  a l s o  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  c u s t o m e r s .  T h e  d y n a m i c  o f  
t h e  m a r k e t  d u r i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  b e  l e d  b y  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
i n s t r u m e n t s  w h i l e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  c o n t r a c t s  m a i n t a i n e d  a  m o d e r a t e  
u p w a r d  t r e n d .
T h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t  o f f e r s  a  b r o a d  v a r i e t y  o f  d e r i v a t i v e  
i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  ( s e e  C h a p t e r  6 ) ,  i n c l u d i n g  
' p l a i n  v a n i l l a '  i n s t r u m e n t s  s u c h  a s  f o r w a r d s ,  s w a p  o p t i o n s  a n d  f u t u r e s ,  h i g h l y  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  s t r u c t u r e d  d e r i v a t i v e  i n s t m m e n t s  ( f o r  e x a m p l e  
c o l l a r s  a n d  s w a p  o p t i o n s )  a n d  h y b r i d  d e b t  w i t h  e m b e d d e d  d e r i v a t i v e s .
A l t h o u g h  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  b e e n  u s i n g  d e r i v a t i v e s  f o r  m a n y  y e a r s ,  l i t t l e  i s  
k n o w n  a b o u t  t h e  e x t e n t  o r  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e i r  u s e  b e c a u s e  c o m p a n i e s  h a v e  n o t  
b e e n  r e q u i r e d  -  o r  n o t  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  -  t o  m a k e  p u b l i c  
t h e i r  d e r i v a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s .  C o r p o r a t e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  ( b a l a n c e  s h e e t  a n d  o f f -  
b a l a n c e  s h e e t  r e p o r t s ) ,  w h e n  a v a i l a b l e ,  c a n  b e  c o n f u s i n g  b e c a u s e  t h e  f i g u r e s  
c o r r e s p o n d  t o  a c c o u n t i n g  p e r i o d s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  e v e n t s  i n  
w h i c h  w e  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  e x p o s u r e  o r  h e d g i n g  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  r e p o r t e d  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m ­
p a n i e s .  W e  s h a l l  d e a l  w i t h  t h i s  p r o b l e m  b y  b a s i n g  o u r  a n a l y s i s  o n  i n t e r v i e w s  
w i t h  t h e  t r e a s u r e r s  o r  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  o f  l a r g e  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  b u s i n e s s e s  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a . 8
H ed g in g  ta c tic s  u sed  in  L atin  A m erica n  co u n tr ie s
O n e  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  o u r  i n t e r v i e w s  i s  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  
c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  U S  a n d  G e r m a n  c o m p a n i e s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  
s i m p l e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  t h a t  i s ,  o v e r - t h e - c o u n t e r  ( O T C )  i n s t r u ­
m e n t s  s u c h  a s  f o r w a r d s ,  s w a p s  a n d  o p t i o n s  ( T a b l e  9 . 3 ) .  T h e y  d e a l  m a i n l y  
w i t h  t h e  m a i n  b a n k s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t ,  s u c h  a s  C i t i b a n k  
a n d  C h a s e  M a n h a t t a n ,  S p a n i s h  b a n k s  s u c h  a s  S a n t a n d e r  a n d  B B V A , o t h e r  
E u r o p e a n  b a n k s  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k s  s u c h  a s  M e r r i l l  L y n c h  a n d  M o r g a n  
S t a n l e y .  T h e y  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  l o c a l  b a n k s  o n l y  i n  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  w h e n  s m a l l  
l i a b i l i t i e s  n e e d  t o  b e  c o v e r e d .
I n  t h e  i n t e r v i e w s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  a i m e d  a t  h e d g i n g  t h e i r  f i n a n ­
c i a l  r i s k  e x p o s u r e  a n d  n o t  a t  m a k i n g  s p e c u l a t i v e  g a i n s .  T h e y  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e
G ra c ie la  M o g u illa n s k y  1 6 7














United States 56.8 8.0 9.1 18.2 1.1 6.8 1.1
Germany 75.5 4.3 13.8 18.1 0.0 1.1 0.0
Source: B o d n a r  a n d  G e b h a rd t  (1 9 9 8 ).
m a i n  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  t r e a s u r e r  w a s  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  
t h a t  i s ,  t o  m a k e  a  p r o f i t  f r o m  p r o d u c i n g  g o o d s  a n d  s e r v i c e s .  T h e y  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  b e s t  w a y  t o  d o  t h i s  w a s  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  f a i r l y  s t a b l e  f i n a n c i n g  o r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e g i m e ,  a n d  t h a t  w a s  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  m a k i n g  c o n t r a c t s  i n  t h e  
d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s .  T h i s  a s s e r t i o n  i s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  S t u l z  ( 1 9 9 6 )  a n d  F i t e  a n d  
P f l e i d e r e r  ( 1 9 9 5 ) ,  w h o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  r e s u l t s  i n  a  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c a s h  f l o w  v o l a t i l i t y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  i n  a  l o w e r  v a r i a t i o n  
i n  f i r m  v a l u e .
T h e  m a n a g e r s  o f  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  
p a s t  d e c a d e ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  b e i n g  t a k e n  s u r p r i s e  b y  u n e x p e c t e d  e v e n t s  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e i r  c o m p a n i e s  h a d  s e t  u p  t e a m s  t o  c o n d u c t  
c o u n t r y  a n d  r e g i o n a l  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  a n a l y s e s  a n d  m a n a g e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l s .  T h e y  a l s o  s t u d i e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a g e n c i e s  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k s .
B u t  t h e  b a n k  i n t e r v i e w e e s  h a d  a n o t h e r  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  C h i l e  
t h e y  a r g u e d  t h a t  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  e n g a g e d  i n  a c t i v e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  
r i s k  m a n a g e m e n t  ( m a i n t a i n i n g  o p e n  p o s i t i o n s ) ,  w h i c h  t h e y  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  
s p e c u l a t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e y  d e d u c e d  t h i s  f r o m  t h e  s h o r t  p e r i o d  f o r  w h i c h  
f i r m s  t o o k  d e r i v a t i v e s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e y  w e r e  e x p o s e d  t o  m o v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
' b a s e  r i s k '  ( t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s p o t  p r i c e  o f  t h e  a s s e t  t o  b e  h e d g e d  
a n d  t h e  f u t u r e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  u s e d )  a n d  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .
T h e  a n s w e r  g i v e n  b y  t h e  f i n a n c e  m a n a g e r s  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  w a s  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  a m o n g  a  f e w  o p e r a t o r s  
a n d  t h e  l o w  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t s  d i d  n o t  
a l l o w  t h e m  t o  e n g a g e  i n  o p t i m a l  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  a n a l y z e d  i n  t h e  
n e x t  s e c t i o n .
The Latin American derivative market
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t r y  t o  n e g o t i a t e  d e r i v a t i v e  c o n ­
t r a c t s  i n  t h e  l o c a l  m a r k e t s  a s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  c a n  b e  o b t a i n e d  t h e r e  a t  l o w e r  
c o s t .  H o w e v e r  t h e y  f a c e  s o m e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  t h a t  t h e  m a r k e t s  h a v e  o n l y  
b e e n  r e c e n t l y  d e v e l o p e d  -  i n  t h e  p a s t  t w o  t o  f i v e  y e a r s  i n  m o s t  c a s e s .  O n e  o f  
t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  t h e i r  c r e a t i o n  w a s  t h e  h u g e  i n v e s t m e n t s  t h a t  w e r e  b e i n g
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m a d e  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  s i n c e  t h e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s .  
T h e  p r o c e s s  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  a n d  t h e i r  
i n v e s t m e n t s ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  a  d e m a n d  f o r  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  l o a n s  a n d  t h e  
c o n s e q u e n t  d e m a n d  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e m  f r o m  c u r r e n c y  r i s k .
W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  B r a z i l ,  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  d e r i v a t i v e s  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  i s  s t i l l  v e r y  w e a k .  F o r  e x a m p l e  n o n - d e l i v e r y  f o r w a r d  c o n ­
t r a c t s  i n  t h e  C h i l e a n  c u r r e n c y  w e r e  n o t  l e g a l i z e d  i n  C h i l e  u n t i l  2 0 0 1 .  I n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  A r g e n t i n a  t h e  l e g a l  f r a m e w o r k  i s  s t i l l  b e i n g  d i s c u s s e d  i n  p a r l i a m e n t ,  
a n d  i n  M e x i c o  a  r e f o r m  t o  t h e  l e g a l  f r a m e w o r k  h a s  o n l y  j u s t  a l l o w e d  l o c a l  
a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k s  t o  a c t  a s  m a r k e t  m a k e r s .  N a t u r a l l y  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  
m a r k e t  d e v e l o p e d  f i r s t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  N e w  Y o r k  a n d  
C h i c a g o .
B r a z i l  h a s  t h e  m o s t  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  l o c a l  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t  w i t h  m a n y  t y p e s  
o f  i n s t r u m e n t .  A p p r o x i m a t e l y  2 7  p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  d e r i v a t i v e s  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  U S  
d o l l a r  f u t u r e s .  T h e s e  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  o n l y  7  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n  1 9 9 1 ,  
b u t  i n  1 9 9 7  t h e y  p e a k e d  a t  3 6  p e r  c e n t .  M a n y  t y p e s  o f  O T C  i n s t r u m e n t  c a n  
a l s o  b e  f o u n d  i n  M e x i c o ,  i n c l u d i n g  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  o p t i o n s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  
a n d  s w a p s .  F o r  t h e  C h i l e a n  c u r r e n c y ,  t h e  d a i l y  n e g o t i a t e d  a m o u n t  o f  n o n ­
d e l i v e r a b l e  f o r w a r d s  ( N D F s )  i n  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  m a r k e t  i s  i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  
$ 2 5 0  m i l l i o n  w h i l e  i n  t h e  l o c a l  d e l i v e r y  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t  t h e  s u m  i s  a r o u n d  
$ 6 0 0  m i l l i o n .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  t h i n  m a r k e t  s u c h  a s  t h a t  i n  P e r u ,  o n l y  N D F  
c o n t r a c t s  a r e  m a d e ,  w h i l e  i n  B o l i v i a  t h e r e  i s  n o  d e r i v a t i v e  m a r k e t  a t  a l l .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s  i n  o u r  s u r v e y  t h e  b e s t  w a y  t o  
m a n a g e  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  i n  e m e r g e n t  m a r k e t s  w a s  t o  e n t e r  l o n g - t e r m  c o n t r a c t s  
d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  o f  e c o n o m i c  s t a b i l i t y ,  w h e n  i n s t r u m e n t s  c o u l d  b e  f o u n d  
a t  a  l o w e r  c o s t .  M a k i n g  l o n g - t e r m  c o n t r a c t s  w a s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  
c o m p a n i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  a  s t e p  d e v a l u a t i o n  w a s  e x p e c t e d  d u r i n g  
t h e  n e x t  s i x  t o  t w e l v e  m o n t h s .  T h e  p u r p o s e  w a s  t o  m a k e  a  b r i d g e  o v e r  t h e  
c r i s i s  p e r i o d .
H o w e v e r  t h e  m a n a g e r s ,  o f  n o n - f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  w a s  
n o t  a l w a y s  p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  i n s t r u m e n t s  w e r e  n o r m a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  o n l y  a  
f e w  m o n t h s . 9 F o r  e x a m p l e  t h e  f o r w a r d  c o n t r a c t s  m a r k e t  w a s  l i q u i d  f o r  4 2  o r  
9 0  d a y s ,  a n d  o n l y  a  f e w  e n t e r p r i s e s  c o u l d  h e d g e  f o r  a  y e a r  o r  m o r e .  O n e  
r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  w a s  t h e  l a c k  o f  a  s e c o n d a r y  m a r k e t  f o r  l o n g - t e r m  i n s t r u m e n t s .  
T h e r e  w e r e  n o  m a r k e t  m a k e r s ,  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  i n s t r u m e n t s  w e r e  n e g o t i a t e d  
i n  t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t .  T h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  h a d  t o  w a i t  u n t i l  s o m e o n e  w a n t e d  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  a  l o n g - t e r m  i n s t r u m e n t  a n d  s e t  a  p r i c e  o n  i t .
S t a t i s t i c s  p u b l i s h e d  b y  C e n t r a l  B a n k  o f  C h i l e  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  w h a t  w a s  
s a i d  b y  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n y  m a n a g e r s .  B e t w e e n  1 9 9 6  a n d  2 0 0 0  i n  
t h e  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t ,  m o r e  t h a n  9 0  p e r  c e n t  o f  p e s o - d o l l a r  c o n t r a c t s  w e r e  f o r  
p e r i o d s  o f  l e s s  t h a n  4 2  d a y s ,  a n d  a  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l e d  f o r  U F - d o l l a r  
c o n t r a c t s  ( T a b l e  9 . 4 ) .  I n  m a r k e t s  w i t h  a  m a t u r i t y  o f  m o r e  t h a n  4 2  d a y s ,  t h e  
d a i l y  a v e r a g e  v o l u m e  n e g o t i a t e d  w a s  $ 2 2  m i l l i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  a  v e r y  s m a l l  
a m o u n t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s .
Tab le  9 .4  F o r w a r d  c o n t r a c t s  i n  C h i l e ,  1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 0
Peso-dollar
forwards Peso-dollar forwards maturity period
UF/dollar





Up to 42 days/ 
total (%)






Up to 90 days 91-360 days More than 
360 days
1996 36 334 98.9 1.1 11 495 36.6 51.4 12.0
1997 96 166 96.3 3.7 15 885 33.4 50.9 15.7
1998 99 377 97.1 2.9 13 517 35.2 52.9 11.9
1999 101 623 96.5 3.5 23 889 38.4 46.7 14.9
2000 107 872 94.5 5.5 31 378 54.0 34.9 11.1
Source: C e n tra l B a n k  o f  C h ile , Informe Económico y Financiero (w w w .b c e n tra l.c l/).
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F i g u r e s  9 . 1  a n d  9 . 2  s h o w  t h e  a m o u n t s  a n d  p r i c e s  o f  f o r w a r d  c o n t r a c t s  i n  
C h i l e .  F i g u r e  9 . 1  s h o w s  t h e  a v e r a g e  m o v e m e n t  o f  a l l  p e s o - d o l l a r  c o n t r a c t s ,  i n  
w h i c h  s h o r t - t e r m  i n s t r u m e n t s  p r e d o m i n a t e .  T h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  w e r e  f i r s t  u s e d  
i n  1 9 9 5 - 9 6  a n d  s h o w e d  a n  u p w a r d  t r e n d  f r o m  t h e  b e g i n n i n g .  T h e r e  w a s  
a  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e  d u r i n g  t h e  A s i a n  c r i s i s  a n d  t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  t o t a l  a m o u n t  
n e g o t i a t e d  e a c h  m o n t h  o s c i l l a t e d  b e t w e e n  $ 5  m i l l i o n  a n d  $ 7  m i l l i o n .  T h i s  
c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  h i g h  v o l a t i l i t y  i n  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i n  C h i l e .
Figure 9.1 Chile: total forward contracts with non-financial corporations, 1995-2001 
Source: C e n tra l  B an k  o f  C h ile .
Figure 9.2 Chile: forward contracts for more than 42 days with non-financial corpor­
ations, 1995-2001 
Source: C e n tra l  B a n k  o f  C h ile .
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It is also interesting to observe that for contracts of more than 42 days, 
sizable demands occurred on only a few occasions. One explanation for this 
is that long-term forward contracts are more expensive than short-term ones. 
In 2001, in short-term operations the spread was 30 cents, but one-year 
instruments had a spread of 3 pesos. Chilean bankers argued that firms' 
finance managers were unwilling to bear that cost and preferred to be 
exposed to basic risk, using short-term contracts that could be rolled over. 
According to the bankers, this was speculative management.
To qualify the above statements, it should be said that during turbulent 
periods, or when a financial external shock occurred, the possibility of hedg­
ing via derivatives was more restricted and instruments were only available 
at very high prices.
The price of a forward contract, F, depends on the spot value of the 
exchange rate, S, the local interest rate, iD, and the international interest 
rate, ix:
F = S* (1 + iD) / (1 + ix) (9.1)
Although the international interest rate is more stable during a financial 
or currency crisis, the value of the dollar in the spot market, S, and the 
difference between the domestic rate and the international interest rate may 
rise substantially. Moreover foreign exchange policy and monetary policy 
can serve to increase the cost of the instrument. This was the case in Chile 
after the Asian and Russian crises. Between 1998 and 1999 there was not 
only a strong devaluation but also a huge increase in the local interest rate 
(Figure 9.3). This presented a serious problem for hedges. If the contract ended 
in the middle of a crisis it would have been impossible to make a rollover at 
a reasonable price. The cost of rollover might have been more than the cost 
of the devaluation and the sum of losses could not compensate the use of 
the instrument.
In Argentina, from 1999 the financial markets expected that the currency 
board would be abandoned. That year the differential cost for hedging 
was 21-25 per cent (compared with 18 per cent in Brazil and 7 per cent in 
Chile) because the expected volatility in the spot market increased the risk 
of hedging.
In Brazil, during 1998 the Brazilian real was quoted in the forward market 
at 3.0 reals per dollar. In the worst point in the crisis it rose no higher than 
2.20 and after that it fell to 1.75. A hedging with a forward contract at 3.0 
would imply a huge loss instead of protection against devaluation.
The lack of sophisticated derivative instruments, the short duration of 
hedging contracts and the shortage of liquidity are great disadvantages for 
national and multinational firms operating in Latin America. Moreover there 
is an absence of transparency and asymmetry of information. For example 
in Chile firms do not have access to the interbank and stock market prices 
of foreign currency. At the same time the demand for hedging by some firms
1 7 2  Corporate Risk Management and Exchange Rate Volatility
Observed daily foreign exchange rate
Domestic rate of interest
Figure 9.3 Chile: daily foreign exchange rate and interest rate, 1996-2001 (pesos per 
dollar)
Source: Based on Central Bank of Chile statistics.
is very large in relation to the supply of foreign currency, so they have to 
use intermediaries in the market in order to prevent banks from knowing 
where the demand is coming from and consequently pushing up the cost of 
derivatives.
One conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that managers may wish 
to hedge their currency risk exposure but they are not prepared to pay a very 
high price for it. This is the reason why the development of local financial 
markets is very important for non-financial multinational corporations. 
Another conclusion is that due to the fragility of the Latin American deriva­
tive markets, instruments operate procyclically, become more expensive 
and are sometimes unobtainable in turbulent periods when they are most 
required.
Exchange rate policy and currency risk policy
In theory a currency board or a band regime present less risks than a flex­
ible exchange rate policy. But the finance managers interviewed stated that
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currency risk management depended more on the confidence of investors in 
a policy than on the type of policy in question. Therefore it is not the type 
of foreign exchange rate policy but the inconsistency between that policy 
and the evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals that matters. A good 
example here is the Argentinean case, where by law one peso is equivalent 
to one dollar. There is now a risk of a very sharp step devaluation, as in any 
country with a very overvalued currency, and multinational companies are 
trying to avoid that risk by maintaining a very short cash position.
The analysis is similar in the case of a band regime. If the exchange rate 
policy is not consistent with the macro fundamentals and the central bank 
makes continuous changes to the range or the centre of the band -  thus 
changing the rules of the game -  it is perceived that a floating rate exists, 
together with a high degree of currency volatility. In such cases currency 
risk management will be consistent with the perception of instability in the 
foreign exchange regime. For example in Chile between the Tequila and 
Asian crises, multinational companies in the telecommunication and elec­
tricity sectors hedged less than half of their total debt in foreign currency, 
due to the Central Bank's credible foreign exchange policy and persistent 
revaluation of the exchange rate (see Chapter 13). However after the Asian 
crisis and during a period of instability in the range of the band, they began 
to hedge between 70 per cent and 100 per cent of their debt; a strategy that 
has continued with the floating exchange rate regime.
In conclusion, currency risk management by multinational non-financial 
corporations does not depend solely on exchange rate policy -  it is also 
related to the consistency of that policy and the evolution of the rest of the 
macroeconomic variables. Without consistency, companies will always have 
a perception of instability and changes to the rules of the game, causing 
a high degree of uncertainty and increasing the need for a more developed 
derivative market. A more developed derivative market could improve the 
financial conditions for FDI in Latin America.
Currency risk management and the impact of the foreign 
exchange rate
Fender (2000a, 2000b) shows that the use of financial derivatives to hedge 
against interest rate movements has a macroeconomic implication. If firms 
can stabilize their corporate cash flows with regard to interest rate changes, 
this will affect the impact of monetary impulses on investment spending as 
well as on economic activity.10 As a result the financial accelerator effects of 
monetary policy are likely to be reduced and the monetary authorities will 
lose some of their power. But what happens with the foreign exchange 
transmission mechanism?
Negative external shocks, such as those which occurred during the Tequila, 
Asian and Russian crises, cause foreign exchange and financial market
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distrust. The impact of this distrust is transmitted to firms' cash flows by 
the international interest rate, the domestic interest rate (if the firms also 
have loans in the domestic financial sector) and the foreign exchange rate. 
Expectation of a step devaluation obliges finance managers to react with 
a hedging strategy using the international or domestic derivative markets 
(Figure 9.4).
The Latin American subsidiaries of international banks need to cover their 
currency exposure, and they do this by selling the local currency to local 
banks. If the economic situation is stable the local banks can risk some 
degree of exposure, but when there is a crisis they have to cover themselves 
by buying significant amounts of dollars on the spot foreign exchange 
market, thus affecting the foreign exchange rate. Just who loses most 
depends on the macroeconomic context before the crisis and on the current 
monetary and foreign exchange policy. In the case of Chile, after the Asian 
crisis the Central Bank was the greatest loser, losing $4 billion of reserves 
between 1998 and 1999.
In Latin American countries, foreign exchange derivative markets tend to 
dry up in the middle of a turbulent period -  short-term capital flows are 
rapidly remitted to the countries of origin and the local financial markets 
lose foreign currency liquidity -  so instead of helping to smooth foreign 
exchange rate movements they induce greater volatility. This volatility is 
again transmitted to cash flow movements.
The magnitude of the effect of this on firms depends not only on external 
factors, such as the country's foreign exchange and monetary policy 
(Figure 9.5), which determines the eventual scale of the external shock, 
but also on internal factors, such as the activities of the firms (oriented
Figure 9.4 Actors in  a foreign exchange derivative market
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Figure 9.5 M ultinational com panies' currency risk m anagem ent and the foreign 
exchange market
towards local or foreign markets), the diversity of their business (con­
centrated in only one region or distributed around the world), and their 
investment and financing policies and hedging strategy.
Assuming that multinational companies in Latin America hedge mainly 
with short-term instruments, a crisis will induce them to make a rollover 
or increase the hedged amount. As Figure 9.5 shows, in this case the trans­
mission mechanism between the financial management of the firm and the 
exchange rate market goes through the financial system. The transmission 
mechanism goes directly from the firm to the exchange rate market (the 
bold arrow in Figure 9.5) if the financial strategy requires a reduction of 
exposure. The firm will change foreign exchange debt into local debt or 
accelerate the remittance of earnings, expected dividends and reserves. In 
this case the companies will put pressure on the foreign exchange market by 
buying dollars and reducing the degree of exposure.
While such a response by just one company will not have macroeconomic 
consequences, if all the companies make the same move over a short period, 
serious pressure will be put on the foreign exchange rate and on the local 
financial market. If they all do so at once, the whole edifice will come 
down.11 During 2001 this happened in the Chilean foreign exchange market. 
Interestingly, it was caused not by an expected financial or currency crisis in 
that country but by the crisis in Argentina.
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Because of the low cost of the instruments associated with the interest 
rate -  4 per cent in the Chilean market compared with 18 per cent in Brazil -  
national and multinational corporations went to the Chilean financial 
and derivative markets to hedge their currency exposure while waiting for 
the Argentinean economy to stabilize. This not only affected the foreign 
exchange market but also put pressure on the financial system. If banks are 
without liquidity -  as is often the case when a regional financial or currency 
crisis is expected -  or there is increased uncertainty among bank managers, 
loans tend to be concentrated among large firms and credit is restricted for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. In general, credit also tends to be con­
centrated in the export sector, which is less vulnerable in such circumstances.
Conclusions
Macroeconomic studies that compare of the volatility of FDI with short-term 
capital flows conclude that the first is less volatile. While the business and 
microeconomic literature deals with the financial management of corpor­
ations and the instruments and models used for optimization, there is 
a lack of studies on the interaction between microeconomic currency risk 
management by corporations involved in FDI, and its macroeconomic effects 
on the volatility of the foreign exchange rate.
In trying to explore this interaction this chapter has addressed three 
questions:
• Is currency risk management by non-financial corporations affected by 
foreign exchange volatility and financial contagion?
• Do the diverse exchange rate policies have different effects on multi­
national companies' cash flow management?
• Can we identify micro-macro transmission mechanisms between currency 
risk management and the foreign exchange market?
In order to assess the link between currency risk management and its 
impact on the foreign exchange market we built a typology of financial strat­
egies, classifying firms by their degree of risk exposure, market orientation 
and degree of geographical diversification.
Multinational companies in the export sector have the lowest degree of 
exposure since their incomes, loans and earnings are denominated in the 
local currency and therefore they do not need to hedge their transaction 
or translation risk. In fact they are the most important providers of foreign 
currency, thereby contributing to the liquidity of the foreign exchange 
market. These firms did not stop investing, paying salaries and buying local 
inputs during the turbulent 1990s. Their stable cash flow management can 
be observed in their subsidiaries’ balance sheets.
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Multinational companies that are regionally and geographically diversified 
always hedge against transaction or cash flow exposure, but they very seldom 
hedge against translation (accounting or balance sheet) exposure. This is 
because devaluation in one country can be compensated by revaluation in 
another.
The companies that face the greatest problems with currency risk exposure 
are multinational companies that are oriented towards the local market, 
whose investments are concentrated in one region or in the public service 
sector and whose earnings are in the local currency. In theory they are 
supposed to hedge the whole of their transaction and translation exposure. 
However it is very costly to hedge a significant proportion of the risk involved 
because of the weakness of the institutional framework, liquidity in periods 
of turbulence and the lack of instruments in the derivative market for Latin 
American currencies. In fact the difficulty of hedging has led to significant 
losses in accounting exposure, that is, in the value of assets and liabilities.
In addition to the above, there is asymmetry of information between the 
financial sector and non-financial corporations, making it difficult for the 
latter to negotiate the value of the required instruments and increasing 
the cost of derivative instruments for long-term hedging. While the finance 
managers of subsidiaries justify their behaviour in those terms, bankers 
suggest that this is in fact speculative behaviour since finance managers of 
non-financial corporations prefer to have some risk exposure than to pay 
a high cost for derivatives. But the excessive cost of derivatives in turbulent 
periods support the arguments of the former.
With regard to the second question, in countries with a currency board or 
a band regime, managers do not need to hedge their currency risk since 
in theory foreign exchange security is provided by the central bank. But 
finance managers state that without consistency between a country's foreign 
exchange regime and its monetary and fiscal policy -  that is, the macro- 
economic fundamentals -  companies will perceive that changes have been 
made to the rules of the game and will therefore increase their hedging 
activities, as the recent Argentinean crisis dramatically illustrated.
The answer to the third question depends on companies' market orientation 
and degree of geographic diversification. The largest impact is generated by 
multinational companies in the public service sector or whose operations 
focus on the local market or region. Unfortunately the lack of statistical 
information makes it difficult to measure the magnitude of the impact, and 
for that reason we have only provided a basic idea of the transmission mech­
anisms between currency risk management and the foreign exchange market.
Two transmission mechanism can be identified, both of which begin with 
the financial management of multinational non-financial corporations. One 
goes directly from the cash flow management of the firm to the foreign 
exchange market. This occurs when the multinational company decides 
to change its liabilities from foreign to local currency, or to increase the
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remittance of dividends. In both cases managers go to the foreign exchange 
market to buy dollars at the spot price. When this happens in the middle of 
a crisis and is widespread among firms, it puts downward pressure on the 
foreign exchange value of the local currency.
The second transmission mechanism is an indirect one that goes from the 
financial management of the firm through the financial system. In this case 
it is banks that have to hedge their currency risk exposure, particularly if 
they are facing or expecting an international or regional financial crisis. This 
puts pressure on the local currency, the extent of which will depend on the 
capacity of the central bank to respond to the shock.
This transmission mechanism can affect not only the country facing the 
currency crises but also neighbouring countries, as illustrated by the impact 
of the recent Argentinean crisis on the Chilean exchange rate. In that case 
the combination of a flexible rate with a monetary policy aimed at reacti­
vating the economy in Chile prompted Argentinean multinational firms 
to turn to the Chilean derivative market.
Notwithstanding the need to improve the regulation of derivative markets 
to enhance countercyclical behaviour, further development of these markets 
would permit longer terms and a greater variety of instruments. These could 
in turn allow the stabilization of cash flow management, the reduction of 
translation risk and the avoidance of pressure by non-financial multinational 
companies on the foreign exchange market in turbulent periods. But while 
this might be a good solution for short-term microeconomic behaviour, it 
would not resolve the macroeconomic problems of countries facing foreign 
shocks in the context of inconsistency between foreign exchange policy and 
macroeconomic imbalances.
Further studies of the macroeconomic impact of currency risk management 
by multinational corporations will require detailed national case studies, for 
which this chapter has provided a general framework and some guidelines 
on the factors to be examined. First, it will be necessary to conduct detailed 
studies of the functioning of the derivative markets and the institutional 
framework that governs their operations, including the volume and terms 
of transactions. Second, the foreign exchange and monetary policies of 
the country in question will have to be considered because of their impact 
on the financial and derivative markets. Finally, the impact on the foreign 
exchange rate of the strategies with which the different types of multinational 
and national corporation face those markets will have to be investigated.
Notes
* The idea of exam ining th e  macroeconomic im pact of currency risk m anagem ent 
by m ultinational companies was suggested by Stephany Griffith-Jones, and this 
chapter has benefited from stim ulating conversations w ith her th roughout its 
developm ent.
1. See Ocampo (1999, 2000), Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (1999) and  Goldstein (2000), 
am ong others.
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2. W harton School and CIBC W ood G undy (1996); World of Banking (1995).
3. The exception was the second half of the 1980s, w hen short-term  capital and 
loans did no t enter the region.
4. All these studies contrast w ith Claessens, D > ws, bu t w ith observations coming 
from few countries (Claessens etal., 1995).
5. See Davis etal. (1991), Stern and Chew (1998), Guay (1999), Prevost etal. (2000) 
and Bartram (2000) for analyses of currency risk m anagem ent in  non-financial 
corporations.
6. Because of the nature of their business, several m ultinational companies also 
hedge the com m odity price risk, using com m odity price derivatives for an im port­
an t portion  of their projected output. For example in  the N orth American gold 
m ining industry firms hedge over 26 per cent of their production, on  average 
(Bartram, 2000).
7. See the BIS press releases for June 1998, 13 November 2000 and 16 May 2001.
8. Interviews were conducted w ith finance managers of companies w ith head­
quarters in  Britain or Spain. We also draw on  quarterly financial statem ents 
reported by m ultinational enterprises to  the US SEC (Form 20-F).
9. In the  derivative markets of developed countries, m aturity  was betw een three and 
six years before th e  financial crises of the 1990s, bu t th is range was reduced to 
one to  three years after the Asian crisis.
10. See also Getler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke et al. (1996), O liner and Rudebusch 
(1996), Carpenter etal. (1998) and Fazzari etal. (2000).
11. See 'Patterns in financial markets: predicting th e  unpredictable', The Economist, 
2 June 2001.
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T h e  N e w  B a s e l C a p i t a l  A c c o r d  a n d  
D e v e l o p i n g  C o u n t r ie s :  Is s u e s ,  
I m p l i c a t i o n s  a n d  P o l i c y  P r o p o s a ls
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Stephen Spratt
Introduction
After the Asian crisis of 1997-98 bank lending to developing countries fell 
sharply and has since become negative. In June 1998 loans outstanding to 
developing countries totalled US$924 billion; by December 2000 they had 
fallen to US$753 billion, an annual decline of 7.9 per cent.1 It is in this con­
text that the implications of the new Basel Capital Accord for developing 
countries should be assessed. A particular concern is that the new accord 
may further discourage lending.
It is clear that banks have become highly risk averse vis-à-vis developing 
(emerging) economies. However this increased awareness of the particular 
risks posed by this type of borrower mirrors a more general trend towards 
greater risk aversion and emphasis on the need for accurate risk assessment. 
This trend, with an increasing focus on efficiency in all parts of the banking 
business, is in part a response to competition from non-bank financial 
institutions. The latter are not subject to the same regulatory constraints as 
banks, a situation that has placed some banks at a competitive disadvantage. 
Consequently, given the fear that business will migrate from the regulated 
(bank) sector to the unregulated (non-bank) sector, banking regulators have 
come under pressure to act.
It is argued that the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has forced banks to hold 
levels of regulatory capital that do not correspond to actual risks, as measured 
by the banks' own internal models.2 This situation has created perverse 
incentives that have led to distortions in lending practices. In particular the 
capital requirements for lending to highly rated borrowers are more than 
banks would choose to hold, putting them at a commercial disadvantage 
with respect to non-bank institutions. Recognizing these trends, the Basel 
Committee has proposed a new capital accord with a strong focus on aligning 
regulatory capital requirements with actual risks.
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Whilst the effects on developing countries are clearly not central to 
the new proposals, it seems likely that, as with the 1988 accord, significant 
effects will be felt. This chapter outlines the areas with the highest potential 
impact -  both positive and negative -  before offering some policy recom­
mendations aimed at maximizing the former, minimizing the latter and 
avoiding a net negative impact.
The new Basel Capital Accord
Although the proposed new Basel Capital Accord is to be built on 'three 
mutually reinforcing pillars', it is likely that the changes proposed to the 
measurement of credit risk (under Pillar 1) will have the most far-reaching 
implications for developed and developing countries alike. Consequently it 
is this aspect of the new accord that will be the focus in this chapter.
The proposals include three possible approaches to the measurement of 
credit risk, with increasing degrees of complexity: the standardized approach 
and the foundation and advanced internal-ratings-based (IRB) approaches. 
The new system proposed in the standardized approach addresses many 
of the concerns raised by developing countries about the 1988 accord. In 
particular the removal of the OECD/non-OECD distinction and the reduc­
tion of the incentive for short-term lending are positive proposals. Also, the 
removal of the sovereign ceiling would be of benefit to highly rated banks 
and corporates in less highly rated countries, regardless of OECD member­
ship. Overall, therefore, the proposals should, as envisaged, more closely 
align capital requirements with actual risk.
The proposed use of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) has 
been criticized in some quarters. Whilst we too have some misgivings, these 
are primarily of a practical nature and need not prove insurmountable.3 On 
balance, therefore, the proposals contained in the standardized approach are 
to be broadly welcomed. Unfortunately, however, the standardized approach 
cannot be viewed in isolation. In our judgement the IRB approach, if imple­
mented in its current form, would have negative implications for developing 
countries. Consequently the net impact of the new accord on developing 
countries is likely to be determined by the extent to which the IRB approach 
comes to dominate the banking industry's relations with the developing 
world.
The IRB approach
Perhaps the most significant changes proposed under the new accord relate 
to the greater use of banks' internal risk management systems. The rationale 
behind these changes is that greater sensitivity to the measurement of actual 
risk would enable banks more accurately to price and provide for risk. This 
would enable the banking system to function more efficiently and reduce
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the perverse incentives created by the existing accord. The result, it is hoped, 
would be a sounder, more efficient banking system that would function 
better for the benefit of all concerned. This argument is based on the benefits 
that would result from a more efficient allocation of resources at the micro- 
economic level. However, while this may be true at the level of individual 
banks, it fails to take account of the potentially negative macroeconomic, 
systemic implications of the proposals. From the perspective of developing 
countries there are two major areas of concern.
Cost and quantity of lending
It seems probable that one impact of the new accord will be an increase 
in the quantity of loans to borrowers rated above BBB and a fall in loans 
to borrowers rated below BBB. Given that the majority of the latter are in 
the developing world, they are likely to see a reduction in overall levels 
of lending from internationally active banks. What lending does occur will 
be concentrated in highly rated sovereigns, corporates and banks. Patricia 
Jackson, head of the Bank of England's Financial Industry and Regulation 
Division, puts it thus: 'For any bank, the effect of the internal ratings 
approach on required capital will depend on the risk profile of its particu­
lar book -  high risk books will demand more capital than currently and 
low risk books less' (Bank of England, 2001). Consequently there will be 
a strong incentive for banks to refocus their portfolios in the direction 
of higher-quality (lower-risk) lenders -  that is, to reduce the proportion of 
developing-country lending and increase the proportion of lending to 
developed-country borrowers.
A number of independent studies have attempted to assess the likely impact 
on the cost of borrowing for low-rated borrowers. Some have predicted 
alarming increases in the cost of borrowing, to the extent that developing 
countries will be effectively excluded from international bank lending 
(Reisen, 2001). Other research that also predicts a sharp rise in the cost of 
lending to lower-rated borrowers does not predict increases of the same 
magnitude (Powell, 2001). The various approaches, however, all point to 
a significant rise in the cost of lending to low-rated borrowers. Indeed 
this problem was also cited in submissions to Basel by a number of major 
international banks, some of which argued that the calibrations used by 
the Basel Committee were too conservative and therefore produced capital 
requirements, particularly for low-rated borrowers, in excess of those pro­
duced by their own internal models. For example Citigroup argued that 
'under the new Accord, the calibration of capital causes regulatory minimum 
capital requirements to increase to inappropriately high levels when com­
pared to existing rules or internal risk models'. Similarly the Credit Suisse 
Group contended that 'The calibration of high-risk grades in the IRB 
sanctions SMEs and emerging markets. Their access to capital from large 
institutions will be made significantly more difficult.'4
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The Basel Committee appears to have largely accepted this point. Following 
the first consultation period, the committee initiated a quantitative impact 
study (QIS2) to assess the effect of the proposal on capital requirements. 
Overall the study found that, contrary to intentions, capital requirements 
would be higher under the proposals than under the existing accord for all 
groups in both the standardized and IRB foundation approaches. The results 
for the advanced IRB were more mixed, with most banks predicting a slight 
fall in requirements. In response to these findings the committee altered 
the calibration of the IRB curve, with the result that the regulatory capital 
curve was flattened quite significantly. A further impact study (QIS3) was 
announced for the autumn of 2002 to test the effects of these modifications, 
and as a consequence the release of the final consultative document was 
postponed from early 2002 to early 2003. One outcome of these modifica­
tions has been to reduce the capital requirements for lending to lower-rated 
borrowers from that implied in the original proposals. However, whilst 
this represents an improvement the capital requirements for lower-rated 
borrowers will still be substantially higher than under the existing accord. 
Hence the incentive for banks to refocus their portfolios towards higher-rated 
borrowers remains.
Some have argued that the concern about the impact of the new proposals 
on the cost of bank lending is misplaced. Whilst it is not disputed that the 
capital requirements for lending to lower-rated borrowers will rise under 
the IRB approach,5 the suggestion is that banks price loans according to 
their own internal models, rather than on the basis of capital requirements. 
Consequently all the new accord will do is to bring the regulatory require­
ments into line with existing practice. However whilst this may be so for the 
most sophisticated international banks, it does not necessarily apply to all 
international banks that lend to emerging and developing economies: given 
the likely 'kudos' of adopting the IRB approach it seems likely that even 
these less sophisticated banks will wish to do so, if possible. Furthermore, 
even for the most sophisticated banks this argument is only valid if the 
regulatory capital required is below that which the banks would choose to 
hold. If the regulatory requirements are above those indicated by the banks' 
own models, they will be liable to 'bite' and force an increase in the cost 
(and/or reduction in quantity) of lending to lower-rated borrowers.
One factor that may well produce such an outcome is the failure of the 
proposals to take account of the benefits of international diversification. 
It has long been argued that one of the main benefits of investing in develop­
ing and emerging economies is their relatively low correlation with mature 
markets. If this is the case, then clear benefits -  at the portfolio level -  will 
accrue to banks with well-diversified international portfolios. That is, a bank 
with a loan portfolio that is distributed widely across a range of relatively 
uncorrelated markets is less likely to face simultaneous problems in all of 
those markets than a bank with loans concentrated in a smaller number of
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relatively correlated markets. If this is so, then in order accurately to align 
regulatory capital with the actual risks a bank might face the accord should 
take account of this portfolio level effect: the capital requirements for a bank 
with a well-diversified international loan portfolio should reflect the lower 
total risk than that for a more concentrated portfolio. At present the pro­
posals contain no such considerations, suggesting that, in this area at least, 
the capital requirements may not accurately reflect actual risk.
In order to resolve this issue we tested differential correlations between 
developed and developing markets, first with specific regard to international 
bank lending and profitability, and second in a more general macroeconomic 
sense (Griffith-Jones et al, 2002). Tests using each of our financial sector and 
macro variables, over all periods covered, strongly suggested that a bank 
with a loan portfolio that is well diversified across the major developed 
and developing regions will enjoy diversification benefits at the portfolio 
level: the correlation between the risks associated with loans to each of these 
regions is lower than for a bank with a loan portfolio that focuses only 
on developed markets. All of our results offer significant support for the 
validity of this position, and all are statistically significant. All the tests we 
performed, using a variety of variables over a range of time periods, provide 
strong support for the diversification hypothesis.
Further evidence comes from a simulation exercise we undertook to assess 
the potential unexpected loss resulting from a portfolio that was diversified 
within developed countries, and one that was diversified across developed 
and developing regions. This exercise involved the construction of two 
simulated loan portfolios, the purpose being to assess the probable level of 
unexpected loss in each. Thus we could directly compare the simulated 
behaviour of the two portfolios. The results of our simulation show that 
the unexpected losses for the portfolio focused on developed-country 
borrowers would, on average, be almost 23 per cent higher than for the 
portfolio diversified across developed and developing countries.
Given that capital requirements are intended to deal with unexpected 
loss, the fact that the level of unexpected loss in our simulation is lower for 
a diversified than for an undiversified portfolio is highly significant. Taken 
together with the statistical work on correlations, this evidence suggests that, 
so as to not penalize emerging and developing economies by incorrectly 
measuring the risk associated with lending to such countries, the Basel 
Committee should closely examine the practicalities of incorporating the 
benefits of international diversification into its final consultative paper.
The argument that asset correlation is variable is self-evident. Furthermore 
the suggestion that this variability affects the level of risk in an overall port­
folio and should therefore be reflected in the capital requirements, would 
also seem to have force. Indeed the committee has recognized this fact with 
the modifications already made with respect to SME lending. Following the 
release of the original consultative document there was widespread concern
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that lending to SMEs would be adversely affected by a large increase in the 
capital requirements associated with such lending. After intensive lobbying 
the committee reconsidered the issue, and agreed that the treatment of 
SMEs should be separated from other corporate lending, with borrowers 
with less than 50 million euro in annual sales receiving an average reduction 
in capital requirements of about 10 per cent relative to larger corporates. 
The rationale for this modification is that the chance of a large number of 
SMEs defaulting simultaneously is less than for a smaller group of large 
borrowers -  that is, the correlation between their probabilities of default is 
lower. Consequently a loan portfolio that is well diversified across a large 
number of SMEs will face lower overall risk at the portfolio level than one 
that focuses on a few larger borrowers. The results of our empirical work 
strongly suggest that a similar modification is justified with respect to inter­
national diversification. If such a modification is not made, then the risk 
and probability of default will not be accurately measured. This implies 
that the aim of the new accord -  a more accurate pricing of risk to determine 
capital -  will not be fully met.
A further question is that even if the IRB curve is brought into line with 
those produced by banks' internal models, is this a realistic assessment of 
the risk posed by developing-country borrowers? The absence of robust, 
long-term historical default data for all classes of borrower (certainly an issue 
in developing countries) produces great uncertainty about quantifiable 
risk. This uncertainty creates a strong incentive to herd, with developing 
countries periodically going in and out of fashion for reasons that are often 
only loosely associated with economic fundamentals. Thus it can be argued 
that market perception of the risk posed by developing countries is often 
overstated, sometimes understated, and only rarely objectively justified 
by economic fundamentals. Indeed these perceptions may well be, in some 
instances, the most significant 'fundamental' of all. Given the fact that devel­
oping countries face a very different lending environment from developed- 
country borrowers, there appears to be a case for formally recognizing this 
difference and developing a distinct approach to regulatory capital.
Procyclicality
One of the most significant charges levelled at the new proposals is that they 
will exacerbate procyclical tendencies in the banking system. The probability 
of default (PD) is inherently procyclical in that during an upturn the average 
PD will fall, and therefore the incentive to lend will increase. Conversely, 
during a downturn the average PD will increase (due to more difficult 
economic circumstances) and therefore a credit crunch may develop, with 
all but the most highly rated borrowers having difficulty attracting funds. 
In addition, deteriorating economic conditions will cause existing loans 
to 'migrate' to higher-risk categories, therefore raising the overall capital 
requirements and further deepening the downturn. The Basel Committee
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acknowledges this concern in the second consultative package, although 
'The Committee has also considered the argument that a more risk-sensitive 
framework has the potential to amplify business cycles. The Committee 
believes that the benefits of a risk-sensitive capital framework outweigh this 
concern' (Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord, p. 8, paragraph 40).
However, as is the case with much of the new accord, the trade-offs in 
terms of costs and benefits are viewed primarily in terms of their impact on 
the major banks. It is likely that developing countries will feel the costs dis­
proportionately (reduced lending coupled with an increase in the frequency 
and scale of crises) while simultaneously receiving few of the benefits. If 
we assume that financial crises are connected with the business cycle, and 
accept that developing countries are disproportionately affected by such 
crises, it becomes clear that developing countries have more to fear from 
an amplified business cycle than countries in the developed world. Given 
that influential voices in the latter are expressing real concern about the 
impact of increased procyclical pressures, the developing countries' fears are 
certainly not misplaced.
The Basel Committee seems to have accepted the validity of this criticism. 
The flattening of the IRB curve will reduce the procyclical impact to some 
extent, and the next consultative document is likely to include a variety 
of measures to combat procyclicality. However the important question 
is whether the concrete measures proposed will be enough to offset the 
potentially negative effects of increased procyclicality. It is thought that the 
committee will propose the use of stress testing, but it is unlikely that this 
will be sufficient to eliminate the problems associated with procyclicality. 
These are of sufficient importance to warrant the incorporation of explicitly 
countercyclical mechanisms, and further research is clearly warranted in 
this area. It seems desirable to introduce forward looking provisions with 
an explicit countercyclical element at the time the new Basel Accord is 
implemented; this option needs to be urgently evaluated.
A more fundamental question concerns the extent to which any measure 
will be able to offset the inherent procyclicality of a market-sensitive frame­
work while maintaining increased overall risk sensitivity, which is a central 
aim of the new accord.
The net impact on developing countries and policy 
proposals
Whilst the proposals contained in the standardized approach are broadly 
to be welcomed, in that they address many of the concerns expressed by 
developing countries about the existing accord, the introduction of IRB 
approaches -  even after the modification of the original proposals -  has 
very problematic implications. If the negative impact of the IRB approaches 
outweighs the positive effects of the standardized approach, from a
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developing-country perspective, then the new accord will merely give with 
one hand only to take more with the other.
The expressed purpose of the new accord is to align regulatory capital 
more closely with actual risk. However the failure of the proposals to take 
account of the benefits of international diversification suggests that, in this 
instance at least, risk is not being accurately measured. That is, by excluding 
the possibility of banks' capital requirements taking account of diversifi­
cation effects, the proposals effectively mean an inaccurate measure of risk 
at the portfolio level.
The danger that the implementation of the IRB approach will result in 
a reduction in the quantity and/or an increase in the cost of bank lending 
to developing countries is compounded by the likely increase in the cyclic­
ality of such lending. The systemic implications of greater risk sensitivity 
in lending patterns are likely to impact on developed and developing coun­
tries alike, although more so on the latter given the smaller size of their 
economies vis-à-vis international capital flows. It is therefore crucial that 
the trade-off between microeconomic allocative efficiency and macroeco­
nomic systemic stability is more clearly thought through. Specifically, it is 
not clear that what is good for individual banks is necessarily good for the 
stability of the banking system as a whole, or for the economic prospects of 
the developing world in particular.
Our policy proposals can therefore be summarized as follows.
First, early adoption of the IRB approach is likely to have significant, 
possibly unintended, consequences and we therefore recommend postponing 
its implementation to allow for further research, specifically with regard 
to procyclicality and the impact on lending to developing countries by the 
major international banks.
Second, if the IRB approach is to be implemented in something like its 
current form, it is essential that the regulatory requirements for low-rated 
borrowers are lowered at least to the levels suggested by the banks' own 
models. This is the minimum requirement to prevent the accord worsening 
the existing situation, even if one accepts the proposition that banks currently 
price their loans according to internal models rather than regulatory capital. 
To this end, the clear benefits of diversification linked to lending to develop­
ing countries that we have demonstrated should be explicitly incorporated 
to allow an accurate measurement of risk. Given the changes already made 
to the proposals with respect to corporates and SME lending, as well as the 
fact that the changes we propose seem to have a solid empirical basis, there 
are no theoretical, empirical or practical reasons why changes should not 
be made in order to incorporate the benefits of international diversification. 
The fact that developing countries have no representation on the Basel 
Committee should not be a bar to this important change. A modification 
would not only be technically correct, but also supportive of the stated aim 
of the G7 governments to increase the role of private capital flows as an 
engine of growth and development for developing and emerging economies.
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Third, serious attention should be paid to the adoption of countercyclical 
mechanisms to mitigate the procyclical elements of the IRB approach, rather 
than the currently suggested use of stress testing. One measure that is gath­
ering increased support is the Spanish provisioning approach: the practical 
workings of this mechanism should be empirically researched to ascertain 
the feasibility of extending such a system internationally.
Fourth, the improvements contained in the standardized approach should 
be developed to reduce, if not eliminate, the incentives for short-term 
lending, and the number of risk buckets should be increased to reduce 
regulatory biases towards lending to certain categories of borrower.
Finally, one aspect of the standardized approach that has attracted much 
attention is the proposal to use external credit rating institutions to assign 
ratings. Given that international financial stability can be viewed as a public 
good, there is a strong argument for having a public element in credit rating. 
Of the major international financial institutions, the Bank for International 
Settlements has the best track record in terms of spotting potential crises 
and has financial stability as its main objective, so it would be well placed 
to play a joint role with rating agencies.
Concluding remarks
The fact that the Basel Committee has decided to postpone the implemen­
tation of the new accord until a further consultative package has been 
assessed is to be welcomed. It is to be hoped that the concerns of developing 
countries are given sufficient weight in this process, which should be as 
transparent and open as possible. The 1988 accord, devised with the G10 
banks in mind, rapidly became the industry standard. Similarly the new 
accord, whilst not primarily aimed at the needs of developing countries, 
will have serious and unavoidable consequences for many developing and 
emerging economies. Given the crucial importance of ensuring a stable and 
suitable level of financing to facilitate much needed economic development 
in the poorer parts of the world, it is vital that these issues are seriously 
addressed so that a net negative impact can be avoided. This can be done in 
ways that are consistent with a more precise measurement of risk and the 
strengthening of the international banking system, which are the main aims 
of the new Basel Capital Accord.
Notes
1. An alternative way of viewing this is to  examine banks' net exposure to  developing 
countries in  terms of assets and liabilities. Banks' exposure peaked in  1997 w ith 
a net credit position of US$147 billion. However net claims on  developing coun­
tries th en  fell by a staggering US$292.8 billion, and by 2000 banks had become net 
debtors to  the tune of US$145 billion (see C hapter 5).
2. See Bank of England (2001).
3. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see the IDS finance website: 
w ww.ids.ac.uk/intfinance.
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4. See 'C om m ents received on  the Second Consultative Package', www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
cacom m ents.htm .
5. The fact th a t capital requirem ents overstate the risk for high-rated borrowers is 
a m ajor im petus behind the new  proposals. However if these requirem ents are to  
be lowered and the overall level of capital in  the banking system is to  rem ain fixed 
at 8 per cent, th en  th e  requirem ents at the low-rated end m ust rise.
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T h e  I n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  E m e r g in g -  
M a r k e t  A s s e ts  D e m a n d  S c h e d u le *
Valpy FitzGerald
Introduction
The expansion and contraction of portfolio capital flows and short-term 
bank lending from OECD countries in emerging markets during the past 
decade has generated a large and controversial body of literature. Most of 
the debate has focused on the effect of these flows on emerging markets 
themselves, and on the effect of host country policies on the attraction or 
retention of the flows. However the process by which credit providers and 
portfolio investors make their decisions is much more than simply deciding 
to supply a specific amount of capital to emerging markets at a given 
average risk and price, and then to allocate this between individual emerg­
ing markets according to local risk and return characteristics -  the so-called 
'fundamentals'.
In any market, changes in the level of transaction flows and the prices at 
which they take place must reflect shifts in either the demand schedule or 
the supply schedule (or both simultaneously), and both these schedules will 
be affected by agents' expectations about the future evolution of the market. 
Fortunately increasing attention is being paid to two dimensions of what 
this chapter logically terms 'the demand for emerging-market assets'.
The first strand in the recent literature relates to what are frequently but 
somewhat misleadingly called the 'push' and 'pull' factors that determine 
capital flows at the macroeconomic level. The aggregate level of capital 
flows to emerging markets is held to be determined by the push factors, 
which include market conditions in the source country and the return 
on emerging markets as a whole. The pull factors are the conditions in 
the destination countries, which determine the allocation of the aggregate 
flow across the emerging markets. The second strand relates to the deter­
minants of investors' decisions to purchase (or sell) emerging-market assets 
at the microeconomic level. Portfolio choice models thus include source- 
country conditions as determining the opportunity cost of capital (that is, 
the risk-free portion of the portfolio) and the overall asset stock; while
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destination-country conditions determine the yield and risk of emerging- 
market assets.
From the first strand it is apparent that shifts in aggregate asset demand 
(that is, changes in the push factors), such as OECD interest rate changes 
and G3 exchange rate fluctuations, account for at least half of the observed 
changes in capital flows, independently of the asset supply (that is, 'pull') 
conditions: the so-called 'fundamentals' in emerging markets themselves. 
From the second strand it is clear that what matters to individual investors' 
decisions is not only information about fundamentals but also the way in 
which the information is used, endogenous cycles in risk appetite and the 
effect of regulatory incentives -  all of which are determined by conditions 
in the source country.
In effect the demand schedule for emerging-market assets is three- 
dimensional. As well as price (or yield) on one axis, so to speak, and the 
quantity of assets on another axis, there exists a third dimension that can 
be broadly termed 'quality' on another. This is no different in principle 
from the market for, say, cars -  except that, as we shall see, quality is not 
a stable or exogenous factor. Nor, as we shall see, is it a 'market in lemons' 
where quality is unknown to the buyer alone. The supply schedule (that 
is, emission or resale by government, company or bank concerned) has the 
same three dimensions. Ideally, quality is the given risk of debt default, 
dividend collapse or major devaluation, as determined by the fundamentals 
of the country and its companies, so that the interaction between stable 
demand and supply schedules will determine the price and quantity at 
which the market in assets clears. The changes in this equilibrium over 
time are the observed capital flows. Variations in asset quality when 
fundamentals alter due to external shocks or domestic politics will be 
reflected in changing prices and flows as markets adjust to the changed 
circumstances. Then the objective of emerging-market governments (and 
their international advisors) is to improve asset quality by sound (or sounder) 
management so that either asset prices improve (that is, yield spreads fall) 
or more assets can be supplied (that is, capital inflows are attracted) at the 
going price.
Asset prices can be seen as information that is directly available to the 
market, but only in the form of past and current values and yields. However 
future prices (or indeed the appropriate long-term price trend) are an essen­
tial aspect of price and are a matter of investors' expectations rather than 
measurable data. Moreover the quantity dimension is ambiguous for two 
reasons. First, what is recorded (for example in balance of payments statistics) 
is the value of flows made up of innumerable transactions (price multiplied 
by quantity), and while the number of securities transactions could in 
principle be counted there is no clear definition of the volume index to be 
used to aggregate them. Second, changes in the stocks of financial assets 
(which are what is recorded at the firm level) reflect not only new flows but
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also stock revaluations. Ideally, then, we need records of asset stock volumes 
and prices, with the changes decomposed into flows and revaluations.1
The third dimension of 'quality' is the most difficult to define. It 
should reflect risk, of course, but this cannot be ascertained merely from the 
volatility of returns in the past because it also contains market expectations 
of future yields and volatility (which may vary not only with the underlying 
fundamentals but also with market beliefs about that future) on the one 
hand, and the role of the asset in the investor's portfolio -  including its 
covariance with other assets, their respective yields and her or his degree of 
risk aversion -  on the other. If markets clear properly and price fully reflects 
quality, this will not present a practical measurement problem, although it 
could still present an obstacle to the design of policy to reduce volatility.
In terms of elementary algebra we have two equations (demand and supply) 
in three variables: price, quantity and quality (risk). This system cannot be 
solved without a third equation. If a single stable relationship between price 
and risk exists, as financial textbooks suppose, then this constitutes the third 
equation and the system can be solved -  that is, there is market equilibrium. 
In practice, however, this stable relationship does not exist, so in effect there 
is market failure. The response of agents is to construct heuristic rules of 
thumb that reflect practical experience of the observed relationships between 
quality and quantity. This response is made explicit in management rules 
for credit rationing and portfolio benchmarking at the microeconomic level. 
It is also implicit in asset bubbles and regional contagion at the macro- 
economic level.
Such quantity-quality linkages are a familiar characteristic of domestic 
financial markets. A backward-sloping credit supply curve occurs when 
lenders are increasingly unwilling to lend to borrowers as their debt mounts, 
and the offer of higher yields (that is, lower prices) does not stimulate 
more lending (that is, asset demand) because it reduces the capacity of the 
borrower to pay. By extension, further lending to a single client will increase 
the investor’s risk exposure, thus affecting quality as well as price. Hence 
profit maximization by lenders leads to a situation in which the demand 
for loans is not fully met at the current price (that is, the return for a given 
risk class). As a consequence there are shifts in the asset demand schedule 
(credit supply) that determine the credit flow. At the aggregate level these 
credit shifts have substantial effects on output -  further affecting asset 
quality and amplifying the cycle.
Finally, the way in which investors assess asset quality depends on the 
way in which the information is used, and not just on the asymmetry in 
its availability to buyer and seller that the textbooks assume. The path- 
dependent formation of expectations and the difficulty of assessing future 
contract compliance limit the ability of investors to adopt an optimal 
portfolio position, defined entirely by expected returns and measurable 
volatility. Indeed the widespread 'benchmark' approach -  defining a range
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and a central position for portfolio composition -  implies that an objective 
definition of asset quality is not available to be priced. Limits on exposure 
to a particular country by a single bank across all its asset purchases have 
a similar effect. This is the aspect of the demand function that is most diffi­
cult to assess, particularly because the way in which investing institutions 
use information (public or private) to reach this conclusion can change as 
well as the circumstances themselves.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section attempts to derive 
the main macroeconomic characteristics of the emerging-market asset 
demand schedule from the literature on push factors in capital flows, which 
emphasizes the asymmetric effect of changes in monetary conditions on 
OECD markets and 'pure contagion'. It then reviews recent portfolio com­
position decisions by fund managers in order to establish the key micro- 
economic characteristics, particularly the roots of herding and risk appetite 
in bounded rationality. Bringing these two perspectives together provides 
the basis for a critique of official market interventions and their limited 
effect on demand conditions. The chapter concludes by suggesting that 
more determined efforts to stabilize and lengthen demand schedules may be 
needed to restore an orderly market in emerging-market assets.
Push factors and credit cycles -  the macroeconomic dimension 
of the asset demand schedule
Changing investor perceptions are clearly related to international capital 
market instability. For instance before the Asian crisis five factors were 
considered to determine market access, or rather re-entry after the debt crisis 
of the 1980s (IMF, 1992: 45 etseq.):
• Sound macroeconomic policies to reduce perceptions of country transfer 
risk.
• Structural reforms such as privatization and financial liberalization to 
provide attractive assets in the form of equities and treasury bills.
• The restructuring of existing commercial debt in order to reduce the 
disincentive effect of large debt burdens on private investment.
• A solid record of servicing claims after the 1982 crisis to enhance reput­
ation among investors.
• The reduced transaction costs implied by modern technology and 
integrated markets.
All these factors were essentially related to the quality and supply of assets 
rather than the demand for them, despite the fact that the ERM crisis had 
recently demonstrated that private sector behaviour could be highly desta­
bilizing, and that self-fulfilling speculative attacks could be encouraged by 
the availability of bank credit for this purpose (IMF, 1993, particularly the
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section on private sector behaviour during crisis). In particular, highly lever­
aged institutions such as hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of 
investment banks could create rapid changes in the demand for particular 
asset classes and thus destabilize particular markets (IMF, 1994). It also 
became clear that speculative activities across the interstices of the inter­
national financial system were not simple arbitrage but actually created 
systemic settlement and liquidity risks (IMF, 1994: 34-7, 120-38).
This somewhat belated recognition2 of the destabilizing potential of 
endogenous investor behaviour (despite the fact that domestic financial 
regulation took this for granted) prompted urgent official attention to the 
need to regulate international banking on a cross-border basis (IMF, 1997), 
herding behaviour by portfolio investors -  particularly fund managers -  and 
contagion between emerging markets (IMF, 1998: 69-71), and highlighted 
the need for ratings agencies to take account of the exposure of private 
banks as well as macroeconomic data (IMF, 1999: 101-15, 180-203).
This overdue acceptance that demand schedule shifts are a major cause of 
instability in capital flows and beyond the control of emerging markets 
has not, however, been matched by an initiative to stabilize demand. As 
a consequence, formal analytical modelling of international capital markets 
in the aggregate (as opposed to the microeconomics of portfolio behaviour) 
has made little progress, in sharp contrast to the valuable contributions 
made by trade theory to the formulation of international trade policy. Sticky 
prices, market segmentation, heterogeneous investors, persistent currency 
misalignments despite arbitrage and the cost of scarce information all need 
to be accounted for if the model is even to approximate the real world in 
a useful way (Dumas, 1994). Indeed the divergence of asset prices from their 
fundamental values is a systemic characteristic of all capital markets, and 
while it is a zero sum game for those financial agents who are directly 
involved, the effects on the real economy are far from negligible and must 
be taken into account by regulators (Tobin, 1998: ch. 6).
As the demand for and supply of emerging-market assets does not come 
into equilibrium, an explicitly disequilibrium econometric framework is 
clearly required in practice (Agenor, 1998). Models of 'credit crunches' are 
a familiar approach to the analysis of domestic capital markets (Blinder, 
1987) but are not generally used in international finance. Such models 
imply that a pecking order of FDI, debt and equity is required for such 
a framework, consistent with asymmetric information and finance theory 
(Razin et al, 1998). Above all the effect of demand changes on asset prices 
and flows is likely to be asymmetric in the sense that an increase (or decrease) 
in demand will not affect all assets equally, but rather prices and quantities 
stabilize the safer the asset.
One of the few instances of this approach is the detailed examination 
of capital flows to four emerging markets -  Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and 
Korea -  by Mody and Taylor (2001). They have found that the 'short' side of
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the market, which can vary over the cycle, determines the level of flows. It 
is therefore possible to determine instances of 'international capital crunch', 
when flows are curtailed because of lender rationing. In particular their 
results show that higher US yield spreads are associated with credit crunches 
for emerging markets. Their analysis also highlights the part played by 
asymmetric information (as distinct from default risk) in conditioning 
capital flows. There is also ample evidence that domestic investors are better 
informed about payoffs in their own market than are foreign investors 
in both Europe (Gehrig, 1993) and Japan (Kang and Stulz, 1994), leading 
to home bias. There is also evidence that domestic investors moved out of 
markets in crisis before foreigners did in the cases of Korea (Kim and Wei,
1999) and Mexico (Frankel and Schmukler, 1996). This has led Brennan 
and Cao (1997) to suggest that while foreign equity purchases may be an 
increasing function of returns, due to the cumulative information advantage, 
news will cause foreign investors to revise their positions more than domestic 
ones will.
The relative role of push and pull factors in separately determining fluc­
tuations in capital flows has been researched empirically, particularly in 
respect of the outward surge of the early 1990s, although there is no general 
consensus on the relative roles played by these factors. Calvo et al. (1993) 
stress external factors because reforming and non-reforming countries were 
similarly affected and at same time. The key factor was the poor return on 
safe assets in the G3 countries (especially the United States), which provided 
an incentive to search for higher returns. In the mid 1990s Fernandez-Arias 
(1996) concluded that push factors predominated, especially the falling 
US interest rates. By extension, sustained US asset price growth in the late 
1990s explains the decline in demand, as well as supply quality problems in 
emerging markets themselves. Montiel and Reinhart (2001) have thus con­
cluded that the key push factors were those which reduced the attractiveness 
(risk-return characteristics) of industrial country debtors and therefore the 
demand for emerging-market assets. This was related to the business cycle: 
the collapse of Japanese asset prices and low US and European interest rates 
are cited for the early 1990s. Longer-term push (demand) factors included 
changes in the financial structure of industrial countries, such as the rise 
of mutual funds, where the small emerging-market share in their growing 
portfolios allowed for a longer-term upward trend. According to these 
authors, at least half of the observed variations in capital flows during the 
1990s can be explained by these push factors.
More recently attention has turned to the downturn in the capital 
flow cycle in the late 1990s. The cumulative stock positions for emerging- 
market bonds, loans and equity seem to indicate that a stable position was 
approached in the second half of the decade after the rapid stock expansion 
in the first half (Figure 11.1). In addition it is clear that towards the end of 
the decade there was a shift towards higher-quality assets, such as syndicated
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Figure 11.1 Aggregate trends in  emerging-market asset stocks, 1994-2001 (US$ billion) 
Source: IMF (2001).
loans to affiliates of multinational corporations, investment-grade bonds 
and corporate equity traded on international exchanges. This might imply 
that the boom was in fact a stock readjustment following the earlier decline 
in demand due to the deterioration of asset quality (that is, the debt crisis) 
on the one hand, and the expansion of asset supply due to the privatization 
of utilities and financial liberalization on the other. The subsequent 'drought', 
then, reflected deteriorating asset quality and a reduced supply of assets as 
privatizations were completed and sovereign issuers reduced their public 
sector borrowing under adverse conditions (IMF, 2001).
However Figure 11.2 suggests another explanation. It is clear that in the 
case of US mutual funds at least, the demand for emerging-market assets was 
closely correlated with the demand for international assets more generally. 
In other words the push factors determining the latter -  including relative 
returns, portfolio diversification and home bias -  were dominating the pull 
factor. A similar pattern can be observed for international bank portfolios, 
which kept on growing at the end of the decade while the emerging-market 
share steadily declined (ibid.: 23). Hence the divergence in the late 1990s 
can be attributed to a decline in asset quality (that is, to the successive 
emerging-market crises), although it should be remembered that this too 
was related to the previous upsurge of demand, which created an asset 
bubble. Similar effects have been detected in the bubble in technology 
stocks, in which emerging-market equities and bonds appear to constitute 
a single-asset, risk-return class for many institutional investors.
As Figure 11.3 demonstrates, there is also evidence of an increasing cross­
correlation between emerging-market assets in times of crisis due to broad 
selling. For this high and variable degree of contagion, ‘common external
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factors and lack of investor discrimination are the more likely explanators' 
(ibid. 18). In downswings the lack of safe havens within an asset class also 
appears to increase cross-correlation. Eleven 'droughts' of varying length 
have been identified between 1993 and 2001, defined as periods when the 
primary dollar market was effectively closed to the main non-investment- 
grade borrowers. Rate-spread widening and market volatility have been
jd\ il » ___ _ Russian
/ Sjk default USHY September 11
J Brazil sell-off \  
1 /d e v a l u a t i o n  \  Turkey
\ devaluation 
US interest \  1 
. » rate concerns i „ r
I f Q p
Valpy FitzGerald 199
identified as key factors in such market closures: markets tend to reopen 
when spreads stabilize or narrow again. These factors also cause issuers to 
delay issuing, so there is a supply effect as well. However closure tends to be 
sudden and opening gradual, because 'while there has typically been a key 
discrete event that closes markets, there has typically not been a clearly 
identifiable discrete event that reopens them' (ibid.: 20).
In sum, it is clear from the macroeconomic evidence on capital flows that 
shifts in the demand schedule for emerging-market assets have dispropor­
tionate effects on both prices (yields) and quantities (flows), causing major 
macroeconomic shocks that in turn affect assets in terms of both quality 
(that is, economic stability and default risk) and supply. The factors that cause 
these shifts include the cost (interest rates) and availability of capital -  that 
is, the OECD business cycle -  on the one hand, and changes in risk aversion 
on the other. Risk aversion itself depends on home market conditions, and 
also on the experience of previous crises and the contagion of whole asset 
classes, independently of the underlying fundamentals, which change over 
time as collective perceptions of the causes of emerging-market instability 
change. To understand the changes in risk aversion it is necessary to turn to 
the microeconomic evidence on investor behaviour.
Momentum trading and risk appetite -  the microeconomic 
dimension of the asset demand schedule
For some time it has been clear that (1) the microeconomic logic of invest­
ment behaviour in response to particular financial incentives and (2) the 
way in which investors use information can have severe consequences 
for the pricing of developing-country stocks, quite independently of the 
underlying fundamentals.3 The consequent asset bubbles can have a serious 
impact on the real economy in both developed and developing countries 
even in the presence of low inflation, fiscal balance and monetary rectitude 
(IMF, 2000).
The principles of investor valuation in terms of the risk of and return on 
assets in a portfolio are well known, but the liquidity of emerging-market 
assets (almost a form of contract uncertainty) is also relevant when there 
is a possibility of market collapse. Liquidity then relates to the perception 
of other buyers' reactions to news (herding and contagion), and to the 
anticipated actions of public authorities (so-called 'moral hazard'). As a 
consequence, asset valuation methods and portfolio composition rules tend 
to be rather crude, being largely based on considerations of liquidity and 
exit possibilities (Clark et al., 1993).
However there are limitations to the use of yield spreads on emerging- 
market bonds as evidence of markets' perception of asset quality in the form 
of underlying default risk. A measure of yield dispersion and of comovements 
is necessary to determine whether the effects of shocks are common to all
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the bonds surveyed, and the time profile of risk is needed to detect investors' 
demand for liquidity. Moreover 'care is needed in interpreting yield spreads, 
since they are influenced by a variety of factors other than the perceived 
creditworthiness of the borrower including investors' appetite for risk and 
the liquidity of particular instruments' (Cunningham etal, 2001: 175). In 
particular, 'changes in risk appetite follow from change in preferences or 
institutional factors, such as the need to adjust portfolios following losses 
incurred on holdings of other risky assets' (ibid.: 185).
Yield dispersion increases over time as well as after crises, which can be 
interpreted as growing discrimination among investors in a cumulative 
learning process. However it is still the case that beyond investment grade4 
the relationship between risk (as reflected in ratings) and price (reflected 
in yield spreads) tends to break down, particularly during droughts, when 
credit rationing severely reduces transaction volumes. Moreover, to the 
extent that the yield-spread term structure slopes upward (because default 
risk increases into the future), then average yield measures will be dis­
torted when composition changes through the cycle according to liquidity 
preference.
We understand very little about how information is actually used in these 
investment decisions. In particular, perceptions of risk cannot reliably be 
based on an econometric analysis of past trends, due to the lack of data and 
the persistence of structural breaks. Under conditions of uncertainty not 
only is the most recent and timely information used (such as reserve levels 
or asset price trends, as used by chartists) rather than more informative 
data, but also judgement is strongly affected by the implicit models used by 
investors. Moreover in view of the cost of information (that is, research), its 
untimeliness and its uncertainty, portfolio investors logically prefer to move 
quickly in response to news. Finally, the incentives faced by fund managers 
(such as quarterly performance bonuses based on performance relative to 
the industry average) are widely considered to exacerbate this behaviour.
In effect, as Keynes pointed out a long time ago, uncertainty cannot be 
reduced to risk or probability, rather it is related to the strength or degree 
of belief. Thus 'people evaluate the probability of events by the degree 
to which these events are representative of the relevant model or process' 
(Kahneman et al., 1982: 97). Measurements of likely risk under circumstances 
that are difficult to imagine (low availability) or have not been experienced 
before are systematically underestimated as the event is felt to be unlikely. 
In general, 'although the language of probability can be used to express 
any form of uncertainty, the laws of probability theory do not apply to all 
variants of uncertainty with equal force' (ibid.: 519).
An interesting application of this insight can be found in De Grauwe's 
model of the 'band of agnosticism' in exchange rates, within which demand 
is stable but once breached leads to large demand shifts. This reflects 
'rational behaviour in an uncertain world' (De Grauwe, 1996: 181-206).
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De Grauwe argues that 'the idea that economic agents compute a future 
exchange rate based on a model they believe in, then telescope it back into 
the present, is of little use in a world where economic agents have great 
difficulty in working out what the true model of the world is' (ibid.: 189). 
Under these circumstances, small information costs lead to quite large asset 
price bands.5 De Grauwe suggests that 'the band of agnosticism is also a 
breeding ground for fads which, in the absence of credible alternatives, are 
elevated to important theories' (ibid.: 202), and concludes that 'movements 
of real exchange rates are, within certain bounds, inexplicable' (ibid.: 209) -  
all one can do is to make probabilistic statements about them.
Another direction is provided by recent work on herding by investors, 
which indicates three possible causes:
• Payoff externalities, where the payoff to an agent who adopts an action 
is positively related to the number of agents who adopt the same action.
• Principal-agent considerations such that a manager, in order to maintain 
or gain reputation when markets are imperfectly informed, may prefer 
either to ‘hide in the herd’ to avoid evaluation or 'ride the herd' to 
improve reputation.
• Information cascades, where later agents, inferring information from 
the actions of prior agents, optimally decide to ignore their own informa­
tion (Devenow and Welck, 1996). Here too the use of information is as 
important as its availability.
The macroeconomic variables discussed in the previous section also enter 
into standard models of portfolio optimization as the basis for asset allocation 
by fund managers (Disyatat and Gelos, 2001). Clearly, higher home interest 
rates, lower volatility in home assets, higher covariance between these and 
emerging-market assets, and higher risk aversion will all reduce demand for 
emerging-market assets independently of the supply conditions. Further, the 
benchmarking model explains pervasive herding behaviour and thus the 
momentum effect of demand for an asset becoming a positive function of 
quantity (capital flow). These models take both the risk aversion of investors 
and the characteristics of assets as given. There is, however, good reason to 
treat risk aversion (or 'risk appetite') as a variable in itself, one that not only 
changes but is also path dependent, varying with past experience of yields 
and bubbles and thus potentially strongly procyclical. Thus the prevalence 
of home bias, particularly under conditions of uncertainty, is clearly part of 
the problem for emerging markets as an asset class, and not just a structural 
factor.
US pension funds hold between 1.5 per cent and 2.0 per cent of their port­
folios in emerging-market assets, mainly through mutual funds, which in 
turn account for about 10 per cent of market capitalization in host countries 
(Kaminsky etal., 2000b).6 Econometric analysis clearly indicates that funds'
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momentum trading in emerging-market equities is positive -  they systematic­
ally buy winners and sell losers (Kaminsky etal, 2000a). Contemporaneous 
momentum (buying winners and selling losers) is stronger during crises; 
lagged momentum trading (buying past winners and selling past losers) 
is stronger when there are no crises. Investors also engage in contagion 
trading, that is, they sell assets from one country when asset prices fall 
in another. Kaminsky etal. also found differences between the behaviour 
of fund managers and direct investors, with managers being more likely to 
engage in momentum trading, partly because individuals flee mutual funds 
during crises even if the fundamentals do not warrant it.
In a similar vein, Disyatat and Gelos (2001) have explored portfolio data 
for dedicated US mutual funds to assess whether they follow benchmarks or 
portfolio rebalancing rules. The authors found that benchmarking explains 
observed behaviour better than the rebalancing rule in the standard mean- 
variance optimization model, but they did not explore variations in risk 
aversion over time. The IMF, however, recognizes that risk appetite changes 
over time, and to identify this it uses the JP Morgan 'global risk aversion 
index' (IMF, 2001), which measures monetary liquidity and credit premia 
(Figure 11.4). However, the Bank of England warns that 'it is difficult to 
construct robust indicators of risk appetite' because of the difficulty of 
separating out the effects of pure contagion and underlying fundamentals 
in aggregate indicators7 (Cunningham etal., 2001: 185).
It is therefore necessary to construct a model of risk aversion (or risk 
appetite) that suspends the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) assump­
tion, allowing for observed cyclical behaviour in risk appetite and asymmetry 
through the cycle, with risk aversion rising suddenly in a crisis and only 
slowly declining afterwards. Kumar and Persaud (2001) suggest how this 
might be done. They argue that observed spreads should not be explained 
in terms of the difference between global risk (a) and the variance of the 
asset price (a2), as is conventionally done, but in terms of the product of risk 
appetite (K) and the standard deviation of the asset price (P). This defines 
the expected return E(R), which is measured as the difference between the 
long-term asset price, LR(P), and the current price, P.
This formulation has two advantages: it allows risk appetite to be separately 
estimated, and it reflects the fact that variations in risk appetite will have 
proportionately larger effects on riskier asset prices:
This formulation has the attractive property that the effect of global risk is 
symmetrical on emerging market asset prices, but the effect of risk appetite 
varies with the riskiness of the asset price itself:
E(R) = a+ K log(<T2) 
E(R) = LR(P) -  P 
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Figure 11.4 Global risk aversion 
Source: IMF (2001).
A definition of JP Morgan's LCPI
The LCPI has two broad sub-components measuring liquidity and 
credit premia respectively. The indicators of a liquidity premia consist 
of the spread between on- and off-the-run US treasuries and US swap 
spreads. The credit premia indicators consist of US high-yield spreads, 
an emerging market bond index (the EMBI), JP Morgan's Global Risk 
Aversion Index, and implied volatilities of the major exchange rates. 
An overall index is constructed by equally weighting the different sub­
components of the indicators.
dP/da = -1  dP/dK = 21og a (11.4)
It also means that K can be estimated separately as a coefficient in the 
regression of the volatility of an asset on its price. Empirical tests by Kumar 
and Persaud on leading emerging market currencies clearly demonstrate 
cyclical behaviour in risk appetite (K) and support the hypothesis that 
the more volatile (riskier) an asset is, the greater the rise in expected return 
in relation to the general level of risk. That is, the demand schedule for 
emerging market assets will be both steeper and more volatile than that for 
home assets.
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At the microeconomic level, we can draw together the factors discussed 
above by exploring a simple framework for asset allocation in a portfolio 
made up of two asset classes:8 the emerging-market asset, 1, and the home 
asset, 2, with expected returns, r, and risk profiles, a2, such that:
rl > r2 of > (11-5)
The share, w, of emerging-market assets in the portfolio and the covariance 
between the two asset classes, <r12, then determines its overall return, R, and 
variance, 22, characteristics:
R = rxw + rz (l—w) (11-6)
22 = w2u2 + (1 -  w)2 a2 + 2w(l -  w)ui2 (11.7)
The investors' problem is to maximize their objective with respect to port­
folio composition, which is defined as follows:
max = R -  -g-A^2 (11-8)w 2
where A is the risk aversion coefficient. This then solves for the optimal 
value of the share of emerging-market assets, w*, in the portfolio:
<j\ + a^+2 <jx
r, + r
+ [<*? + «id (11.9)
From our point of view, the key benefit of this standard textbook result is 
that it enables us to construct an implicit asset demand schedule on the 
basis of the same characteristics of the asset demand schedule identified in 
the previous section. In other words the positive (negative) effect on the 
demand for emerging-market assets of a decrease (increase) in the home 
rate of return, r2, an increase (decrease) in the riskiness of home assets, a2, 
a fall (rise) in pure contagion, cri2, and above all an increase in risk aver­
sion, A.
In sum, both empirical evidence and analytical insights indicate that 
the emerging-market asset schedule is relatively unstable and may respond 
to exogenous changes in risk appetite. In addition, momentum trading 
and investor herding combine to create asset bubbles quite independently 
of changes in the supply conditions or fundamentals. The effect of these 
demand fluctuations on individual emerging markets is asymmetric in the 
sense that demand is disproportionately more unstable for higher-risk 
assets. This evidence supports our interpretation of the nature of the asset 
demand schedule at the aggregate level, but also implies that changes 
in aggregate risk aversion should be made endogenous in a dynamic 
formulation.
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'An orderly market' -  the effects of official interventions on the 
asset demand schedule
In combination, the two previous sections imply that if the market is to 
become more orderly and if capital flows to developing countries are to 
increase in both volume and maturity, supply-side measures alone will not 
be sufficient. Therefore we must turn to the issue of intervention in asset 
demand.
If a full set of prices does not exist, or if perfect information on them 
is not available, even if firms and households act perfectly competitively 
(taking prices as parametric) then the market equilibrium -  if it exists -  is not 
welfare maximizing (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). This is particularly true of 
financial markets, because a full set of futures markets, and of markets for all 
risks, usually does not exist. Again the presence of externalities such as the 
liquidity effect of major agents leaving the market can also lead to market 
failure or an absence of markets. Firms (or individuals or governments) 
cannot issue unlimited bonds at a given risk premium over current interest 
rates because the risk premium depends on the amount borrowed and the 
collateral available.
Lenders will not lend even at higher interest rates (or even more collateral) 
because this would increase the risk and dissuade good borrowers. The 
profit-maximizing loan book for a bank thus takes the form of rationing -  
that is, a limit on the overall level of loans to particular classes of borrower 
or types of asset. Asymmetric information (where borrowers have better 
knowledge of the likelihood of default than do lenders) will lead to the 
situation where assets may be sound, but no one is willing to lend -  that is, 
a 'collapsed market' (Hiller, 1997). In these circumstances a small increase 
in the perceived risk for some borrowers, or a reduction in the overall 
supply of funds, can cause the credit market to collapse for a whole class of 
borrowers (Mankiw, 1986). The consequences for macroeconomic stability 
in a single economy are now widely recognized (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992), 
and logically they are even more significant for international capital markets. 
Specifically, the absence of full market clearing leads to a serious problem 
with market access: low-income countries do not have access to international 
bond markets (at whatever premium) while middle-income countries can 
easily lose access due to regional contagion or political events (World Bank, 
2000).
Asymmetric information problems are to some extent resolved by rating 
agencies, although their record is very mixed (IMF, 1998, 1999). Externalities 
also exist in the form of overheating on market upswings and liquidity 
problems on downswings, both of which may justify supervisory oversight 
and last-resort lending. Contract risk in the case of equities is not great, and 
the legal costs of transactions are reduced by the use of American or Global 
Depository Receipts in developed-country markets. However in the case of
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bonds there are serious externality and contract problems in cases of bond 
default and debt workouts, where the interests of individual bondholders 
may not coincide, thus causing a 'common action' problem. In the case of 
bank lending there should be fewer information problems because banks 
possess both expertise and information from their branches. The risk of 
default, however, remains high due to liquidity problems and financial 
fragility in emerging markets, so banks tend to make only short-term loans, 
and preferably to other banks and multinational affiliates. What is more, 
bank lending tends to become highly volatile in response to political and 
regional events, and to be strongly procyclical; so it does not provide sup­
port in times of economic difficulty, and tends to increase credit availability 
during macroeconomic booms.
Broadly speaking we can identify three traditional forms of public inter­
vention in the flow of private capital to emerging markets:
• Intermediation between developed-country lenders (that is, global capital 
markets) and developing countries, based on the particular advantages of 
information, diversification or contract enforcement that such institutions 
have over the private sector in order to provide longer-term loans than 
the market is willing to offer, or to gain access for countries that are not 
considered creditworthy; this being the role of the World Bank and the 
other (regional) multilateral development banks.
• Efforts to ensure that financial contracts are more likely to be enforced, 
either by improving the economic and institutional strength of the 
borrowing country, or by using international leverage to ensure that con­
tracts are honoured in debt work-outs; and for longer-term lending to 
offer investment insurance facilities and export credit guarantees on the 
same principle.
• Provision of countercyclical finance as a lender of last resort in situ­
ations where the borrower is fundamentally solvent but there is a liquidity 
shortage due to market expectations that become self-fulfilling when the 
maturities of borrowers' assets and liabilities are mismatched (the role 
of the IMF); helping to restructure and refinance outstanding developing 
country liabilities where longer-term solvency obtains, and to allocate 
the costs of writing off debt when the borrower is insolvent -  equivalent 
to bankruptcy proceedings in national private sectors.
All three forms of intervention relate to what we have defined as the 
supply schedule for emerging-market assets. More recently the dissemin­
ation of reliable information to capital markets on the quality of assets and 
borrowers, thus reducing the asymmetric information problem, has become 
the key element in the G7 Financial Stability Forum's (FSF) Compendium 
of Standards9 for the strengthening and extension of existing systems of
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global financial supervision, increasing the availability and timeliness of 
information (mainly official statistics) to the markets.
The positive incentive for compliance despite the high administrative cost 
is that emerging markets that adhere to the new rules will enjoy enhanced 
market access, although this is only a potential benefit. The penalties for 
non-compliance are clearer: financial regulators in OECD countries can apply 
penalties or constraints such as capital requirements on investors acquiring 
assets in non-compliant countries; and official lenders (particularly the IMF) 
can refuse to support non-compliant countries. These disincentives might be 
effective in reducing foreign interest in non-compliant countries, but they 
also tend to reinforce the cyclical nature of investors' interest in emerging 
markets and thus undermine sustainable growth in developing countries.
Moreover, as we have seen, the market does not always use information 
effectively as much depends on the models used to analyze statistical data. 
These models are generally backward looking (which leads to 'overshooting'), 
while traders react to news that does not reflect the underlying fundamen­
tals. The rules proposed by the FSF that attempt to define 'best practice' 
in emerging-market policies related to economic reform and policy conduct 
are problematic because what constitutes sound fundamentals is not always 
agreed (for example the acceptability of capital controls) and indeed tends 
to change over time.10 Precisely because capital markets do not function well 
on their own, developed countries maintain a high degree of prudential 
regulation of their own national capital and banking markets in order to 
ensure the integrity of markets by regulating creditors as much as -  if not 
more than -  debtors (Goodhart etal., 1998). Nonetheless international 
measures to stabilize capital flows that affect source countries have been 
very limited. An increased role for rating agencies in rating countries or 
companies, as proposed by the Basel Committee, could even risk increasing 
the negative procyclical features of bank lending and make it more difficult 
for poorer countries (and companies in those countries) to gain access to 
bank lending. The current proposals for banks would also lead to the greater 
use of banks' own value-at-risk (VaR) models when setting regulatory capital 
requirements, which could strengthen -  rather than reduce -  the propensity 
for boom-bust flows and the bias against emerging markets.
The proposal for the revision of bond contracts to permit majority bond­
holder decisions (the so-called 'collective action clauses') in situations of 
debt restructuring is an important step forward, but it does not constitute 
a measure to alter the demand schedule. In effect such measures alter 
bond quality by making the consequences of default more certain and thus 
allowing better risk pricing. This is in marked contrast to the OECD markets, 
where fiscal and regulatory incentives are used to encourage institutional 
investors to take longer-term positions (Davis, 1995).
Table 11.1 shows key elements of investment regulation of pension funds 
in a number of industrialized countries (OECD, 2001). It is clear that the UK
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and US pension funds are among the least closely regulated in the developed 
world. The pressure for more active portfolio allocation to manage risk and 
the need for higher returns to support an ageing population mean that 
emerging-market assets could be a valuable component of portfolios if the 
market becomes less cyclical. There is no explicit regulatory constraint on 
pension funds holding securities issued by (or backed by assets of foreign 
investors in) developing countries. In contrast other EU pension funds are 
much more closely regulated and there are considerable restrictions on their 
portfolio composition. This is mainly designed to reduce the risk of funds 
failing but also to generate a market for long-term domestic government and 
corporate debt and property mortgages.
In sum, despite the fact that demand shifts account for a large part of 
emerging-market instability because of their asymmetric effects, official inter­
vention has been concentrated almost entirely on asset supply conditions. 
Interventions that could affect demand, such as new information standards 
and bank capital adequacy rales, will probably have little effect at best or 
further destabilize demand at worst.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated how shifts in the demand schedule for 
emerging market assets affect asset prices, asset quality (for example default 
risk) and asset stocks, and thus capital flows. In doing so it has identified 
a number of points at which macroeconomic theory, evidence on aggregate 
flows, microeconomic evidence and theory on portfolio adjustment can 
be brought together to define the key components of this demand schedule. 
It has established that shifts in the demand schedule, independently of 
conditions in emerging markets, account for a large part of the changes in 
observed capital flows. But the task is far from complete as we still lack 
a formal analytical definition of this schedule. A corresponding definition of 
the supply schedule -  including the determinants of borrowing decisions and 
the interactive effects of the flows on asset quality -  will also be needed to 
construct a well-grounded, reduced-form estimation model for econometric 
testing of the data.
Nonetheless some tentative policy conclusions can be drawn from the 
argument so far. First, the G3 governments should pay more attention to 
the negative effects on emerging markets of volatility in the OECD capital 
markets. Relatively small fluctuations in G3 interest rates and exchange rates 
(and the related capital account variations resulting from investment-saving 
imbalances) cause absolute shifts in the emerging-market asset demand 
schedule that are very large in relation to the economies of the host coun­
tries. However the fact that the G3 governments are unwilling (or unable) to 
adopt mutual macroeconomic coordination rules in order to sustain their
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own economies implies that they are unlikely to do so in order to help 
developing countries.
Given the inevitability of macroeconomic cycles in the G3 zone, there 
appear to be two other policies that could stabilize capital flows to emerging 
markets from the demand perspective. The first would be to encourage -  by 
a combination of regulatory changes and tax incentives -  G3 institutional 
investors to acquire and hold emerging-market assets of a longer maturity 
than at present. This would both shift the demand upwards and reduce its 
volatility over the cycle by increasing risk appetite on a structural basis. The 
advantages to institutional investors would, of course, be higher long-term 
yields without the excess risk generated by the market instability of the past 
decade.
The second would be to create greater liquidity in the market by encour­
aging market makers (such as international financial institutions) to make 
an explicit commitment to countercyclical intervention by standing ready to 
buy assets from the private sector during the downswing of the cycle (when 
risk appetite declines) and sell during the upswing. This form of liquidity 
provision would probably be more effective than the present practice of last- 
resort lending when crises occur, particularly as it would reduce the ex ante 
volatility of emerging-market assets and thus enhance their attractiveness to 
institutional investors.
Notes
* Earlier versions of th is chapter were presented to  th e  WIDER/ECLAC seminars
on  'Capital Flows to Emerging Markets since the Asian Crisis' in  Santiago de
Chile (8-9 March 2001) and  Helsinki (1-18 October 2001). I w ould like to  thank  
colleagues at these seminars for their critical yet constructive com m ents.
1. This problem is discussed in  depth  in  Luttick (1998), w ho also addresses th e  major 
inconsistencies between asset-liability and inflow -outflow  statistics, recorded by 
the countries of origin and destination.
2. Not th a t th is had been absent from the critical economics literature, of course, 
from Keynes th rough  to  Kindleberger.
3. See IMF (1995), particularly the section on  institutional investor behaviour and 
the pricing of developing country stocks (pp. 37-44).
4. According to the Bank of England, the spread/rating curve tends to  the origin, moves 
th rough  250 basis points at M oody’s A2 and 500 basis points at B3, becoming 
asym ptotic to infinity  beyond B3 (C unningham  et al., 2001).
5. The size of the band (that is, the  speculative estimate of future exchange rate 
m inus forward price) m ust logically be greater th an  the square root of the volatility 
m ultiplied by the  risk aversion coefficient and the cost of inform ation. An 
increase of 1 per cent in  inform ation costs as a proportion of th e  gain from the 
transaction can w iden the band w idth by 20 per cent under reasonable param eter 
assumptions.
6. These are World Bank estimates for 1997; the total assets am ounted to  US$50-70 
billion.
7. Such as JP M organ's EMBI global index (IMF, 2001).
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8. In fact it w ould be m ore realistic to  build a ‘decision tree' in  the way tha t 
trade modellers do (derived from models of aggregate consum ption), allowing for 
successive stages of disaggregation. Thus the first division would be between hom e 
and international assets, the second w ithin international assets between the OECD 
and emerging markets, the th ird  w ithin emerging markets between regions, and 
so on. But the essence of the m odel would be similar.
9. The FSF Compendium o f Standards contains the work of six separate bodies: the 
Basel Comm ittee on  Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Com m ittee on  Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS), th e  International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS), the International M onetary Fund (IMF), the International O rganisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD).
10. As has, for th a t matter, th e  con ten t of and support for the so-called W ashington 
Consensus.
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José Antonio Ocampo
The association between capital flows and economic activity has been 
a strong feature of the developing world, and particularly of emerging 
markets, for a quarter of a century. This highlights the central role played by 
the mechanisms that transmit externally generated boom-bust cycles in 
capital markets to the developing world, as well as the vulnerabilities they 
engender. The strength of business cycles in developing countries, and the 
high economic and social costs they generate, are thus related to the strong 
connections between domestic and international capital markets.
This implies that an essential objective of macroeconomic policy in develop­
ing countries is to reduce the intensity of capital account cycles and their 
effects on domestic economic and social variables. This chapter explores the 
role of two complementary policy tools in achieving these objectives: capital 
account regulations and countercyclical prudential regulation of domestic 
financial intermediation. After a brief look at the macroeconomics of boom- 
bust cycles, the chapter focuses on the possibility of directly affecting the 
source of the cycles through capital account regulations, and then considers 
the role of countercyclical regulations.
The macroeconomics of boom-bust cycles
Capital account cycles in developing countries are characterized by the twin 
phenomena of volatility and contagion. The first is associated with significant 
changes in risk evaluation during booms and crises of what international 
market agents consider to be risky assets, which involve a shift from an 
'appetite for risk' (or more properly, an underestimation of risks) to a ‘flight 
to quality' (risk aversion). The second implies that, due to information 
asymmetries, developing countries are pooled together in risk categories that 
are viewed by market agents as strongly correlated. Beyond any objective
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criteria that may underlie such views, this practice turns such correlations 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Capital account volatility is reflected in variations in the availability of 
financing, in the procyclical pattern of spreads (narrowing during booms, 
widening during crises) and in the equally procyclical variation of matur­
ities (reduced availability of long-term financing during crises). Such cycles 
involve both short-term movements -  such as the very intense movements 
observed during the Asian and, particularly, the Russian crises -  and, perhaps 
primarily, medium-term fluctuations, as the two cycles experienced over the 
last three decades indicate: The boom in the 1970s was followed by a debt 
crisis in a large part of the developing world, and another boom in the 1990s 
was followed by a sharp reduction in net flows after the Asian crisis. Due to 
contagion, such cycles tend to affect all developing countries, although with 
some discrimination by the market, reflecting the perceived level of risk of 
specific countries or groups of countries.
The main way in which the economic literature has explored the effects 
of external financial cycles on developing countries is by analyzing the 
mechanisms through which vulnerability is built up during capital-account 
booms. This may lead to the endogenous unstable dynamics analyzed by 
Minsky (1982) and Taylor (1998), among others, whereby the accumulation 
of risk leads to a sudden reversal of flows, and eventually to, a financial crisis. 
Alternatively the accumulated vulnerability is reflected in sensitivity to an 
exogenous shock, for example a contagion effect generated by a crisis in 
other developing countries or a downturn in financial markets in the indus­
trialized world.
Thus in addition to the effects of traditional trade shocks, new sources of 
vulnerability have arisen. These are associated with the flow and balance- 
sheet effects of capital account fluctuations on domestic financial and non- 
financial agents, and with the impact of such fluctuations on macroeconomic 
variables. Some of these effects are transmitted through public sector 
accounts, but the dominant feature of the 'new generation' of business 
cycles in developing countries is the sharp fluctuation in private spending 
and balance sheets. The macroeconomic effects are amplified if the stance of 
macroeconomic policy is procyclical, as market agents actually expected it 
to be. The credibility of macroeconomic authorities and domestic financial 
intermediaries plays a key role throughout this process.
If the fiscal policy stance is procyclical, temporary public sector revenues 
and readily accessible external and domestic financing induce an expansion 
of public sector spending, which is later followed by an adjustment when 
those conditions are no longer present. Furthermore, during the downswing 
interest payments follow an upward trend due to devaluation and to increased 
domestic interest rates and international spreads. This trend, together with 
downward pressure on public sector revenues, triggers a procyclical cut in 
primary spending, but this may be insufficient to avoid a sudden jump in 
public sector debt ratios.
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The structure of public sector debt plays a crucial role in this dynamic. 
In particular, if most of the public sector debt is short term the necessary 
rollovers considerably increase the financing requirements during the crisis, 
thus undermining confidence in the capacity of the government to service 
the debt. If the short-term debt is external, risk premiums increase and the 
availability of financing may be curtailed. If it is domestic, there may be 
strong pressure on interest and exchange rates, as asset holders’ high 
liquidity facilitates the substitution of foreign assets for public sector debt 
securities.
As in the past, exchange rate fluctuations also play an important part 
in the business cycle, but their flow effects are now mixed with, or even 
dominated by, the wealth effects they have in economies with large net 
external liabilities. The capital gains generated by appreciation during the 
upswing helps to fuel the private spending boom, whereas the capital losses 
generated by depreciation have the opposite effect in the downturn. Further­
more such gains induce additional net inflows when there are expectations 
of exchange rate appreciation, and the opposite effect if depreciation is 
expected, thus endogenously reinforcing the capital account cycle. The 
income effects may have similar signs, or at least in the short run, if 
the traditional conditions for the contractionary effects of devaluation (or 
the expansionary effects of appreciation) are met (Krugman and Taylor, 
1978). Policy-induced overvaluation of the exchange rate, generated by anti- 
inflationary policies that anchor the price level to a fixed exchange rate, 
accentuate these effects.
Domestic financial multipliers play an additional role through their effects 
on private spending and balance sheets. Indeed the domestic financial sector 
is both a protagonist and a potential victim of the macroeconomics of 
boom-bust cycles. The external lending boom facilitates domestic credit 
expansion and private sector spending during the upswing, but private 
sector debt overhangs accumulated during the boom subsequently trigger 
a deterioration in portfolios and a contraction in lending and spending 
during the downswing. At the same time banks and other financial inter­
mediaries have inherent weaknesses that make them particularly vulnerable 
to changes in market conditions since they operate with high leverage ratios; 
they can be affected by maturity mismatches between deposits and lending 
(which are essential to their economic role of transforming maturities), and 
are subject to market failures that affect the assessment of credit risk.
Market failures are associated with information asymmetries, adverse 
selection and (possibly) moral hazard, all of which distort risk assessments 
and the allocation of funds to investment (Stiglitz, 1994; Mishkin, 2001). 
Buoyant expectations and their effects on the value of assets and liabilities 
may cause market agents to underestimate risks during booms. Overestima­
tion of credit quality increases the speed of credit growth. In many cases, 
under the pressure of increased competition banks relax their standards 
of risk appraisal and make loans to borrowers with a lower credit quality.
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This strategy is more frequent in the case of new participants in the mar­
ket, since the older and larger institutions tend to retain the best-quality 
borrowers. Overall a deterioration of banks' balance sheets results from the 
excessive risk taking that characterizes lending booms, but it only becomes 
evident after a lag. De Lis et al. (2001) refer to 'a strong positive impact of 
credit growth on problem loans with a lag of three years'.
Eventually the risks that have built up are revealed in a rise in non­
performing loans. In the absence of new capital, which is hard to raise 
when balances have deteriorated, banks are forced to cut lending even if 
borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates. The protection provided 
by loan-loss provisions and capital may be insufficient to absorb the adverse 
shocks. The severity of the ensuing credit crunch depends on the magnitude 
of the credit boom and its effects on credit quality, and may be exacerbated 
by the fragility of the balance sheets of non-financial firms. Even the best- 
run banks may find it difficult to manage a shock that severely affects their 
clients.
The accumulation of currency and maturity mismatches on the balance 
sheets of both financial and non-financial agents is an additional source 
of vulnerability. Mismatches are associated with asymmetries in the finan­
cial development of industrialized and developing countries -  that is, the 
considerable 'incompleteness' of markets in the latter (Ocampo, 2002a). In 
particular domestic financial sectors in developing countries have a short­
term bias. Domestically financed firms thus have significant maturity mis­
matches on their balance sheets. Whereas small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are unable to avoid such mismatches, large corporations may 
compensate for them by borrowing in external markets, but firms operating 
in non-tradable sectors then develop currency mismatches. A variable mix 
of maturity and currency mismatches is therefore a structural feature of 
non-financial firms' balance sheets in developing countries.
Domestic asset prices reinforce these cyclical dynamics. The rapid increase 
of asset prices during booms (particularly of stocks and real estate) stimulates 
credit growth. In turn, lending booms reinforce asset demand and thus asset 
price inflation. The resulting wealth effects intensify the spending boom. 
This process is further reinforced by the greater liquidity that characterizes 
assets during periods of financial euphoria. However this behaviour also 
increases the vulnerability of the financial system during the subsequent 
downswing, when debtors have difficulty serving their obligations and it 
becomes clear that the loans did not have adequate backing or that asset 
price deflation has reduced the value of collateral. Asset price deflation is 
reinforced as debtors strive to cover their financial obligations and creditors 
seek to liquidate the assets received in payment for outstanding debts 
under conditions of reduced asset liquidity. The negative wealth effect of 
decreasing asset prices contributes to the contraction of the economy and 
the credit crunch that follows in its wake.
José Antonio Ocampo 221
Monetary policy has a limited degree of freedom to smooth out the 
dynamics of boom-bust cycles under all exchange rate regimes. In a fixed 
exchange rate regime, reserve accumulation during the boom fuels monetary 
expansion, which together with falling international spreads leads to a 
reduction in domestic interest rates. Under a floating exchange rate, both 
can be avoided, but only by inducing exchange rate appreciation, which 
also has expansionary wealth effects. Intermediate regimes (including dirty 
floating) generate variable mixes of these effects. A contractionary monetary 
policy will induce, in all cases, endogenous incentives that amplify the 
capital surge. The typical instrument of a contractionary monetary policy -  
that is, sterilized foreign-exchange reserve accumulation -  also has large 
quasifiscal costs. The inducement to borrow abroad is also reflected in 
additional currency mismatches in the portfolios of either financial or 
non-financial intermediaries. The opposite types of pressure arise during 
a downswing, thereby exposing the accumulated financial vulnerabilities. 
Under a fixed exchange regime or a dirty float, the increase in interest rates 
and the reduction in financing generated by contractionary monetary 
policy aimed at containing speculative attacks on the currency exert strong 
pressure on weak balance sheets, particularly on agents with significant 
maturity mismatches. In a floating exchange rate regime, strong pressure is 
placed on agents with currency mismatches.
The frequency and intensity of financial crises is thus associated with the 
vulnerabilities generated by boom-bust cycles. In historical perspective, the 
frequency of 'twin' external and domestic financial crises is indeed a striking 
feature of the period that started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
exchange rate arrangements in the early 1970s (IMF, 1998; Bordo etal,
2001). The most important policy implication of this is that developing- 
country authorities need to focus their attention on crisis prevention -  that 
is, on managing booms -  since in most cases crises are the inevitable result of 
poorly managed booms. Focusing attention on crisis prevention recognizes, 
moreover, an obvious fact: that the degree of freedom of the authorities 
is greater during booms than during crises. The way crises are managed is 
not irrelevant, however. In particular, different policy mixes may have quite 
different effects on economic activity and employment, as well as on the 
domestic financial system (see Chapter 13; see also ECLAC, 2002; Ocampo, 
2002b).
Capital-account regulations
The dual role of capital-account regulations
As we have seen, the accumulation of risks during booms depends not only 
on the magnitude of private- and public-sector debts but also on maturity 
and currency mismatches on the balance sheets. Thus capital account
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regulations potentially have a dual role: as a macroeconomic policy tool 
to provide some room for countercyclical monetary policies that smooth 
out debt ratios and spending; and as a 'liability policy' to improve private 
sector external debt profiles. Complementary liability policies should also be 
adopted, particularly to improve public sector debt profiles. The emphasis 
on liability structures rather than on national balance sheets recognizes 
the fact that, together with liquid assets (particularly international reserves), 
they play an essential role when countries face liquidity constraints; other 
assets play a secondary role in this regard.
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy tool, capital account regulations aim 
at the direct source of boom-bust cycles: unstable capital flows. If they are 
successful, they provide some room to 'lean against the wind' during periods 
of financial euphoria through the adoption of a contractionary monetary 
policy and/or reduced appreciation pressures. If effective, they also reduce or 
eliminate the quasifiscal costs of sterilized foreign exchange accumulation. 
During crises they provide breathing space for expansionary monetary 
policies. In both cases, capital account regulations improve the authorities' 
ability to mix additional degrees of monetary independence with a more 
active exchange rate policy.
Viewed as a liability policy, capital account regulations recognize the fact 
that the market rewards sound external debt profiles (Rodrik and Velasco, 
2000). This reflects the fact that, during times of uncertainty, the market 
responds to gross (and not merely net) financing requirements, which 
means that the rollover of short-term liabilities is not financially neutral. 
Under these circumstances a maturity profile that leans towards longer-term 
obligations will reduce domestic liquidity risks. This indicates that an essen­
tial component of economic policy management during booms should be 
measures to improve the maturity structures of both the private and the 
public sector's external and domestic liabilities. On the equity side, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) should be preferred to portfolio flows, as the former 
has proved to be less volatile than the latter. Both types of equity flow have 
the additional advantage that they allow all risks associated with the busi­
ness cycle to be shared with foreign investors, and FDI may bring parallel 
benefits (access to technology and external markets). These benefits should 
be balanced against the generally higher costs of equity financing.
Innovations in capital account regulations in the 1990s
A great innovation in this sphere during the 1990s was unquestionably the 
establishment of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) for foreign- 
currency liabilities in Chile and Colombia. The advantage of this system 
was that it created a simple, non-discretionary and preventive (prudential) 
price-based incentive that penalized short-term foreign-currency liabilities 
more heavily. The corresponding levy was significantly higher than the level 
suggested for an international Tobin tax: about 3 per cent in the Chilean
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system for one-year loans, and an average of 13.6 per cent for one-year loans 
and 6.4 per cent for three-year loans in Colombia in 1994-98. As a result of 
the reduced supply of external financing after the Asian crisis, the system 
was phased out in both countries. Other capital account regulations com­
plemented reserve requirements, particularly the one-year minimum-stay 
requirement for portfolio capital (lifted in May 2000) and approval (subject 
to minimum requirements) for the issuance of ADRs and similar instruments 
in Chile, as well as the direct regulation of portfolio flows in Colombia.
The effectiveness of reserve requirements has been the subject of a great 
deal of controversy.1 There is broad agreement that they were effective in 
reducing short-term debt flows and thus in improving or maintaining good 
external debt profiles. However in contrast to this positive view of these 
regulations as a liability policy there has been widespread controversy about 
their effectiveness as a macroeconomic policy tool. This question has been 
made more complex by the fact that neither country was free from the 
strong pressures generated by the external financing cycle that emerging 
economies faced during the 1990s, or from the effects of procyclical macro- 
economic policies (Ocampo, 2002b).
However, judging from the solid evidence that exists on the sensitivity 
of capital flows to interest rate spreads in both countries, it can be asserted 
that reserve requirements do influence the volume of capital flows at given 
interest rates.2 This may reflect the fact that national firms' access to external 
funds is not independent from their maturities -  that is, that the substi­
tution effect between short- and long-term finance is imperfect on the 
supply side -  and/or that the available mechanisms for evading or eluding 
regulations may be costly.3 In any case, a significant part of the history of 
these regulations, particularly in Chile, was associated with the closing of 
regulatory loopholes.4 Alternatively, the URR allows the authorities to main­
tain higher domestic interest rates at a given level of capital inflows, and 
thus of the money supply. Hence in broader terms the usefulness of reserve 
requirements as a macroeconomic policy tool depends on the ability to 
affect capital flows, domestic interest rates or both, with the particular com­
bination being subject to policy choice.5 To the extent that capital flows 
affect the supply of foreign exchange, exchange rates may also be affected. 
Given the numerous channels through which the URR can affect the 
economy, the effectiveness of these regulations can best be measured by a 
broad index of 'monetary pressures' that includes capital inflows, domestic 
interest rates and exchange rates. This is the procedure used below.
In Colombia, where these regulations were modified more extensively 
during the 1990s, there is strong evidence that increases in the reserve require­
ments reduced flows (Ocampo and Tovar 1998, 1999) or, alternatively, were 
effective in increasing domestic interest rates (Villar and Rincon, 2002). 
Similar evidence is available for Chile (see Larrain et al., 2000; Le Fort and 
Lehman, 2000; for interest rate spreads see De Gregorio etal., 2000). The
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evidence of effects on exchange rates is more mixed, though this may 
reflect the difficulties inherent in exchange rate modelling (Williamson, 
2000: ch. 4).
Some problems in the management of these regulations were associated 
with changes in the relevant policy parameters. The difficulties experienced 
in this connection by the two countries differed. In Chile the basic problem 
was the variability of the rules pertaining to the exchange rate, since the 
lower limits of the exchange rate bands were changed on numerous occasions 
before the exchange rate was allowed to float in September 1999. During 
capital account booms, this gave rise to a 'safe bet' for agents bringing in 
capital, since when the exchange rate neared the floor of the band (in pesos 
per dollar) the probability that the floor would be adjusted downward was 
high. In Colombia the main problem was the frequency of the changes 
made to the reserve requirements. Changes foreseen by the market sparked 
speculation, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of such measures for some 
time after the modification. It is interesting to note that in both countries 
the reserve requirements were seen as complementary to, rather than a 
substitute for, other macroeconomic policies, which were certainly superior 
in Chile. In particular the expansionary and contractionary phases of 
monetary policy were much more marked in Colombia, and this country's 
fiscal position deteriorated throughout the decade.
Malaysia also made major innovations in its capital account regulations in 
the 1990s. In January 1994 it prohibited non-residents from buying a wide 
range of domestic short-term securities and established other limitations 
on short-term inflows; these restrictions were lifted later in the year. These 
measures also had a preventive focus, but were quantitative rather than 
price-based. They proved highly effective, indeed superior in terms of 
reducing capital flows and asset prices than the Chilean regulations (Palma,
2002). They also improved the country's debt profile (Rodrik and Velasco,
2000). However, after they were lifted a new wave of debt accumulation 
and asset price increases developed, though the debt profile was kept at 
more prudential levels than in other Asian countries hit by the crisis in 1997 
(Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001; Palma, 2002).
An additional innovation came with the Asian crisis. In September 1998 
Malaysia established strong restrictions on capital outflows. The main objec­
tive was to eliminate offshore trading of the local currency -  that is, the 
segmentation of its demand -  by restricting its use to domestic operations 
by residents. Ringgit deposits abroad were made illegal, and it was deter­
mined that those held abroad by nationals had to be repatriated. Trade 
transactions had to be settled in foreign currency. It was also decided that 
ringgit deposits held in the domestic financial system by non-residents could 
not be converted into a foreign currency for a year. In February 1999 this 
regulation was replaced by an exit levy on the principal, with a decreasing 
rate for investments held for a longer period and no tax on those held for
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more than a year. For new capital inflows, an exit tax on capital gains was 
established, with a higher rate for capital that stayed less than a year (30 per 
cent; 10 per cent otherwise). The exit tax was reduced to a flat 10 per cent 
in September 1999; in January 2001 it was decided that it would henceforth 
apply only to portfolio flows held for less than a year, and in May 2001 it 
was eliminated altogether.
Significant discussions have taken place on the effects of these controls. 
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) provide the strongest argument on the effective­
ness of the regulations.6 Drawing on previous studies, they show that the 
regulations were highly effective in rapidly closing the offshore ringgit 
market and reversing financial market pressure, as reflected in the trends in 
foreign exchange reserves and exchange and interest rates. The removal of 
financial uncertainties, together with the additional scope for expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, led to a speedier recovery of economic activity, 
lower inflation and better employment and real wage performance than 
comparable IMF-type programmes during the Asian crisis. This is true even 
adjusting for the improved external environment when the Malaysian 
controls were imposed, and despite the fact that the country did not receive 
large injections of capital; indeed the initial reaction of external capital 
markets to the regulations was negative.
Figure 12.1 offers a simple way to view the effectiveness of capital account 
regulations in the three countries. Based on similar indicators used in the 
literature, it calculates an index of expansionary monetary pressures. Since 
a capital surge generates expansionary effects through three different 
channels -  the accumulation of international reserves, an appreciation of 
the exchange rate and a reduction in interest rates -  the index weights the 
trends of these three indicators by their standard deviation during the period 
analyzed. A simple inspection of the graph indicates that the Malaysian 
controls were extremely effective, both in reversing the strong expansionary 
effect of capital surges in 1994 and in stopping the strong contractionary 
effects generated by capital outflows in 1998. The price-based capital account 
regulations in Chile and Colombia had weaker effects, particularly in the 
first case. Indeed the introduction of such regulations in Chile in June 1991 
and their strengthening in May 1992 was not accompanied by a reversal of 
the expansionary trend;7 those instituted in July 1995 had a more discernible 
effect. In Colombia, which used price-based regulations more aggressively, 
the effects were stronger. In particular the movement in the index of 
expansionary pressures was more closely tied to changes in capital account 
regulations in 1993-97. In both countries the capital account turned con­
tractionary in 1998, with the reduction in the URR having only a negligible 
effect on this trend.
Overall the innovative capital account regulations in the 1990s served 
as useful instruments, both for improving debt profiles and for improving 











Figure 12.1 Index of expansionary m onetary pressures, 1990-2000
A '  A  Imposition or relaxation of restrictions on capital inflows, respectively (the direction of the
*  ■ arrows indicates the expected effect on the index)
^  ^  Imposition or relaxation of restrictions on capital outflows, respectively
\r\dex = aR +be -c i, where R =  international reserves corrected by the log trend 
e = the twelve-month variation of the real exchange rate, i = the real deposit interest rate, and 
a, b, c are the standard deviations of R, e and /, respectively.
Source: Estimates based on IMF data.
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effects depended on the strength of the regulations, which were only 
temporary and operated as 'speed bumps' rather than as permanent 
restrictions, to use Palma's (2002) expression. The basic advantages of the 
price-based instrument used by Chile and Colombia were its simplicity, its 
non-discretionary character and, as we shall see in the following section, its 
neutral effect on corporate borrowing decisions. The more quantitative-type 
Malaysian system had stronger short-term macroeconomic effects.
It must be emphasized that these systems were designed for countries that 
chose to be integrated into the international capital markets. In the case of 
Colombia the transition from the old type of exchange controls to price- 
based capital account regulations was, in effect, a liberalization of the capital 
account, as reflected in the increased sensitivity of capital flows to interest 
arbitrage incentives (Ocampo and Tovar, 1998).8
Traditional exchange controls and capital account regulations may there­
fore be superior if the policy objective is significantly to reduce domestic 
macroeconomic sensitivity to international capital flows. India provides an 
alternative successful example in this regard. Despite the slow and cautious 
liberalization that has taken place in India since the early 1990s, this country 
still largely relies on quantitative restrictions on flows: overall quantitative 
ceilings, minimum maturities for external borrowing and end-use restrictions 
(most of which have been liberalized in recent years), plus the prohibition 
of borrowing in foreign currencies by non-corporate residents; direct regu­
lation (including, in some instances, explicit approval) of portfolio flows 
in the case of non-residents, as well as of ADRs and investment abroad by 
domestic corporations; some sectoral restrictions on FDI; and minimum 
maturities and interest rate regulations on deposits by non-resident Indians 
(Habermeier, 2000; Reddy, 2001; Rajaraman, 2001; Nayyar, 2002). It must be 
emphasized that, despite the reduced sensitivity to the Asian crisis and the 
increased macroeconomic autonomy that this system has allowed, India has 
not been entirely detached from external financing cycles.
In contrast to the successful experiences previously analyzed, crisis-driven 
quantitative controls generate serious credibility issues and may be ineffect­
ive, as a strong administrative capacity is essential for any capital account 
regime to be effective. This implies that a tradition of regulation may be 
necessary, and that permanent regulatory regimes that are tightened or 
loosened through the cycle may be superior to the alternation of different 
(even opposite) capital account regimes. In broad terms this means that it 
is essential to maintain the autonomy to impose capital account regulations 
and thus the freedom to reimpose controls if necessary (Rajaraman, 2001; 
Reddy, 2001; Ocampo, 2002a, 2002b). This is indeed a corollary of the 
incomplete nature of international financial governance (Ocampo, 2002a) 
and a basic lesson from the Malaysian experience. Also, traditional quan­
titative capital account regulations and direct approval of sensitive flows 
(external portfolio flows, issuance of ADRs and investment abroad by
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residents) can make perfect sense if they are sufficiently well managed 
to avoid loopholes, high administrative costs and, in particular, corruption. 
Indeed simple quantitative restrictions that rule out certain forms of indebt­
edness (for example short-term foreign borrowing, except trade credit lines, 
or borrowing in foreign currency by residents operating in non-tradable 
sectors) are also preventive in character and easier to administer than price- 
based controls (Ariyoshi et al., 2000). These restrictions are more attractive 
and effective when domestic financial development is limited, but they may 
become obstacles to financial development. Indeed this may, be viewed as 
one of the basic costs of capital account regulation. More broadly, there may 
be inherent trade-offs between domestic financial deepening and capital 
account volatility (due in part to the dismantling of capital controls). We 
shall explore some aspects of these trade-offs in the following section.
Certain regulations on current-account transactions (export surrender 
requirements or the obligation to channel trade transactions through certain 
approved intermediaries) and effective segmentation of the market for finan­
cial instruments denominated in the domestic currency may be essential to 
guarantee the effectiveness of regulations. This implies a need to avoid or 
strongly regulate the internationalization of the domestic currency, as well 
as to take a highly conservative approach to domestic financial dollarization 
(Reddy, 2001). These are in fact common features of the four case studies 
considered above; and in the case of Malaysia, achieving this objective 
involved dismantling the offshore market for the domestic currency.
It should be emphasized again that capital account regulations should 
always be seen as an instrument that, by providing an additional degree of 
freedom to the authorities, facilitates the adoption of sensible countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Hence it can never be a substitute for them.
Complementary liability policies
Prudential regulation and supervision can, in part, be substituted for capital 
account regulations. Indeed the distinction between capital controls and 
prudential regulations that affect cross-border flows is not clear cut. In par­
ticular, higher liquidity (or reserve) requirements for the financial system's 
foreign currency liabilities can be established, and domestic lending to firms 
operating in non-tradable sectors that have substantial foreign-currency 
liabilities can be discouraged by more stringent regulatory provisions.
The main problem with these options is that they only indirectly affect 
the foreign-currency liabilities of non-financial agents, and indeed may 
encourage them to borrow abroad. Accordingly they need to be supplemented 
with other regulations, including rules on the types of firm that can borrow 
abroad and the prudential ratios with which they must comply; restrictions 
on the terms of corporate debts that can be contracted abroad (minimum 
maturities and maximum spreads); public disclosure of the short-term 
external liabilities of firms; regulations requiring rating agencies to give
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special weight to this factor; and tax provisions for foreign-currency liabil­
ities (for example no or only partial deductions for interest payments on 
international loans).9 Some of the most important regulations of this type 
concern external borrowing by firms operating in non-tradable sectors. 
A simple rule that should be considered is the strict prohibition of foreign 
borrowing by non-financial firms without income in foreign currency or 
restrictions on the maturities (only long term) or end use (only investment) 
of such borrowing.
Price-based capital account regulations may thus be a superior alternative 
and may be simpler to administer than an equivalent system based on 
prudential regulations plus additional policies aimed at non-financial firms. 
Among their virtues, vis-à-vis prudential regulation and supervision, we 
should also include the fact that they are price-based (some prudential 
regulations, such as prohibitions on certain types of operation, are not), non- 
discretionary (whereas prudential supervision tends to be discretionary in its 
operation) and neutral in terms of the choice made by corporations between 
foreign-currency-denominated borrowing in the domestic market versus the 
international market. Indeed equivalent practices are used by private agents, 
for example the selling fees imposed by mutual funds on investments held 
for a short period in order to discourage short-term holdings (JP Morgan, 
1998: 23).
In the case of the public sector, specific legal limits and regulations are 
required. Direct approval of borrowing and the establishment of minimum 
maturities and maximum spreads by the Ministry of Finance or the central 
bank may be the best liability policy. Provisions of this sort should cover 
the central administration as well as autonomous public sector agencies 
and subnational governments (ECLAC, 1998: ch. 8). Such regulations 
should apply both to external and to domestic public-sector liabilities. The 
most straightforward reason for this is that residents who hold short-term 
public-sector securities have, in periods of external or domestic financial 
instability, other options besides rolling over the public sector debt, including 
capital flight. This is even more so if foreigners are allowed to purchase 
domestic public sector securities.
Thus when the gross borrowing requirements are high, the interest rate 
will have to increase to make debt rollovers attractive. Higher interest rates 
are immediately reflected in the budget deficit, thereby rapidly changing the 
trend in public sector debt, as happened in Brazil prior to the 1999 crisis. In 
addition rollovers may be viable only if the risk of devaluation or future 
interest rate hikes can be passed on to the government, which generates 
an additional source of destabilization. Mexico’s widely publicized move 
in 1994 to replace peso-denominated securities (Treasury Certificates, or 
Cetes) with dollar-denominated bonds (Tesobonos), which was one of the 
crucial factors in the crisis that hit the country late that year, was no doubt 
facilitated by the short-term profile of Cetes (Sachs etal., 1996; Ros, 2001).
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The short-term structure of Brazil's debt was also the reason why, after late 
1997, fixed-interest bonds were swiftly replaced by variable-rate and dollar- 
denominated securities, which cancelled out the improvements that had 
been made in the public debt structure in previous years. It is important to 
emphasize that, despite its fiscal deterioration, no substitution of a similar 
magnitude was observed in Colombia during the 1998-99 crisis; this country's 
tradition of issuing public sector securities with a minimum one-year matur­
ity is a significant part of the explanation (Figure 12.2).
Thus a sound maturity profile for domestic public sector debt is an 
essential complement to a sound public and private external debt profile 
when trying to reduce the degree of vulnerability to capital account shocks. 
Furthermore, on strictly prudential grounds, external borrowing by the 
public sector generates currency mismatches (except for public sector firms 
operating in tradable sectors) and should thus be avoided. However this 
principle should not be translated into simple prohibitions for two reasons.
The first reason is macroeconomic in character. To the extent that external 
private capital flows are procyclical, it is reasonable for the public sector 
to follow a countercyclical debt structure strategy. This means that, during 
capital account surges, it should reduce the borrowing requirements and 
adopt a liability policy aimed at substituting domestic for external liabilities. 
The opposite is true during periods of reduced private flows. Indeed in this 
case the public sector may be one of the best net suppliers of foreign 
exchange, thanks to its better access to external credit, including credit 
from multilateral financial institutions. Such external borrowing may also 
be helpful in maintaining a better external debt profile and avoiding private 
borrowing abroad at excessively high spreads during crises.
The second reason relates to the depth of domestic bond markets, which 
determines the ability to issue longer-term domestic debt securities. This 
attribute includes the existence of secondary markets and active agents 
(market makers) that provide liquidity for these securities. In the absence 
of these preconditions the government faces a serious trade-off between 
maturity and currency mismatches, a trade-off that is typical of all domestic 
agents that produce non-tradable goods and services. Indeed a domestic 
market for public sector debt securities with an excessive short-term bias can 
be extremely destabilizing during a crisis. It may therefore make sense to 
choose a debt mix that includes an important component of external liabil­
ities, despite the associated currency mismatch. In the long term the objective 
of the authorities should be to deepen the domestic capital markets. Indeed, 
due to the lower risk levels and the greater homogeneity of the securities 
it issues, the central government has a vital function to perform in the 
development of longer-term primary and secondary markets for domestic 
securities, including the creation of benchmarks for private sector instruments.
The development of such markets will not eliminate the need for an active 
external liability policy, however, as deeper capital markets are also more
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likely to  cause vo la tile  portfo lio  flows. U n fo rtu n a te ly  th e  trade-offs are 
n o t sim ple in  th is  regard as in te rn a tio n a l in s titu tio n a l investors m ay help  to  
develop dom estic capital m arkets. Thus th e  au thorities m u st choose betw een  
less volatile ex ternal cap ita l flows an d  th e  deve lopm en t o f deeper, liqu id  
dom estic  cap ita l m arkets. C hile 's decision  to  e lim inate  th e  one-year m in i­
m u m  m atu rity  for portfo lio  flows in  M ay 2000, as well as C olom bia's decision 
in  1996 to  allow  foreign in v estm en t funds to  partic ipa te  in  th e  dom estic  
m arket for pub lic  sector securities, m ay  be u n d ersto o d  as a choice for th e  
second  of these  o p tio n s a t th e  cost of ad d itio n a l capital acco u n t volatility. 
Sim ilar trade-offs m ay  be faced in  re la tion  to  th e  d eve lopm en t of deep 
dom estic  p rivate-sector stock an d  b o n d  m arkets.
The role of countercyclical prudential regulations
M ic r o -  a n d  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  p r u d e n t i a l  p o l i c i e s
As we have seen, th e  origins of problem s th a t erup t du ring  financial crises are 
associated b o th  w ith  excessive risk tak ing  d u ring  boom s, as reflected in  a 
rap id  increase in  lend ing , a n d  w ith  m a tu rity  an d  cu rrency  m ism atches on  
financial an d  n on -financia l agen ts ' balance sheets. In  m a n y  coun tries these 
problem s are related  to  inadequa te  risk analysis by  financial agents, as well as 
w eak p m den tia l regulation  an d  supervision of th e  dom estic financial systems. 
The co m b in a tio n  o f  these  factors becom es explosive u n d e r co n d itio n s of 
financial liberalization  in  th e  m idst o f a bo o m  in  ex ternal financing . The 
u n d erestim a tio n  of risks th a t  characterizes en v iro n m en ts  o f econom ic o p ti­
m ism  is th e n  com b in ed  w ith  in adequa te  practices for eva lua ting  risks, b o th  
b y  private  agents a n d  by  supervisory agencies.
This underscores just h o w  im p o rta n t th e  sequencing  of financial liberal­
ization  processes is. This becam e ev iden t du ring  th e  first w ave of financial 
crises th a t h it  Latin Am erica in  th e  early 1980s (see for exam ple Diaz- 
A lejandro, 1988: ch. 17) b u t was b road ly  ignored  in  la ter episodes of 
financial liberalization  in  th e  develop ing  w orld. Since th e  Asian crisis it has 
finally  becom e a m ainstream  idea. Indeed  it is now  w idely recognized th a t 
financial liberalization  shou ld  take place in  a suitable in s titu tio n a l setting, 
w h ich  includes strong  p ruden tia l regulation  an d  supervision. Such regulation  
shou ld  ensure, first o f all, th e  solvency of financial in s titu tio n s  by  estab­
lish ing  appropria te  cap ita l adequacy  ratios relative to  th e  risk assum ed by 
le n d in g  in stitu tio n s, strict write-offs o f questionab le  portfo lios a n d  ap p ro ­
p riate  standards of risk diversification. Properly regulated  an d  supervised 
financial system s are structura lly  superior in  term s of risk m an ag em en t 
since th ey  create incen tives for financial in term ediaries to  avoid  assum ing  
unm anageab le  risks.
To th e  ex ten t th a t  agents assum e th a t th e  sources of financial risks have 
a m acroeconom ic origin, th e  trad itio n a l m icroeconom ic focus of p ru d en tia l
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regu la tion  an d  supervision m u st be co m plem en ted  w ith  regulations th a t  
take acco u n t of such  m acroeconom ic factors. This is particu larly  tru e  in  
developing  countries, w here th e  dynam ics associated w ith  b o o m -b u s t cycles 
in  ex ternal f inancing  are particu larly  in tense . D ue a t te n tio n  shou ld  th u s  be 
paid  to  th e  links betw een  dom estic  an d  ex ternal financing , th e  links am o n g  
these  factors an d  asset prices an d  econom ic activity, an d  th e  links betw een  
dom estic  financial risks an d  varia tions in  in te rest an d  exchange rates.
T he basic p rob lem  in  th is  regard  is th e  inab ility  of ind iv idual financial 
in term ediaries to  in te rnalize  th e  collective risks assum ed du rin g  bo o m  
periods, w h ich  are essentially  o f a m acroeconom ic character a n d  therefore 
en ta il co o rd in a tio n  problem s th a t  exceed th e  possibilities o f an y  o n e  agent. 
M oreover risk assessm ent a n d  trad itio n a l regula tory  tools, inc lud ing  Basel 
standards, have a procyclical bias in  th e  w ay th e y  operate. Indeed  in  a system  
in  w h ich  loan-loss p rovisions are tied  to  loan  delinquency, p recau tionary  
regulatory  signals are ineffective du ring  boom s, an d  hence  do  n o t ham p er 
credit grow th. O n th e  o th e r  h a n d  th e  sharp  increase in  lo an  de linquency  
d u rin g  crises does reduce financial in s titu tio n s ' capital, a n d  hence  th e ir  
lend ing  capacity. This, in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  greater subjectively perceived 
level o f risk, triggers th e  c red it squeeze th a t  characterizes such  periods, 
th e reb y  reinforcing  th e  dow nsw ing  in  econom ic activ ity  an d  asset prices, 
an d  in  tu rn  th e  quality  o f th e  portfo lios o f financial in te rm ed iaries.10
Indeed  th e  sudden  in tro d u c tio n  of strong  regulatory  standards du ring  
a crisis m ay  w orsen  a credit squeeze, so a lth o u g h  th e  au tho rities  m u st adop t 
clearly defined  rules to  restore confidence d u rin g  a financial crisis, th e  
app lica tion  of stronger standards shou ld  be gradual. In  o rder to  avoid  m oral 
hazard  problem s, th e  au tho rities m u st never bail o u t th e  ow ners o f financial 
in s titu tio n s  b y  guaran tee ing  th a t  th e ir  losses w ill be w ritten  off, u p  to  th e ir  
n e t w orth , if regulators have to  in te rv en e  in  these  in stitu tions.
In  order to  take accoun t of th e  m acroeconom ic factors th a t  affect risks, 
in strum ents need  to  be designed th a t will in troduce a countercyclical elem en t 
in to  p ru d en tia l regu la tion  an d  supervision. In  th is  regard th e  m ajo r in s tru ­
m e n t is u n d o u b te d ly  forw ard-looking provisions. Such provisions shou ld  be 
estim ated  w h en  loans are disbursed o n  th e  basis o f expected  or la ten t losses, 
tak ing  in to  acco u n t th e  full business cycle, ra th e r th a n  o n  th e  basis of 
loan  de linquency  or short-term  expectations of fu tu re  lo an  losses, w h ich  are 
h igh ly  procyclical. This m eans, in  fact, th a t  p rov ision ing  shou ld  approach  
th e  criteria trad itiona lly  follow ed by  th e  insu rance in d u stry  (where p rovi­
sions are m ade w h e n  th e  insu rance policy  is issued) ra th e r th a n  th e  b ank ing  
industry . This practice could  help  to  sm o o th  o u t th e  cycle by  increasing 
p rovisions or reserves du rin g  cap ita l accoun t surges, th u s  h e lp ing  to  reduce 
th e  credit cru n ch  th a t takes place du ring  busts.
I t m u st be em phasized  th a t  all regulatory  approaches have clear lim its an d  
costs th a t  ca n n o t be overlooked. P rudentia l regulation  involves som e n o n ­
price signals, an d  p ru d en tia l supervision is full o f in fo rm atio n  problem s an d
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is a d iscre tionary  activ ity  th a t  is susceptible to  abuse. Som e classic objectives 
of p ruden tia l regulation , such as risk diversification, m ay  be difficult to  a tta in  
w h en  m acroeconom ic issues are a t th e  ro o t o f th e  difficulties. The experi­
ence o f m an y  industria lized  coun tries ind icates th a t even  w ell-regulated 
system s are sub ject to  period ic episodes of euphoria , w h en  risks are u n d e r­
estim ated. The recen t crisis in  A rgentina is a specific case in  w h ich  a system  
o f p ru d en tia l regulations th a t  was considered  to  be on e  o f th e  best in  th e  
develop ing  w orld  -  w ork ing  w ith in  th e  fram ew ork o f a  financia l sector 
characterized by  th e  large-scale presence of m u ltin a tio n a l banks -  clearly 
failed to  avert th e  effects o f m ajo r m acroeconom ic shocks o n  th e  dom estic  
financial system . M oreover, b e in g  able to  separate cyclical from  long-term  
tren d s is always a difficult task, as an y  process th a t involves learn ing  will 
always generate p a th -d e p en d e n t m echan ism s in  w h ich  short- an d  long-te rm  
dynam ics are in te rconnec ted . Learning processes inc lude th o se  associated 
w ith  th e  fo rm ation  of expectations of fu tu re m acroeconom ic events, w h ich  
is particu larly  d ifficult in  develop ing  econom ies facing substan tia l shocks 
(H eym an, 2000).
M oreover m a n y  regulatory  practices aim ed a t correcting  risky practices on  
th e  p art o f financial in term ediaries sh ift th e  underly ing  risks to  non-financia l 
agents, th u s  generating  ind irec t risks th a t  are expressed in  credit risks. The 
n e t effect o f regu la tion  o n  banks ' vu lnerab ilities is therefo re  partial, as th e  
literatu re on  th e  m ig ra tio n  o f risks indicates. T hus regu la to ry  standards th a t 
establish  low er risk ratings for short-term  credits a n d  reduce m ism atches 
betw een  th e  m atu rities o f b an k  deposits a n d  le n d in g  will reduce d irect 
ban k in g  risks, b u t will also reinforce th e  sho rt-term  bias in  lend ing . M aturity  
m ism atches are th e reb y  displaced to  non -financia l agents. Indeed  th e  n e t 
effect o f th is  type o f regu la tion  m ay  be an  in ad eq u a te  supp ly  of long-te rm  
financing  an d  reduced  fixed cap ita l investm en t. Also, p ru d en tia l regulations 
th a t  forbid banks to  h o ld  currency m ism atches in  th e ir  portfo lios will 
reduce th e ir  d irect risk, b u t m ay  encourage non -financia l agents to  borrow  
abroad. The risks assum ed by  corporations, particu larly  th o se  opera ting  in  
non-tradable sectors, will eventually  be translated  in to  credit risk by dom estic 
financial in s titu tio n s  th a t  are also th e ir  creditors.
For th e  sam e reason, s tronger regu la tion  will resu lt in  h ig h e r spreads in  
dom estic  financial in te rm ed ia tio n , particu larly  if i t results in  m ore s tringen t 
dom estic  vis-à-vis in te rn a tio n a l regulatory  practices, w h ich  is a likely o u t­
com e given th e  stronger vo la tility  o f develop ing  countries. H igher spreads 
will generate incen tives for co rporations w ith  d irect access to  in te rn a tio n a l 
cap ita l m arkets to  borrow  abroad, th u s  increasing th e  like lihood  of currency 
m ism atches in  th e  portfo lios o f these agents. T hey m ay also result in  a 
subop tim al supp ly  o f financ ing  for SMEs, or an  excessively sho rt-te rm  bias 
in  th e  supply  of cred it for such firm s. In  all these cases th e  reduced  v u ln e r­
ab ility  o f th e  dom estic  financial sector w ill have as a coro llary  th e  m a tu rity  
an d  currency m ism atches of non-financial agents (as well as suboptim al fixed
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capita l investm en t), w h ich  m ay becom e credit risks for dom estic  financial 
agents du ring  th e  d o w n tu rn .
T he d ifferen tia tion  betw een  system ic an d  non-system ic risks th a t is typical 
in  portfo lio  risk analysis is particularly  relevant in  th is  regard. The form er 
depends o n  th e  correlation of th e  price fluctuations of each  particu lar asset 
w ith  prices for th e  en tire  m arket an d  arises from  exposure to  co m m o n  factors 
(for exam ple econom ic policy or th e  business cycle) w hile  non-system ic risks 
d epend  o n  th e  ind iv idual characteristics of each stock an d  m ay be reduced 
by  diversification. W hereas th e  second type of risk can  be reduced by  ade­
quate  regulations aim ed a t im proving  m icroeconom ic risk m anagem ent, th e  
first canno t, an d  in  th e  face of system ic risks th e  use of co m m o n  risk m a n ­
agem en t techn iques can  actually  resu lt in  greater m acroeconom ic vo la tility  
(Persaud, 2000). Thus to  a large extent, m acroeconom ic risks th a t are sys­
tem ic in  character can  on ly  b e  shifted  to  o th e r m arket agents w ith in  a spe­
cific econom y an d  are on ly  au then tica lly  diversified w hen  ex ternal econom ic 
agents are w illing to  assum e th em . N onetheless countercyclical p ruden tia l 
policies can  help  to  reduce th e  collective risks th a t  agents m ay assum e d u r­
ing  periods of euphoria . They can  also help  to  generate im proved  incentives 
for financial agents th a t  behave procyclically (those exposed to  industries 
w ith  h ig h  system ic risks).
In  all cases, as in  th e  case of cap ita l con tro ls, im proved  p ru d en tia l regula­
tio n , inc lud ing  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of strong  countercyclical co m p o n en ts  th a t 
take in to  accoun t th e  m acroeconom ics of b o o m -b u st cycles, is a com plem en t 
b u t n o t a substitu te  for appropria te  countercyclical m acroeconom ic policies.
I n s t r u m e n t s  t o  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  c r e d i t  r i s k
U nder generally  accepted acco u n tin g  principles, p rovisions shou ld  cover 
expected  losses, th o u g h  of a n  u n ce rta in  m agn itude , an d  are th u s  registered 
as expenses, w hile  reserves app ly  to  unexpected  losses an d  are p art o f 
capital. These p rincip les also im ply  th a t  banks shou ld  charge a n  in te rest 
p rem ium  for expected  risk w hile  stockholders shou ld  cover unexpected  risks. 
A ccoun ting  practices also d iffe ren tia te  betw een  general a n d  specific prov i­
sions. In  m ost coun tries th e  ca lcu lation  of specific prov isions is d o n e  o n  an  
ind iv idual basis for com m ercial loans an d  o n  a poo led  basis for retail loans. 
G eneral p rovisions are estim ated  o n  th e  basis o f pools o f loans, o r th e  to ta l 
portfo lio . In  som e coun tries th e y  are trea ted  as reserves, a n d  as such  as 
capital, w hile  in  o thers th e y  are sub tracted  from  assets. W ith  trad itiona l 
accoun ting  m ethods, specific provisions are m ade shortly  before o r even 
after a loan  becom es de lin q u en t. In  th is  sense a system  based w ho lly  o n  th is 
type o f p rov ision  will n o t reflect th e  tru e  credit risk o f th e  loan  portfo lio  
and, as ind icated  above, will be in h e re n tly  procyclical. T he rules o n  general 
provisions an d  reserves are usually  m ore flexible an d  allow  for m ore forward- 
looking  approaches in  th e  appraisal o f risk.
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In  som e countries th e  au tho rities (th e  go v ern m en t o r th e  cen tra l bank) 
take a restrictive app roach  an d  establish  s ta tu to ry  rules th a t  d eterm ine th e  
level o f provisions. In  o thers th e  system  varies from  a strict fo rm ula to  
statistical approaches th a t  use h istorical data, in fo rm atio n  on  peer groups 
an d  m ore explicit in te rn a l risk m odels. Several OECD coun tries allow  th e  
c o n s titu tio n  of fo rw ard-looking p rovisions based on  past experience an d  th e  
expectation  of fu tu re  events. H ow ever m ost o f th e m  are o rien ted  tow ards 
th e  sho rt term , u sing  a one-year ho rizon  to  m easure risk.
The best-know n excep tion  to  th is  rule is Spain, w h ich  in  D ecem ber 1999 
issued a regu la tion  requ iring  countercyclical prov isions calcu lated  by  sta tis­
tical m ethods. T he m ain  feature of th is  approach  is th e  es tim atio n  of 'la te n t 
risk ' based o n  past experience over a period  lo n g  en o u g h  to  cover a t least 
on e  business cycle. This generates a dynam ic in  w h ich  provisions b u ild  
u p  du ring  econom ic expansions an d  are d raw n  u p o n  du rin g  dow n tu rn s 
(Poveda, 2000; De Lis e ta l .,  2001). The m ajo r in n o v a tio n  o f th is  system  is its 
explicit recogn ition  th a t  risks are incurred  w h en  credits are approved  an d  
disbursed, n o t w h en  th e y  fall due.
M ore particularly, u n d e r  th is schem e statistical o r actuarial p rovisions 
for la ten t risks m u st be estim ated  for hom ogeneous categories o f credit 
accord ing  to  th e  possib le loss th a t  a typ ical asset (loan, guaran tee , in te r ­
b an k  or fixed in co m e portfo lio  investm en t) in  each  category  is expected  to  
involve, es tim ated  o n  th e  basis o f a full business cycle. E ither th e  in te rn a l 
risk m an ag em en t m odel o f th e  financial in s titu tio n  or th e  s tandard  m odel 
p roposed  by th e  Banco de España can  be used for th a t  purpose. The la tter 
establishes six categories, w ith  an n u a l p rov ision ing  ratios th a t  range from  
0 to  1.5 per cen t. These statistical p rovisions m u st be accum ulated  in  a fund, 
to g e th er w ith  special p rov isions (trad itional prov isions for n on -perfo rm ing  
assets or th e  perfo rm ing  assets o f borrow ers in  financial difficulties) an d  
recovered n o n -p erfo rm in g  assets.11 The fu n d  can  be used to  cover loan  
losses, th u s  in  effect en tire ly  substitu ting  for special prov isions if resources 
are available in  adequate  am oun ts. If th is  is so th e  provisions actually  follow  
th e  cred it cycle.
A lthough  th e  accum ula tion  an d  draw ing dow n of th e  fu n d  m ade u p  by 
statistical an d  specific provisions has a countercyclical dynam ic, th is  on ly  
reflects th e  cyclical p a tte rn  of b an k  lend ing . In  th is  regard th e  system  is, 
strictly speaking, 'cycle-neutra l' ra the r th a n  countercyclical, b u t it is certain ly  
superior to  th e  trad itiona l procyclical p rovision ing  for loan  losses o r forward- 
looking  p rov ision ing  based o n  sho rt tim e horizons.
Therefore a system  such  as th is  shou ld  be co m plem en ted  by  strictly  
countercyclical p ru d en tia l provisions, decreed by  th e  regulatory  a u th o rity  
for th e  financial system  a w hole, or by  th e  supervisory a u th o rity  for special 
financial in stitu tio n s, o n  th e  basis of objective criteria. These criteria could  
inc lude  th e  g row th  ra te  of credit, th e  bias in  lend ing  tow ards sectors ch a r­
acterized by  system ic risks or th e  grow th  of fore ign-currency-denom inated
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loans to  non -tradab le  sectors. V oluntary  p ru d en tia l p rovisions could  also be 
encouraged. In  b o th  cases it is essential th a t  tax  deductib ility  be g ran ted  to  
th e  provisions. Indeed  accoun ting  an d  tax a tio n  rules co n trib u te  to  failures 
in  risk assessm ent because, in  general, th e y  m ake it necessary to  register 
events th a t  have already occurred.
T he foregoing analysis ind icates th a t  an  appropria te  policy  for m anag ing  
th e  m acroeconom ic effects o f b o o m -b u s t cycles in  develop ing  countries 
shou ld  involve a m ix tu re  of: (1) forw ard-looking provisions for la ten t risks, 
to  be m ade w h en  credit is g ran ted  so th a t  financia l in term ediaries will have 
to  take accoun t of th e  risks th e y  incu r th ro u g h o u t th e  en tire  business cycle; 
an d  (2) m ore d iscrete countercyclical p ru d en tia l prov isions based o n  a series 
o f objective criteria. Specific p rovisions shou ld  be m anaged  to g e th er w ith  
forw ard-looking provisions, as in  th e  Spanish system . As we shall see in  th e  
follow ing sections, these  provisions shou ld  be supp lem en ted  by  regulations 
in  o th e r areas. Reserves or general p rovisions p lay  a less clear role an d  in  
fact are n o t d istinguishable from  th e  role of cap ita l in  covering  unexpected  
losses.
A system  of p rovisions such as th is  w ould  certa in ly  be superior to  th e  use 
o f cap ita l adequacy  ratios to  m anage th e  effects o f business cycles. C apita l 
adequacy  requ irem ents shou ld  in stead  focus o n  long-te rm  solvency criteria 
ra th e r th a n  o n  cyclical perform ance. Insofar as developing  coun tries are 
likely to  face m ore m acroeconom ic volatility, th e re  m ay be an  a rg u m en t for 
requ iring  h igher cap ita l-asset ratios (see th e  add itiona l argum en ts below), 
b u t th e re  is n o n e  for requ iring  th a t  cap ita l adequacy  requ irem en ts shou ld  
be, as such, countercyclical.
It shou ld  also be rem em bered  th a t  th e  stricter standards in  develop ing  
coun tries for th e  m an ag em en t o f m acroeconom ic risks -  in  term s of p ro ­
visions, capital o r o th e r variables -  increase th e  costs o f financial in te r­
m ed iation , thereby  reducing  in te rn a tio n a l com petitiveness a n d  creating  
arbitrage incen tives to  use in te rn a tio n a l financial in te rm ed ia tio n  as a n  alter­
native. Also, p ru d en tia l policies are certa in ly  n o t a  so lu tion  for th e  risks th a t 
procyclical m acroeconom ic policies m ay generate.
P r u d e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  c u r r e n c y  a n d  m a t u r i t y  r i s k s ,  a n d  v o l a t i l e  
a s s e t  p r i c e s
Experience indicates th a t currency  a n d  m a tu rity  m ism atches are essential 
aspects o f financia l crises in  developing  coun tries. P ruden tia l regu la tion  
shou ld  th u s  establish  strict rules to  p reven t currency m ism atches (includ ing  
those  associated w ith  hedg ing  an d  related  operations) an d  to  reduce 
im balances betw een  th e  m atu rities o f th e  assets an d  liabilities o f financial 
in term ediaries. In  add ition , liqu id ity  regulations shou ld  be estab lished  to  
m anage such im balances.
The strict p ro h ib itio n  of currency m ism atches in  th e  portfolios of financial 
in term ediaries is th e  b est rule. T he au tho rities shou ld  also closely m o n ito r
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th e  in te rm ed ia tio n  of sho rt-te rm  ex ternal credits. As w e have seen, th e  
currency  risks o f no n -fin an cia l firm s, particu larly  th o se  opera ting  in  n o n ­
tradable sectors, m ay  eventually  tu rn  in to  credit risks for b an k s .12 This po in ts  
to  th e  need  for b e tte r m o n ito rin g  o f th e  currency  risks o f these  firms, an d  
probably  for specific regulations o n  len d in g  to  firm s in  n o n -tradab le  sectors 
w ith  substan tia l liabilities in  foreign currency. In  particular, regulations 
could  be used to  establish  m ore s tringen t p rovisions an d /o r  risk w eigh ting  
for th o se  opera tions, o r a stric t p ro h ib itio n  on  le n d in g  in  foreign currencies 
to  non -financia l firm s w ith  n o  incom e in  th o se  currencies; cap ita l accoun t 
regulations w ou ld  have to  establish com plem en ta ry  no rm s for d irect 
borrow ing  ab road  by  these  firm s (see above).
In  add ition , p ru d en tia l regu la tion  needs to  ensure adequate  levels of 
liqu id ity  for financia l in term ediaries so th a t  th ey  can  h an d le  th e  m ism atch  
betw een  th e  average m atu rities of assets a n d  liabilities th a t  is in h e re n t in  
th e  financial system 's essential fu n c tio n  of transfo rm ing  m aturities, w h ich  
generates risks associated w ith  vo la tility  in  deposits an d /o r  in te rest rates. 
This underscores th e  fact th a t  liqu id ity  an d  solvency problem s are far m ore 
closely in te rre la ted  th a n  trad itio n ally  assum ed, particu larly  in  th e  face of 
m acroeconom ic shocks. Reserve requirem ents, w h ich  are strictly  an  in s tru ­
m e n t o f m o n e ta ry  policy, p rovide liqu id ity  in  m a n y  countries, b u t th e ir  
declin ing  im p o rtan ce  m akes it necessary to  find  new  tools. M oreover th e ir  
trad itio n a l structu re  is n o t geared to  th e  specific objective of ensuring  
financial in te rm ediaries ' liqu id ity  in  th e  face of th e  m a tu rity  m ism atches 
th e y  h o ld  in  th e ir  portfo lios. An im p o rta n t in n o v a tio n  in  th is  area was th e  
system  created  in  1995 in  A rgentina, w h ich  set liqu id ity  requ irem en ts based 
o n  th e  residual m a tu rity  of financial in s titu tio n s ' liabilities ( th a t is, th e  
n u m b e r of days rem ain in g  before reach ing  m a tu rity ).13 These liqu id ity  
requ irem en ts -  o r a system  of reserve requ irem ents w ith  sim ilar character­
istics -  have th e  ad d itio n a l advantage th a t  th e y  offer a d irect incen tive 
to  th e  financial system  to  m a in ta in  an  appropria te  liability  structure . The 
quality  o f th e  assets w ith  w h ich  th e  liqu id ity  requ irem en ts are m e t is obvi­
ously a crucial factor. In  th is  regard it m ust be p o in te d  o u t th a t  allow ing 
such assets to  be invested  in  public  sector bon d s was an  essential w eakness 
of th e  A rgen tinean  system , as it increased  th e  v u ln e rab ility  of th e  financ ia l 
system  to  pub lic  sector d eb t restructuring , a risk th a t  tu rn e d  in to  reality  in  
2001.
The v a lua tion  o f assets used as collateral for loans also presen ts problem s 
w h en  these assets exh ib it price volatility, because in  m a n y  cases ex ante  
assessm ents m ay be sign ifican tly  h igher th a n  ex p o s t prices. Limits o n  loan- 
to-value ratios a n d  rules to  ad just th e  value of collateral for cyclical price 
varia tions sh o u ld  be adop ted . O ne app roach  in  th is  regard is th e  'm ortgage 
lend ing  value', a v a lu a tio n  procedure applied  in  som e European countries 
th a t  reflects long-te rm  m arket trends in  real estate prices based o n  experi­
ence (ECB, 2000).
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T he proposal for th e  new  Basel Accord a ttem p ts  to  align risk w eights w ith  
th e  evaluations of ex ternal cred it ra tin g  agencies. U nfo rtuna te ly  th is  w ould  
in troduce  a n  add itiona l procyclical bias, given th e  procyclical p a tte rn  of 
credit ratings (see C hap te r 7). The h ig h  co n cen tra tio n  o f th e  ra tin g  in d u stry  
is a n  add itiona l arg u m en t against ad o p tin g  th is  recom m enda tion . M oreover 
it w ou ld  be d ifficult to  apply  th is  p ractice in  develop ing  coun tries du e  to  th e  
absence of adequate credit ratings for m ost firm s.
Conclusions
This ch ap te r has explored  th e  com plem en ta ry  use of tw o in s tru m e n ts  to  
m anage cap ita l acco u n t vo la tility  in  developing  countries: cap ita l accoun t 
regulations a n d  th e  countercyclical p ru d en tia l regu la tion  of dom estic  f in an ­
cial in term ediaries. These in stru m en ts  shou ld  be seen as com p lem en ta ry  to  
countercyclical m acroeconom ic policies, b u t n e ith e r  o f th e m  can  nullify  th e  
risks th a t  procyclical m acroeconom ic policies can  generate.
O verall th e  innova tive  cap ita l accoun t regulations of th e  1990s can  be 
seen as useful in stru m en ts  in  term s of im prov ing  deb t profiles an d  facili­
ta tin g  th e  a d o p tio n  of (possibly tem porary) countercyclical m acroeconom ic 
policies. T he m a in  advantages of th e  price-based u n rem u n e ra te d  reserve 
req u irem en t p ioneered  by C hile an d  C olom bia are its sim plicity, non - 
d iscre tionary  character an d  neu tra l effect o n  corporate borrow ing  decisions. 
T he m ore q u an tita tiv e  M alaysian system  has been  show n  to  have  stronger 
short-term  m acroeconom ic effects. Traditional quan tita tive exchange controls 
m ay be superior if th e  objective of m acroeconom ic policy  is significantly  to  
reduce dom estic  m acroeconom ic sensitiv ity  to  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l flows.
P ruden tia l reg u la tio n  an d  superv ision  can , in  part, be su b stitu te d  for 
these  direct regulations o n  th e  capital account. The m ain  p rob lem  w ith  th is 
o p tio n  is th a t  it has, a t best, in d irec t effects o n  th e  foreign-currency  
liabilities o f non-financia l agents an d  m ay encourage th e m  to  borrow  abroad. 
A ccordingly th e y  n eed  to  be su p p lem en ted  w ith  o th e r  d isincen tives for 
ex terna l bo rrow ing  by  th o se  firm s. U n rem u n era ted  reserve requ irem en ts 
m ay  be a superior a lternative  a n d  m ay be sim pler to  adm inister. In  th e  
case of th e  pub lic  sector, d irec t regu la tion  of ex tern a l bo rrow ing  sh o u ld  
be co m b in ed  w ith  a strategy  a im ed  a t th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f dom estic  b o n d  
m arkets.
P rudentia l regu la tion  an d  superv ision  shou ld  take in to  acco u n t n o t on ly  
m icroeconom ic risks b u t also th e  m acroeconom ic risks associated w ith  
b o o m -b u s t cycles. In  particular, in stru m en ts  n eed  to  be designed th a t  will 
in troduce  a countercyclical e lem en t in to  p ru d en tia l regu la tion  an d  super­
vision . M ore specifically, we argue for a regulatory  ap p ro ach  th a t  involves 
a m ix tu re  of: (1) forw ard-looking provisions for la ten t risks, w ith  provisions 
to  be m ade w hen  credit is g ran ted  o n  th e  basis o f th e  cred it risks th a t  are 
expected  th ro u g h o u t th e  full business cycle (this was th e  app roach  adop ted
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by  th e  Spanish au thorities); an d  (2) m ore discrete countercyclical p ru d en tia l 
provisions, to  be app lied  by  th e  regulatory  a u th o rity  to  th e  financial system  
a w hole, or by  th e  supervisory au th o rity  for special financia l in stitu tio n s, on  
th e  basis o f objective criteria (for exam ple th e  g row th  rate  o f credit, o r th e  
grow th  of cred it for specific risky activities). C apital adequacy  requ irem en ts 
should  focus o n  long-term  solvency criteria an d  should  n o t be countercyclical, 
b u t it m ay be advisable for coun tries facing strong  cyclical f luctuations to  
establish  h igher cap ita l-asse t ratios.
The system of countercyclical p ruden tia l regulation  an d  supervision should  
be co m plem en ted  by  regulations in  o th e r areas. In  particular, p ru d en tia l 
regu la tion  shou ld  estab lish  strict rules to  p reven t currency  m ism atches 
(includ ing  those  incu rred  by  firm s opera ting  in  n o n -tradab le  sectors w h en  
borrow ing  in  foreign currency), liqu id ity  requ irem en ts a n d  lim its o n  loan  
to  collateral value ratios or rules o n  th e  v a lua tion  of collateral designed to  
reflect long-term  m arket trends in  asset prices.
N o te s
* This chapter h as b en efited  from  jo in t w ork undertaken  w ith  M aria Luisa C h iap p e  
for th e  Expert G roup o n  D ev e lo p m en t Issues (EGDI), M in istry  o f  Foreign Affairs o f  
Sw eden.
1. For d o cu m e n ts th a t support th e  e ffectiven ess o f  th e se  regu lations in  C h ile  see  
A gosin  (1998), Larrain e ta l .  (2000), Le Fort an d  L ehm an n  (2000), A gosin  and  
F french-D avis (2001) an d  Palm a (2002). For a m ore m ix ed  v ie w  see V aldés-Prieto  
a n d  Soto (1998) A riyoshi e ta l .  (2000), D e G regorio e ta l .  (2000) an d  Laurens
(2000). For stron g  v iew s o n  the ir  p o sitiv e  effects in  C o lo m b ia  see O cam p o an d  
Tovar (1998 , 1999) an d  Villar an d  R incón  (2002); for a m ore m ix ed  v ie w  see  
C árdenas an d  Barrera (1997) an d  C árdenas an d  Steiner (2000).
2 . Indeed  ev id en ce  o f  th e  in sen s itiv ity  o f  th e  v o lu m e  o f  cap ita l flow s to  capital 
acco u n t regu lations co m es from  eco n o m etr ic  analysis in  w h ich  URR is n o t  
in c lu d ed  as a d eterm in an t o f  in terest rate spreads b u t rather as a n  a d d ition a l 
factor a ffectin g  capita l flow s. T his m ay be seen  as an  in ad eq u ate  eco n o m etr ic  
sp ecification .
3. Som e o f th e se  m ech a n ism s, su ch  as th e  u se  o f  h ed g in g , en a b le  in vestors to  cover  
so m e o f  th e  effects o f  th e se  regulations, but in  large part th is  is d o n e  b y  transferring  
risks (m ore specifically , th e  risk associated  w ith  longer-term  fin an cin g) to  o ther  
agents w h o  w o u ld  o n ly  b e  w illin g  to  a ssu m e th e m  at an ad eq u ate reward. M ore 
generally, if  there is n o  stable extern al d em a n d  for th e  d o m e stic  currency, h ed g in g  
m ay be availab le o n ly  in  lim ited  qu an tities, a fact th a t affects th e  m aturities and  
costs in vo lv ed .
4. In Brazil so m e  au th ors h a v e  argued th a t th e  capital a cco u n t regu lations, w h ich  
in clu d ed  a m ech a n ism  sim ilar to  th e  URR (direct tax a tio n  o f  capita l flow s), w ere  
in effec tiv e  d u e to  w idespread  lo o p h o le s  associated  w ith  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  so p h is ti­
cated  d o m estic  fin an cia l in stru m en ts (A riyoshi e t a l. , 2000; Garcia an d  V alpassos, 
2000). H ow ever th e y  provid e n o  statistica l ev id en ce  com parab le to  th a t available  
for C h ile  an d  C o lom bia .
5. T his is th e  very  apt in terp retation  p rovid ed  b y  W illiam son  (2000: ch . 4). Indeed  
w ith  th is  in terp retation  th e  co n flic tin g  ev id en ce  o n  th e  C h ilea n  system  largely  
disappears.
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6. See A riyosh i e t a l.  (2000), Ó tker-Robe (2000) an d  Rajaraman (2001) for a d d ition a l 
ev id en ce  o f  th e  e ffectiven ess o f  th e se  regu lations.
7. T he lev e l o f  th e  URR m a y  a cco u n t for th is  result. V aldés-Prieto an d  Soto  (1998) 
fin d  ev id en ce  o f  a 'th resh o ld  effect', w h ic h  w o u ld  ex p la in  w h y  th e se  regu lations 
w ere o n ly  e ffective  in  red u cin g  cap ita l flow s in  1 9 9 5 -9 6 . It m u st b e  em p h asized  
th a t th is  d oes n o t  im p ly  a better eva lu a tio n  o f  th e  overall m a cro eco n o m ic  p o licy  
package o f  1 9 9 5 -9 6  com p ared  w ith  th a t o f  1 9 9 1 -9 2 . A gosin  an d  Ffrench-D avis
(2001) argue that, o n  broader grounds, m a cro eco n o m ic  m a n a g e m en t in  th e  
earlier part o f  th e  1990s w as m ore appropriate.
8. T his is captured in  o ther  stu d ies (for exam p le  C árdenas an d  Steiner, 2000)  
th r o u g h  th e  use o f  a d u m m y  variable for th e  period  during  w h ic h  th e  URR w as  
in  p lace, an d  has b e e n  in terpreted  (inaccurately, accord in g  to  th e  a ltern ative v iew  
p resen ted  in  th e  text) as ev id en ce  aga inst th e  e ffectiven ess o f  regu lations.
9. For an  analysis o f  th e se  issues see  W orld Bank (1999: 151) an d  Stiglitz and  
B hattacharya (2000).
10. For recent an alyses o f  th e se  issues an d  p o licy  o p tio n s  for m a n a g in g  th e m , see BIS 
(2001: ch . 7), B orio e ta l .  (2001), C lerc e ta l.  (2001) and  Turner (2002).
11. In a d d ition , general p rov ision s eq u iv a len t to  0  per cen t, 0 .5  per ce n t  an d  1 .0 per 
cen t o f  three classes o f  assets are required.
12. For an  analysis o f  th e  risks associa ted  w ith  n on-tradab le sectors see Rojas-Suárez 
(2001).
13. B anco C entral de la R epública A rgentina (1995), 1 1 -1 2 .
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1 3
How Optimal are the Extremes? 
Latin American Exchange Rate 
Policies during the Asian Crisis*
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Guillermo Larrain
O ne co m m o n  feature of th e  coun tries m ost affected by  th e  Asian crisis an d  
its shockw aves -  such  as T hailand , M alaysia, Indonesia, th e  Republic of 
Korea an d  Brazil -  is th a t  th e y  h ad  exchange rate  system s th a t  in  d ifferent 
versions w ere closer to  pegged system s th a n  to  floating  system s (they  were 
o ften  called 'so ft pegs'). C ountries w ith  exchange rate  bands, such as Israel, 
C hile an d  C olom bia also suffered, w hile  floating  countries such as Australia, 
N ew  Z ealand an d  M exico apparen tly  fared better. Based o n  th is , m any  
observers have concluded  th a t  in te rm ed ia te  exchange rate  system s are 
dangerous an d  th a t  op tim ality  is located  a t th e  extrem es. This chap te r 
evaluates th is  conclusion  by  analyzing  th e  experiences of th ree  d ifferen t 
exchange rate  systems: T hose of A rgentina, C hile an d  M exico, w h ich  have 
diverging exchange rate  policies, a t least form ally.1
A stra igh t observation  of recen t events is th a t  coun tries w ith  pegged 
system s, such as th e  currency  boards in  H ong  Kong an d  A rgentina, suffered 
sign ifican t con tag ion  in  tim es of in te rn a tio n a l financial stress. A rgentina 
experienced  deep recessions du rin g  b o th  th e  M exican an d  th e  Asian crisis. 
H ong Kong suffered a recession as a consequence of th e  Asian crisis, b u t 
du rin g  th e  M exican crisis g row th  m erely  decelerated  from  5.4 per cen t in  
1994 to  4 .0  per cen t in  1995. T here are reasons to  believe th a t  com pletely  
rigid exchange rate system s am plify  ex ternal shocks. A pparen tly  th e y  p u t 
overly strong  a n d  therefore unrea listic  requ irem en ts o n  dom estic  flexibility, 
particu larly  o n  w age an d  price flexibility. The am plifica tion  effect arises 
du rin g  a n  external shock w hen  agents consider th a t th e  shock m ay be strong  
en o u g h  to  induce th e  au tho rities to  m odify  th e  exchange rate policy; th is 
is particu larly  so w hen  th e  exchange rate appears to  be overly  appreciated . 
Rigid system s are therefo re p ro n e  to  changes in  m arket se n tim e n t a n d  cred­
ib ility  (or a t least eventually , w ith  th e  exception  of full dollarization).
Likewise exchange rate b an d s d id  n o t fu n c tio n  well du rin g  th e  Asian 
crisis. In  m an y  cases th is  was partly  th e  resu lt of m an ag em en t o f th e  bands.
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The huge increase in  capital inflow s to  em erg ing  econom ies betw een  1990 
an d  1997 p u t severe upw ard  pressure o n  th e  value of dom estic  currencies. 
T he response in  term s of exp an d in g  th e  size of bands or apprecia ting  th e m  
caused a credibility  loss. S ubsequently  th e  b an d s h ad  troub le  ad ap tin g  to  th e  
new  real exchange rate  w h en  th e  Asian crisis appeared  a n d  capital inflow s 
sudden ly  stopped . These events aggravated th e  b an d s ' m ism an ag em en t an d  
therefo re  caused a fu rth e r credibility  loss. T he m ajo r benefit o f th e  b a n d  sys­
tem  arises in  tim es of n o rm ality  w hen  th e re  are n o  severe or one-sided 
shocks. In such circum stances bands can  m a in ta in  exchange rate stability an d  
partially  absorb th e  effects o f s tandard  shocks. C onsequen tly  th e  exchange 
rate m ore efficiently  fulfils its allocative role betw een  tradables an d  n o n ­
tradables. The m a in  troub le  w ith  b ands appears in  tim es of financial distress.
After a general discussion, th is  chap te r exam ines th e  experiences of th ree  
sym bolic cases of exchange rate  policies. O n  th e  cu rrency  bo ard  side, it 
considers th e  experience of A rgentina in  o rder to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  appeal 
th is  system  has h a d  for o th e r  countries, som e of w h ich  later dollarized. 
It th e n  exam ines C hile for th e  case of in te rm ed ia te  regim es an d  M exico for 
th e  floating  regim e. The analysis focuses o n  th e  period  in  w h ich  th e  Asian 
crisis to o k  place.
Exchange rate regime and stability of financial and 
real sectors
T he Asian crisis a n d  its a fte rm ath  caused a considerable shock n o t on ly  
in  Asia b u t in  Latin A m erica as well, b u t w ith  vary ing  degrees o f in tensity . 
C hile was by  far th e  m ost directly  affected due to  its sign ifican t trade  rela­
tions w ith  Asia. But as em erging-m arket spreads increased, especially after 
th e  Russian default, Brazil an d  A rgentina also felt its consequences. Later th e  
Brazilian deva lua tion  in tro d u ced  add itiona l uncerta in ties  th a t  affected all of 
Latin  America. It was therefo re  a period  of in stab ility  a n d  large shocks.
Table 13.1 com pares th e  ou tcom e in  term s of th e  financial an d  o u tp u t 
v o la tility  o f a n u m b e r of coun tries w ith  d ifferent in itia l exchange rate 
regim es in  th e  period  im m edia te ly  after th e  explosion  of th e  Asian crisis. 
In  o rder to  com pare financial an d  real volatility, we co n stru c t a financial 
volatility  index (FVI), w h ich  can  be com puted  in dependen tly  o f th e  exchange 
rate  (ER) regim e.2 If CV deno tes th e  coefficient of varia tion , th e  in d ex  is 
defined sim ply as FVI =  CV(ER) +  CV(reserves) + C V (nom inal in terest rates).
W h en  a co u n try  faces a period  of stress it n o rm ally  reacts by  deprecia ting  
th e  exchange rate , selling  in te rn a tio n a l reserves or increasing  in te rest rates. 
In  fixed exchange rate  regim es, v o la tility  appears in  reserves an d  in te rest 
rates, w hile  in  a p u re  float v o la tility  sh o u ld  appear in  th e  exchange rate 
an d  in te rest rates. Bands o r d irty  floating  system s co m b in e  all th ree  
e lem ents. Real sector vo la tility  is cap tu red  u sing  th e  s tandard  dev ia tion  of 
GDP grow th.
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Ta b le  13 .1  V olatility  in  se lected  cou n tr ies during in tern a tio n a l fin a n cia l turm oil, 
1 9 9 7 (Q 3)-99 (Q 4)
I n i t i a l  
exchange  
ra te  system
C o e ff ic ie n t o f  v a r ia t io n  o f  the  leve ls o f
V o la t i l i t y  
o f  G D P  
(s .d .) (% )
N o m in a l  
exchange  
ra te  (% )  
(a )
In te rn a t io n a l 
reserves (% )
(b)




In d e x  o f  
f in a n c ia l  
v o la t i l i t y  (% )
(a ) +  (b ) +  (c)
A rgentina Fixed 0 .0 7.9 13.1 2 1 .0 5.3
H o n g  K ong Fixed 0.1 3 .9 2 3 .0 2 7 .0 5.5
Australia Float 5 .7 14.5 14.2 3 4 .4 0 .6
M ex ico Float 8 .5 5 .6 2 2 .6 3 6 .7 1.9
N ew  Z ealand Float 7.8 5 .7 2 7 .4 4 1 .0 2.3
C h ile Band 8 .2 8 .2 31.1 47 .5 5.3
C o lo m b ia Band 16.7 8 .2 26 .4 51 .3 4.5
T hailand Soft p eg 9 .4 9 .0 42 .1 60 .5 7.3
M alaysia Soft peg 9 .8 19 .0 37 .9 66 .7 7.8
Brazil Soft p eg 25.1 26 .8 26 .4 78.3 1.6
Korea Soft p eg 14 .8 36 .4 30 .7 81 .9 8.5
Source: Calculations based on IMF data.
Table 13.1 ranks th e  coun tries accord ing  to  th e ir  financial vo la tility  index  
an d  reveals five im p o rta n t a n d  to  som e ex ten t surprising  conclusions ab o u t 
th e  role o f exchange rate  policy  du ring  th e  Asian crisis:
• R anking countries accord ing  to  th e ir  financial vo la tility  in d ex  results in  
th e ir  being  grouped  accord ing  to  th e ir  exchange rate system .
• Fixed system s appear to  have delivered m ore n o m in a l stability  th a n  
alternative system s, b u t th e y  displayed m ore vo la tility  in  a real variable, 
nam ely  GDP grow th.
• F loating regim es h a d  th e  low est GDP volatility, b u t th e y  displayed greater 
financial v o la tility  th a n  fixed systems.
• Soft pegs displayed th e  w orst co m b in atio n  of financial an d  real volatility.
• Bands fell in to  an  interm ediate position, w ith  higher financial volatility th a n  
credible fixed system s a n d  m ore real vo la tility  th a n  floating  regim es.
Som e qualifica tions are requ ired  a t th is  p o in t. First, th e  lesser financial 
vo la tility  in  fixed exchange rate  regim es was probably  d u e  to  th e  fact th a t 
in  th e  period  in  ques tion  th e re  w ere n o  serious challenges in  A rgentina or 
H ong  Kong to  th e  stability  o f th e  exchange rate  policy.3 Therefore it can  be 
concluded  th a t a credible fixed exchange rate policy  delivers greater financial 
stability. But it also follow s th a t, despite hav in g  h a d  credible exchange rate 
policies, A rgentina a n d  H ong Kong also h ad  h ig h  o u tp u t volatility.
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In  th e  case of A rgentina, som e observers have suggested th a t  th e  prob lem  
was due to  rig id ity  in  th e  labour m arket, b u t th e  fact th a t  H ong K ong also 
experienced greater v o la tility  suggests th a t  th is  arg u m en t m ay  be overstated. 
M oreover if we com pare th e  tw o coun tries ' in fla tio n  records we find  th a t 
th e y  w ere n o t significantly  dissim ilar: du rin g  th is  period  cum ulative an n u a l 
in fla tio n  in  A rgentina was - 0 .4  per cen t w hile  in  H ong Kong it was 1.8 per 
cen t. Therefore prices co n trib u ted  m ore to  real deprecia tion  in  A rgentina 
th a n  th e y  d id  in  H ong Kong.4
Second, as we shall see, th e  C h ilean  b a n d  was already suffering from  lack 
o f credibility  du rin g  th e  period  considered. Therefore faced w ith  a shock 
as strong  as th e  Asian crisis, w h en  th e  stabilizing p roperties o f th e  rigid 
p a rt o f th e  b a n d  m echan ism  shou ld  have appeared, th e y  d id  n o t because 
credibility  h ad  been  lost. H ence it can  be concluded  th a t  w h en  faced w ith  
a shock a non-cred ib le b a n d  causes h ig h  volatility, b o th  financia l an d  real. 
W h a t ca n n o t be argued is th a t  th e  lack of credibility  is in h e re n t in  th e  b an d  
system .
Third, soft pegs displayed th e  w orst perform ance. A nalyzed ex p o st th e  soft 
peggers all h ad  repressed exchange rates an d  in  som e cases th e  m arket d id  
n o t have en o u g h  in fo rm atio n  o n  fundam en ta ls  (for instance, short-term  
ex ternal liabilities). W h en  a currency  is overvalued an d  th e re  is pressure 
for correction , soft peg system s are p ro n e  to  specu la tion  a n d  th u s  financial 
volatility.
Four, floating  regim es d id  b e tte r in  term s of real variables b u t less so 
in  te rm s of financial volatility. Beyond th e  exchange rate  v o la tility  th a t  is 
in h e re n t in  a floating  system , in te rest rates sw ang in  floating  countries 
as m u c h  as th e y  d id  in  coun tries w ith  pegged system s. F lo tation  cou ld  n o t 
avoid  in te rest rate  volatility. As is clear from  Table 13.1, policy reactions 
differed considerab ly  am o n g  th e  countries. For instance, desp ite th e  float 
A ustralia used its in te rn a tio n a l reserves qu ite  intensively, w h ile  N ew  Zealand 
used  in terest rates m ore intensively. A m ong th e  floaters, M exico was th e  
m ost in tensive user o f th e  exchange rate.
Table 13.1 also suggests th a t  each  co u n try  chose d ifferen t com binations of 
n o m in a l deprecia tion , reserve accum ula tion  an d  in terest rate  changes w h en  
facing th e  shocks. It appears th a t, for th e  countries in  th e  sam ple, th e  less 
harm fu l financial consequence in  term s of g row th  was vo la tility  in  th e  
exchange rate, as can  be seen in  Figure 13.1. This im plies th a t  exchange rate 
changes m ay have been  effective in  p roducing  th e  necessary expend itu re  
sw itch ing  to  reduce th e  n e t d em an d  for tradables an d  m in im ize th e  im pact 
o n  non -tradab les.5 Also, it appears th a t th e  m ost harm fu l response was in te r­
est rate changes. T he ad ju s tm en t of ex ternal disequilibria te n d ed  to  w ork as 
a global dem and-reducing  too l, generating  u n em p lo y m e n t an d  idle capital 
in  non -tradab le  sectors.
Beyond th e  exchange rate  system , coun tries ' ab ility  to  sm o o th  th e  cycle 
is correlated  w ith  th e ir  financial in teg ra tio n  w ith  th e  rest o f th e  w orld. The
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Volatility of GDP
F ig u re  1 3 .1  GDP v o la tility  versus various fin an cia l v o la tilit ie s  (per cen t)
Notes: Each point represents the ordered pair of volatility in GDP and some definition of finan­
cial volatility (in exchange rate, reserves or interest rates). The numbers on linear regressions refer 
to the partial correlation.
Source: Calculations based on IMF data.
U nited  States runs a n  en o rm o u s cu rren t acco u n t deficit b u t th e  m arket 
does n o t ask for its im m edia te  correction  (nor do  th e  au tho rities th in k  it 
is necessary), as has h ap p en ed  m a n y  tim es in  Latin America. A m ong th e  
reasons for th is  is th e  fact th a t  foreigners have  a h ig h  d em an d  for dollar- 
d en o m in a ted  assets, a n d  th a t  th e  U nited  States does n o t n eed  to  m ake 
its financial ob ligations co n tin g en t o n  com m odity  price m ovem en ts as its 
econom y is so diversified th a t  th e  negative covariance of shocks is p robab ly  
strong  en o u g h  to  stabilize overall risk.
H ence to  reduce th e  dom estic  im pact of ex ternal shocks it  is necessary 
to  im prove th e  quality  o f Latin America's financial links w ith  th e  rest of 
th e  w orld. Three m e th o d s have been  discussed recently. O ne is to  create a 
foreign d em an d  for assets d en o m in a ted  in  th e  n a tio n a l currency, as inspired  
by  th e  A ustralian an d  N ew  Z ealand cases. The degree of in te rn a tio n a l f in an ­
cial in teg ra tio n  of these  tw o OECD countries is far m ore th a n  th a t  o f a 
typical em erg ing  econom y. A m ong o th e r  th ings, th ey  have offshore m arkets 
for securities issued in  dom estic  currencies (see C hap te r 4), an d  are therefore 
able to  hedge th e ir  exposure to  exchange rate  risk in  th e ir  non -tradab le
250 Latin American Exchange Rate Policies
sectors.6 Second, accord ing  to  C aballero (2001), Latin  A m erican financial 
in stru m en ts  are incom ple te  in  th a t  th ey  are n o t c o n tin g en t o n  th e  m ain  
shocks faced by  these  econom ies. If C h ilean  bon d s w ere co n tin g en t o n  th e  
price of copper, a n  ex ternal shock w ould  be less d em an d in g  in  term s of 
cu rren t accoun t ad ju s tm e n t.7 It is n o t obvious th a t  a typical em erg ing  
econom y  will m ove quickly  in  e ith e r o f these  d irections. Third, th e  quality  
of financial links could  be im proved  w ith  p ru d en tia l m acroeconom ic po li­
cies on  excessive sho rt-term  or liqu id  ex ternal liabilities, th e  size of th e  
ex ternal deficit a n d  th e  apprecia tion  of th e  real exchange rate  in  periods of 
cap ita l surges.8
The m ain  b enefit o f th e  floating  regim e appears w h en  significant, long- 
lasting  shocks em erge abruptly . In  th is  case a pure floating  regim e delivers 
a rap id  ad ju stm en t in  th e  exchange rate an d  th e  au tho rities stay  o u t o f 
th e  scene, th u s  keep ing  its credibility  in tact, except w h en  dep recia tion  leads 
to  in fla tion  an d  th e  co u n try  has adop ted  a n  in fla tio n  ta rge ting  schem e. By 
increasing th e  exchange rate risk perceived by  th e  public, it also b e tte r p re­
pares agents fo r sudden  shocks. Conversely floating  regim es cause signifi­
can tly  h igher exchange rate  instab ility  across th e  cycle, w h ich  m ay have 
harm fu l effects o n  grow th, w ith  ineffic ien t allocative signals. In  particu lar a 
floating  regim e c a n n o t avoid  overva luation  in  episodes of capital surge.
We shall n o w  briefly  analyze th e  behav iou r o f exchange rate  regim es in  
th e  period from  th e  M exican crisis to  1999, using  ou r m easures o f financial 
an d  real volatility. Figure 13.2 considers th ree  subperiods: on e  encom passing 
th e  M exican crisis (the  fo u rth  q u arte r o f 1994 to  th e  first qu arte r 1996) a 
n o rm al subperiod  betw een  th e  second  quarte r of 1996 an d  th e  th ird  quarte r 
o f 1997, an d  th e  o n e  in  w h ich  th e  Asian crisis took  place (the  fo u rth  quarte r 
o f 1997 to  th e  fo u rth  qu arte r o f 1999).
Figure 13.2 suggests th a t  in  crisis periods th e re  is a h igher co rrela tion  
b etw een  financial a n d  real vo la tility  th a n  in  no rm al periods. In  no rm al 
periods th e  co rre la tion  betw een  financial a n d  real variables is a lm ost zero. 
H ow ever th e  co rrela tion  varies b etw een  crises, an d  surprisingly  it was h igher 
in  th e  M exican crisis th a n  in  th e  Asian one. This can  be exp lained  by  th e  
fact th a t the  degree o f con tag ion  was less du ring  th e  M exican crisis as, am o n g  
th e  countries in  th e  sam ple, it on ly  spread to  A rgentina.9 H ence th e  h ig h  R2 
reflects a statistical issue ra th e r  th a n  an  econom ic one.
If th e  data  are decom posed  according to  th e  exchange rate regim e prevail­
ing  at th e  b eg in n in g  of each  period, M exico appears in  th e  group of bands 
in  on e  period  an d  as a float in  th e  la tte r tw o (Figure 13.3). The figure shows 
th a t, across crises, th e  m ore stable behav iou r in  financial an d  real term s 
was exhib ited  by  floating  regim es. W h en  negative shocks arrived, all system s 
b u t th e  floating  ones exh ib ited  h ig h  financial an d /o r  real volatility, w ith  soft 
pegs perfo rm ing  worst. Pegged system s appear to  have a curious property : 
w ith o u t negative shocks th e y  display low  real an d  financia l volatility , b u t 
w hen  th e re  is a shock, financia l vo la tility  rem ains m u c h  th e  sam e an d  th e
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F igure  1 3 .2  Real an d  fin a n cia l v o la tility  in  three ep iso d es (per cen t)  
Source: Based on IMF data.
shock  translates in to  real sector volatility. Bands exh ib it sim ilar behav iour 
w ith  respect to  real vo la tility  in  stress periods, b u t w ith  greater financial 
volatility.
It is in te resting  to  n o te  th a t  in  n o rm al tim es, floating  regim es cause rela­
tively m ore financial vo la tility  th a n  do th e  o th e r systems, b u t d u ring  a crisis 
overall vo la tility  is reduced in  floating  regim es.10
In  lig h t o f th e  above considerations, an  'idea l' b u t crude exchange rate  
system  th a t  m ig h t be able to  m in im ize real sector vo la tility  w ould  involve 
a tw o-pronged  approach . In  n o rm a l tim es, w h en  shocks are sm all an d  
un ifo rm ly  distributed , m anaged  flexibility o r a craw ling b an d  w ould  increase 
stability  an d  therefo re  grow th. W h e n  large shocks appear a n d  th e ir  d istri­
b u tio n  is biased in  th e  sam e negative d irec tion  (term s of trade  fall, ex ternal 
financ ing  declines an d  so on), th e n  ideally th e re  shou ld  be a tem porary  
sw itch to  a floating  regim e. H ow ever im p lem en tin g  such  a system  w ou ld  be 
difficult. First, it w ou ld  be p rob lem atic  to  de term ine  w h e th e r a shock  was 
large or sm all, tem porary  or p e rm a n e n t.11 Second, in  o rder to  be successful, 
fixed exchange rate  regim es n eed  full credibility  in d e p e n d e n t o f th e  shock 
suffered; such an  ideal sw itch ing  exchange rate  system  is incom patib le  w ith  
a fixed rate  system .
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Argentina: low inflation and output volatility under the 
currency board
After experiencing hyperin fla tion  in  1989 an d  1990, in  1991 A rgentina 
adop ted  an  ex trem e exchange rate  policy: a currency  board . This system , like 
th e  trad itiona l fixed exchange rate  system , links th e  n a tio n a l currency, in  
th is  case th e  peso, in  a given p ro p o rtio n  to  a foreign currency. In  A rgentina 
th e  parity  was fixed one-to -one w ith  th e  US dollar. In  th e  trad itiona l fixed 
exchange rate system  th e  cen tra l b an k  is able to  realign  th e  parity  a t its dis­
cre tion  an d  has th e  freedom  to  con tro l th e  q u an tity  of h igh-pow ered  m oney. 
H ow ever in  A rgentina p arity  was fixed by  law (the C onvertib ility  Law) an d  
th e  cen tral b an k  was requ ired  to  m a tch  an y  increase in  h igh-pow ered  
m o n ey  w ith  an  accum ula tion  o f in te rn a tio n a l reserves. In  th is sense it  was 
a n  extrem e version  of a fixed exchange rate system , w ith  n o  space for 
dom estic  m acroeconom ic policy. Of course th e  m ost radical o p tio n  was 
sim ply  to  suppress th e  dom estic  currency  an d  fully dollarize.
T he m ain  reason  for th e  ad o p tio n  of a currency  b o ard  in  A rgentina 
in  1991 was to  fig h t hyperin fla tion , th a t  is, th e  strategy was a deliberate
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an ti-in fla tio n ary  device. Between 1975 an d  1990 th e  low est in fla tio n  rate 
in  A rgentina was 90  per ce n t (1986), a n d  du ring  th e  h y p erin fla tio n  years 
it scored as h ig h  as 3079 per cen t (1989). After th e  im p lem en ta tio n  o f th e  
currency  board , an n u a l in fla tion  fell to  below  5 per cen t in  1994, an d  th e n  
to  an  average of - 0 .3  per ce n t betw een  1996 a n d  2000.
At th e  sam e tim e as in fla tion  was collapsing, GDP grow th was accelerating. 
After a n  average rate  of - 0 .9  per cen t in  th e  1980s, g row th  resum ed an d  
averaged 4.1 per ce n t in  th e  1990s. This was due to  th ree  m a in  factors.
First, a ro u n d  th e  tim e th a t  convertib ility  was adop ted , in te rn a tio n a l 
liqu id ity  increased  significantly. U n til 1994 A rgentina w as able to  a ttrac t 
a huge am o u n t o f capital, fu rth er encouraged  by  its m assive p rivatiza tion  
program m e. This, in  co m b in a tio n  w ith  th e  m echanics o f convertib ility  
described before, p rov ided  a sign ifican t stim ulus to  aggregate dem and , 
expectations an d  econom ic activ ity .12 Average GDP grow th  in  th e  period 
1991-94  was 7.9 per cen t. H ow ever at th e  en d  of 1994 M exico devalued 
its currency, an d  th e  suspicion th a t  A rgentina w ou ld  follow  suit increased 
its sovereign risk from  434 bp  over Treasuries in  1994 to  1259 in  1995 
(Table 13.2). T he n e t capital inflow  of US$4.3 b illion  in  th e  last quarte r of 
1994 reversed ab rup tly  to  an  ou tflow  of US$3.3 b illion  in  th e  first quarte r 
o f 1995. The result was a severe recession in  w h ich  GDP fell by  2.9 per cen t 
in  1995 an d  u n em p lo y m e n t rose to  18 per cen t. H ow ever in  1996-98 
cap ita l flows re tu rn ed  an d  o u tp u t recovered. T hen  betw een  Septem ber 1998 
an d  February 1999 th e  Russian defau lt a n d  th e  Brazilian deva lua tion  again 
induced  capital outflow s an d  a recession th a t  lasted  over th ree  years. H ence 
th e  A rgentinean  experience after 1995 was on e  of low  g row th  accom pan ied  
by  significant volatility, associated w ith  th e  instab ility  of cap ita l flows.
Second, th e  acceleration  of g row th  in  th e  first ha lf o f th e  1990s was th e  
resu lt n o t on ly  of capital inflow s b u t also of som e im p o rta n t structural 
reform s, tw o of w h ich  m erit specific m en tio n : trade reform  a n d  p rivatization . 
Trade policy in  A rgentina to o k  place u n d e r th e  fram ew ork of MERCOSUR, 
th e  free trade agreem ent A rgentina signed w ith  Brazil, Paraguay an d  Uruguay. 
After th is trade liberalization  exports soared from  US$18 b illio n  in  1990 to  
a peak of US$34 b illion  in  1998. W ith  regard to  privatization , as described 
by  Larrain an d  W inograd  (1997), given th e  in itia l size of th e  pub lic  sector 
an d  th e  low  p roductiv ity  levels in  public com panies, th e  m assive program m e 
u n d ertak en  in  th e  first h a lf o f th e  1990s resu lted  in  huge gains in  th e  
average value added  per w orker in  privatized  firm s, especially in  th e  n o n ­
tradable sector. This n o t on ly  h ad  a positive im pact o n  grow th  b u t also 
h e lped  to  reduce th e  overapprecia tion  of th e  real exchange ra te .13
Third, a m ost relevant an d  usually  ignored  factor, th e  accelera tion  of 
g row th  in  A rgentina, is linked  to  th e  poo r recessive sta rting  p o in t. Take as 
a b en ch m ark  1974, th e  year in  w h ich  real GDP per cap ita reached  its peak. 
After 1974 th e re  was a steady de terio ra tion  in  GDP an d  by  1990, th e  year 
before convertib ility  was adop ted , it was 16 per cen t below  th a t  in  1974,
254 Latin American Exchange Rate Policies
Ta b le  1 3 .2  Argentina: capita l flow s, real ex ch a n g e  rate and m a cro eco n o m ic  perform ­
an ce, 1 9 9 4 -9 9
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
C urrent accou n t  
balance  
(US$ m illio n )
- 1 1  158 - 5  191 - 6  843 - 1 2  497 - 1 4  603 - 1 2  3 1 2
N et foreign  direct 
in v estm en t  
(US$ m illio n )
2  620 4  112 5 348 5 503 4 5 4 6 2 2  665
N et p ortfo lio  
in v estm en t  
(US$ m illion )
8  389 1 8 9 3 9 8 3 2 10 887 8 3 3 7 - 6  323
All o thers  
(US$ m illio n )
341 - 1  100 - 3  451 8 35 4  9 9 0 - 1  637
C h an ge in  reserves 
(US$ m illio n )
- 6 7 5 - 2 3 1 1 3 258 3 162 4  0 9 0 2  013
Total capita l in flo w s  
(US$ m illio n )
10 4 8 4 2  879 10 100 15 659 18 694 14 325
W ith o u t FDI 
(US$ m illio n )
7 864 - 1  233 4  752 1 0 1 5 6 14 148 - 8  3 4 0
Average spread  
over FRB
434 1 2 5 9 635 301 6 0 8 726
G row th  o f  m o n e y  
su p p ly  (%)
11.6 - 1 . 8 14.4 12.3 - 0 . 9 - 2 . 9
External d eb t/ 
exports (%)*
5 4 0 .8 470 .1 4 6 1 .0 4 7 1 .3 5 3 0 .6 6 0 6 .9
External d eb t/ 
G DP (%)*
33 .3 3 8 .2 40 .3 42 .5 4 6 .9 50 .1
Terms o f  trade in d ex  
(ann u al average)
101.5 101 .8 109 .8 108 .4 102.5 96 .4
GDP grow th  (%) 5 .8 - 2 . 9 5.5 8.1 3 .9 - 3 . 0
Real exch a n g e  
rate (average  
1 9 8 7 -9 0  =  100)
58 .6 66 .0 67 .9 66.1 64 .2 56 .6
* Outstanding public and private debt at year end, as a share of annual exports and annual GDP, 
respectively.
Source: BBVA; IMF/EFI.
hav in g  fallen sharp ly  since 1988. Two in te rp re ta tio n s can  be m ade o f this: 
th a t  convertib ility  an d  th e  structu ra l reform s m en tio n e d  above w ere able 
to  correct th e  lo n g -stand ing  loss in  o u tp u t per capita; a n d  th a t  g row th  was 
relatively easy to  achieve initially, due to  th e  significant gap betw een  actual 
GDP an d  p o ten tia l GDP.14
The g row th  recovery  in  th e  early  1990s a n d  th e  im pressive d rop  in  in fla ­
tio n  w ere p robab ly  th e  m a in  reasons w hy  convertib ility  a ttrac ted  so m u ch  
a tte n tio n  in  th e  in te rn a tio n a l econom y. H ow ever th e  cu rrency  bo ard  had
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pitfalls, m a in ly  its d ependence  o n  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l flows, a variable 
th a t  w as far from  th e  sphere  of in fluence o f th e  dom estic  au thorities . 
O n  to p  of th a t, vo la tility  increased  due to  a rela tively  new  p h e n o m e n o n  in  
th e  in te rn a tio n a l econom y: financ ia l co n tag io n  an d  th e  'g lobaliza tion  of 
financ ia l vo la tility ' (Ffrench-Davis an d  O cam po, 2001). But co n tag io n  
attacks all coun tries m ore  o r less equally, th e  difference a m o n g  th e m  being  
th e  d ifferential in  econom ic fundam en ta ls  an d  th e  capacity  to  correct them , 
particu larly  w h e n  th e y  are m isaligned. A fixed exchange ra te  system  adds 
a n o th e r  p o te n tia l risk, n am ely  forced rea lignm en t, w h ich  is n o rm ally  p re ­
ceded by  efforts to  avoid  it. In  th is  sense fixed exchange rate  system s m ay 
am plify  th e  orig inal ex ternal shock.
In  Table 13.2 it is show n  th a t  in  th e  recession years, 1995 an d  1999, th e  
cap ita l flows to  A rgentina decreased significantly. The o th e r  side of th e  coin  
was a sign ifican t increase in  sovereign spread. Between 1994 an d  1995, as 
sta ted  earlier, th e  d ifferen tia l cost o f public  sector borrow ing  increased  by 
825 bp. After a sharp  drop  in  1996 an d  again  in  1997, d u rin g  th e  Asian crisis 
th e  spread increased to  608 b p  in  1998 an d  726 bp  in  1999. In  th e  con tex t 
o f a n  o p en  cap ita l account, th is  im plies an  increase in  th e  dom estic  cost o f 
borrow ing.
T he reduced  cap ita l inflow s an d  th e  h ig h e r cost of bo rrow ing  resulted  
in  a sudden  h a lt in  m o n ey  supp ly  grow th  a n d  tw o sign ifican t recessions, 
a relatively sh o rt o n e  in  1995, w ith  a loss o f 2.9 per ce n t in  real GDP, a n d  a 
qu ite  long  one in  1999-2000, w h en  GDP fell by  4.0 per cen t. A rgentina an d  
U ruguay were th e  on ly  tw o Latin A m erican countries to  suffer a dom estic  
recession in  b o th  th e  financial crises.15
The crawling-band approach in Chile
In  th e  early 1990s, in  th e  co n tex t o f m assive cap ita l inflow s, th e  C hilean  
au tho rities iden tified  tw o m ain  priorities for m acroeconom ic m anagem en t, 
an d  particu larly  exchange rate  policy. First, as th e  econom y  was p ro n e  to  
h uge  cycles16 it was crucial to  achieve sustained  m acroeconom ic stability. 
Second, it was v ita l to  em phasize g row th  as th e  d o m in a n t criterion  in  policy  
m aking. This m e an t assigning exports a strategic role, in  term s o f b o th  
expansion  an d  diversification.
Several works, in c lu d in g  those  by  C aballero an d  C orbo (1990) an d  ECLAC 
(1998: ch . 4), n o te  th a t  in  o rder for exports to  be an  eng ine  of grow th, 
m a in ta in in g  th e  level an d  stab ility  of th e  real exchange ra te  is crucial. The 
C hilean  au thorities considered th a t  th is  could  be placed in  jeopardy  if capital 
surges caused excessive exchange rate  apprecia tion , an d  th a t  th e re  w ou ld  be 
greater fu ture vo la tility  if th e  d irec tion  of n e t flows w en t in to  reverse.
In  th e  early 1990s th e  au tho rities decided to  regulate th e  foreign exchange 
m arke t a n d  cap ita l inflow s in  o rder to  p rev en t large m isa lignm en ts in  th e  
real exchange ra te  relative to  w h a t th e y  assum ed to  be its long -te rm  trend .
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T he in te n tio n  was to  m ake long -te rm  fu n d am en ta ls  prevail over sho rt-te rm  
factors, based o n  th e  assu m p tio n  th a t  th e re  was b ehav iou ra l asym m etry  
b etw een  th e  m arket a n d  th e  m o n e ta ry  au tho rities : th e  la tte r n eed ed  a lo n g ­
te rm  p la n n in g  h o rizo n  w h en  seeking sustainab le m acroeconom ic stability, 
in  co n tra st to  p rivate  agents, w ho  opera ted  m ore in ten siv e ly  a t th e  sh o rt­
te rm  en d  of th e  m arke t a n d  w ere rew arded w ith  profits d u rin g  th a t  te rm . 
In  o rder to  deal w ith  m arket uncerta in ty , ra th e r th a n  se tting  a u n iq u e  price 
th e  au tho rities  u sed  a craw ling b a n d  cen tred  o n  a reference price th a t  was 
linked  to  a basket com prising  th e  dollar, th e  D eu tschm ark  a n d  th e  yen, 
w eigh ted  accord ing  to  th e ir  share in  C h ilean  trad e .17 The cen tre  o f th e  b an d  
craw led accord ing  to  in fla tio n  d ifferen tia l criteria, th u s  fo llow ing  a PPP rule 
ad ju sted  by  estim ates o f n e t  p ro d u c tiv ity  im p ro v em en ts  in  C hile.
T he changes tak ing  place in  th e  global financial m arkets, th e  increasing  
in te rn a tio n a l approval o f C hile 's econom ic policies, h ig h  dom estic  in te rest 
rates an d  th e  sm o o th  tran s itio n  to  dem ocracy s tim ula ted  a cap ita l in flow  to  
C hile from  m id  1990. This flow  was earlier a n d  relatively stronger th a n  in  
o th e r  em erging econom ies an d  was quickly reflected in  an  apprecia ting  real 
exchange rate. B eginning  in  Ju ly  1990, th e  m arket ra te  lay a t th e  apprecia ted  
ex trem e of th e  band . D uring th e  follow ing m o n th s  th e  econom ic au thorities 
designed a new  m acroeconom ic policy  th a t, co n tra ry  to  th e  fash ion  am ong  
m ultila tera l in s titu tio n s  a n d  financial agents for across-the-board  open in g  
o f th e  capital account, was based o n  th e  p red ic tion  th a t  th e  large ex ternal 
supply  of financing  was n o t sustainable an d  th a t short-term  factors affecting 
th e  cu rren t accoun t, such as th e  h ig h  price of copper, w ou ld  te n d  to  reverse 
in  th e  m ed ium  te rm .18
The set o f policies th a t  follow ed were designed to  prov ide a p ru d en tia l 
m acroeconom ic en v iro n m en t in  o rder to  achieve sustainab le equilibria. 
In  Ju n e  1991 a non -in te rest-bearing  reserve req u irem en t o f 20 per cen t was 
im posed  o n  foreign loans. Reserves h a d  to  be m a in ta in ed  a t th e  cen tra l b an k  
for a m in im u m  of 90 days an d  a m ax im um  of one year.
C entral b an k  p ro p o n en ts  of a d irty  float argued th a t  th e  prevailing  rules, 
w ith  a pure band , an  increasingly  active in fo rm al m arket a n d  a m ore porous 
form al m arket, w ou ld  lead to  th e  exchange rate m o v in g  tow ards e ith er 
ex trem e of th e  b a n d  (it h a d  already  h it  th e  ceiling  in  1989-90, an d  th e  floor 
la ter on). This p ro m p ted  th e  b an k  to  in itia te  d irty  floating  in  M arch 1992. 
T hereafter th e  rate  fluc tua ted  w ith in  a range of o n e  to  eigh t percen tage 
p o in ts  above th e  floor for several years, w ith  th e  b an k  co n tin u in g  to  m ake 
purchases b u t also som e sales (overall th e re  was a significant n e t accum ula­
tio n  of reserves).
In  th e  ensu ing  m o n th s  US in terest rates c o n tin u ed  to  decline, encouraged  
by th e  recession th e  U nited  States was experiencing, w h ich  p u t pressure o n  
C hile's C entral Bank. H ow ever th e  C h ilean  econom y  was b o o m in g  an d  its 
GDP grow th  ra te  h ad  risen  in to  tw o digits. For reasons of m acroeconom ic 
equilib rium  th e  cen tra l b an k  decided to  increase ra th e r th a n  low er th e
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dom estic  in te rest rates. In  o rder to  m ake space for m o n e ta ry  policy  in  th e  
co n tex t of c o n tin u ed  capital inflows, th e  reserve req u irem en t was tigh tened . 
In M ay 1992 it was raised to  30 per cen t an d  was ex tended  to  tim e deposits 
in  foreign currency, an d  in  1995 to  purchases of C hilean  'secondary  ADRs' 
by  foreigners. The period  over w h ich  th e  deposit h ad  to  be m a in ta in ed  was 
ex tended  to  o n e  year, regardless of th e  m a tu rity  o f th e  inflow. P erm anen t 
m o n ito rin g  was conducted  in  o rder to  iden tify  loopholes, w h ich  w ere th e n  
closed. In  general, evasion was qu ite  lim ited  (Zahler, 1998; Le Fort an d  
L ehm ann , 2000).
The system  of reserve requ irem en ts an d  taxes o n  foreign len d in g  was 
d irected  a t relative m arket prices. T he im plicit tax  rate o n  inflow s increased 
dram atically  as m aturities shortened . For in stance  by  1995, for inflow s w ith  
a one-year te rm  it stood  a t 4 per cen t, w hile  for 90 day-term s it represen ted  
a cost o f 13 per cen t (Agosin a n d  Ffrench-Davis, 2001). W ith  th e  ou tb reak  of 
th e  Asian crisis an d  th e  subsequen t scarcity of financial inflow s, th e  reserve 
requ irem en t rate was reduced  to  10 per ce n t an d  th e n  to  zero in  1998.
As a resu lt o f th e  policy  m ix  im p lem en ted  in  1990-94, p lus th e  im proved  
te rm s of trade  in  1995 after th e  Tequila crisis exp loded  in  la te  1994 a n d  its 
effects spread to  A rgentina, C hile m a in ta in ed  a solid ex ternal sector (a sm all 
deficit o n  th e  cu rren t account, a sustainable exchange rate  an d  a lim ited  
am o u n t of short-term  ex ternal liabilities). Therefore th e  across-the-board  
cut-off in  liqu id  fu n d in g  for Latin  Am erica d id  n o t d am p en  th e  C hilean  
econom y. Towards m id  1995 cap ita l flows began  to  re tu rn  to  th e  region, an d  
w ith  special in ten sity  to  Chile.
G iven th e  expecta tions of currency app recia tion  w h en  th e  Tequila shock 
was over, th e  large in te rest rate  d ifferential betw een  th e  peso a n d  th e  dollar 
gave foreign portfo lio  an d  sho rt-te rm  investors a p rofitab le bet, in  sp ite of 
th e  price th ey  h ad  to  pay  for en terin g  th e  C h ilean  financial m arket (in th e  
form  of th e  reserve requ irem en t). The tren d  tow ards app recia tion  could  
have been  curbed by  in tensify ing  th e  price restric tions o n  inflow s (th a t is, 
increasing  th e  size of th e  reserve requ irem en t; Le Fort an d  L ehm ann , 2000). 
H ow ever th e  au tho rities  m ore or less m a in ta in ed  th e  in ten s ity  of th e  policy  
too ls th e y  w ere using  in  1996-97, an d  a consequence cap ita l inflow s over­
w helm ed  th e  dom estic  m arket. T he cen tra l b an k  was un ab le  to  p rev en t a 
sign ifican t real app recia tion  of th e  peso a n d  th is  co n trib u ted  to  a w iden ing  
of th e  cu rren t acco u n t deficit, w h ich  clim bed  to  5.7 per cen t of GDP in  
1996-97 (Table 13.3).
In  th e  nego tia tions for a free trade agreem ent w ith  C anada th e  C hilean  
authorities successfully defended th e  m ain tenance  of th e  reserve requirem ent 
as a po licy  too l to  regulate financial inflow s. But th e  general overoptim ism  
in  dom estic  an d  foreign financial m arkets, th e  w idespread ag reem ent th a t 
th e  crisis h ad  been  left b e h in d  an d  th e  risky te m p ta tio n  to  speed th e  reduc­
tio n  of dom estic  in fla tio n  w ith  exchange-rate apprecia tion , w eakened  th e  
policy  of sustainable m acroeconom ic equilibria.
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Table 13.3 Chile: capital flows, exchange rate and macroeconomic performance,
1990-2000
1 9 9 0 -9 5 1 9 9 6 -9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
A ctual GDP grow th  (%) 7.8 7.4 3 .9 - 1 .1 5 .4
P roductive cap acity  grow th  (%) 7.8 6 .8 7.3 5 .9 4 .2
In v estm en t ratio (% o f  GDP) 26.1 31 .6 3 2 .2 26 .9 26 .6
In fla tion  (%) 14.7 6.3 4 .7 2.3 4.5
C urrent acco u n t b a lan ce - 2 .5 - 5 . 7 - 6 . 2 - 0 . 2 - 1 . 6
(% o f  GDP)
Fiscal balan ce (% o f  GDP) 1.8 2.1 0 .4 - 1 .5 0 .1
Terms o f  trade (% o f  GDP) 0 .2 - 1 . 4 - 3 . 0 0 .2 0 .0
N et capita l in flo w s (% o f  GDP) 6.9 8 .0 2 .8 - 0 . 9 1.7
Real exch a n g e  rate (1 9 8 6  =  100) 99 .5 8 1 .4 78 .0 82 .3 8 5 .9
Note: The terms of trade effect are expressed in current prices. 
Sources: Central Bank of Chile; Ffrench-Davis (2002).
The au tho rities ' exchange-rate  m an ag em en t d id  n o t deter speculative 
inflow s after 1995. In  spite o f th e ir  form al adhesion  to  a craw ling b an d  
in  1996-97, in  o rder to  apprecia te  th e  b an d  (beyond  a form al b ro ad en in g  
of th e  b an d  to  ± 12 .5  per cent), in  1997 th e  au tho rities tinkered  w ith  th e  
w eights assigned to  each currency, m aking th e  peg to  a currency basket rather 
th a n  th e  dollar less credible. In  N ovem ber 1994 th e  w eigh t of th e  US dollar 
h ad  been  reduced  from  50 per ce n t to  45 per cent, reflecting  th e  falling  use 
of th a t  currency  in  C h ilean  trade. In  January  1997 it was arb itrarily  raised to  
80 per cen t. Also, th e  ex terna l in fla tion  used to  correct th e  referential 
exchange rate  was overestim ated  by 10 percen tage p o in ts  betw een  1995 an d  
1997, generating  considerable additional revaluation. Furtherm ore an  annua l 
2 per cen t app recia tion  of th e  reference ra te  h ad  been  set in  N ovem ber 1995, 
based o n  th e  assu m p tio n  th a t  C hilean  p roductiv ity  w ou ld  grow  faster th a n  
th a t  of its m a in  trad in g  partners.
T he Asian crisis n o tab ly  w orsened  te rm s of trade in  1998-99  an d  Chile 
found  itself w ith  a n  overvalued real exchange rate an d  a deficit o n  th e  curren t 
acco u n t th a t was m ore th a n  tw ice as large as th e  average for 1990 -95 .19 
C apital outflow s began  in  late 1997 an d  accelerated in  1998-99, induc ing  
a n  exchange rate dep recia tion  in  th e  co n tex t o f a relative price co rrec tion  
process after th e  sign ifican t m acroeconom ic im balance created  in  1996-97.
Since 1991 cap ita l outflow s h a d  b een  encouraged  as a w ay of alleviating  
apprecia ting  pressures o n  th e  exchange rate. Pension funds h ad  b een  allow ed 
to  invest up  to  16 per ce n t o f th e ir  to ta l asset abroad, in  gradual steps. 
H ow ever th e  h ig h e r rates o f re tu rn  o n  financial assets in  C hile th a n  abroad  
an d  expectations of peso apprecia tion  h ad  discouraged foreign in v estm en t 
by  C hilean  in s titu tio n a l investors. By m id  1997 p ension  funds h a d  invested  
m erely  0.5 per c e n t o f th e ir  funds abroad. The ou tflow  sped u p  w ith  th e
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Asian crisis, w h en  th e  con tag io n  to  Chile reversed expectations from  appre­
cia tion  to  deprecia tion . W ith in  a sh o rt period  th e  ou tflow  from  p ension  
funds reached  th e  equ ivalen t o f 4.8 per cen t o f GDP. This w orsened  Chile's 
ex ternal p osition  an d  was a n  im p o rta n t source of th e  sharp  m o n e ta ry  co n ­
trac tio n  in  1998-99.
The C entral Bank had  been  soft w ith  th e  apprecia ting  pressures in  
1996-97, b u t i t  sharply  repressed th e  depreciating  pressures a t th e  en d  of 
1997, arguing th a t  in  an  overheated  econom y  deva lua tion  w ould  be too  
in flationary . In  Septem ber 1999, w h en  th e  econom y  was already in  reces­
sion, th e  cen tra l b an k  an n o u n c ed  th e  suspension  of th e  exchange ra te  b an d  
to  enable a substan tia l devalua tion  u n d e r a freely floating  rate.
T he stabilizing  p roperties of a b a n d  em erge w h e n  th e re  is credibility  in  its 
param eters, nam ely  th e  level o f th e  cen tral parity, th e  rate  of crawl an d  th e  
band 's  w id th . The craw ling b a n d  -  th e  in te rm ed ia te  regim e in  force in  Chile 
u n til 1999 -  gradually  lost credibility  due to  its m ism anagem en t.20 Indeed  
th e  lack of active in te rv en tio n  to  enforce th e  band , th e  various rea lign ­
m e n ts  to  th e  cen tra l parity  an d /o r  th e  w id th  of th e  b an d , a n d  th e  arbitrary  
changes in  th e  w eights used to  determ ine th e  central parity  all gave th e  signal 
th a t  th e  param eters could  be changed  a t w ill.21 Eventually  th e  m o n e tary  
au tho rities recognized th e  n eed  to  correct th e  excessively apprecia ted  real 
exchange rate.
The period o f active in te rven tion  in  capital inflow s an d  th e  m anagem en t of 
th e  real exchange rate was correlated  w ith  a h ig h  rate o f productive capacity  
u tiliza tion . The negligible gap betw een  effective a n d  p o te n tia l GDP achieved 
in  1991-97  proved  to  be a d e term in in g  factor in  th e  sign ifican t increase in  
cap ita l fo rm atio n  an d  p o ten tia l GDP (Agosin, 1998). In  fact th e  in v estm en t 
ratio  rose 10 p o in ts  in  1990-98 com pared  w ith  1982-89, a n d  GDP grow th  
jum ped  from  2.9 per cen t a year to  7 per cen t (Table 13.3).
W ith  th e  recessive a d ju s tm e n t in  1999 a n d  th e  lack of v igorous recovery  
in  2000 -1 , th e  in v e s tm e n t ra tio  lo st n ea rly  o n e  h a lf  o f its p rev ious gain. 
O ur in te rp re ta tio n  is th a t  th e  in te n s ity  of w h a t was a n  u n av o id ab le  
d ow nw ard  a d ju s tm e n t w as associa ted  w ith  th e  d isequ ilib ria  in  1996-97 , 
first th e  excessive ap p rec ia tio n  a n d  th e n  th e  delay  in  a llow ing  a d ep re­
cia tio n  in  1998. T hereafter th e  au th o ritie s  failed  to  ex p lo it all th e  positive 
features o f th e  C h ilean  eco n o m y  th a t  w ou ld  allow  m o v e m en t tow ards th e  
p ro d u c tio n  fron tier, th u s  en co u rag in g  econom ic  e m p lo y m e n t an d  cap ita l 
fo rm a tio n .
Mexico: the oldest floating exchange rate regime in 
Latin America
T he ad o p tio n  of a floating  exchange rate regim e in  M exico was th e  ou tcom e 
o f a full-scale b alance o f p ay m en t crisis in  D ecem ber 1994. Before th a t, since 
O ctober 1992, M exico h a d  used  an  exchange rate  b a n d  in  w h ich  th e  floor
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was fixed in  n o m in a l term s an d  th e  ceiling craw led daily. In  spite of th e  fact 
th a t  th e  econom y grew  a t an  average of on ly  3.8 per ce n t per year betw een  
1989 an d  1993, M exico a ttracted  a lo t o f a t te n tio n  for tw o reasons. First, it 
becam e a lead ing  co u n try  in  term s of p rivatization , w ith  revenues of 3.3 per 
cen t o f GDP in  1991 an d  1992. Second, in  1993 M exico jo ined  th e  N o rth  
A m erican Free Trade A greem ent (NAFTA), an d  th is led to  its becom ing  
a m em ber of th e  OECD. These tw o associations resulted  in  th e  rap id  liberal­
ization  of capital flows.
T he m arkets reacted  positively  to  these  events, as reflected in  th e  fact 
th a t  49 per cen t o f to ta l cap ita l inflow s to  Latin Am erica w en t to  M exico in  
1990-93. O n average th e  co u n try  received US$23.6 b illio n  per year, 83 per 
ce n t o f w h ich  consisted  o f flows o th e r  th a n  foreign d irect in v es tm en t (FDI). 
O n  th e  dom estic  fron t, h igher expected  re tu rns  even tua lly  led to  a b oom  
in  private expend itu re . As a result th e  deficit o n  th e  cu rren t acco u n t rose 
from  US$7 b illion  in  1990 to  US$30 b illion  in  1994 an d  th e  real b ilateral 
exchange rate  w ith  th e  U n ited  States apprecia ted  30 per cen t in  four years.
A ccording to  Ros (2001) th e  M exican crisis was n o t th e  ou tcom e of 
inconsistency  in  econom ic policy, n o r a self-fulfilling m echan ism . Instead  
h e  p o in ts  to  (1) th e  p a rt played by th e  ill-conceived percep tion  th a t th e  
shocks being  faced by M exico -  h igher in te rest rates in  th e  U nited  States an d  
politica l tu rm o il a t h o m e -  w ere tem porary , an d  (2) percep tions of th e  h igh  
cost involved  in  tig h ten in g  m o n e ta ry  policy  in  early  1994 or m odify ing  
th e  exchange rate policy. These tw o considerations led th e  g o v ern m en t to  
sell in te rn a tio n a l reserves an d  increase th e  issuance of do lla r-denom inated , 
short-term  Tesobonos against th e  peso -denom ina ted  Cetes. Reserves fell 
from  US$26 b illion  in  th e  first quarte r o f 1994 to  US$16.5 b illion  th ree  
m o n th s  later. The deb t n o t on ly  changed  d en o m in a tio n  b u t th e  average 
te rm  sho rtened  as well. US$28.6 b illion  in  Tesobonos w ere due to  m atu re  in  
1995, 35 per c e n t o f th is d u rin g  th e  first qu arte r (Ros, 2001). G iven th e  sta te  
of th e  in te rn a tio n a l reserves, th is  p u t th e  co u n try  in  danger of defau lt an d  
eventually  led to  speculative attacks o n  th e  peso. The n ew  go v ern m en t tried  
to  change th e  b an d  by  low ering th e  ceiling by  15 per cen t, b u t it was to o  late 
an d  it was forced to  q u it th e  b a n d  system . At th e  sam e tim e in terest rates 
rocketed, m ark ing  th e  start o f th e  severe an d  costly  Tequila crisis (Calvo an d  
M endoza, 1996).22
A ccording to  C arstens an d  W erner (1999) th e  crisis h a d  th ree  aspects. 
First, short-term  cap ita l inflow s encouraged  an d  financed  th e  overspend ing  
th a t caused th e  ab o v em en tio n ed  cu rren t accoun t deficit. Second, even  if th e  
pub lic  deb t a n d  th e  fiscal balance suggested a h ea lth y  public  sector, th e  
sh o rt m a tu rity  o f th e  stock o f g o v ernm en t deb t 'exposed th e  c o u n try  to  a 
financial pan ic ' (ibid.) In  th a t  con tex t, an y  dou b t ab o u t th e  will of m arkets 
to  co n tin u e  ro lling  over th e  existing  deb t w ou ld  have caused an  attack  on  
M exico's ex ternal debt. Finally, a severe b ank ing  crisis occurred. After th e  
exchange rate  b a n d  was ab an d o n ed  an d  a float was adop ted , th e re  was an
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ab ru p t deva lua tion  of abou t 95 per cen t betw een  just before th e  crisis an d  
M arch 1995. To avoid  th e  in fla tionary  consequences of th is  devaluation , 
th e  cen tra l b an k  tig h ten ed  m o n e ta ry  policy  by  raising th e  in te rest rate from  
16 per cen t in  D ecem ber 1994 to  86 per cen t th ree  m o n th s  later. Fiscal policy  
was tig h ten e d  by 2.6 per cen t o f GDP in  1995. This co n trac tio n ary  package 
resulted  in  a sharp  recession in  w hich  GDP fell by  6.2 per cen t an d  dom estic 
dem an d  by  12.9 per cent.
Just after th e  crisis th e re  was a b rief experim en t w ith  m o n e ta ry  targeting , 
b u t as in fla tion  cam e dow n an d  th e re  was strong  evidence of in stab ility  in  
th e  d em an d  for m oney, th e  cen tra l b an k  started  to  set an n u a l in fla tio n  
targets (Ortiz, 2000). The m ain  elem ents o f th e  cu rren t fram ew ork are (1) th e  
m ed ium -term  goal of reducing  in fla tio n  to  th e  in te rn a tio n a l level in  2003, 
w ith  an n u a l in fla tion  targets, (2) m o n e tary  policy  actions based o n  an  assess­
m e n t o f in fla tionary  pressures, a n d  (3) a tran sp a ren t system  based o n  th e  
pub lica tion  of quarte rly  in fla tion  reports.
A basic difference betw een  M exico an d  o th e r  'in fla tio n  targeteers' is th e  
form er's choice of policy  in s tru m e n t. W hile  m o st in fla tio n  targeteers use th e  
sho rt-term  in te rest rate, th e  M exican cen tra l b an k  uses a reserve opera ting  
procedure know n  as th e  'co rto '. This system  causes sign ifican t short-term  
vo la tility  in  n o m in a l in te rest rates, lead ing  to  a m ore stable exchange rate 
an d  hen ce  a m ore stable in fla tionary  env ironm en t.
Between 1996 an d  2000 M exico en joyed  a relatively prosperous period  in  
w h ich  GDP grow th  averaged 5.3 per cent; how ever by  2000 th e  econom y was 
clearly overheated . Indeed  in  th a t  year GDP grew  6.9 per cen t, well beyond  
w h a t had  b een  estim ated, th e  real exchange rate  h ad  apprecia ted  13 per cen t 
since 1997 an d  th e  deficit o n  th e  cu rren t acco u n t h a d  m ore th a n  doub led  
over th e  sam e period, desp ite th e  h ig h  oil prices (Table 13.4).
W ith  regard to  th e  float, th is  was n o t a pu re  float as th e re  was a com pli­
cated  rule to  regulate in te rv en tio n  in  th e  foreign exchange m arket. The rule 
inc luded  a tw o-pronged  approach  in  w h ich  a n  o p tio n  m echan ism  was used 
to  accum ulate reserves an d  a co n tin g en t sale was used w h en  th e  cen tral b ank  
w an ted  to  m in im ize a sudden  deprecia tion . This app roach  was aim ed at 
figh ting  peso apprecia tion  an d  accum ulating  in te rn a tio n a l reserves. H ad th e  
cen tra l b an k  in te rv en ed  directly  in  th e  spo t m arket th e  ou tcom e w ould  have 
b ee n  m ore  sim ilar to  th a t  achieved w ith  a n  exchange rate  b a n d  o r a soft peg. 
The m echan ism , n o w  abandoned , was asym m etric in  th a t  it p u t greater 
em phasis o n  stopp ing  a sudden  deprecia tion  th a n  o n  stopp ing  a sudden  
app recia tion  (Galán e ta l . ,  1999).
This in te rv en tio n  m echan ism  an d  M exico's surrender to  in te rest rate 
vo la tility  ra th e r th a n  exchange rate vo la tility  resu lted  in  M exico en joy ing  
a significant degree o f exchange rate stability. The ad o p tio n  of th e  floating  
regim e co incided  w ith  a period  of h ig h  an d  relatively stable GDP grow th  
an d  significant financial stability. Of course a substan tia l p a rt of th is  was 
due to  th e  fact th a t  M exico's largest trad in g  partner, th e  U n ited  States,
T ab le  1 3 .4  M exico: capita l flow s, real ex ch a n g e  rate an d  m a cro eco n o m ic  p erform ance, 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 0
1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
Current acco u n t  
balance  
(US$ m illio n )
- 2 4  4 4 2 - 2 3  4 0 0 - 2 9  6 6 2 - 1  575 - 2  3 3 0 - 7  4 4 8 - 1 6  0 9 0 - 1 4  325 - 1 7  6 9 0
N et capita l in flo w s  
(US$ m illio n )
2 6 1 8 7 30  632 12 465 - 1 4  735 6  190 21 447 19 300 18 6 0 2 2 4  8 0 0
C hanges in  reserves 
(US$ m illio n )
- 1  173 - 6  0 5 7 18 398 - 9  648 - 1  8 0 6 - 1 0  5 1 2 - 2  138 - 5 9 2 - 2  8 2 4
GDP grow th  (%) 3 .6 2 .0 4 .4 - 6 . 2 5 .2 6 .8 5.0 3 .8 6.9
Terms o f  trade  
(1995 =  100)
105 .0 104.9 103.3 100 .0 102 .8 1 04 .0 100.4 102 .3 107 .4
Real ex ch a n g e  rate 
(average 
1 9 8 7 -9 0  =  100)
74 .0 70.3 72.1 106 .0 9 5 .4 83 .5 84 .0 76.7 71 .6
External d eb t/ 
GDP (%)
3 2 .0 3 2 .4 33 .2 57 .9 47 .3 3 7 .2 38.1 34 .7 2 5 .9
Source: ECLAC.
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experienced dynam ic  grow th  u n til 2000, w ith  a substan tia l increase in  
im ports (particularly from  M exico). The story  changed  sharp ly  for b o th  from  
late 2000.
Concluding remarks
In  th e  co n tex t o f th e  m ore in teg rated  w orld  econom y, exchange rate  policy  
is crucial as it is th e  variable th a t  links n a tio n a l prices to  foreign prices. 
It also affects re tu rns in  m a n y  sign ifican t sectors o f th e  econom y, such  as 
th e  p ro d u c tio n  of exportables. Also, being  an  in te rn a tio n a l b en ch m ark  it 
acts as a gauge to  dom estic  investors, an d  also affects shadow  prices.
T he review  in  th is  chap te r o f th e  A rgentinean, C h ilean  an d  M exican 
experiences show s th a t  a policy  th a t  is su itab le in  on e  m acroeconom ic 
e n v iro n m en t m ay n o t be so in  another. Each exchange rate system  has 
its ow n logic an d  requires m easures to  en h a n ce  its credibility. In  th is  sense, 
a crucial p o in t to  bear in  m in d  w h en  ad o p tin g  a n  exchange rate  policy  is 
th e  cost o f sw itch ing  to  a n  a lternative policy  if it fails. H ow ever in  som e 
cases, public  discussion o n  an  exit strategy m ay  h ave a negative effect o n  th e  
credibility  o f th e  policy, for exam ple in  fixed exchange ra te  regim es.
C redible pegged system s p rom ise  greater (nom inal) financia l stability, 
an d  to  som e ex ten t th a t  was th e  case in  A rgentina du rin g  th e  period  exam ­
ined . But th e  requ ired  co m p lem en ta ry  po licy  is h ig h  price-level flexib ility  
in  o rder to  ad ju st to  negative real shocks by  cu ttin g  prices. T he long-te rm  
cred ib ility  of th is  system  there fo re  depends o n  h ig h  flexibility  in  th e  labour 
m arket a n d  an  active fiscal po licy  to  respond  adequate ly  to  negative shocks. 
W ith o u t these  m easures, pegged system s are p ro n e  to  greater real sector 
volatility .
Floating system s induce m ore real stability  b u t a t th e  price of increased 
financial instability . There m ay  also be a cost in  term s of g row th  as th e  real 
exchange rate loses pow er to  allocate resources, in  w h ich  case it is necessary 
to  consider th e  use of o th e r  policy  in stru m en ts  to  p ro m o te  exports, such 
as tech n o lo g y  policy, trade policy  an d  so on. F loating system s are useful 
in  tim es of financial distress w h en  th e  au tho rities have doub ts ab o u t th e  
level o f th e  real exchange rate, th e  n a tu re  of th e  shock th e y  face an d  th e ir  
response to  it, as flo ta tion  enables th e m  to  avoid  jeopard izing  th e ir  rep u ta ­
tio n  by  defend ing  th e  w rong  exchange rate.
Finally, bands are useful in  tim es of n o rm ality  w h en  th e re  are n o  large 
shocks o n  th e  horizon . In  th is  s ituation , bands help  to  stabilize th e  n o m in a l 
exchange rate  an d  hen ce  th e  real exchange rate, w h ich  has a positive effect 
o n  exports an d  grow th. But b an d s are o f less use if a large shock  occurs an d  
th e  au tho rities fail to  m ake a p ro m p t an d  adequate  response, because th ey  
o p en  th e  w ay to  speculation  a n d  significant financial instability . Probably 
th e  best policy here is active in tram arg ina l in te rv en tio n  w ith in  th e  band . 
In te rv en tio n  is likely to  be m ore effective w h en  th e  exchange rate is kep t far
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from  th e  edges of th e  b an d  (M undaca, 2000). This suggests th a t  th e re  m ay 
be som e op tim al b a n d  w id th , as th e  C h ilean  experience shows.
C orner so lu tions d o  n o t have sym m etrical consequences. E xchange rate 
policy  m akes a d ifference w h en  significant capital surges occur an d  sub­
sequen t shocks cause a sudden  reversal o f th e  flows (W illiam son, 2000; 
Ffrench-Davis an d  O cam po, 2001). M ost significant increases in  th e  supply  
o f ex ternal financ ing  are n o t one-off events b u t a process th a t  takes tim e, as 
in  1977-81, 1990-94  a n d  1996-97. W hen  cap ita l inflow s occur th e  cu rren t 
acco u n t deteriorates, asset prices increase an d  th e  real exchange rate  app re­
ciates. D ifferent exchange rate policies deliver different com binations of these 
th ree  elem ents. W ith  pegged system s, an  upw ard  surge in  foreign capital 
flows creates a d em an d  boom , w ith  consequences for asset prices, probably  
a crow ding  o u t o f dom estic  savings an d  a w orsening  of th e  ex terna l balance. 
In fla tion  in  non-tradab les m ay  lead to  real apprecia tion . W ith  floating  
regim es a n o m in a l app recia tion  will take place, m ak ing  th e  process of 
real apprecia tion  faster (and  h en cefo rth  po ten tia lly  m ore d isruptive if th e  
increased liqu id ity  is transito ry) th a n  w ith  th e  pegged system . In  fact w h en  
th e  force b e h in d  th e  cap ita l surge is external, sm all econom ies m ay  suffer 
from  significant overvaluation .
Pegs te n d  to  w ork  be tte r in  th e  upw ard  phase of th e  cycle, b u t after th e  
peak  th e  float does b e tte r  in  te rm s of th e  necessary expend itu re  sw itching. 
As show n by  W yplosz (1999) an d  Ros (2001), in  th is  type of cycle th e re  
is th e  possibility  o f m ultip le  equilibria based o n  self-fulfilling beliefs: expec­
ta tio n s  of m ore  inflow s (outflows) m ay fu rth e r apprecia te (depreciate) an  
already  apprecia ted  (depreciated) currency.
Exchange rate  in stab ility  is n o t costless, an d  large dev ia tions from  th e  
equ ilib rium  level by  th e  real exchange rate  are n o t costless either. Exports, 
in  term s of b o th  g row th  a n d  d iversification , b enefit from  stable en v ir­
o n m e n ts  (ECLAC, 1998: ch . 4). Therefore exchange rate  po licy  faces tw o 
challenges w h en  a ttem p ts  are b e in g  m ade to  im prove overall g row th  p er­
form ance: th e  need  to  m axim ize real exchange rate stability  w ith o u t pegging 
th e  currency, an d  th e  n eed  to  avoid  sign ifican t cu rrency  m isalignm ents , 
th a t  floating  does n o t im pede. Bands, th e  obvious so lu tion , m ay  address 
b o th  b u t th e y  are sensitive to  large shocks.23 Irrespective of th e  policy  
adop ted , cen tra l banks m u st concern  them selves w ith  b o th  th e  level an d  
th e  stab ility  o f th e  exchange rate . In  th is  respect, a n d  desp ite  w h a t has 
h ap p e n ed  since th e  Asian crisis, craw ling bands are still an  o p tio n  to  
consider.
Latin A m erican financial in strum ents suffer from  at least tw o shortcom ings. 
O ne is linked  to  th e  in s tru m e n ts  them selves, in  th a t  th e y  lack con tingency  
m easures to  deal w ith  th e  shocks th a t are co m m o n  in  Latin A m erican co u n ­
tries. The o th e r  is linked  to  th e  m arkets, w here th e re  is a lack o f sustainable 
foreign d em an d  for in stru m en ts  d en o m in a ted  in  local currencies. M acro- 
econom ic policies m ay expand  in  term s of addressing b o th  in stru m en ts  an d
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m arkets, b u t it is n o t clear a t all th a t  coun tries will be able to  do  b o th  th ings 
in  sign ifican t ways in  th e  sh o rt term .
In  th e  cu rren t phase of th e  cycle, w h en  th e re  is a sign ifican t shortage of 
capital inflows, m an y  countries in  Latin America have m oved  tow ards across- 
the-board  liberalization of th e  capital account. However policy  m akers will 
need  to  take care w h en  th e  cycle m oves in to  th e  n ex t phase. Recent experi­
ence in  em erg ing  econom ies show s th a t  th e  b ehav iou r of cap ita l inflow s can 
be  in co n sis ten t w ith  m acroeconom ic sustainability , particu larly  in  term s of 
th e  stability  o f th e  exchange rate an d  econom ic activity. Therefore th e  
au tho rities need  to  follow  closely th e  developm ents in  various m arkets an d  
have flexible policy  packages ra th e r th a n  single, rigid policy  tools.
N otes
* W e ack n ow led ge th e  c o m m e n ts  m a d e  b y  Am ar Bhattacharya, S teph an y G riffith- 
Jones, José A n to n io  O cam p o, A vinash  Persaud, H elm ut R eisen, R ogerio Studart 
an d  H eriberto Tapia. All rem a in in g  errors are our responsib ility . T he o p in io n s  
expressed  in  th is  chapter are th o se  o f  th e  au th ors and  d o  n o t  n ecessarily  reflect 
th o se  o f  ECLAC or th e  BBVA.
1. See Fischer (2001) an d  Levy an d  Sturzenneger (1999) for a c la ssifica tion  o f  
ex ch a n g e  rate regim es.
2. For a recent d iscu ssio n  o f th e  sources o f  v o la tility  in  Latin A m erican  eco n o m ies, 
see Rodrik (2001).
3 . This b eco m es ev id en t w h e n  w e  con sid er  A rgentina in  200 1 .
4. H ow ever w e h a v e  n o t  co n tro lled  for th e  degree o f  overva lu ation  o f  th e  ex ch a n g e  
rate in  each  country. Because in  A rgentina th e  exch an ge rate w as u sed  exp lic itly  as 
an anti-in fla tion ary  dev ice  and  it appreciated sharply in  1 9 9 1 -9 2 , th e  required fall 
in  d o m estic  prices an d  w ages w as greater th a n  th a t w h ic h  e ffe c tiv e ly  to o k  p lace.
5. T his d o es n o t  tack le th e  p rob lem  p o sed  b y  th e  n eg a tiv e  effect o f  real ex ch a n g e  
rate in sta b ility  o n  th e  p ro d u ction  o f  tradables an d  th e  d iversification  o f  exports. 
See C aballero an d  C orbo (1990) an d  ECLAC (1998).
6. A recent m o v e  in  th is  d irection  has in v o lv ed  C hile . There h a v e  b een  tw o  b o n d  
issues, o n e  b y  th e  IADB an d  th e  o th er  b y  th e  g o v ern m en t o f  U ruguay in  instru­
m en ts  d en o m in a ted  in  C h ilean  p esos in d ex ed  to  C h ilean  in fla tio n .
7. C h ile  d ev e lo p ed  an  e ffic ien t p roxy  b y  esta b lish in g  a copper stab iliza tion  fund . 
O ther cou n tr ies h a v e  a lso  u tilized  funds, su ch  as th e  Fondo C afetero in  C o lom b ia , 
an d  th e  o il stab iliza tion  funds in  M exico  an d  V enezuela.
8. Real ex ch a n g e  rate m isa lig n m en t can  a lso  occur in  d ev e lo p ed  eco n o m ies , for 
e x a m p le  th e  h u g e  sw in gs o f  th e  US dollar in  th e  199 0 s an d  its sharp appreciation  
v is -à -v is  th e  euro sin ce  1998  (W illiam son , 2 0 0 0 ). For em erg in g  eco n o m ies , see  
Ffrench-D avis an d  O cam p o (2001).
9. C ou n tries n o t  in c lu d ed  in  th e  sam ple w ere a lso  subject to  co n ta g io n , in c lu d in g  
Peru an d  Uruguay.
10. T he title  ch o se n  b y  Braga e t a l.  (2001), D o n 't  F ix , D o n ’t  F lo a t, is in  lin e  w ith  th is  
sort o f  argum ent.
11. T his proposal is co n sis te n t w ith  th e  c o n te n t an d  title  o f  Frankel (1999).
12. In th e  m ea n tim e  th e  real ex ch a n g e  rate appreciated  sharply, th e  d eficit o n  th e  
current acco u n t rose an d  gross capital form a tio n  recovered  o n ly  m o d e stly  
(Frenkel e t a h , 1998).
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13. M ost o f  th e  p rivatized  co m p a n ie s b e lo n g ed  to  th e  non -trad ab le sector. In th ese  
firm s, average p rod u ctiv ity  per w orker rose after privatization . T he lin k  to  real 
ex ch a n g e  rate is becau se  -  contrary to  th e  B alassa-Sam uelson  effect, in  w h ic h  n et  
p rod u ctiv ity  grow th  in  th e  tradable sector causes a real app reciation  o f  th e  
currency -  th e  tran sm iss ion  m ech a n ism  w as a red u ction  in  th e  real cost o f  th e  
services p rod u ced  b y  th o se  com p an ies. T his p rod u ctiv ity  ga in  d o es n o t  con sid er  
th a t all u n e m p lo y e d  h ad  zero p roductiv ity . As su ch  overall p rod u ctiv ity  grow th , 
w h ic h  takes a cco u n t n o t  o n ly  o f  em p lo y ed  p eo p le  b u t o f  all th e  labour force, 
increased  b y  m u c h  less.
14. In fact an n u a l grow th  in  1 9 8 8 -2 0 0 0  w as a m ere 2 .3  per cen t. It can  b e  assum ed  
th a t th e  gap b e tw een  e ffective  an d  p o ten tia l GDP in  1991 w as q u ite  large.
15. Several LACs exp er ien ced  a recessive gap (The gap  b e tw een  effectiv e  a n d  p o te n ­
tia l GDP), but a b so lu te  GDP k ep t rising. Average GDP grow th  drop p ed  from  
5 .2  per cen t in  199 4  an d  199 7  to  1.1 per ce n t  in  1995 an d  0 .3  per cen t in  1999 .
16. In 1975 an d  198 2  C h ile  h ad  exp erien ced  th e  sharpest recession s o f  all Latin  
A m erican  countries; see F french-D avis (2002: ch s 1, 6).
17. C h ile  w as a p io n eer  in  im p le m e n tin g  ex ch a n g e  rate p o lic ies  based  o n  th e  various  
craw ling-peg  approaches (W illiam son , 1981). T h is h a p p en ed  b etw een  April 1965  
an d  July 197 0 . Subsequently , from  O ctober 1973  to  June 197 9 , a seco n d  experi­
m e n t  o f  th is  k in d  w as carried o u t. In th e  1980s, after th e  1982  crisis, a craw ling  
p eg  w as rein stated  an d  th is  e v o lv ed  in to  a craw lin g  b an d , w h ic h  c o n tin u e d  u n til 
Septem ber 1999  (Ffrench-D avis, 2002: ch s 4, 10).
18. In  ad d itio n  C h ile  w as c o m in g  o u t o f  a p ro fo u n d  debt crisis, w h ic h  h a d  b een  
acco m p a n ied  b y  sharp ex ch a n g e  rate d ep reciation . C o n se q u en tly  there w as room  
for so m e eq u ilib ra tin g  ap p recia tion . H ow ever as agents' ex p ec ta tio n s ch an ged  
from  p ess im ism  to  o p tim ism , th e y  so u g h t a n e w  stock  o f  in v e stm e n t in  th e  
em ergin g  m arket over a sh ort period  o f  tim e . T his im p lied  ex cessiv e ly  large tran­
sitory  in flow s.
19. A n en larged  d efic it  o n  th e  current a cco u n t in  1 9 9 5 -9 7 , ad justed  b y  th e  trend  in  
th e  term s o f  trade, w as p ro o f o f  an  o verly  appreciated  ex ch a n g e  rate th a t ad justed  
faster th a n  p rod u ctiv ity  im p ro v em en ts. W e c o n te n d  th a t th e  actual appreciation  
in  1 9 9 0 -9 4  h a d  b een  eq u ilibratin g  (g iven  th e  m oderate d efic it o n  th e  current 
acco u n t an d  an  ap p reciation  th a t w as softer th a n  in  all o th er  em erg in g  Latin  
A m erican  cou n tr ies). See F french-D avis (2000: ch . 10).
2 0 . T he band  an d  its cen tre  h a d  b een  cred ib le for a lo n g  tim e. M agen d zo  e t a l.  (1998), 
u sin g  data u n til  1997 , before th e  A sian crisis reached  C hile , f in d  th a t cred ib ility  
in  th e  b an d  h a d  decreased , b u t th e y  d o  n o t  q u a n tify  th e  degree o f  cred ib ility  that  
h ad  ex isted  prior to  th a t tim e.
21 . A ccording to  K rugm an (1991) there  is ex o g e n o u s full cred ib ility  in  th e  band's 
param eters w ith o u t  in tram arginal in te rv en tio n . T he ‘h o n e y m o o n  e ffe c t’, tha t  
is, stab iliz in g  sp ecu la tion , appears becau se o f  su ch  credib ility . In  practice cred­
ib ility  an d  rep u ta tio n  n eed ed  to  b e  b u ilt  u p  b y  th e  centra l bank . Intram arginal 
in te rv en tio n  d irected  at en forc in g  th e  lim its o f  th e  b an d  w as crucial as w ith o u t it 
sp ecu la tion  w o u ld  te n d  to  b e  destab iliz ing .
22 . Larrain e t a l.  (2000) sh o w  th a t cred it risk a gen cies a lso  fa iled  to  p lay  a co u n ter­
cyclical role. T he m ain  tw o  agencies dow ngraded  their rating o n ly  after th e  devalu ­
a tio n  to o k  p lace.
23 . W yp losz  (1996), c o m m e n tin g  o n  a paper b y  Leiderm an (1996), states th a t th e  
argum ents in  favour o f  b an d s w ere so  stron g  th a t it w as d ifficu lt to  b e  sceptical 
ab ou t it. H ow ever h e  m e n tio n s  so m e  o f  th e  e lem en ts th a t u ltim a te ly  led  bands
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in to  trouble, a m o n g  w h ic h  w as th e  lev e l o f  th e  band, th a t is, h o w  it co u ld  cop e  
w ith  ch an ges in  th e  real ex ch a n g e  rate (for exa m p le  in  resp onse  to  a shock) tha t  
lay  b ey o n d  th e  lim its  o f th e  band.
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Countercyclical Fiscal Policy: 
A Review of the Literature, Empirical 
Evidence and Some Policy Proposals*
Carlos Budnevich
Introduction
At th e  b eg in n in g  o f th e  1990s th e  U nited  States experienced a recession, 
b u t th e  US governm ent's  large budget deficit d id  n o t allow  th e  use of a d is­
cre tionary  countercyclical fiscal po licy  to  stim ula te th e  econom y. W ith  th e  
e lim in a tio n  of budget deficits in  recen t years, th e  use of d iscre tionary  fiscal 
policy  has re-em erged. In  fact, in  th e  face of an  econom ic d o w n tu rn  th e  
U nited  States recen tly  enacted  a tax  reform  th a t  reduced tax  rates. Sim ilarly 
in  C hile a law  to  reduce personal incom e tax  rates has b een  approved  by  th e  
g o v ern m en t in  o rder to  cool aggregate d em an d  an d  im prove efficiency. B oth 
coun tries have considered  exp an d in g  th e ir  fiscal expend itu re  to  accelerate 
th e ir  econom ic recovery. D iscretionary  countercyclical fiscal po licy  again  
appears to  be a feasible op tion .
Over th e  last decade m an y  of th e  w orld 's cen tra l banks have changed  
th e ir  procedure for co n d u c tin g  m o n e ta ry  policy. Decisions o n  th e  n a tu re  
of m o n e ta ry  policy  have  becom e m ore explicit, m ore tran sp a ren t, m ore 
system atic an d  m ore sensitive to  changes in  in fla tion . In  th e  case of th e  
U n ited  States, C hile an d  several o th e r countries, these new  policies have been  
very  effective in  reducing  in fla tion , a lth o u g h  th e ir  effect o n  th e  stability  of 
th e  real econom y du rin g  dow n tu rn s has b een  questioned .
The ap p ro p ria te  m acroeconom ic  ro le o f fiscal po licy  w h e n  m o n e ta ry  
po licy  is system atically  an d  s trong ly  reacting  to  changes in  in fla tio n  is 
ev iden t: to  susta in  pub lic  acco u n ts  a n d  p lay  a coun tercyclical role. The 
task  of coun tercyclical m o n e ta ry  po licy  can  b e  described  as try in g  to  keep 
real GDP n ea r p o te n tia l GDP w h e n  in fla tio n  is o n  target. O f course w ith  
th e  effects of a ch an g e  in  m o n e ta ry  po licy  occu rring  w ith  lo n g  an d  v ari­
able lags, th e  cen tra l b a n k  m ig h t n o t  be able to  m a tch  aggregate d em an d  
w ith  p o te n tia l GDP rap id ly  en o u g h  to  p rev e n t in c ip ie n t in fla tio n  from  
beco m in g  a reality.
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There is som e controversy  abou t w h e th e r cen tra l bankers shou ld  try  
to  ad just in te rest rates in  order to  change aggregate d em an d  in  th e  way 
described here. This issue has b ro u g h t to  th e  debate th e  possib ility  of using  
fiscal policy  as a countercyclical device. W h en  discussing fiscal po licy  issues 
a d is tin c tio n  shou ld  be m ade betw een  d iscre tionary  changes in  taxes an d  
spending, an d  changes in  taxes an d  spend ing  due to  au to m atic  stabilizers, 
such as increased spend ing  o n  u n em p lo y m e n t benefit a n d  th e  decrease in  
tax  revenue caused by  reductions in  incom e du ring  a recession. B oth types 
o f change in  taxes a n d  spend ing  affect aggregate dem and , b u t th e  au to m atic  
ones m ay be m ore pred ic tab le an d  w ork m ore quickly th a n  th e  discre­
tio n a ry  ones.
This chap te r discusses d iscre tionary  countercyclical m o n e ta ry  an d  fiscal 
policies. It analyzes th e  role o f au tom atic  stabilizers in  fiscal policy, an d  
reviews concepts, m easurem ents an d  m ethodo log ical issues to  assess th e  
stance of fiscal policy. It th e n  analyzes fiscal policy  reactions to  ex ternal 
shocks, pub lic  an d  ex ternal f inance an d  th e  econom ics of stab ilization  
funds in  coun tries w hose exports consist m ain ly  of vo la tile  com m odities. 
An analysis o f th e  role o f fiscal policy  in  Latin Am erica follows, in c lu d in g  
C hile's recen t experience w ith  fiscal policy. N ext, som e proposals for fiscal 
reform  are discussed.
The macroeconomic role of discretionary countercyclical 
monetary and fiscal policy
Fiscal po licy  has tw o  m acroeconom ic objectives: to  sustain  pub lic  accounts 
an d  to  regulate aggregate dem and . It is m ore or less ev iden t th a t  policy 
efforts have co n cen tra ted  o n  th e  first objective, leav ing  th e  stabilizing  role 
to  m o n e tary  policy.
Sustainability  o f pub lic  d eb t im plies keep ing  th e  long -run  solvency of th e  
go v ern m en t so as to  satisfy its in te rtem p o ra l budget constra in t. Public deb t 
financing  o f pub lic  deficits is sustainab le if in te rest rates are low er th a n  th e  
g row th  of th e  econom y. W h en  in terest rates exceed GDP g row th  th e  persist­
ence of a p rim ary  deficit leads to  an  explosion  of pub lic  debt, endangering  
th e  solvency of th e  public  sector.
U nder trad itio n a l Keynesianism , fiscal policy  m u st r a n  surpluses u n d er 
full em p lo y m en t a n d  allow  for deficits du ring  recessions. M acroeconom ic 
stab ilization  requires sym m etric, countercyclical regu la tion  of aggregate 
dem and . K eynesianism  differs from  th e  neoclassical view  in  th e  reco m m en ­
d a tio n  of m ore  active policies, resu lting  in  m ore p ro n o u n ce d  fluctuations in  
fiscal accounts b u t always w ith  a n u ll resu lt o n  average in  th e  cycle.
Strict fiscal d iscip line in  n o rm al circum stances is requ ired  to  preserve th e  
ability to  in tervene w hen  adverse econom ic events occur. Fiscal discipline and  
flexibility are tw o  fu n d am en ta l p rincip les of budget policy  u n d e r econom ic 
globalization. Fiscal discipline is essential to  th e  credibility o f m acroeconom ic
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policy, w hile flexibility  is needed  to  face unexpected  shocks in  a h igh ly  
vo la tile  econom ic en v iro n m en t.
If fiscal policy  can  sh ift aggregate d em an d  an d  change real GDP in  th e  
sh o rt term , how  shou ld  th is  pow er be used? From  a norm ative  perspective, 
a reasonable countercyclical goal of fiscal po licy  will b e  th e  sam e as th a t  of 
m o n e ta ry  policy: to  keep real GDP close to  p o ten tia l GDP w h en  in fla tion  
is o n  target. H ow ever countercyclical fiscal po licy  m ay n o t be needed  if 
a cen tra l b an k  w isely uses its pow er to  m ove th e  aggregate d em an d  curve 
to  try  to  keep real GDP in  line w ith  p o ten tia l GDP. H ow ever th is  m ay  n o t 
be th e  case for em erg ing  m arkets th a t  are sub ject to  sizeable shocks to  th e  
term s of trade  a n d  th e  capital account, an d  w here the re  are frequen t ex ternal 
financing  constrain ts. In fact using b o th  policies in  a com plem entary  m an n er 
m ay b e tte r d istribu te  th e  b u rd en  of th e ir  effects betw een  d ifferen t m arkets.
As argued by Taylor (2000) n o t  all recen t developm ents suggest a sm aller 
role for d iscre tionary  fiscal policy. If m o n e ta ry  policy  targets in fla tio n  a t 
a rate  near zero th e re  is a risk th a t  th e  sho rt-term  in terest rate  will approach  
its low er b o u n d  of zero in  a recession.1
W h a t can  an d  shou ld  cen tra l banks do  to  stabilize o u tp u t a n d  em ploy­
m en t?  A ccording to  King (1999) th e  u n ce rta in  effect o f m o n e ta ry  policy  
o n  real variables -  o rig ina ted  in  transm ission  m echan ism s th a t  are n e ith e r 
sufficiently  well u n d ersto o d  n o r  sufficiently  stable over tim e -  pu ts  a co n ­
siderable co n s tra in t o n  th e  ab ility  o f cen tra l banks to  target real variables. 
This leads to  th e  conclusion  th a t  m o n e ta ry  policy  shou ld  focus o n  keeping  
in fla tio n  close to  its ta rge t a n d  n o t o n  fin e tu n in g  o u tp u t.2
A ccording to  Taylor (2000), w h en  m o n e ta ry  policy  reacts to  th e  sta te  of 
th e  real econom y, expecta tions th a t  m o n e ta ry  policy  is try in g  to  exp lo it th e  
Phillips curve m ay  develop, reducing  its credibility  a n d  its scope to  respond . 
To recover credibility, m o n e ta ry  po licy  shou ld  focus en tire ly  a n d  public ly  o n  
reacting  to  in fla tion , so th a t  th e  cen tra l b an k  can  develop a strong  rep u ta tio n  
as an  in fla tion  fighter, w hile fiscal policy  shou ld  focus o n  th e  countercyclical 
job of keep ing  real GDP close to  p o ten tia l GDP.
Experience has show n  th a t, w ith  th e  excep tion  of au to m atic  fiscal stabil­
izers, im p lem en ta tio n  lags are m u c h  sho rte r for m o n e ta ry  po licy  th a n  for 
fiscal policy, w h ich  pu ts  legislated changes in  fiscal policy  a t a d isadvantage 
as countercyclical tools. The cen tra l b an k  can  m ake ad ju stm en ts in  in te rest 
rates relatively quickly -  all th a t  is needed  is a board  m eetin g  an d  a vote, 
an d  th e n  to  convey th e  decision to  th e  trad in g  desk, w here th e  sho rt-term  
in terest rate  is changed.
F urtherm ore th e  use of trad itio n a l d iscre tionary  fiscal po licy  can  m ake 
th e  job of a fully au to n o m o u s cen tra l b an k  m ore difficult, because of th e  
need  to  spend  tim e forecasting  th e  size of fiscal proposals an d  d e term in in g  
th e  p robab ility  th a t  such proposals will be passed. This can  be coun tered  
w ith  strong  day-to-day co o rd in a tio n  an d  in fo rm atio n  exchanges betw een  
b o th  in stitu tions.
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O ne w ay of overcom ing  th e  lack of tim eliness an d  pred ic tab ility  of cu rren t 
fiscal policy is to  give th e  governm ent, in  co n su lta tio n  w ith  th e  cen tral 
bank, th e  au th o rity  to  raise o r low er th e  value-added  tax  (VAT) rates an d  
pen sio n  fu n d  co n trib u tio n s, o r to  accelerate o r decelerate certain  public 
spending.
The role of automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy
Econom ic fluctuations have a significant effect o n  pub lic  accounts. Fiscal 
au to m atic  stabilizers are defined  as public  earnings an d  expenses th a t are 
directly linked to  th e  econom ic cycle. A utom atic stabilizers are those elem ents 
of fiscal policy  th a t  te n d  to  m itigate  o u tp u t fluctuations w ith o u t an y  explicit 
governm en t action . They inc lude all co m p o n en ts  o f th e  g o v ern m en t budget 
th a t  act to  offset fluc tua tions in  effective d em an d  by reducing  taxes an d  
increasing g o v ern m en t spend ing  du ring  a recession, a n d  do in g  th e  opposite  
du ring  an  expansionary  cycle. Perhaps th e  m ost com m o n ly  analyzed au to ­
m atic  stabilizer is incom e tax, w hich  reduces th e  m ultip lie r effects of d em and  
shocks th ro u g h  th e  m arg inal ta x a tio n  of incom e fluctuations. A progressive 
incom e tax  w ith  h ig h  m arg inal rates can  substan tia lly  reduce fluctuations in  
after-tax  incom e an d  private  spend ing  w ith o u t th e  n eed  for explicit discre­
tio n ary  policy changes. M oreover au tom atic  stabilizers avoid  th e  im p lem en ­
ta tio n  tim in g  problem s th a t  cause d iscre tionary  policy to  lag b e h in d  events.
A utom atic stabilizers m u st be triggered by  a shock th a t  causes econom ic 
activ ity  to  fall or rise. As argued by  A uerbach an d  Feenberg (2000), th e  
effectiveness of an  au to m atic  stabilizer n o t on ly  depends o n  h o w  m u c h  of 
a change in  d isposable incom e it produces, b u t also o n  how  significant 
th e  effect is o n  private co n su m p tio n . Potentially, progressive incom e taxes, 
value-added taxes, taxes o n  corporate profits an d  u n em p lo y m e n t insu rance 
p rem ium s an d  benefits can  serve as au to m atic  stabilizers.
O ne of th e  m ost fam iliar m easures of th e  sensitiv ity  of taxes to  incom e 
changes is th e  elasticity  of aggregate incom e taxes w ith  respect to  changes 
in  aggregate incom e. This elasticity  serves as an  ind icato r o f th e  tax  system 's 
overall progressiveness. For a given level of taxes, th e  h ig h e r th e  elasticity 
th e  sm aller th e  change in  after-tax  incom e th a t results from  a given change 
in  incom e before tax. However, in  term s o f m easuring  th e  tax  system 's role 
as an  au tom atic  stabilizer th e  incom e elasticity  of taxes has a severe sh o rt­
com ing: it is in v arian t w ith  respect to  w h e th e r th e  share of incom e taken  
as taxes is h ig h  or low. If taxes take a large share o f th e  econom y  th e y  will 
be m ore  able to  act as a n  au to m atic  stabilizer th a n  if th e y  take a sm aller 
share. Key d e te rm in an ts  o f th e  m agn itude of au to m atic  fiscal stabilizers are 
th e  share of tax  revenues, an d  th e  size of tax  an d  expend itu re  elasticities, 
w ith  respect to  GDP.
For o u tp u t to  be stabilized it is necessary for th e  m itiga ting  effect o f taxes 
due to  changes in  before-tax  incom e to  transla te  in to  m ore stable h ouseho ld
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consum ption . However, a h igh  reaction  of consum ption  to  a short-term  shock 
to  cu rren t disposable incom e requires th e  presence of a liqu id ity  co n stra in t 
th a t  reduces ho u seh o ld  co n su m p tio n  to  below  its desired level. Any change 
in  tax  paym en ts m ust transla te  in to  changes in  aggregate d em an d  if au to ­
m atic  stabilizers are to  succeed. For exam ple th e  effect o f corporate incom e 
taxes o n  co n su m p tio n  will be ten u o u s if th e  ow nersh ip  of corporate stock is 
strongly  co n cen tra ted  am ong  ind iv iduals w h o  are un likely  to  face liqu id ity  
constra in ts .
In  th e  case of sta te  u n em p lo y m e n t benefit, it is im p o rta n t to  n o te  
th a t  th is  fluctuates in  response to  rises a n d  falls in  u n em p lo y m e n t du ring  
th e  business cycle. The re la tionsh ip  betw een  o u tp u t fluctuations an d  
changes in  th e  level o f u n em p lo y m e n t benefit depends o n  th e  re la tionsh ip  
b etw een  o u tp u t a n d  u n em p lo y m en t, th e  e x ten t o f u n em p lo y m e n t covered 
by u n em p lo y m e n t insurance, th e  rate of benefits d em an d ed  by  those  w ho 
are eligible, an d  th e  fraction  of lost wages th a t  is replaced by  u n em p lo y m e n t 
benefit.
It is im p o rta n t to  create en o u g h  room  for au tom atic  stabilizers to  w ork 
fully  du rin g  a recession in  o rder to  co m p lem en t th e  regu la to ry  role of 
m o n e ta ry  policy. In  Latin  Am erica fiscal policy  has n o t p layed  a co u n te r­
cyclical role. D uring recessions, fiscal policy  is typically  o rien ted  tow ards 
keeping  financial solvency u n d e r contro l, w hile  d u ring  boom s expend itu re  
te n d s  to  ex p an d  w ith  th e  cycle.
It is necessary to  design a n  in s titu tio n a l fram ew ork th a t  w ill ensure th e  
consistency  of fiscal policy, such as stab ilization  funds from  tax  revenues.3 
Such m echan ism s can  w ork countercyclically  to  allow  saving du ring  boom s 
an d  w ithdraw als for spend ing  purposes du rin g  crises.4 Public spend ing  
m an ag em en t m u st follow  clear, long-te rm  sustainability  criteria. The m ain  
countercyclical co m p o n en ts  shou ld  be social safety n e t p rov ision  an d  th e  
presence of a tax  revenue stab ilization  fund.
Review of concepts and measurement issues in fiscal policy
Follow ing Heller e ta l .  (1985), th is  section  reviews th e  ex isting  techn iques 
for assessing th e  stance of fiscal policy, w ith  th e  purpose of characterizing  
th e  expansionary  or co n trac tio n ary  n a tu re  of cu rren t fiscal policy.
T he first approach , used by  th e  IMF, m easures th e  to ta l im pulse or in itia l 
stim ulus to  aggregate dem and  arising from  fiscal policy, w hether d iscretionary 
or o therw ise, du ring  a given period. C oncep tually  it identifies as a fiscal 
im pulse an y  change in  th e  actual budget th a t  is n o t caused by  th e  business 
cycle. The idea is to  o b ta in  a new  m easure of th e  budget in  iso lation  from  
endogenous forces th a t arise from  changes in  GDP. The IMF m easure currently  
m akes n o  d is tin c tio n  betw een  a change in  aggregate d em an d  th a t  results 
from  a d iscre tionary  budget decision  an d  o n e  th a t  results from  au tom atic  
fiscal stabilizers.
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The approach  starts by  estab lish ing  a base year in  w h ich  th e  tax  revenue 
to  effective o u tp u t ratio , t0, an d  th e  public  spend ing  to  p o te n tia l o u tp u t 
ratio , g0, co rrespond  to  a period  of m acroeconom ic stability, in c lu d in g  a ba l­
ance betw een  p o te n tia l a n d  effective GDP. The 'cyclically neu tra l b u d g e t' is 
derived from  th e  actual budget by  assum ing  th a t  n o m in a l tax  revenues are 
u n it  elastic w ith  respect to  ac tua l n o m in a l o u tp u t, an d  n o m in a l governm en t 
expend itu res are u n it  elastic w ith  respect to  p o ten tia l o u tp u t valued  a t 
cu rren t prices. This gives a b en ch m ark  to  d e term ine  w h e th e r  fiscal policy  
is procyclical, neu tra l o r countercyclical. G row th  in  expend itu re  th a t  is 
above, equal to  o r below  p o te n tia l o u tp u t, yp t, g row th  is respectively defined  
as expansionary, n eu tra l o r contractionary . Similarly, g row th  in  tax  revenues 
th a t  is above, equal to  o r below  effective o u tp u t, yt, grow th  is respectively 
classified as contractionary, neu tra l or expansionary, regardless of th e  source of 
th e  change in  revenue (d iscretionary  tax  increase, progressive tax  structure).
This sim ple IMF app roach  calculates th e  cyclically neu tra l b u d g et u n d e r 
th e  assum ption  of u n ita ry  elasticities of expend itu re  an d  revenue w ith  
respect to  p o te n tia l a n d  actual o u tp u t, therefo re allocating  th e  co n trib u tio n  
o f au tom atic  stabilizers to  th e  fiscal im pulse.
A change in  pub lic  deficit has a cyclical character w h en  it is du e  to  th e  
difference betw een  cu rren t an d  p o ten tia l GDP. A structu ra l deficit is equ i­
v a len t to  th e  difference betw een  th e  effective deficit an d  th e  cyclical deficit. 
An effective deficit in  excess of th e  cyclically neu tra l deficit is deem ed 
expansionary , relative to  th e  base-year fiscal stance. The effective budget 
surplus, B t, can  be decom posed  in to  tw o elem ents: th e  cyclically n eu tra l 
budget surplus, t0 y t -  g0 yp t, an d  th e  fiscal stance, Fist, w h ich  rep resen t th e  
dev iations be tw een  th e  cyclically neu tra l budget surplus an d  th e  effective 
bu d g et surplus:
B t =  t0 y t -  g0 yp t -  Fist (14.1)
A ny increase (reduction) in  th e  budget surplus above th e  cyclically n eu tra l 
budget leads to  a con trac tio n ary  (expansionary) stance in  fiscal policy. The 
fiscal im pulse, FIt, is defined  as th e  change (first difference) in  th e  fiscal 
stance m easure:
FIt = Fist -  Fist - !  = dG t -  g 0 dypt -  (d T t -  t0 dy t) (14.2)
T he fiscal im pu lse in  a given period reflects th e  change in  th e  fiscal stance. 
T he fiscal im pulse a t b est provides a m easure of th e  m ag n itu d e  of th e  in itia l 
stim ulus to  aggregate d em an d  arising from  th e  n e t changes of fiscal policy 
in  a given period.
O ne ad v an tag e  o f th is  ap p ro a ch  is th e  s im p lic ity  of th e  ca lcu la tio n  a n d  
in fo rm a tio n  req u irem en ts . To ca lcu late  th e  fiscal im pulse , o n e  o n ly  needs 
ac tu a l a n d  p o te n tia l o u tp u t g row th , a set o f base-year p u b lic  ex p e n d itu re  
a n d  p u b lic  rev en u e  to  o u tp u t ratios, a n d  th e  ch an g e  in  th e  ac tu a l b u d g e t 
balance. H ow ever such  a m easu re  m ay  m iss th e  in te n s ity  an d  d irec tio n  o f
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th e  effects. In  fact th e  e lastic ity  o f tax  revenues w ith  respect to  o u tp u t is 
an  em p irica l m a tte r  th a t  is likely to  vary  w ith  th e  ra te  o f in f la tio n  a n d  th e  
effects o f p rogressiv ity  a n d  ad m in is tra tiv e  lags in  co llec tion . In  p a rticu la r 
th e  e lastic ity  of VAT d ep en d s  o n  th e  co m p o sitio n  of p riv a te  co n su m p ­
tio n  o f du rab le  an d  n o n -d u ra b le  goods, th e  e lastic ity  of im p o rts  w ith  
respect to  GDP a n d  th e  cyclical b eh a v io u r o f evasion . In  fact, as du rab le  
c o n su m p tio n  is m ore  sensitive  to  eco n o m ic  ac tiv ity  th a n  n o n -d u ra b le  
c o n su m p tio n , a h ig h e r  p ro p o rtio n  o f durab les m ay  raise th e  in co m e 
e lastic ity  of VAT. T he e lastic ity  o f g o v e rn m e n t ex p en d itu res  is also  an  
em pirica l issue.
This approach  also suffers from  th e  so-called balanced  b u d g et m ultip lier 
problem . The m easure im plicitly  assum es th a t equal increases in  governm en t 
spend ing  an d  taxes provide n o  ad d itio n a l stim ulus to  aggregate dem and , 
w hereas m ost co n v en tio n a l m odels im ply  th a t  a change in  g o v ernm en t 
spend ing  has a larger effect o n  incom e th a n  an  equ iva len t transfer o r tax  
change. Therefore th is  m e th o d  m u st be com bined  w ith  an  approach  to  
m easure expend itu re  o n  goods an d  services, transfers an d  taxes o n  a m ore 
disaggregated basis to  ob ta in  a f ind ing  o n  th e  p o ten tia l im pact o n  aggregate 
dem and .
M oreover, as th is  tech n iq u e  calculates th e  fiscal im pulse residually, it will 
inc lude th e  effects n o t on ly  of changes in  fiscal policy a n d  th e  subsequen t 
effects o f au tom atic  stabilizers, b u t also of structura l changes in  th e  econom y. 
Finally, th e  ca lcu la tion  of th e  fiscal stance on ly  adjusts th e  b u d g et for devi­
ations of o u tp u t from  its p o ten tia l level -  a p rob lem  also en co u n te red  w ith  
o th e r  techn iques. T he effects o f prices, in te rest rates (b o th  real a n d  n om ina l) 
an d  th e  exchange rate  are ignored.
The OECD provides an  alternative techn ique th a t has tw o m ajor differences 
from  th e  IMF m easure. First, th e  elasticities o f cyclically n eu tra l expend itu re  
a n d  revenue w ith  respect to  real o u tp u t are n o t constra ined  to  u n ity  in  th e  
OECD m eth o d . H ence th e  OECD's fiscal im pulse ind icato r is free from  a u to ­
m atic  stabilizer effects. Second, th e  OECD m e th o d  uses ratios of expend itu re  
an d  revenue to  p o ten tia l an d  actual o u tp u t, respectively, in  th e  previous 
period, n o t base-period values.
T he OECD app roach  has a larger data  req u irem en t th a n  th e  IMF's m e th o d  
as it includes estim ates of go v ern m en t expend itu re  an d  revenue elasticities. 
The elasticity  o f public  expend itu re  is a fu n c tio n  of th e  m ag n itu d e  of th e  
subsidies given to  th e  unem ployed . The relative im p o rtan ce  of th e  cyclical 
deficit depends o n  th e  size of incom e elasticity  of tax  revenues, th e  o u tp u t 
gap m easured by  th e  d ifference betw een  effective an d  p o ten tia l o u tp u t an d  
th e  p ro p o rtio n  of tax  revenues relative to  th e  level of econom ic activity.
A nother m e th o d  is th e  w eigh ted  standard ized  surplus m easure. This 
provides a good em pirical estim ate of fiscal policy  aim ed at m easuring  dis­
cre tionary  ac tion  b y  th e  au thorities. T he m e th o d  was first developed by  
Blinder an d  G oldfeld (1976) u sing  US data. S im ulation  tech n iq u es are
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em ployed  to  decom pose th e  budget in to  au to n o m o u s (exogenous) an d  
induced  (endogenous) com p o n en ts . The fiscal im pulse is defined  as th e  
change in  th e  exogenous co m p o n en t o f th e  budget.
In  th e  IMF's cu rren t fiscal im pulse m ethodo logy  th e  grow th  of g overnm ent 
expenditures o th e r  th a n  u n em p lo y m e n t benefits is regarded as cyclically 
neu tra l if it is equal to  p o ten tia l o u tp u t g row th. U n em p lo y m en t benefits are 
excluded from  th e  base-year expend itu re  ratio  an d  from  actual expend itu re  
in  a given period, im p ly ing  th a t  an y  changes in  u n em p lo y m e n t benefits are 
trea ted  as a fully  cyclical p h en o m en o n . As u n em p lo y m e n t benefits d epend  
o n  th e  sta te o f th e  econom y, th is  m e thodo logy  im plicitly  assum es th a t  eco­
n o m ic  recovery w ill re tu rn  th e  u n em p lo y m e n t rate to  th e  level p revailing  in  
th e  base year.
It is im p o rta n t to  stress th a t, dep en d in g  o n  th e  policy  question , certain  
m easures of th e  fiscal budget will be m ore adequate th a n  others. If th e  policy 
ques tion  cen tres o n  th e  short-term  financial pressure caused by  th e  govern ­
m en t's  financ ing  requ irem ents, th e n  th e re  is a strong  case for a budget 
balance m easure th a t  accurately  reflects th is  pressure. T he cash base budget 
data  dom inates in  th is  regard. H ow ever if th e  m ain  concern  is to  analyze th e  
effects of g o v ern m en t expend itu re  an d  revenue policy  o n  aggregate m acro- 
econom ic variables, such  as co n su m p tio n  an d  investm en t, th e n  a strong  
case can  be m ade for u sing  n a tio n a l accoun t data  w h en  co n stru c tin g  th e  
fiscal im pulse, so th a t  th e  budgetary  data  is m ore system atically  rela ted  to  
aggregate dem and .
Stabilization funds, public and international finance, fiscal 
policy and external shocks
C om m odity  price risk is th e  risk th a t  com m odity  prices m ay change rapidly, 
substan tia lly  an d  unpredic tab ly . G overnm ents typically  bear tw o kinds of 
com m od ity  price risk. First, m a n y  governm ents ob ta in  substan tia l revenue 
from  com m odity  p roductio n /ex p o rta tio n . Second, m a n y  g overnm ents try  to  
sm o o th  som e dom estic  com m o d ity  prices to  m itigate th e  social, econom ic 
an d  political im pact of large an d  frequen t changes in  prices.
In  th e  absence of f in an c in g  o p p o rtu n itie s , w h en  prices go do w n  for 
a p roducer or u p  for a consum er, th e  go v ern m en t has to  cu t expend itu re  or 
raise o th e r  revenue. This is difficult to  do  qu ickly  an d  efficiently. Increasing 
spend ing  w h en  export prices rise is easier, b u t it is difficult to  do  efficiently. 
Reliance o n  com m o d ity  revenue norm ally  leads to  s top -go  fiscal policy. It is 
also likely to  m ake fiscal policy  procyclical. O th er p rob lem s inc lude th e  
difficulty  of p lan n in g , such  as basing  a budget o n  com m o d ity  price assum p­
tio n s th a t cou ld  tu rn  o u t to  be very  w rong.
D eveloping coun tries typ ically  base th e ir  in te rn a tio n a l trade  o n  a few 
com m odity  exports an d  im ports  th a t are subject to  h ig h ly  vo la tile  m arket 
prices. A practice th a t  has b een  extensively used  in  th e  past has b een  for
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governm en ts to  establish  stab ilization  funds to  reduce com m o d ity  price 
volatility, to  m ake prices an d  revenues m ore pred ic tab le an d  to  keep ex p en d ­
itu re in  line  w ith  p erm a n en t incom e flows. For com m od ity  producers, th e  
fu n d  accum ulates resources w h en  th e  in te rn a tio n a l spo t price is above its 
reference price, an d  vice versa. For com m odity  consum ers, th e  fu n d  sub­
sidizes dom estic  co n su m p tio n  w h en  th e  spo t price is above its reference 
level, a n d  vice versa.
R ecent em pirical w ork o n  com m o d ity  prices show s th a t m o st com m od ity  
prices even tua lly  revert to  th e ir  m ean  -  a requ irem en t for a stab ilization  
fu n d  to  be viable -  b u t on ly  very  slowly, w ith  th e  average reversal tim e being  
m easured  in  years ra th e r th a n  m o n th s . H ence a com m o d ity  stab ilization  
fu n d  has to  be very  large to  be effective. F urtherm ore, in  th e  case of an  
export (im port) stab ilization  fu n d  it is strongly  recom m ended  to  in itia te  it 
in  scenarios o f h ig h  (low) prices ra th e r th a n  long-te rm  or tren d  prices, 
so th a t  th e  fu n d  can  finance subsequen t negative price situa tions.5
M any  countries have ab an d o n ed  these  funds as g o v ernm en t in te rv en tio n  
to  stabilize com m od ity  prices an d  reduce u n ce rta in ty  has o ften  proved  
ineffective an d  costly. N onetheless th e re  are som e successful cases, such  as 
th e  com m odity  stab ilization  funds in  C hile (copper) an d  C olom bia (coffee), 
w h ich  are aim ed a t stabilizing  com m odity -rela ted  go v ern m en t revenues 
instead  of prices. W h en  governm ents collect com m odity -rela ted  revenues, 
these funds are appropriate m echanism s for separating the  term s of trade cycle 
from  th e  fiscal cycle. They are characterized by  th ree  elem ents: (1) a reference 
price for raw  m aterial, de term in ed  in  th e  budget fo rm u la tion  and , based o n  
conservative, m edium -term  projections; (2) a fund  th a t accum ulates resources 
d u rin g  boom s a n d  pays o u t du rin g  adverse periods; an d  (3) opera ting  m les 
th a t  estab lish  a re la tion  betw een  price fluctuations an d  co n trib u tio n s  to  or 
w ithdraw als from  th e  fund.
Instead  of se tting  u p  a stab ilization  fund, governm en ts can  borrow  or ru n  
dow n  assets w h en  th e  in te rn a tio n a l price goes against th em . T he p rob lem  is 
th a t w h en  th e  coun try  m ost needs fund ing  it is less likely to  be able to  ob ta in  
it. Also, m a n y  coun tries do  n o t have significant foreign assets to  dispose of. 
F urtherm ore it is po litica lly  difficult to  generate a sufficient surplus to  repay 
th e  deb t w h en  th e  s itua tion  is reversed, lead ing  to  solvency problem s.
To hedge against com m od ity  price volatility, policy  m akers can  consider 
th e  use of com m od ity  derivatives. This has several advantages: com m odity  
derivatives reduce u n ce rta in ty  ab o u t fu tu re  revenues, th e y  rely o n  m arket 
prices ra th e r th a n  adm in istra tive  prices, th e y  sh ift th e  risk ou tside th e  
co u n try  an d  th e y  reduce th e  cost o f com m o d ity  financing , th u s  increasing 
th e  cred itw orth iness of th e  com m o d ity  producer. H ow ever a d isadvantage is 
th a t th e y  will n o t p rev en t a persis ten t deterio ra tion  of or sudden  spikes in  
com m odity  prices.6 T hey  typically  m itigate th e  short-term  effects o n  o u tp u t 
o f adverse price m ovem en ts,7 b u t as th e y  concen tra te  o n  th e  short-term  they  
are u nab le  to  m a tch  th e  long  p ro d u c tio n  h o rizo n  of som e com m odities.
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In  theory, if price shocks are o f a p e rm a n en t n a tu re  it is be b e tte r to  ad just 
ra th e r th a n  to  use com pensa to ry  financing . H ow ever th e  ques tion  is how  
quickly to  ad ju st to  th e  new  price con d itio n s in  o rder to  m in im ize dom estic  
ad ju stm en t costs w ith  an  incom ple te  derivatives m arket.
Let us prov ide a form al fram ew ork to  analyze a price stab ilization  schem e 
for co n su m p tio n  purposes.8 Suppose th e  go v ern m en t w ishes to  m in im ize 
th e  cost o f expected , E ,  quad ra tic  dev iations of th e  dom estic  p rice from  
th e  in te rn a tio n a l price, ( p t  -  p * ) 2 9  T he go v ern m en t is against th e  quick 
ad justm en t of dom estic prices over tim e (p t -  p t - i ) 2, so it negatively w eights 
quadra tic  dev iations of th e  cu rren t dom estic  prices from  past dom estic  
prices. As is well d o cu m en ted  in  th e  literature , if  in te rn a tio n a l prices follow  
a ran d o m  w alk process, a stab ilization  schem e will be n e ith e r  feasible no r 
sustainable w ith o u t explicit fiscal su p p o rt.10 If th e  g o v ern m en t is concerned  
ab o u t ad ju s tm en t costs, th e re  is a sm o o th in g  role for prices even if th e  shock 
is o f a p e rm a n en t natu re . If th e  g o v ern m en t does a ttac h  a negative w eight 
to  th e  quick  a d ju s tm e n t of dom estic  prices it is b e tte r to  in tro d u ce  a form al 
stab ilization  schem e, such as a form al price b an d  w ith  rules ra th e r th a n  an  
im plicit b an d  w ith  n o  rules.
The governm ent's  o p tim iza tio n  prob lem  is to  m in im ize  th e  fo llow ing cost 
function :
M in a E ( p t -  p * ) 2 +  b E ( p t  -  p t - \ ) 2 (14.3)
subject to  th e  ran d o m  w alk process follow ed by  in te rn a tio n a l prices:
P t* =  p t - 1* +  th  (14.4)
T he op tim al stab ilization  policy  will lead to  th e  sm o o th in g  of in te rn a l prices 
based o n  th e  fo llow ing rule:
p t = b /(b  + a)pt - i  + a/{b  + a)pf_!* (14.5)
Intu itively , th e  h ig h e r th e  cost a ttac h ed  to  th e  a d ju s tm e n t o f dom estic  
prices over tim e  (b) an d  th e  low er th e  w eigh t given to  dev ia tions o f th e  
local price w ith  respect to  in te rn a tio n a l prices (a), th e  m ore gradual th e  
o p tim al process o f ad ju stm en t for in te rn a l prices will be to  new  in te rn a tio n a l 
cond itions.
D uring ex ternal boom s, m o n e tary  sterilization  m ust be perform ed th ro u g h  
th e  generation of a fiscal surplus. In  th e  presence of a com m odity  stabilization 
fund , a h igher (lower) co m m o d ity  export price is au tom atica lly  transfo rm ed  
in to  a h igher (lower) fiscal surplus by  th e  rules of accum ula tion  (depletion) 
o f th e  fund. U nder such  con d itio n s th e  ad ju stm en t effort does n o t rely on  
h igher tax a tio n  or low er pub lic  expenditure.
If th e  ow nersh ip  of a com m od ity  export is pub lic  (foreign), th e n  a stabil­
ization  fund  (FDI financing) will stabilize th e  econom y th ro u g h  a n  adequate 
response b y  public savings (profit repatriation). In th e  case of m ining, projects 
typically  m atu re  in  several years. The associated deb t for p ro jec t finance has
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to  pay in te rest periodically, w hile  am ortiza tion  typically  takes place after 
construc ting  th e  p lan t. If th e re  is a n  excess o f cash  flow  generation , th e  last 
in s ta lm en t of th e  loan  is p repaid , w hile  th e  opposite  occurs u n d e r  a defic it.11
To deal w ith  shocks th a t  trigger ex ternal crises, co n tin g en t policies based 
o n  sim ple, easily verifiable rules, a n d  a fu n c tio n  o f variables n o t d irectly  
con tro lled  by  th e  au tho rities  can  be of h e lp .12 The first step  is to  iden tify  
a sm all set of shocks th a t  cap ture a large share of triggering factors. For 
exam ple positive in d ex atio n  to  th e  term s o f trade an d  inverse in d ex atio n  
to  an  in d ica to r o f tigh tness in  in te rn a tio n a l financial m arkets such as th e  
EMBI spread w ould  probab ly  suffice as in d ex a tio n  m echan ism s for in te rest 
paym en ts o n  pub lic  an d  ex ternal debt, o r for pub lic  expenses th a t  are less 
costly  an d  ineffic ien t to  stop. Indexa tion  to  th e  price of a co m m o d ity  avoids 
m a n ip u la tio n  an d  m oral hazard  problem s, due to  its exogenous natu re . 
Several firm s have experim en ted  w ith  com m odity -indexed  bonds, b u t m ost 
seem  to  hedge co m m o d ity  price vo la tility  u sing  th e  op tio n s m arkets.
W ith  respect to  c o n tin g en t public  d eb t m anagem en t, private  sector 
in v es tm en t w ith  pub lic  sector insu rance represen ts a strictly  procyclical 
fiscal policy, as guaran tees are freely given du rin g  boom s, w h en  th e  private 
sector invests, an d  fall due du ring  dow n tu rns. The general policy p rescrip tion  
w ould  instead  suggest es tab lish ing  an  explicit public  sector fu n d  financed  
by  a n  insu rance p rem ium  charged to  th e  private sector, w h ich  is essential in  
countercyclical policies today. It is im p o rta n t to  recognize th a t  u n em p lo y ­
m e n t insurance, public  w orks guarantees, deposit in su rance an d  m in im u m  
pension  guaran tees shou ld  be explicit, lim ited  an d  financed  by  taxes or 
p rem ium  charges.
Ex an te  fu n d in g  has a relative advantage a n d  ex p o s t financ ing  a relative 
d isadvantage in  sm o o th in g  cash  flows along  th e  p a th  to  im proved  stabiliza­
tion . Flat rate p rem ium s are m ore appropria te  th a n  risk ad justed  p rem ium s 
for sm o o th in g  a n d  stabilizing in  th e  course o f th e  cycle, as risk ten d s to  be 
low  du rin g  boom s an d  h ig h  du rin g  dow n tu rns.
In  a sm all o p en  econom y fiscal policy  has to  p lay  a countercyclical 
role w h en  ex ternal shocks occur. W h e n  capita l inflow s are a private  sector 
p h e n o m e n o n  th e  fiscal accoun ts m ay n o t be s tren g th en ed  enough , th u s  
req u irin g  a n  increase  in  taxes o r a re d u c tio n  in  pu b lic  ex p en d itu re . 
In  c o m b in a tio n  w ith  tig h t m o n e ta ry  policy  a n d  restrictive fiscal policy, 
m easures devo ted  to  lim iting  cap ita l surges m ay be considered. W h en  th e  
accum ula tion  of in te rn a tio n a l reserves is a ttrib u tab le  to  a n  expo rt boom , it 
is difficult to  q u es tio n  th a t  th e  h igher g enera tion  of saving shou ld  be an  
effort m ade by  th e  sector th a t  d irectly  benefits from  it. If th e  ex ternal 
surplus has its o rig in  in  th e  private sector, it is m ore d ifficult to  d istribu te  
th e  savings equitab ly .13
T he use of a tem porary  restrictive fiscal policy  m ay be of help  w hen  
th e re  are surges in  cap ita l inflow s. A lthough  such a policy  w ou ld  n o t stop  
th e  inflow s, it could  co n ta in  th e  in fla tionary  im pact a n d  reduce aggregate
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d em an d .14 As th e  n eed  to  issue public  deb t is reduced, it is also possible th a t 
a restrictive po licy  m ay  h e lp  to  low er dom estic  in te rest rates. If tax  changes 
are transito ry  an d  th e re  are borrow ing  constra in ts , a n  increase in  taxes m ay 
be effective in  co n tro llin g  absorp tion .
As corporate taxes, progressive incom e taxes, value added  taxes an d  
custom s du ty  revenues norm ally  have an  o u tp u t elasticity of greater th a n  one, 
strong  capital inflow s w ill help  finance g row th  in  abso rp tion  above GDP, 
lead ing  to  an  increase in  tax  collection. Follow ing a structural surplus rule, 
th e  g o v ernm en t shou ld  save m ore a n d  o b ta in  a h ig h e r effective su rp lus.15 
H ow ever w ou ld  th a t  be enough? Probably n o t. Therefore in  ad d itio n  to  th e  
au tom atic  stabilizers, policy  m akers m igh t consider m easures to  increase VAT, 
payroll taxes or co n trib u tio n s to  th e  p ension  fu n d  or th e  u n em p lo y m e n t 
insu rance fund . This w ould  b e tte r d istribu te  th e  b u rd en  of m o n e ta ry  an d  
fiscal policy  to  c o n ta in  absorp tion .
If strong  cap ita l inflow s generate an  abso rp tion  th a t  exceeds p o ten tia l 
GDP, a co n trac tio n ary  d em an d  policy  will be required . If th e  cen tra l b an k  
applies a restrictive m o n e ta ry  policy, th e n  quasifiscal losses an d  fu rthe r 
cap ita l inflow s w ill take place. To avoid  such a v icious circle, it m ay  be m ore 
desirable to  app ly  a co n trac tio n ary  fiscal policy. Conversely, w h en  m assive 
cap ita l outflow s take place a n d  th e  econom y is overheated , b o th  co n trac­
tio n a ry  fiscal an d  m o n e ta ry  policies m ay be needed.
Public sector and the level of activity: theory and empirical 
evidence
U nder Keynesian u n em p lo y m en t an d  th e  need  to  reduce th e  fiscal deficit an d  
pub lic  debt, fiscal ad ju s tm en t m easures w ill depress th e  econom y. A public  
deficit u n d e r these  co n d itio n s expands th e  level of activity.
U n d er th e  neoclassical full e m p lo y m e n t m odel, th e  repercussions o f fis­
cal po licy  d e p e n d  o n  th e  n a tu re  of th e  fiscal ad ju s tm e n t. Tax increases 
th a t  lead  to  d is to rtio n s  in  m ark e t prices o r an  increase  in  c u rre n t ex p e n ­
d itu res th a t  are ex p ected  to  be f in an c ed  by  fu tu re  taxes w ill h av e  a c o n ­
tra c tio n a ry  effect o n  th e  level o f eco n o m ic  activ ity . R eductions in  b o th  
ex p e n d itu re  a n d  tax  te n d  to  increase th e  level o f eco n o m ic  activ ity . A 
cred ib le  cu t in  e x p e n d itu re  w ill p ro m p t ex p ec ta tio n s  o f reduced  taxes, 
p ro d u c in g  positive  supp ly -side effects th a t  w ill increase  GDP in  th e  sh o r t­
te rm . Supply-side m odels assum e th a t  fiscal a d ju s tm e n t is ex p a n sio n a ry  if 
it is based  o n  e x p e n d itu re  red u c tio n s, b u t  c o n tra c tio n a ry  if taxes are 
ra ised .16
O ther m odels describe m acroeconom ic behav iou r accord ing  to  th e  level 
o f public  debt. W h e n  th e  stock of public deb t approaches defau lt level, an  
increase in  th e  deficit significantly  raises th e  p robab ility  of inso lvency  an d  
of h igher in terest rates, leading to  reduced dom estic activity .17
Carìos Budnevich 281
In  th e  Latin A m erican con tex t, G avin e t al. (1996) have fo u n d  th a t  th e  
vo la tility  o f m acroeconom ic ou tcom es is greatly  au g m en ted  by  th e  h igh ly  
procyclical fiscal responses in  th e  region. Procyclical fiscal responses are m ost 
p ro n o u n ced  d u ring  recessions an d  th e y  stem  from  th e  fact th a t  access to  
in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m arkets o ften  van ishes in  th e  face of adverse shocks, 
forcing a fiscal co n trac tio n  in  an  already w eakened econom y. T hus policy 
m u st be concerned  w ith  ensu ring  fiscal susta inab ility  an d  solvency. But th e  
w eak re la tionsh ip  w ith  in te rn a tio n a l capital m arkets is due to  th e  vo la tility  
of th e  m acroeconom ic e n v iro n m en t in  Latin America, an d  creates th e  need  
for large fiscal ad ju stm en ts  th a t  can  be po litica lly  unfeasible, th u s  reducing  
cred itw orth iness an d  p ro m p tin g  investors to  exit from  th e  reg ion  a t th e  first 
sign of tro u b le .18
A ccording to  G avin e t al., deficits in  Latin Am erica vis-à-vis th e  dom estic  
financia l system  (or taxes) are th ree  tim es larger th a n  in  th e  OECD co u n ­
tries. F urtherm ore th e  tax  base in  Latin Am erica is h ig h ly  vo latile an d  
procyclical. Latin Am erica relies extensively  o n  non -tax , ind irec t tax a tio n  
an d  trade taxes.
W ith  regard to  spend ing  patterns, G avin e t al. n o te  th a t  Latin Am erica 
spends a h igher p ro p o rtio n  o n  in te rest paym ents, capital expend itu re  an d  
wages, an d  less o n  n o n -in te re st transfers th a n  do  OECD countries. M oreover 
Latin Am erica exh ib its less flexibility  in  tim es of crisis as in te rest paym ents 
o n  deb t te n d  to  increase. F urtherm ore Latin Am erica pays h igher an d  m ore 
variable co u n try  risk p rem ium s th a n  th e  OECD countries.
T he ratio  of fiscal deficit to  GDP in  Latin Am erica is tw ice as vo la tile  as in  
th e  OECD coun tries (ibid.) Fiscal deficit w ith  respect to  th e  financial system  
is five to  te n  tim es m ore vo latile th a n  in  th e  OECD. W h en  GDP increases, 
th e  surplus in  OECD coun tries increases, b u t in  th e  Latin A m erican region 
th ey  te n d  to  rem ain  stable o r fall. Tax revenues are also m ore sensitive 
in  Latin Am erica th a n  in  th e  OECD. This im plies th a t pub lic  spend ing  in  
Latin Am erica is h igh ly  procyclical an d  fiscal ou tcom es are particu larly  
con trac tionary  du rin g  recessions.
In te rn a tio n a l cap ita l flows to  Latin Am erica o ften  d isappear just w h en  
th e y  are needed  to  finance a countercyclical fiscal policy. G iven th e  region 's 
precarious access to  in te rn a tio n a l financial m arkets, procyclical fiscal m eas­
ures are th e  best too ls available to  th e  fiscal au thorities. Precarious cred it­
w o rth in ess  is ro o te d  in  w eak fiscal s tru c tu re s  in  a v o la tile  m acro  
en v iro n m en t.
Talvi a n d  Vegh (2000) prov ide a po litical ex p lan a tio n  o f th e  puzzling  
behav iou r of fiscal policy  in  developing  countries. S tarting  from  th e  
observation  th a t  f luctuations in  th e  tax  base are m u c h  larger in  developing 
countries th a n  in  th e  G7 countries, full tax  sm o o th in g  w ould  im ply  ru n n in g  
large budgetary  surpluses in  good tim es an d  large budgetary  deficits in  
bad  tim es. However, due to  po litical constra in ts  it m ay  be im possib le to  ru n  
large budgetary  surpluses w h en  tim es are good. If a g o v ernm en t is unab le
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to  generate large en o u g h  surpluses du ring  expansions it is forced to  borrow  
less du ring  recessions in  o rder to  satisfy th e  solvency constra in t.
The p a tte rn  o f procyclical fiscal deficits in  Latin Am erica has been  in te r­
p reted  as arising from  subop tim al policies, an d  probab ly  from  th e  financial 
constra in ts  faced by  th e  governm ents concerned . H ow ever accord ing  to  
C aballero (2000, 2001), w h en  ex ternal financial shocks are a n  im p o rta n t 
cause of fluctuations, th e  econom ic au tho rities shou ld  o p tim ally  d istribu te  
th e ir  scarce in te rn a tio n a l resources am o n g  dom estic  agents in  order to  
sm o o th  th e  differences in  financial distress.
A lthough in  princip le it m ay  be possible to  follow a countercyclical taxation  
an d /o r  fiscal sp en d in g  po licy  th a t  could  com pletely  elim ina te  th e  variance 
in  GDP grow th, th e  possib ility  o f ach iev ing  such  a degree of flexibility  seems 
unrealistic. T ax-sm ooth ing  considerations, th e  difficulty  of ad justing  an d  
con tro lling  wages, th e  n eed  to  m ake expend itu res requ ired  by  law  an d  th e  
tim e needed  to  bu ild  pub lic  w orks m ay reduce th e  au th o ritie s ' ab ility  to  
exercise th e  requ ired  degree of flexibility  for countercyclical purposes. A 
stop -go  process in  in v es tm en t is likely to  generate w aste, an d  therefo re  a 
m ore  stable spend ing  p a tte rn  m ay im prove m atters.
The experience of Chile
T he role played b y  fiscal policy  in  C hile has been  ex tensively  analyzed an d  
debated . Its in te rp re ta tio n  is n o t easy, since a lth o u g h  a n  average surplus of
1.9 per cen t o f GDP was m a in ta in ed  in  1990-97, pub lic  spend ing  grew 
strongly  a t 6.5 per cen t. Increased public  spend ing  o n  h ea lth , education  an d  
o th e r  social prov isions was financed  th ro u g h  increased taxes an d  revenues 
linked to  th e  coun try 's  strong  econom ic grow th, an d  con trib u ted  to  a fu rther 
expansion  of aggregate dem and .
T he key d ev e lo p m en ts  in  C hile 's fiscal po licy  in  th e  p as t 15 years 
have  b een  th e  m a in te n a n c e  of a fiscal surp lus b e tw een  1985 a n d  1998, 
a n d  th e  c rea tio n  o f a copper stab iliza tion  fu n d  in  1985 an d  a pe tro leu m  
stab iliza tion  fu n d  in  1991. T he p u rpose  of th e  copper stab iliza tion  fu n d  
is to  stabilize pu b lic  ex p en d itu re , w hile  th e  p e tro leu m  fu n d  is in te n d e d  
to  sm o o th  th e  v o la tility  o f in te rn a tio n a l prices o n  th e  a d ju s tm e n t p a th  
of dom estic  oil prices. In  th e  case of th e  copper stab iliza tion  fu n d , a t th e  
b eg in n in g  of each  year th e  b u d g e t office sets a reference price, a n d  w ith ­
draw als an d  deposits  are m ade q u arte rly  as a step  fu n c tio n  of ac tua l an d  
reference prices. T he fin an ce  m in is te r decides th e  a m o u n t an d  th e  tim in g  
of w ithdraw als for tw o precise purposes: to  co m p lem en t in co m e w h en  th e  
effective price is sign ifican tly  below  th e  b u d g et p ro jec tions, or to  p repay  
deb t du rin g  boom s.
Chile has also exh ib ited  partia l flexibility  in  respect o f VAT in  th e  recen t 
past, as in  1996 th e  g o v ernm en t was allow ed by  law  to  set th e  VAT rate
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betw een  16 per cen t a n d  18 per cen t. In  th e  even t th e  au tho rities decided to  
increase VAT from  17 per cen t to  18 per ce n t to  help  finance th e  education  
reform s.19
Ffrench-Davis an d  Tapia (2001) argue th a t  fiscal policy  in  th e  period  
1990-95 was very p ruden t. The increases in  social expend itu re w ere financed 
w ith  new  tax  revenues an d  fiscal policy  strictly  follow ed th e  accum ulation  
or d ep le tion  rules of th e  copper stab ilization  fund.
W ith  regard to  fiscal responsib ility  for th e  excess aggregate d em an d  th a t 
took  place in  1996-97, fiscal expend itu re  (7.9 per cent) rose m ore th a n  GDP 
grow th  (7.4 per cent). H ow ever th e  fiscal sector in  C hile on ly  accoun ted  for 
20 per cen t of th e  econom y an d  therefo re th e  m a in  im pulse for aggregate 
d em an d  grow th  (8.5 per cent) m ust have com e from  th e  private  sector. The 
even tua l fiscal co n trib u tio n  was clearly insufficient. The fiscal budget was 
show ing  a surplus a n d  th e  go v ern m en t n o t on ly  rejected new  loans from  th e  
W orld Bank an d  th e  IDB b u t also prepaid  debt. The effective fiscal surplus 
was even  h ig h e r as th e  copper stab ilization  fu n d  was accum ulating  resources 
a t th e  tim e.
In  1999 Chile ran  a fiscal deficit for th e  first tim e since 1985. At th e  en d  of 
1999 th e  coun try 's  m acroeconom ic policies sh ifted  tow ards m ore rules an d  
a less d iscre tionary  fram ew ork, w ith  m o n e ta ry  po licy  follow ing a n  in fla tio n  
target approach . The go v ern m en t th a t  to o k  pow er in  M arch 2000 proposed  
to  recover th e  fiscal surplus b y  estab lish ing  a structu ra l b u d g et surplus rule 
o f 1 per cen t, s ta rting  in  2001.
The fiscal policy  rule allows th e  op era tio n  o f au to m atic  stabilizers in  th e  
budget an d  avoids th e  need  for fine-tun ing  accord ing  to  th e  phase  of th e  
econom ic cycle, leaving th is  role to  m o n e ta ry  policy. W hile  som e ex p en d ­
itu res a n d  revenues d ep e n d  o n  th e  evo lu tion  of th e  econom y, a n  im p o rta n t 
p ro p o rtio n  of expenses an d  revenues are n o t flexible because th e y  represen t 
legal com m itm en ts.
The new  m e th o d  of p reparing  th e  budget in  C hile delivers ind icators 
for iden tify ing  th e  stance of fiscal policy, avoids a procyclical bias in  public  
finance, allows eva lua tion  of th e  m acroeconom ic im pact of fiscal policy, 
ensures th e  stability  an d  c o n tin u ity  o f fiscal policy  an d  reinforces fiscal 
d iscipline.
In  th e  co n s tru c tio n  o f th e  structu ra l balance ind icator, th e  go v ern m en t 
has considered  th e  existence o f a strong  revenue co m p o n en t o rig ina ting  in  
th e  p ro d u ctio n  of copper th a t  exhib its m ean  reversion in  its price behaviour. 
The structural balance excludes th e  cyclical effect o f GDP (the  gap betw een  
effective a n d  p o ten tia l o u tpu t) an d  ran d o m  effects of th e  price of copper. 
T he structu ra l bu d g et is n o t o n ly  explained  by  au to n o m o u s decisions of th e  
g o v ernm en t (discretion) b u t also reflects f luctuations in  th e  fiscal balance 
th a t  are due to  factors o th e r  th a n  th e  business cycle.
Taxes an d  copper revenues are believed to  be cyclical; spend ing  is assum ed 
to  be non-cyclical. T he m eth o d o lo g y  adop ted  by  C hile for defin ing  th e
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structural b u d g et surplus follows th e  OECD m ethod , allow ing  for a tax  
revenue elasticity  w ith  respect to  GDP th a t  is d iffe ren t from  unity :
In Tpt -  In Tpt _j =  1,05 * (In Ypt -  In Ypt _ i)
(p e rm an e n t tax  revenue increases) (14.6)
In T t -  In Tt _j =  1,05 * (In Yt -  In y t _j)
(curren t tax  revenue increases) (14.7)
In Rcut = In  Pcut + In Qcut (cu rren t revenues from  copper) (14.8)
In RScut = In Pcupt +  In Qcut (trend  revenues from  copper) (14.9)
There is a clear separation betw een th e  structural co m p o n en t an d  th e  cyclical 
co m p o n en t o f th e  effective balance th a t allows th e  o p era tio n  of au tom atic  
budgetary  stabilizers.20 S tructural surpluses allow  tran sito ry  fiscal deficits 
u p  to  th e  desired levels an d  avoid  th e  ineffic ien t co n trac tio n  o f spend ing  
d u rin g  recessions. They also avoid  th e  overexpansion  of expend itu res using  
transito ry  w indfall fiscal revenues.
This policy p rom otes saving, enables th e  financing  of co n tin g en t liabilities, 
com pensates th e  cen tra l b an k  deficit a n d  saves financial resources for future 
generations w ho  will n o t b enefit directly from  non-renew able resources such 
as copper. The new  policy  fram ew ork brings to g e th er greater responsib ility  
a n d  transparency  in  th e  ad m in istra tio n  of public  resources.
Total C h ilean  pub lic  d eb t is relatively sm all, reach ing  14.2 per cen t of 
GDP in  2000. C o n tin g en t liabilities do  n o t com prom ise th e  fiscal balance in  
th e  sh o rt te rm , a lth o u g h  th e y  m ay do so in  th e  m ed iu m  term . C o n tin g en t 
liabilities linked  to  m in im u m  pensions are estim ated  a t US$7.2 b illion ,21 
a n d  th e  C h ilean  g o v ern m en t proposes to  p u t fiscal surpluses in to  a fu n d  to  
finance fu ture social security  expenditure.
Fiscal policy proposals
As n o te d  by  M assad (1998), w ith  increasing cap ita l m ob ility  a h igher degree 
of flexibility in  fiscal policy is required  to  keep public savings h ig h  in  periods 
of strong  capita l inflows.
To reduce th e  procyclical behav iou r of C hile's GDP, B udnevich  an d  Le Fort 
(1997) suggest lim itin g  th e  g row th  of public  ab so rp tio n  (the  relevant 
m acroeconom ic ind icator) to  p o ten tia l o u tp u t g ro w th .22 T hey p o in t to  th e  
n eed  for escape clauses, an d  consider it desirable to  allow  som e flexibility  in  
respect of public  in v estm en t an d  em ergency situations.
In  th e  area of tax  flexibility, B udnevich an d  Le Fort argue th a t  VAT m ay be 
a useful too l because of its b road  base, h ig h  revenue response, lower efficiency 
costs an d  red istribu tive character. It has several o th e r  advantages, such as its 
ab ility  to  help  stabilize co n su m p tio n , its qu ick  collection  response an d  th e  
sim plicity  o f its ad m in is tra tio n . VAT changes operate th ro u g h  ad ju stm en ts
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to  disposable incom e as well as to  relative prices. A m ong th e  costs o f VAT 
flexibility  are an  increased m e n u  of costs an d  greater sho rt-term  in fla tio n  
instability , w h ich  te n d  to  lim it th e  p o ten tia l use of such a m echan ism .23 
An add itiona l cost of u sing  taxes as countercyclical devices is th e  u n ce r­
ta in ty  th e y  generate.
B udnevich  a n d  Le Fort also argue th a t it m ay  be useful to  com plem en t 
VAT flexibility  w ith  som e incom e tax  flexibility.24 M oreover, given th a t th e  
p ro fit base has a m u c h  h ig h e r cyclical f lu c tu a tio n  th a n  GDP, an d  given th e  
progressive structu re  of personal incom e tax, b o th  corporate an d  personal 
incom e tax  co n s titu te  au tom atic  stabilizers.
The creation  of a stabilization  fund  w ould  com plem en t th e  countercyclical 
fiscal policy proposal, for th e  purpose of m o n ito rin g  an d  accum ulating  th e  
countercyclical responses of fiscal policy. The fund  shou ld  accum ulate 
(pay ou t) resources w h en  add itiona l (lower) revenues are o b ta in ed  because 
o f increases (reductions) in  th e  VAT rate  w ith  respect to  its long-term  level. 
To ensure th e  transito ry  n a tu re  of such  a policy, B udnevich  an d  Le Fort 
p ropose floor a n d  ceiling levels for th e  stab ilization  fu n d  of 0 per cen t an d  
8 per ce n t o f GDP. If one of these  lim its w ere to  be h it, a m ech an ism  shou ld  
be activated  to  increase or reduce taxes, as applicable.
In  th e  Latin A m erican con tex t, G avin  e t al. (1996) suggest th a t  th e  fiscal 
budget shou ld  be consisten t w ith  a gradual m o v em en t tow ards th e  desired 
deb t levels in  th e  m ed ium  term . This m eans th a t fiscal surpluses shou ld  be 
accum ulated  an d  n e t public  deb t reduced du ring  econom ic boom s, a n d  th a t 
th e  fiscal balance shou ld  be allow ed to  m ove in to  deficit du ring  contractions. 
The au tho rs n o te  th a t  it is hard  to  reverse pub lic  spend ing  co m m itm en ts  
an d  to  change tax  rates in  response to  changes in  long-term  fundam entals . 
Fiscal deficit an d  deb t shou ld  ad just in  response to  transito ry  shocks. They 
propose as an  opera tional fiscal target a cyclically ad justed  fiscal deficit, 
tak ing  in to  acco u n t differences betw een  cu rren t an d  fu tu re  expectations of 
th e  level o f o u tp u t, th e  level of dom estic  absorp tion , th e  te rm s o f trade an d  
th e  real exchange rate.
M eanw hile th e  Business C ouncil o f A ustralia (1999) has explored  th e  
possibility  of re-engineering A ustralian in stitu tions to  increase th e  tim eliness 
a n d  effectiveness of fiscal policy. W hen  th e re  is a sharp  an d  serious deterio ­
ra tio n  in  n a tio n a l incom e, for exam ple as a resu lt o f a sudden  decline in  th e  
te rm s of trade, th e  m ost appropria te  econom ic response w ou ld  be a sm all 
an d  tem porary  n o m in a l wage cut. If short-term  wage flexibility  is p u t in  
place before th e  occurrence of shocks, a capacity  for rap id  ad ju stm en ts can 
be b u ilt in to  w age se tting  in stitu tions, for exam ple by  allow ing a p o rtio n  of 
wages to  be paid  in  th e  form  of bonuses linked  to  profits.25 Profits w ou ld  be 
less vo la tile  an d  b oom s an d  busts w ou ld  be m oderated , an d  th e  im pact on  
labour costs an d  firm s' incen tive  to  h ire  an d  fire w ou ld  be countercyclical.
B onuses can  h av e  p rocyclica l effect o n  em p lo y ees ' co n su m p tio n . 
Empirically, how ever, countercyclical effects are d o m in an t. W hile th e
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11. Project fin a n ce  le n d in g  in  m in in g  is a lso  stab iliz in g  as d eb t p a y m en ts accelerate  
or decelerate d ep en d in g  o n  cash  flo w  behaviour, w h ic h  b asica lly  reflects th e  price  
o f  th e  p roduct so ld . For m o re  deta ils see B u d n ev ich  e t a l.  (2001).
12. See C aballero (2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 1 ) for m ore details.
13. In fact w ith  a fiscal surplus it  is p ossib le  to  reduce th e  m on eta ry  base an d  in terest 
rates b y  p rep ayin g  p u b lic  extern al debt an d  red u cin g  th e  d em a n d  for fu n d in g .
14. Our analysis o f  cap ita l flow s assu m es n o  effect o n  th e  d em a n d  for m on ey .
15. This o n ly  takes p lace  if  tax  reven u e ex p a n sio n s ab ove G DP grow th  are cyclical.
16. See Frenkel an d  Razin (1989) for m ore details.
17. For m od e ls ex p la in in g  su ch  behaviour, see Bertola an d  D razen  (1993) and  
Sutherland (1995).
18. T his effect is in  ad d itio n  to  th e  typ ical key price m isa lig n m en ts an d  un su sta in ab le  
a ccu m u la tio n  o f  p u b lic  debt.
19. In fact th is  tax  rate f lex ib ility  w as n o t u sed  for cou n tercyclica l purposes.
2 0 . To m easure th e  structural b u d get an  estim ate  o f  p o te n tia l o u tp u t is required. T he  
first step  is to  estim ate  a C ob b -D o u g la s p ro d u ction  fu n c t io n  for th e  C h ilean  
e co n o m y , an d  th e  se co n d  is to  ca lcu late p o ten tia l o u tp u t as th e  va lu e o f  th e  p ro­
d u ctio n  fu n c t io n  eva lu ated  at trend  in p u t levels.
21 . Estim ate b y  th e  M in istry  o f  F inance.
22 . A lternative w ays o f  ca lcu la tin g  p o te n tia l o u tp u t grow th  can  b e fo u n d  in  M orandé  
and Vergara (1997) an d  Ffrench-D avis (2001).
23 . B u d n evich  an d  Le Fort (1997) prop ose  a lim ited  variation  o f  VAT o f  ± 1  per cen t.
2 4 . A ccording to  s im u la tio n  exercises co n d u cte d  for C h ile  b y  B u d n evich  an d  Le Fort 
(1997), a h y p o th e tica l cou n tercyclica l fiscal p o lic y  co u ld  reduce th e  variance o f  
G DP grow th  b y  2 4  per cen t. T his red u ction  in  th e  varian ce o f  GDP grow th  is 
d u e in  58  per c e n t  to  th e  stab ilization  o f  p ub lic  absorp tion  grow th , w h ile  th e  rest 
correspond  to  th e  o p era tion  o f  cou n tercyclica l stab iliz in g  taxes.
2 5 . T his practice is w idespread  in  cou n tr ies su ch  as Japan, Taiw an an d  Korea.
2 6 . A sim u la tio n  c o n d u cte d  b y  th e  B usiness C o u n cil o f  Australia (1999) suggests that  
i f  a b o n u s system  h a d  b een  op eratin g  at th e  tim e  o f  th e  last m ajor recession  there  
w o u ld  h ave b e e n  a m u c h  m ore m oderate fall in  e m p lo y m e n t in  Australia th a n  in  
fact to o k  p lace.
27 . See C aballero (2 0 0 0 , 2 001) for further details.
28. H ow ever in fla tion ary  bias d o es n o t  affect u n d erly in g  in fla tio n , relevant for p o licy  
decision s.
29. O n occasion , in  ad d itio n  to  trad itional m acro eco n o m ic  m an a g em en t instrum ents, 
Singapore has u sed  its co m p u lso ry  sav in gs v eh ic le , th e  C entral P rovident Fund, 
w ith  so m e success.
30 . C om p ulsory  p e n s io n  fu n d  system s u su ally  p roh ib it th e  u se  o f  accu m u la ted  fun d s  
as collateral for o b ta in in g  loan s.
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Financial Regulation and Supervision 
in Emerging Markets: The Experience 
of Latin America since the Tequila 
Crisis
B arbara  S ta llin gs a n d  R ogerio S tu d a r t
Introduction
The increasing in teg ra tio n  of in te rn a tio n a l financial m arkets poses new  
challenges to  dom estic  financial m arkets everywhere, b u t especially those  in  
em erging econom ies. The financia l crises of 1994-95 a n d  1997-98 sounded  
w ake-up calls to  Latin  A m erica an d  East Asia, respectively, ind ica ting  th a t 
regu la tion  an d  superv ision  needed  to  be s tren g th en ed  substantially . Since 
th e n  im p o rta n t steps have been  taken  to  im prove th e  rules an d  ensure th e ir  
im p lem en ta tio n , b u t financia l regu la tion  a n d  superv ision  do n o t take place 
in  a vacuum . O n th e  on e  h a n d  th e y  m ust be consisten t w ith  dom estic m acro- 
econom ic policies, an d  th ey  need  a supportive m acroeconom ic en v iro n m en t 
in  w h ich  to  operate  -  as th e  A rgentine crisis th a t began  in  2001 show s on ly  
to o  well. O n th e  o th e r  h a n d  th e y  have to  take in to  accoun t th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
rules set by  th e  Bank for In te rn a tio n a l Settlem ents (BIS), th e  In te rn a tio n a l 
M onetary  F und (IMF) an d  o th e r  in stitu tions.
The issue th a t links th is chapter w ith  th e  o thers in  th e  UNU/WIDER project 
is th a t  vo la tility  -  deriv ing  from  in te rn a tio n a l capital flows as well as m acro- 
econom ic trends in  ind iv idual countries -  is a lead ing  cause of financial 
crises. Problem s in  ind iv idual banks can  set off cha in  reactions because of 
th e  direct links be tw een  banks, an d  because of th e  effects th a t  b an k  collapses 
can  have o n  borrow ers' capacity  to  h o n o u r  th e ir  com m itm en ts. This is th e  
m ain  rationale for th e  concep t o f system ic risk. Financial regulation  is m ean t 
to  m itigate system ic risk by  im posing  restrictions o n  th e  w ay in  w h ich  banks 
finance th e ir  opera tions an d  allocate th e ir  portfolios. The aim  is to  ensure 
th a t they  conduct adequate assessm ents o f th e  risks im plied  in  the ir activities, 
m ake provisions for expected  losses an d  m a in ta in  en o u g h  capital to  absorb 
unexpected  losses.
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There is a good deal of evidence th a t financial activity  is h igh ly  procyclical. 
This prob lem  goes beyond  th e  usual asym m etric  in fo rm atio n  p rob lem  an d  
has to  do  w ith  a t least tw o processes. First, increasing confidence am o n g  
ind iv idual investors tends to  generate a self-fulfilling process of change in  
asset prices. As investors becom e m ore op tim istic , th e y  try  to  ex pand  th e ir  
h o ld ings of such assets a t a pace th a t  is far m ore rap id  th a n  th a t  o f th e ir  
supply. Boom s in  asset prices th e n  te n d  to  corroborate p ast expectations, 
lead ing  to  fu rth e r op tim ism . Ind iv idual risk assessm ent th u s  changes w ith  
th e  sta te o f collective en thusiasm . Second, banks are also procyclical, even 
th o u g h  th e  ch a in  of reaction  is slightly  different. W aves of op tim ism  in  th e  
b an k in g  sector lead to  an  expansion  of lend ing , w h ich  affects th e  level of 
aggregate d em an d  an d  th u s  th e  incom e a n d  cash flow  of consum ers an d  
th e  productive  sector. In tim es of expansion , real an d  financial asset prices 
increase, as does th e  value of collateral. T h rough  these  self-fulfilling p ro ­
cesses, banks te n d  to  increase th e ir  leverage a n d  th u s  th e ir  vu lnerab ility  to  
changes in  th e  variables th a t  affect th e ir  risks: econom ic activ ity  an d  level 
of em p loym en t (credit risk), borrow ing  in terest rates (liquidity  risk) an d  asset 
prices (m arket risk).
This chapter exam ines financial sector behaviour in  Latin America, a lthough  
m a n y  of th e  sam e problem s a n d  a ttem p ts  a t so lu tions can  be fo u n d  in  o th e r 
em erg ing  econom ies.1 It begins w ith  a brief look a t th e  structure o f th e  
financial sector as a w hole, w h ich  has changed  substan tia lly  over th e  last 
decade. D espite these  changes, banks co n tin u e  to  d o m in a te  th e  sector an d  
so th e  analysis focuses o n  th em . In  th is  con tex t, th e  ch ap te r tu rn s  n ex t to  
th e  regulatory  an d  supervisory system s for banks an d  to  developm ents since 
th e  M exican crisis in  1994-95. It also looks briefly  a t th e  new  in te rn a tio n a l 
guidelines being  p roposed  by  th e  BIS an d  th e  IMF to  investigate w hether 
th e y  can  help  shelter th e  b an k in g  system s from  th e  types of shock th e y  have 
suffered in  th e  recen t past, o r w h e th e r th e y  are likely to  create add itiona l 
problem s.
The ch ap te r th e n  looks a t case studies o f four of th e  m o st im p o rta n t 
coun tries in  th e  region: A rgentina, Brazil, C hile an d  M exico. By exam in ing  
th e  experiences of these  coun tries we can  gain  a b e tte r  idea of how  th e  
changes cam e abou t an d  th e  w ay in  w hich  ind iv idual co u n try  characteristics 
have affected th e  opera tion  of th e  financial system s. These tw o sections 
provide evidence th a t  b an k  regu la tion  an d  supervision in  Latin Am erica 
have im proved  in  recent years, b u t m u c h  rem ains to  be done. The chap te r 
concludes w ith  a set of policy  recom m endations.
We are certain ly  n o t th e  first to  discuss these  topics, as over th e  past few 
years th e re  has b een  an  explosion  of research o n  th e  financial sector in  
develop ing  countries, in c lu d in g  issues of regu la tion  an d  superv ision .2 We 
draw  o n  th e  theore tical an d  em pirical d im ensions of th is  litera tu re  w here 
relevant, an d  b rin g  it to  bear o n  th e  issues u n d e r consideration  in  th e  UNU/ 
WIDER research project.
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The financial sector in Latin America in the 1990s
Liberalization, crisis and rescue: some stylized facts
The essential background  for u n d ers ta n d in g  cu rren t developm ents in  th e  
financial sector in  Latin  Am erica is th e  financial liberalization  process, b o th  
dom estic  an d  in te rn a tio n a l, th a t  to o k  place in  th e  1980s a n d  1990s in  m ost 
countries. C hile was a n  im p o rta n t excep tion  in  th a t  b o th  liberalization  an d  
crisis preceded th o se  of its ne ighbours by  at least a decade.
M oving from  a system  in  w h ich  th e  au tho rities set in te rest rates, d irected  
cred it an d  held  a large share of b an k  deposits as requ ired  reserves, govern ­
m en ts  freed com m ercial banks to  m ake th e ir  ow n decisions o n  borrow ers, 
loan  vo lum e a n d  prices. At approx im ate ly  th e  sam e tim e, cap ita l accoun t 
liberalization  enab led  local banks to  engage in  transac tions in  foreign 
currencies an d  allow ed foreign in s titu tio n s to  en ter local m arkets. Such 
changes were frequen tly  m ade w ith o u t th e re  being  an  adequate  regulatory  
a n d  supervisory system  in  place, w h ich  co m p o u n d ed  th e  problem s for 
bankers w ho lacked sufficient experience in  co n d u c tin g  cred it analyses of 
local borrow ers a n d  w ere n o t conversan t w ith  th e  com plexities of in te r­
n a tio n a l financial m arkets.
The typical results w ere credit boom s, m ism atches betw een  m aturities 
an d  currencies, an d  even tua lly  bank ing  crises. As seen in  th e  em blem atic  
C h ilean  case (but also la ter in  M exico, East Asia an d  A rgentina), errors by 
dom estic  actors prov ided  th e  basis for such crises, an d  if th is  was com bined  
w ith  ex ternal shocks th e  s itu a tio n  becam e far m ore serious (see H eld an d  
Jim énez, 2001). G o v ern m en t rescues ten d ed  to  follow  a s tan d ard  procedure. 
In  th e  first in stance th e y  involved  th e  takeover of no n -p erfo rm in g  loans, th e  
recap ita lization  of banks a n d  liqu idations an d  m ergers, usually  invo lv ing  
foreign in stitu tions. Later, in  an  a ttem p t to  p rev en t fu tu re crises, regu la tion  
a n d  supervision w ere stepped  up, greater in fo rm ation  an d  transparency  w ere 
required  an d  deposit in su rance was som etim es p u t in  place.3 In  th e  process 
th e  characteristics o f th e  sector changed  significantly.
Characteristics of the new financial sector
The financial sectors in  Latin A m erican coun tries rem ain  bank-based, b u t 
th e y  have u n d erg o n e  a n u m b er of im p o rta n t changes in  recen t years. First, 
th e  size an d  d ep th  o f th e  financia l sector increased in  m ost coun tries du ring  
th e  1990s. In p art th is  was th e  resu lt of th e  d ram atic  dec line  in  in fla tion  
th ro u g h o u t th e  region, such  th a t  in  m ost coun tries prices rose a t single-digit 
rates com pared  w ith  th e  th ree- o r four-digit rates o ften  fo u n d  in  th e  1980s. 
Thus individuals, h ouseho lds a n d  firm s becam e m ore w illing  to  h o ld  m o n ey  
an d  o th e r  financial assets, p rov id ing  th e  necessary prerequisite  for th e  
developm en t o f robust financial system s. Better in s titu tio n s  com plem en ted  
th e  behav iou r of ind iv idual agents.4 Table 15.1 gives an  idea o f th e  ex ten t 
of th e  tren d  tow ards financia l deepening , u sing  M 2 as a share of GDP as
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Table 15.1 Money supply (M2) as share of GDP, 1992-2000 (per cent)
1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0
L a t in  A m e ric a
A rgentina 14 21 23 2 9 3 2
Brazil n .a . n .a . 28 31 29
C hile 38 37 43 46 50
C olom bia 20 20 20 24 26
C osta  Rica 32 32 33 33 35*
M exico 29 28 26 28 21
A s ia
Republic o f  Korea 39 41 43 58 80
M alaysia 72 80 92 95 103
P hilip p in es 36 47 56 61 62
T hailand 75 78 81 103 106
* Figure for 1999.
Source: Based on IMF international financial statistics.
an  indicator. It shows an  increase for four o f th e  six Latin A m erican countries 
during  th e  decade; th e  p ro m in en t exception  was Mexico. The biggest increase 
was in  A rgentina, a lth o u g h  C hile h ad  th e  h ighest levels. T he tab le  also 
show s data  for four Asian countries. The in te rreg ional con trast is strik ing in  
tw o senses: n o t on ly  w ere th e  levels h igher in  every case in  Asia, b u t th e  rate 
of increase was also higher.
Second, th e  ex isting  banks w ere allow ed to  engage in  new  activities, 
resu lting  in  th e  fo rm ation  of so-called un iversal banks. In  general th is  was 
th e  resu lt of th e  deregu lation  of b ank ing  activities, w h ich  led to  b an k  oper­
ations expand ing  in to  securities trad in g  an d  insurance an d  increased th e ir  
real estate activities. D eregulation  also enab led  banks to  ow n non -financia l 
firm s. This tre n d  m oved  in  ta n d em  w ith  events in  m a tu re  econom ies,5 
b u t un like  som e o f th e  latter, th e  securities m arkets in  em erg ing  econom ies 
w ere still very  u n d erd e v e lo p e d  a n d  shallow . T herefore m o st b a n k  p o r t­
fo lio  diversification  was in to  short-term  securities, in su rance an d  real estate 
activities.
Third, foreign in s titu tio n s  becam e increasing ly  sign ifican t actors in  th e  
financial sector. T heir greater ro le was p a rt of th e  liberalization  process, as 
new  sectors w ere o pened  to  foreign partic ipa tion . Three vehicles w ere used 
by  foreign banks an d  financial service firm s to  en ter develop ing-coun try  
m arkets: privatizations, m ergers an d  acquisitions, an d  greenfield investm ent. 
C onsequently , as can  be seen in  Table 15.2, foreign assets as a share of to ta l 
assets rose substan tia lly  in  all seven Latin A m erican coun tries for w h ich  
da ta  is available (Argentina, Brazil, C hile, C olom bia, M exico, Peru an d  
Venezuela); th e  increase for M exico w ould  be m u ch  greater if th e  recen t
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Tab le  1 5 .2  Foreign bank  assets as share o f  to ta l bank  assets, 
1 9 9 4 -2 0 0 0  (per cent)
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
L a t in  A m e ric a
A rgentina 17.9 4 8 .6 49
Brazil 8 .4 16.8 23
C hile 16.3 5 3 .6 54
C olom bia 6 .2 17.8 26
M exico 1.0 18.8 24
Peru 6 .7 33 .4 40
V enezuela 0 .3 41 .9 42
C e n tra l Europe
C zech R epublic 5 .8 49 .3 66
H ungary 19.8 5 6 .6 62
P o la n d 2.1 5 2 .8 70
Turkey 2 .7 1.7 n .a .
A s ia
Korea 0 .8 4 .3 3
M alaysia 6 .8 11.5 18
T hailand 0 .5 5 .6 12
Sources: IMF (2000: 153) for 1994 and 1999; BIS (2001: 25) for 2000.
sale of th e  coun try 's  second  largest b an k  w ere inc luded  in  th e  table. It is 
in te resting  to  n o te  th a t  th e re  w ere sim ilar trends in  Eastern Europe b u t 
n o t in  Asia.6
Fourth, the re  was a decrease in  th e  nu m b er of banks -  especially in  Latin 
America an d  Asia -  as a result of th e  m ergers an d  acquisitions just m en tioned , 
inc lud ing  privatiza tions (Table 15.3). W hat is som ew hat surprising  is th a t  
th is  process d id  n o t resu lt in  a significant increase in  co n cen tra tio n . Indeed  
in  Asia an d  Eastern Europe the re  appears to  have been  a decrease in  concen ­
tra tion . In  Latin Am erica th e  share of th e  largest ten  banks rose, b u t n o t by  
a large am o u n t. This im plies th a t  th e  in s titu tio n s th a t d isappeared  from  th e  
m arket were th e  sm allest ones.
Fifth, th e re  was som e expansion  of capital m arkets. This d eve lopm en t h ad  
several causes: th e  increase in  portfo lio  flows to  th e  region u n til 1998; th e  
p rivatization  of social security  an d  th e  deregu lation  of private in s titu tio n a l 
investors, w hich  led to  an  increase of investm ents in  securities; an d  th e  v ir­
tuous circle created  by  th e  process o f stab ilization  a n d  securities m arket 
expansion  in  som e econom ies in  th e  region. Table 15.4 show s o n e  ind icato r 
o f th is  trend: th e  vo lum e of deb t securities issued in  dom estic  m arkets (both  
in  abso lu te am o u n ts  an d  as a share of th e  w orld  to ta l) betw een  1989 an d  
2000. W hile th is  indicates th a t such issues in  Latin America expanded  rapidly 
d u rin g  th e  period, m ore  th a n  doub ling  betw een  1992 an d  2000, th e  vast
Table 15 .3  Indicators of concentration in the banking sector, 1994 and 2000 (share in total deposits)
1 9 9 4 2 0 0 0
N u m b e r La rg e s t Largest H H  In d e x N u m b e r Larg e s t Larg e s t H H  In d e x
o f  ban ks 3  ban ks 1 0  banks o f  banks 3  b an ks 1 0  banks
L a t in  A m e ric a
A rgentina 2 0 6 39.1 73.1 756.9 113 3 9 .8 80 .7 8 6 5 .7
Brazil 245 4 9 .9 78.8 1 2 2 0 .9 193 5 5 .2 85 .6 1 2 7 8 .6
C hile 37 39 .5 79.1 8 3 0 .4 29 39 .5 8 2 .0 8 5 7 .9
M ex ico 36 48 .3 80 .8 1 0 0 5 .4 23 56 .3 94 .5 1 3 6 0 .5
V enezuela 43 43 .9 78.6 9 7 9 .2 42 4 6 .7 75.7 9 23 .1
A s ia
R epublic o f  Korea 30 5 2 .8 86 .9 1 2 6 3 .6 13 43 .5 77.7 8 9 9 .7
M alaysia 25 4 4 .7 78.3 9 1 8 .9 10 4 3 .4 82 .2 1 0 0 5 .1
P h ilip p in es 41 3 9 .0 80 .3 819 .7 27 3 9 .6 73.3 7 89 .9
T hailand 15 47 .5 83.5 1 0 3 1 .7 13 41 .7 79.4 8 5 4 .4
C e n tra l Europe
C zech  R epublic 55 72 .0 97 .0 2 1 0 1 .5 42 6 9 .7 90.3 1 757 .8
H ungary 40 5 7 .9 84 .7 1 578 .8 39 51 .5 80 .7 1 2 4 1 .8
Poland 82 52 .8 86 .7 1 2 6 3 .6 77 43 .5 77.7 8 9 9 .7
Turkey 72 4 0 .7 79.1 9 5 7 .2 79 35 .9 72.0 7 1 0 .2
Source: IMF (2001: 11).
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Table 15.4 Outstanding amounts of debt securities issued in domestic markets, 1989-2000 (US$ billion and per cent)
US$ billion Percentage of total
1989 1992 1997 2000 1989 1992 1997 2000
All issuers 14 149.7 18 713.2 25 572.7 29 951.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
OECD (excl. Mexico) 13 790.0 18 231.8 24 631.3 28 852.9 97.5 97.4 96.3 96.3
France 605.8 956.3 1 102.5 1 068.1 4.3 5.1 4.3 3.6
Germany 729.4 1 260.2 1 732.1 1 688.9 5.2 6.7 6.8 5.6
Japan 2 558.5 3 355.5 4 399.3 6 088.8 18.1 17.9 17.2 20.3
United States 6 682.2 8 546.5 12 071.7 14 571.6 47.2 45.7 47.2 48.7
Latin America 101.2 190.5 448.7 446.3 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.5
Argentina 44.7 15.5 27.3 38.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Brazil n.a. 111.0 344.5 297.0 n.a. 0.6 1.3 1.0
Chile 7.0 17.4 36.5 34.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mexico 49.5 46.6 38.5 72.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Peru n.a. n.a. 1.9 3.6 n.a. n.a. 0.0 0.0
Source: B a s e d  o n  BIS d a t a  (w w w .b i s . o r g / p u b l / q c s v 0 2 0 3 /a n x l 6 a . c s v ).
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majority of the increase was due to a single country -  Brazil. Moreover the 
region's share of total issues remained minuscule.
All these trends have implications for regulation and supervision. The 
risks associated with the increasing strength of financial crises, a greater mix 
of activities, the increasing operational complexity of the activities under­
taken by banks and a bigger foreign presence can all complicate the tasks of 
regulators and supervisors. A particular danger in recent years has been the 
increased occurrence of 'twin crises': simultaneous crises in the banking and 
foreign exchange markets. As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue, when  
two crises take place simultaneously they are far more severe than when they 
occur in isolation.
As a consequence of these new challenges, regulators and supervisors must 
be better trained, and in some cases they will need greater support from 
their governments. At the same time the new circumstances may also offer 
advantages if the banks see it as being in their collective interest to improve 
their image and if foreign supervisory institutions provide useful support. 
Insofar as the local financial sector becomes more sophisticated, there 
will also be a need for coordination among the regulators of the various 
components.
Regulation and supervision: the state o f  the art
Drawing on an important new database created by the World Bank,7 we 
can sketch out the current situation with respect to the regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector in many Latin American countries at the 
end of the 1990s.
Table 15.5 provides a set of indicators on banking regulation in seven 
Latin American countries, plus the United States as a benchmark. The most 
widely known indicator is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement, 
currently set at 8 per cent by the BIS through the Basel I agreement. While 
the United States sets its minimum at the 8 per cent level, as do Chile and 
Mexico, the other Latin American countries have higher ratios, with Brazil 
and Argentina at the top of the list with 11 per cent and 11.5 per cent 
respectively. A similar situation is found with the actual risk-adjusted ratio. 
With the exception of Bolivia, all Latin American countries maintain higher 
ratios than the 12 per cent found in the United States. Again, Argentina and 
Brazil have the highest ratios.8
Several other indexes are presented in Table 15.5. The capital stringency 
index includes adherence to the BIS guidelines, but also various measures of 
the degree to which leverage potential is limited (for precise definitions see 
Barth eta l, 2001a). With a range from 1 to 6, where 6 is the most stringent 
and the US benchmark is at 4, only Argentina among the Latin American 
countries has a score of 6, followed by Bolivia and Peru; Venezuela is 
last with a score of 2. The capital regulation index combines the previous 
index with one measuring the type of assets that can count toward the
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Table 15.5 Bank regulation: selected indicators




11.5 11.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 9.1 10.0 8.0
Actual risk-adjusted 
capital ratio (%)
16.4 15.8 11.4 12.3 13.0 12.7 14.0 12.0
Capital stringency 
index
6.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0
Capital regulation 
index






1.8 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.0 2.5 3.0
Source: B a r th  et al. ( 2 0 0 1 a ) .
capital-asset ratio, with a range of 1 to 9. On this indicator Argentina 
and Bolivia have the highest degree of stringency, followed by Mexico, with 
Venezuela again at the rear. The activities and ownership index deals with 
the types of activity that banks can engage in and restrictions on who can 
own a bank. This qualitative index ranges from 1 to 4, with the United States 
at 3. Unlike other indicators, Argentina allows the greatest freedom to banks, 
while Mexico and Bolivia are the most restrictive.
It is clear from the data in Table 15.5 that regulation has many dimensions, 
with some countries being stricter on some than on others. Nonetheless 
there is some indication of a cross-country pattern. To measure this we con­
structed a summary index (the overall regulation index, ORI) by dividing 
the values in each row of Table 15.5 by the average of that row and then 
summing them up by country. Figure 15.1 presents the result of these 
calculations.
The figure shows that regulation is strictest in Argentina, followed by 
Bolivia; Venezuela is the least restrictive. Nonetheless it is important to 
note that the United States has a lower level of restrictions than do many 
Latin American countries. Likewise Chile, which is commonly regarded as 
having the best regulatory and supervisory system in Latin America (Held 
and Jiménez, 2001), does not rank highly on the overall index. It could be 
hypothesized that an inverted U-shaped relationship is involved, whereby 
banks become more self-regulating after some level of development (and/or 
some minimal level of experience) is attained. Thus lower scores do not 
necessarily indicate poor regulation and supervision. On the contrary they 
may indicate that a country has advanced to the point where it can allow
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Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Mexico Peru Venezuela US
Figure 15.1 Overall regulation index (ORI)
Source: B a s e d  o n  T a b le  1 5 .5 ;  s e e  t e x t  f o r  m e t h o d o l o g y .
individual financial institutions a little more autonomy with respect to 
regulation, or for market-based regulation to play a larger role. At the same 
time it is clear that very strong macroeconomic shocks can undermine even 
the highest scores and lead to banking crises, as the Argentine situation in 
2001-2 shows.
Table 15.6 uses the same data to examine trends in bank supervision. 
While more attention is typically devoted to the matter of regulation, the 
best regulations are of little use if they are not enforced. The number of 
professional supervisors per bank varies widely, from 0.1 in the United States 
to 11.5 in Mexico, but there seems to be only a very weak relationship 
between the number of supervisors and their attributes, as measured by the 
official supervisory index.9 The latter indicator is the sum of 16 measures 
of supervisory power to deal with abnormal situations and the degree of 
discretion supervisors have in such circumstances. The less the discretion 
and the greater the power, the higher the index. With the United States 
at 14, only Brazil has a higher ranking, while Bolivia and Mexico have the 
lowest. A subset of the 16 items on the supervisory power index is found in 
the index of forbearance discretion. Argentinean supervisors have the least 
discretion, while Chilean and Venezuelan supervisors have the most; the 
United States is in the middle.
The last two items in Table 15.6 deal with what the World Bank calls 
'private monitoring'. The index on this factor measures whether an external 
audit is required, the percentage of the ten largest banks that are rated 
by international rating agencies, the degree of accounting disclosure and 
director liability, and the lack of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. On a 
scale of 1 to 8, the United States, Argentina, Chile and Peru score 8, while
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Table IS.6 Bank supervision: selected indicators




2.4 4.0 6.0 3.0 11.5 3.6 1.0 0.1
Official supervisory 
index
12.0 15.0 11.0 13.0 10. 14.0 14.0 14.0
Prompt corrective 
action index
n.a. 6.0 n.a. 3.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.0
Restructuring power 
index
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Declaring insolvent 
power index
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Forbearance 
discretion index
3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0
Supervisor tenure 
index





3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0
Percentage of top 




100.0 100.0 20.0 50.0 n.a. 50.0 40.0 100.0
Private monitoring 
index
8.0 8.0 7.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 6.0 8.0
Source: B a r th  etal. ( 2 0 0 1 a ) .
Mexico and Venezuela are lowest at 6. The percentage of top banks rated by 
international agencies is 100 per cent for the United States, Argentina and 
Brazil, and 20-50 per cent for the other countries in our sample.
To obtain a summary view of supervision in each economy we created an 
overall supervision index (OSI), following the same methodology used to 
construct the ORI. Figure 15.2 shows the OSI values for the countries in our 
sample. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have the highest ratings (the strictest 
supervisory standards), with Venezuela at the low end, along with Bolivia 
(which paradoxically has a comparatively high ORI). As with the overall 
index on regulation, the United States and Chile rank lower than the Latin 
American countries with the highest scores, again suggesting the inverted-U 
interpretation.
The data presented in Tables 15.5 and 15.6 and in Figures 15.1 and 15.2 
have several problems: they represent only a single point in time, they are
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Argentina Brazil Bolivia Mexico Venezuela
Figure 15.2 Overall supervision index (OSI) 
Source: B a s e d  o n  T a b le  1 5 .6 ;  s e e  t e x t  f o r  m e t h o d o l o g y .
overview measures that summarize a large amount of information in a single 
number, and they give a somewhat mechanical impression of a very com­
plex problem. To obtain a better idea of some of the details as well as the 
changes in the regulatory and supervisory systems in recent years, we have 
to turn to other studies of the region. We shall consider two such studies 
before turning to our own country analysis.
In one of the most important studies, Aguirre (2000) stresses that sig­
nificant changes had been made in banking legislation in almost all of the 
17 countries he surveyed. In general, these changes were made in response to 
crises or serious problems in the countries' banking systems. He identifies the 
key changes as less public-sector ownership, greater foreign participation, 
broader scope for banking activities and improvements in the supervisory 
and regulatory authority. With respect to the latter, he focuses mainly on 
institutional factors, such as the agency that performs the supervision and the 
scope of the mandate of such institutions (only banking, or also insurance 
and securities activities). He found a wide difference across countries, but 
admits that the literature is not conclusive on the relative merits of different 
systems.
The second study, by Livacic and Saez (2000), focuses specifically on 
supervision. Again noting the improvements during the 1990s, the authors 
emphasize the gap between the rules on the books and the ability of super­
visors to enforce them. Examples include loans to 'related' clients and the 
treatment of overdue loans. They suggest various remedies, including the 
provision of more resources (financial and human) and greater autonomy 
for supervisors.
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Basel II and the IMF financial sector assessment programmes
Most of the changes in bank regulation and supervision in Latin America 
have been made in response to events in individual countries or, to some 
extent, in the region more broadly (especially the Mexican crisis of 1994-95). 
Nonetheless developments at the international level have also played 
a part. In particular the BIS and the Basel Committee on Banking Super­
vision have been influential in putting these issues onto the agenda and 
homogenizing the standards in developed and developing countries. At the 
moment, however, the international standards themselves are in a state of 
flux and the proposed changes pose new challenges to developing country 
institutions.
The Basel Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel I), introduced in 1988, was 
a milestone in banking regulation. The 8 per cent minimum capital 
requirement for internationally active banks, which was adopted by over 
100 countries (including most in Latin America), clearly contributed to 
financial stability. Nonetheless the criticism began to be voiced that the 
approach was too rigid and simplistic and that it did not correspond 
to actual levels of risk. Developing countries were especially concerned 
that the rules provided incentives for short-term rather than long-term  
lending.
Basel II was meant to correct the problems identified by introducing 
more complex alternatives for determining risk, including the use of models 
developed by individual banks. Experts studying the potential impact on 
developing countries feared that the new approach could have a negative 
impact on those economies in two ways. First, the new risk categories were 
likely to lead to a significant decline in lending to developing countries or 
greatly increase the cost. Second, the new system would be inherently pro­
cyclical, increasing the frequency of crises that have an especially negative 
impact on the developing world. Partly because of these criticisms, the 
implementation of Basel II was postponed to allow further study (for further 
details see Chapter 10).
In a parallel initiative the IMF and World Bank introduced some 60 stand­
ards and codes (ROSCs) to increase financial stability by offering policy 
benchmarks. These have been incorporated into the IMF's surveillance 
of member countries' economies through the financial sector assessment 
programmes. While agreeing that the measures could be helpful, developing- 
country representatives have complained that they had no say in determining 
the standards and that implementing all of them would be an extremely 
expensive undertaking. At the same time they fear that not being able (or 
willing) to comply would further reduce their chance of obtaining finance. 
(For a discussion of the codes and standards from a developing country 
perspective see IMF Survey, 2 April 2001.)
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N ational responses to  recen t f in an c ia l crises
Financial structure and changes before the Tequila crisis
Moving beyond regional trends, a consideration of individual country cases 
can deepen our understanding of the reform process as well as the problems 
that remain. The four countries that have been selected -  Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico -  have much in common but also important differences 
in timing, operational characteristics and the macroeconomic environment 
in which the financial sector operates.
All four economies went through a process of financial liberalization at 
some point between the 1970s and the 1990s, which resulted in changes in 
the way banks operated and eventually in banking crises. Chile was the first 
to embark on the liberalization process, beginning shortly after the military 
coup in 1973. Changes included the freeing of interest rates, eliminating 
directed credit, reducing the reserve requirements and relaxing regulation 
and supervision more generally. As in the other three cases it was followed 
by a rapid increase in lending and then a banking crisis in 1981-84. The 
crisis forced the authorities to take immediate action, and they restructured 
the banking sector by intervening in 21 private financial institutions, 
including the two largest banks in the country. Later 14 of these institutions 
were liquidated and the rest were rehabilitated and privatized again.
Soon after the crisis, policy makers introduced changes in regulation and 
supervision that drew on the lessons learnt from the previous experience. 
The crisis thus led to a modern system of prudential regulation and increased 
supervisory capacity by the state. A new banking law was promulgated in 
1986, encompassing a lower debt-to-capital ratio, reserve requirements 
according to banks' leverage position, mandatory information disclosure to 
the public, a partial public guarantee of deposits, restrictions on loans to 
'related' clients, and a strict separation between the core business of banks 
and their subsidiaries. After the introduction of the restrictions, external 
financial liberalization was implemented gradually. Firms were initially 
allowed to issue bonds and shares in external markets, and subsequently 
institutional investors (banks, pension fund managers and insurance com­
panies) were permitted to hold external assets and capital controls were 
gradually eased. Further changes in 1997 included adoption of the Basel 
Committee's 8 per cent rule (for more details see Budnevich, 2000; Field and 
Jiménez, 2001).
The other three countries began the liberalization process a decade or 
more later as part of a broader economic reform package that was typical of 
the region (see Stallings and Peres, 2000). The measures introduced were 
similar to those in Chile in the 1970s, but each country's measures had 
individual characteristics that distinguished its package from the others.
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After a long period of recovering from the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico 
embarked on an ambitious financial liberalization process in 1988; interest 
rates were freed, the liquidity requirements were eliminated, credit alloca­
tion directives were abolished and the previously nationalized banks were 
reprivatised. The response of the banking system was almost immediate. 
There was a rapid growth of lending (around 30 per cent per year in real 
terms from 1989-94), and the share of loans to the private sector rose from 
10 per cent to 40 per cent of GDP (Yacamán, 2001). But as admitted by most 
analysts, the first years of privatization were characterized by 'reckless -  
sometimes fraudulent -  lending' (EIU, 2001; 7) due to poor regulation and 
supervision, weak credit-analysis procedures and lack of internal controls. 
As lending outpaced deposits, banks put themselves in a dangerous position 
by funding their shortfall through interbank borrowing, mainly from foreign 
banks. As a consequence non-performing loans increased from around 2 per 
cent of total loans in 1990 to 9 per cent in 1994, prior to the peso crisis 
(McQuerry, 1999).
In addition to these micro-level problems, macroeconomic policies also 
contributed to the build-up of the financial crisis. The use of an exchange 
rate anchor to control inflation led to overvaluation of the peso, large 
current account deficits and strong capital inflows. In the short run these 
flows stimulated growth of credit, but when they were reversed they set the 
stage for a twin crisis, as discussed earlier.
Argentina's financial liberalization, which began in the early 1990s,10 had 
some of the characteristics of that of Mexico. In particular liberalization -  
which lifted most of the controls on the domestic and foreign operations 
of the domestic financial system that had been imposed during the period 
of high inflation and external constraints -  took place at the same time as 
an exchange-rate-based stabilization programme (the Plan de Convertibilidad). 
The international situation in the early 1990s, which was marked by rising 
liquidity, declining international interest rates and increased access to the 
financial markets of industrial countries, led to a surge of optimism in the 
Argentinean markets. Simultaneously price stability and a fixed exchange 
rate regime abruptly reduced both inflation and exchange rate risk. These 
factors created fertile ground for the rapid growth of financial activity, but 
also led to maturity and exchange rate mismatches.
The Argentinean financial sector enjoyed an impressive recovery until 
1994: deposits and loans grew rapidly, while peso and dollar lending rates 
fell significantly, although they remained very high in comparison with 
those in most developed economies and a significant number of developing 
economies. These improvements were the result of several important events. 
First, a process of monetization -  which normally follows price stability -  led 
to the rapid growth of deposits in the banking sector. Second, there was an 
increase of foreign capital inflows, which raised confidence in the Convert­
ibility Plan, and increased banks' propensity to make dollar-denominated
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loans and borrowers' willingness to borrow in dollars, thus leading to the 
rapid dollarization of both liabilities and assets in the banking sector. Third, 
the increased competition among banks and the improvement of overall 
confidence reduced banks' liquidity preference, resulting in a rapid expan­
sion of credit. In the case of domestic banks, this increased liquidity caused 
them to be less careful in their lending strategies and hence their portfolio 
quality deteriorated.
Brazil also went through significant liberalizing bank reforms before 1994, 
although it started from a stronger initial position than the other countries. 
In this case the initial liberalization preceded stabilization. Three important 
regulatory shifts marked the development of Brazil's financial system in 
the early 1990s: external liberalization and the banking reform in 1988, and 
acceptance of the Basel capital-adequacy ratio in 1994. The Brazilian reform 
had immediate consequences. From 1989 there was a sharp reduction in the 
number of commercial banks, investment banks and finance companies, 
most of which became universal banks. An important step in the process 
of liberalization was to allow the expansion of existing foreign financial 
institutions and the entry of new ones (especially commercial and invest­
ment banks). These changes should not prompt an overestimation of the 
importance of the reform, whose real significance was that it consolidated a 
trend that was already underway in the 1980s: the overwhelming dominance 
of universal banks that operated with a very short time horizon.
The Tequila crisis and its effects on  the stability o f the banking system  
The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked a crisis that 
severely damaged the country's banking system and had ramifications else­
where in the region and the world. Because Mexican regulations limited 
banks' foreign exchange exposure, the problems caused by the devaluation 
were less significant than in other cases (although loopholes enabled banks 
to get around some of the restrictions, see O'Dougherty and Schwartz, 
2001). Several indirect problems were also serious. These included a sharp 
drop in economic activity, a hike in interest rates and an increase in the 
demand for dollars. The consequence was a growing inability among 
debtors to service their obligations and therefore a further rise in the already 
high number of non-performing loans. Initially, however, the authorities 
thought the banking crisis would be limited in scope because of the restric­
tions on foreign exchange exposure. In addition the lack of an established 
regulatory authority meant that information was scarce. Thus the Mexican 
approach was incremental, with solutions being adopted as new problems 
appeared (McQuerry, 1999).
The other country in the region that was particularly affected by the 
Tequila crisis was Argentina, whose banking system was also hit hard. The 
currency board system in Argentina meant that the domestic monetary 
authorities had no other way of preventing potential capital outflows than
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allowing domestic rates to rise in 1995. This provoked an increase in arrears 
and defaults and reduced the confidence of depositors, leading to significant 
withdrawals of deposits. Even though the Convertibility Plan had been 
successful for almost five years, depositors showed their fear of devaluation 
by withdrawing their dollar deposits. Thus in addition to a liquidity problem 
the banks faced increased exchange rate mismatching. The combination of 
deteriorating asset quality and loss of deposits revealed the vulnerable side 
of the seemingly solid Argentinean system. In order to avoid a full banking 
crisis the Argentinean central bank (the BCRA) began injecting liquidity 
through its discount window, backed by the sale of dollar-denominated 
bonds (which in turn led to increased exchange-rate exposure on the part of 
the government) and reducing the reserve requirements for banks. Despite 
these steps by the BCRA, the accumulated losses amounted to 12 per cent of 
the banking sector's net worth by the first quarter of 1995.
Unlike in Argentina, the causes of the 1995 banking crisis in Brazil 
preceded the Tequila crisis, although the latter exacerbated the problems. 
The fundamental reasons had to do with the abrupt adjustment that the 
banks had to make due to the success of the 1994 stabilization programme 
(the Plano Real). During the 1980s banks earned substantial profits from 
inflationary gains associated with the double intermediary role of public 
debt that the Brazilian banks enjoyed during the long period of high infla­
tion and indexation. The abrupt decline in these gains and the high fixed 
costs in Brazil's banking sector led private banks to expand credit, which 
prompted the boom in consumer demand that followed the 1994 stabiliza­
tion programme.11 The rapid and sometimes careless expansion of credit, 
the high interest rate policy and rising unemployment provoked a rise in 
non-performing loans and arrears. The monetary authorities tried to restrict 
this expansion by setting very high reserve requirements, but these failed 
to constrain credit expansion. In addition interest rates were maintained at 
high levels, which created an increasingly dangerous mix of credit expansion 
and high lending rates. The public banks faced additional problems due 
to their limited capacity to restructure their portfolios (dominated by state 
government debt) and their high operational costs (in view of the job 
security of many of their employees). The Tequila crisis was the last straw in 
a process of increasing bank problems.
Chile was much less vulnerable than the other countries for two reasons. 
First, its macroeconomic performance was barely affected by the Tequila crisis 
due to its lower external debt, strong trade balance and sound domestic 
fundamentals (for example high growth and fiscal balance). Second, as 
explained above, the Chilean banking system had already gone through 
major changes in supervision, regulation and structure. As a matter of fact, 
from 1991 onwards bank activity started expanding at a rate that was slightly 
higher than that of GDP, such that the ratio between loans and GDP grew 
from 45 per cent in 1990 to 66 per cent in 1999 -  much higher than the peak
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achieved in 1984. Other indicators also point to an improvement in the 
efficiency and further consolidation of the banking sector (Ahumada and 
Marshall, 2001: 46-7).
Regulatory changes after the 1994-95 crisis
The Tequila crisis revealed the strengths and vulnerabilities of the banking 
systems of the four countries. The speed and depth of the changes in 
regulation and supervision varied with the information available to the 
authorities, their perception of the severity of the problems confronting them  
and the instruments they had at hand. In this context Chile's situation -  
with almost no impact on the banking sector -  stands out as completely 
different from the other three cases and shows the importance of its 
earlier steps to clean up the banking sector, establish a modern regulatory 
and supervisory system and maintain comprehensive real macroeconomic 
balances.
In Argentina after 1995, given the characteristics of its monetary and 
exchange rate regime, it became clear that (1) its banking sector was highly 
vulnerable to changes in domestic interest rates, exchange rates and depositor 
confidence; (2) domestic banks were more vulnerable than foreign-owned 
ones; and (3) since the capacity of the monetary authorities to intervene 
in periods of crisis was very limited under the Convertibility Plan, some 
additional mechanisms were needed to increase systemic liquidity (especially 
for dollar deposits). In order to overcome these weaknesses a set of measures 
was introduced to restructure the sector by injecting more capital, promoting 
mergers and acquisitions, and creating incentives for the expansion of 
foreign banks.
Of the most important regulatory changes, five should be emphasized. 
First, the Fondo Fiduciario de Capitalización Bancaria was a full restructuring 
programme supported by BCRA funds and aimed at capitalizing and strength­
ening the banking sector by providing incentives for the acquisition of 
banks in trouble by those with a more solid market position. Second, the 
Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos, a deposit insurance scheme financed by 
private funds, was aimed at increasing depositors' confidence and the 
banking safety net. Third, a new system of reserve requirements was intro­
duced in order to reduce leverage and improve safety. This new system 
widened the scope of the previous policy to encompass all bank liabilities, 
rather than just sight and saving deposits as was the case earlier. Fourth, the 
Programa Contigente de Pases was an innovative mechanism to increase the 
systemic liquidity of the banking sector by establishing contracts between 
the BCRA and international banks, in which the former acquired the right 
to sell dollar-denominated government bonds and mortgage-based securities 
to the latter. This meant that the participating banks provided a short-term 
overdraft line that gave the BCRA a lender-of-last resort facility in times 
of crisis.12 Finally, measures were introduced to stimulate the continuing
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process of mergers and acquisitions and to expand the share of foreign 
banks in the domestic market.
The results of these measures initially seemed quite positive in many 
respects. In the second half of the 1990s private bank provisions in relation 
to total credit increased substantially, liquidity within the banking sector 
rose, and the capital-adequacy ratio was maintained at levels far beyond 
those established by the Basel I guidelines. In addition foreign banks more 
than doubled their share of the market between 1994 and 1999. In sum the 
banking sector became more solid, which explains why its ability to deal 
with the emerging market crises that characterized the late 1990s was far 
superior to what had been observed after the Mexican crisis. Nonetheless 
macroeconomic policies -  and especially the Convertibility Plan -  eventually 
undermined these improvements and the banking sector entered a severe 
crisis after the devaluation of 2002. It will clearly take many years to recover.
Brazil also took important steps to strengthen its banking system, but 
as mentioned above, these were not prompted by the Tequila crisis itself. 
During the first three years of the successful stabilization programme the 
central bank intervened in 40 banks (of the 271 that existed in July 1994): 
29 were liquidated, four failed, six were placed under temporary adminis­
tration and one continued to operate. A further 32 banks went through 
a restructuring process that resulted in mergers and acquisitions, some of 
them with government support through the bank restructuring programme 
(PROER), which included fiscal incentives for banks to acquire other finan­
cial institutions and for the promotion of mergers (among domestic banks) 
and acquisitions (by foreign banks). Another programme (the PRO ES) was 
directed at the restructuring of the public financial institutions, which 
were in particular difficulty. This facility was created by the central bank to 
provide loans to federal and state banks to speed up their restructuring and 
in some cases their privatization or liquidation. In the process of restruc­
turing, foreign banks were allowed to enter the economy. The number and 
participation of foreign banks increased significantly after 1995, presenting 
a competitive challenge to the Brazilian banks.
In addition to the restructuring of the banking sector, a number of com­
plementary regulatory measures were decreed in late 1995. These included 
the establishment of a deposit insurance fund that guaranteed up to R$20 000 
per depositor, and increased capital requirements for the establishment of 
new banks. Separately, new central bank regulations were introduced to 
promote accountability and avoid bailouts by ensuring that the shareholders 
of institutions that were sold or transferred were liable for any previous 
wrongdoings. Perhaps the most significant of these additional measures was 
a 'preventative' law that gave the central bank authorization to restructure 
financial institutions that were not meeting system requirements or were 
demonstrating financial problems. While a form of this law had existed 
previously, and the central bank was authorized to place banks under one of 
three forms of special regime (a temporary system of special administration,
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intervention, or extrajudicial liquidation), these laws had lacked a preventa­
tive character. Now the central bank was empowered to prescribe preventative 
remedies (for example increased capitalization, the transfer of stockholder 
control, or mergers and acquisitions) for faltering banks, and certain assets 
of failing banks could be confiscated. An indicator of the effectiveness of the 
changes was the lack of a serious banking crisis in the face of the devaluation 
of 1999.
Mexico moved more slowly than Argentina and Brazil in dealing with its 
financial crisis. Indeed Mexico has had constant banking difficulties since 
1995 and is still involved in a costly restructuring of its banking system. The 
government set up several programmes to help recapitalize and strengthen 
the banks. The best known was administered by the deposit insurance agency 
FOBAPROA, which involved the purchase of the banks' non-performing 
loans to clean up their balance sheets. In addition a number of banks were 
intervened in and later resold, leading to a dramatic increase in foreign par­
ticipation in the banking sector (Graf, 1999).
In December 1998, new financial legislation was approved by the Congress 
and duly implemented. Chief among the changes were:
• A new deposit insurance system, which ended the de facto unlimited 
deposit insurance that had existed previously and increased the oversight 
of the deposit insurance agency.
• Stricter accounting standards, which increased the transparency of credit 
operations for both supervisors and the public, imposed stricter stan­
dards for handling overdue loans and substantially increased loan-loss 
provisions.
• A series of measures to improve lending practices and new laws on credit 
transactions to speed up the process of foreclosing on assets and allowing 
for a wider range of property to be used as collateral.
• Stricter rules on capital quality (EIU, 2000).
In addition, in order to reduce possible future exchange rate mismatching 
the Bank of Mexico lowered the existing ceilings on foreign currency liabil­
ities and imposed compulsory liquidity coefficients in foreign currency 
(Yacamán, 2001). In the aftermath of the crisis, banking activity as a 
percentage of GDP declined between 1994 and 1996, and only in 1996 did 
overall lending start to grow again. Lending to the private sector only began 
to rise in 2000.
C onclusions: po licy  lessons from  th e  L atin  A m erican experience
As we have seen through the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, managing the financial system is an enormous challenge, especially 
in developing countries. The inherent fragility of the financial sector is mag­
nified by the volatility of capital flows and the macroeconomic shocks that
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have been discussed in earlier chapters. The resulting instability mounts as 
the problems of individual banks quickly spread to other institutions and to 
the real economy as well. While such problems have always existed, new  
ones are continually arising with the increased integration of international 
capital markets.
It is important to stress, as we have throughout the chapter, that financial 
instability is not an isolated problem but is closely related to macroeco­
nomic policy and performance. The relationship runs in both directions. On 
the one hand financial crises undermine attempts to maintain stable output 
growth rates and thereby increase employment opportunities and reduce 
poverty. They are also extremely expensive and can hobble government 
finances and private sector viability for years afterwards. On the other hand 
macroeconomic policy can bring about financial instability or even crises. 
For example raising interest rates can create problems for the financial sector, 
especially if it is already in a weakened condition. Likewise devaluing the 
local currency is very risky if the financial sector is heavily indebted in 
foreign currency.
Among our cases, Chile provides a good example of the way in which a 
well-functioning financial system can be an important asset for an economy. 
After the significant corrections made after the deep financial crisis in 
the early 1980s, the financial sector became crucial in maintaining high 
economic growth for a long period, and it gave policy makers room to 
follow flexible policies when hard times emerged. At the other extreme the 
Argentinean crisis is an especially dramatic example of negative interactions 
between the two. Despite significant improvements in regulation and super­
vision during the 1990s, the banking system was kept afloat after the January 
2002 devaluation only by tight capital controls and the freezing of deposits.
Based on our analysis, and in the context of these new dilemmas, several 
policy lessons can be drawn by developing countries. First, it is clear that 
much remains to be done in the specific areas of regulation and supervision. 
Some countries are more advanced than others, but all can do more in 
terms of developing institutional supervision, improving the transparency 
of regulations and so on. However it is important to bear in mind that the 
tightest regulations are not necessarily found in the best-performing banking 
systems. This may mean that very strict regulations are necessary when the 
banking system is beginning to develop, but it may be possible to relax 
them somewhat in the longer term, if and when banks begin to take greater 
responsibility for their own behaviour.
Second, even countries that have made substantial progress in the regu­
latory and supervisory sphere cannot assume that this is sufficient. The best 
regulatory and supervisory systems assume a relatively stable macroeconomic 
environment. The procyclical nature of the banking sector, with its implica­
tions for stability, is exacerbated in the case of Latin America due to the 
nature and sharpness of its recent business cycles. In a situation of strong
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volatility, whether domestic, international or both, the financial system will 
become increasingly fragile. Hence regulation of the financial sector must 
go hand in hand with adequate fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, 
as well as with measures to prevent external shocks from ravaging local 
economies.
Third, because of the procyclical nature of the banking sector, some 
observers have recommended provisioning rules that take into consideration 
changes of risk throughout the cycle (see for example Ocampo, 2002). Under 
such a system, like that which is currently in place in Spain, risk is estimated 
for categories of credit according to the possible loss that a typical asset 
would experience over the entire cycle. Even though this method aims to 
provide a cushion for changes in risk throughout the cycle, Ocampo argues 
that it can also be used as a countercyclical instrument.
Fourth, there are other problems in the financial sector that have little 
to do with regulation and supervision, and may even involve trade-offs 
with the latter. The main function of the financial sector is to support the 
development of the local economy, which means providing credit in such 
a volume that production and consumption can grow at an appropriate 
rate. If the regulations are too tight, banks may prefer to hold only the safest 
assets, whether government bonds or loans to the largest and lowest-risk 
customers in the private sector. Consideration must be given to these aspects 
of the financial system while balancing them with the obvious need to make 
the system a safer one.
Finally, a supportive international environment must complement a 
sound domestic regulatory and supervisory system in developing countries. 
This includes adequate macroeconomic coordination in industrial countries 
as well as appropriate regulation of their financial systems. It also means 
that any new international regulations must consider the implications for 
developing countries. It must be recognized that the impact on the financial 
sectors of industrial and developing countries is not the same, and both 
must be taken into account.
Notes
1. For discussions of these topics in Asia see Masuyama et al. (1999) and ESCAP (1999,
2000).
2. The most extensive work has been conducted by the Development Research Group 
and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department of the World Bank. This 
is summarized in World Bank (2001); background papers can be found on the 
World Bank website. BIS annual reports and working papers are very useful, espe­
cially with respect to the issue of cycles (for example Borio et al., 2001), as are the 
publications of the FSF. The IMF's annual publication, International Capital Markets, 
contains extensive data and analysis, and the IMF's financial sector assessment 
papers can now be found on its website. On regulation and supervision in Latin 
America see Held and Szalachman (1991), Norton and Aguirre (1998), United 
Nations (1999) and Aguirre (2000).
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3. This became a common approach in the management of financial crises in both 
developed and (more often) developing economies in the 1990s; see Fischer (2001).
4. On financial institutions see Burki and Perry (1998) and World Bank (2002).
5. On these trends see Feeney (1994), Blommestein (1995), Fornari and Levy (1999) 
and BIS (2001).
6. The issue of foreign participation in the banking sector of developing countries 
has been extensively studied in the last few years. See for example IMF (2000), 
Clarke et al. (2001), Litan et al. (2001) and Chapter 4 of this book.
7. See Barth etal. (2001a) for a description of the database, which was constructed 
from a survey of bank regulators and supervisors in 107 countries. In a companion 
paper Barth et al. (2001b) present a preliminary analysis of the data and question 
the relevance of the regulatory and supervisory guidelines stressed in their paper. 
We believe that the conclusions reached by Barth et al. are due to their failure 
to distinguish between developing and developed countries, whose experiences 
have been quite different with respect to the behaviour of the financial sector. We 
intend to test this hypothesis in future research.
8. ECLAC has often advocated that developing countries should maintain ratios 
that are above the international norm, given the extremely high cost of banking 
crises. See for example ECLAC (2000).
9. This result is to be expected, given the differences in the structure of the banking 
system between countries. In particular the US banking sector is characterized by 
a myriad of small local banks, while the Latin American countries have a much 
smaller number.
10. Argentina attempted financial liberalization in the late 1970s, but the related 
measures were reversed as part of the overall abandonment of reforms at that 
time. For an analysis of the earlier attempt see Studart and Hermann (2001: 34-8).
11. In the first months o f the implementation of the Plano Real, Brazil's central bank 
expanded the monetary base very rapidly to accommodate the increased demand 
for money that usually occurs after a successful price stabilization programme. 
This also increased the reserve base of the domestic banks, permitting them to 
expand credit.
12. This mechanism, which was designed to deal with liquidity problems, did not 
work during the recent crisis because of the magnitude o f the challenges facing 
the BCRA. That is, since in a currency board the central bank does not act as 
lender of last resort, the mechanism was a way of mimicking this role in periods 
when specific banks experienced reduced liquidity. However the mechanism was 
not meant to deal with potential solvency problems, as in the case of the recent 
crisis. In a solvency crisis of the magnitude faced by Argentina, if the mechanism  
had been used the international banks would have had to cover a very significant 
part of Argentina's total deposits, thus putting their own assets at unacceptable 
risk. Hence it was not used and the government had to freeze bank deposits in 
order to avoid the overall insolvency of the system.
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